
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EDITORS:
T. F. TORRANCE, M.B.E., D.D., D.THEOL.
J. K. S. REID, B.D.

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PREACHING THE LAW

by Professor RAGNAR BRING

Thesis 1: In Jesus' day the Law was the sum of the religious tradition of Israel. For Christianity the Law—understood in a new light—was the sum of the Christian message. Christ was the 'New Law'.

In the New Testament the word 'Law' is largely equivalent to what we today call the Old Testament. But there are exceptions to this use of the term. The Law sometimes designates the Pentateuch. This is the case in the liturgy of the Synagogue. But for the Jews the term 'Law' also could include their entire religious tradition. It governed the daily life of the people—not only in matters of what we call worship, morality, ethics or religion but also in matters legal, social and political. Additions to the commandments found in the Pentateuch and the commentaries that had been added and still were being added, were not thought to be something foreign to the law. It was thought that they simply applied what the Scriptures said. The phrase 'it has been said to them of old times' is often understood as being merely a formula of disapproval, since in the Gospels Jesus criticised these rules. But their original purpose was to continue the tradition of which the Scriptures were the core. Their contemporary significance was manifest in the constantly renewed discussion of how they were to be interpreted and applied. For this purpose casuistic rules were needed, that took into account all the concrete situations of life. Thus a law-abiding Jew could always know how he had to act.

If we now turn to the New Testament, we shall find there a completely different attitude. This change does not mean that the first Christians broke away from the tradition that centred upon the Scriptures. On the contrary, they criticised both Pharisees and Scribes, both Jews and Judaisers, for not being faithful to the Scriptures of the Old Covenant or to the tradition that was governed by the Spirit in which they had been written. The Old Testament quotations in the Epistles of St. Paul—themselves the oldest written documents in the New Testament—show his conviction that only now, as a Christian, could he

correctly interpret the Old Testament. When on the road to Damascus he had met Christ as the risen Lord and promised Messiah, he saw also the words of the Old Testament in a new light. Now the veil was taken away, that had hidden from the Jews the innermost meaning of the Law and its ultimate purpose. Jesus, whose disciples he had persecuted, showed Himself not to be accursed of God. He should not be done away with, as was the case with deceivers and those who sinned against the Law. He was the Suffering Servant of the Lord, who had borne the sins of the people. And the curse that He bore when He hung on the tree (Gal. 3.13; Deut. 21.23) and was counted among the wicked, was the curse that had been upon Israel, and even upon all mankind.

We might say that St. Paul's experience on the road to Damascus gave him the key to the Scriptures. He had followed the Rabbinical tradition and had learned a great deal from it. But he discovered that at the most decisive point of all it was wrong and therefore did not represent the true tradition. For the Rabbis did not understand God's righteousness (Rom. 10.2). But this did not mean that St. Paul wanted to propagate a new doctrine of his own concerning righteousness. Rather did he think that he had been given the true understanding of the Scriptures, i.e. of the Old Testament. According to him, the Old Testament did not teach that righteousness was of the Law, but of faith.

Or, to put it in more extreme terms, the Law in the Old Testament had not been given in order that by it we might obtain the righteousness which is of the Law, or so that men might create for themselves a righteousness of their own. It was given in order to judge and condemn them, in order to imprison them, as it were, until the promised deliverance and blessing should come.

This implies a completely different understanding of the Law from that which the Rabbis had taught. The Law had been fulfilled only by Christ. Thus the Law and the whole of the Old Testament could be rightly understood only now, in the light of Christ's death and resurrection. But this also meant a new understanding of what the fulfilment of the Law meant.

Fulfilling or accomplishing the Law meant for the Jews what it still means for many people today—following a number of

particular and concrete commandments. But the New Testament connects a series of much more profound ideas with the fulfilment of the Law. It does not describe this fulfilment—which held the promise of life—in terms of human endeavours. Nor does it think that now, after Christ has come and given us a new life, we fulfil the Law by living according to commandments that before had been too difficult to observe.

For St. Paul, accomplishing the Law has to do with the ultimate fulfilment of the Law. The Law itself was not a set of ultimately valid commandments that have to be obeyed. In the last resort the commandments and rules given in the Law serve to bring men face to face with the righteousness of God. *This* was the righteousness in which men *should* live, for which they were created and which the Law really demanded of them, but which they could never attain 'by works' (cf. Rom. 9.32).

This righteousness was fulfilled by Christ, 'who . . . counted it not a prize to be on equality with God but emptied himself . . . and being found in fashion as a man . . . humbled himself, becoming obedient even unto death, yea, the death of the cross' (Phil. 2.6ff). The Law that brought men face to face with God's righteousenss could not but condemn man, who at the bottom of his heart was unrighteous. To be subject to the Law and to acknowledge the Law as the highest authority thus became equivalent to being under a curse, from which there was no escape, as long as men sought to be righteous by doing the works of the Law instead of looking in faith for the promised blessing (Gal. 3.10ff). But now, says St. Paul, Christ had taken the curse of the Law upon Himself and thus opened the way for the promised blessing. Thus the Law has been fulfilled by Christ. By being fulfilled, the Law has now become *one* with Christ. Christ was the final purpose or aim of the Law (*to telos tou nomou*, cf. 2 Cor. 3.13). The children of Israel 'should not look steadfastly unto the end (*to telos*, the final aim) of that which was passing away'. That is why Moses put a veil on his face, that reflected the glory of God. The glory of Christ is the same as the glory of God. But when the Law was given to the children of Israel, they were not granted to see its end or aim (*to telos*) in the glory of Christ. To Israel the Law was given as something that would pass away. Christ was the final aim,

the end of the Law (*telos nomou*, Rom. 10.4). But they held fast the Law without looking beyond it to the fulfilment of what the Law itself promised. Thus they obtained only that righteousness which is of the Law and were unable to receive the fruits of Christ's fulfilment of the Law. That is why the Jews had to be freed from their thraldom under the Law and its righteousness. This happened when through faith they received the promised blessing in Christ. He both fulfilled the Law and accomplished the promise (cf. 2 Cor. 1.20). This fulfilment of the Law, which was the work of Christ, also means that we now have the promise of life (Gal. 3.12).

This means that for the New Testament 'the Law' is not a hard and fast thing, a complete set of rules given once and for all times, that we simply have to obey. It was much more a message about something that was not complete yet; a message that told men that they owed all to their Creator and Lord, and that they were guilty in His sight because their very nature and all their life were not that for which they had been created and to which they belonged. But the Law itself pointed forward to the new life that was to come when it, the Law, should be fulfilled. This did not mean that one day men would be able to do what the Law demanded. The real demand of the Law, its *dikaiōma*, could not ultimately be expressed in terms of particular concrete commandments. What it was that the Law really demanded did not become clear before it was fulfilled and accomplished. Thus it was not possible to distinguish on the one hand the commandments of the Law and on the other the human wills that had to obey these commandments. The due meaning of the commandments was made manifest only when fulfilment came in Christ. Or, to put it differently, the Law really demanded of men a new and different relationship to God, that could not be really described in terms of commandments that the human will can obey. The Law had to be fulfilled before it could be understood and explained.

That is why a true understanding of the Law was not possible except in the light of the Gospel, which is the fulfilment of the Law. But the Gospel does not simply give men the strength to obey a number of rules or commandments that otherwise were too difficult to obey. Rather does the Gospel give a new life which is righteous because it is a life of union with the life of

Christ. In this new life the curse of the Law was no more; death, the wages of sin, had been overcome; and the love that comes from God and Christ was ever renewed. This love fulfils the Law (Gal. 5.14), though its actions cannot be determined in advance. St. Paul thinks that the Christian is fulfilling the Law—in Christ. The Christian lives in Christ and Christ in him (Gal. 2.20). He is crucified with Christ; in Baptism he is buried with Him so as to participate also in His resurrection (Rom. 6.4).

This new life may also be called a life in the *Spirit*. In this context the term 'Spirit' does not mean some kind of inner life. The Spirit is the living Christ. But for him who is in Christ and thus lives in the Spirit, there is no more condemnation; Christ has taken the condemnation upon Himself. And in those who live the life of the Spirit, the demands of the Law are fulfilled. The Law understood in terms of external commandments could not bring forth righteousness. But yet the Law serves the righteousness of God, which is given to those who live in the Spirit, and who day by day grow and progress in the life of the Spirit. Thus the demands of the Law are fulfilled more and more in their lives.

We have said that, according to St. Paul, Christ was the 'end', i.e. the ultimate aim and purpose of the Law. He fulfilled the Scriptures and the Law that they contained. He summed up all the Law in Himself. That is why He can be called the *New Law*, a term that the Apostolic Fathers frequently use.

As we have seen this formula did not mean that Christ was a new law-giver or that Christ was thought to have given men a new collection of laws and commandments to replace those of the Old Testament. When in the Sermon on the Mount Christ says: 'but I say unto you', He does not mean to replace but to fulfil the tradition of the Old Testament. He speaks there as *Kyrios*, with the same authority as that of the Lord who had given the Law of the Old Covenant; He speaks in His name and He alone is able to reveal to men the ultimate purpose of the Old Testament laws and to fulfil them, i.e. to give them their deepest meaning, beyond that which was passing away (2 Cor. 3.13). The reason why certain elements had to pass away was to reveal Christ and His glory. The children of Israel were not allowed to see it. Moses put a veil on his face so that

they might not behold the glory of God that was reflected there after he had spoken with God. That which was passing away was no longer valid because Christ had come. When He said 'but I say unto you', He revealed the ultimate aim, *to telos*, of the Law. Thus he also brought to an end the condemnation of the Law and in that sense became the end of the Law.

The new Law was thus not a set of stricter rules than those of the Old Covenant, but rather Christ Himself and His work. Later generations did indeed interpret the expression 'the new Law' to mean that the Christians had been given new rules and commandments. But in so doing they showed that they were no longer faithful to the New Testament way of looking at this matter. It was quite natural, of course, that the organisation of the Church should need practical rules for daily life, showing what was allowed and what was forbidden. But if such rules are understood as expressing the New Testament doctrine of the Law, they become dangerous. For then they hide the true meaning of what Law really is.

We should not forget that for the Jews 'the Law', *torah*, represented their religious tradition in its entirety and that it determined every aspect of their life. The Christian Gospel fulfils that Law, but in so doing gives it a new, deeper meaning. The first Christians did not think that this meant that they had added a new and arbitrary interpretation from the outside. On the contrary they were convinced that it had been granted to them to discover the real intention and purpose of the Law, which until then had not been understood. This meant that the Law grew from its old form into a new form.

If we think of law as a set of rules and if we demand that it shall determine all aspects of our life, then we are inevitably bound to interpret it by means of a casuistic system. That is what happened to the Rabbis. On the other hand, let us suppose that the Law serves to submit all human existence to the will of God, so that human beings become dependent on God, may be used by Him, and become an expression of His will and doings, but that we must nevertheless avoid developing a casuistic system. In that case we shall be necessarily driven to understand the Law as something that governs our innermost life. In a casuistic system, the Law will always be something that is above man. It will be a system of rules that we have to obey.

This means that we shall be dealing with *two* factors. On one side, we shall have the rules of the Law with their system of positive and negative commandments and regulations. On the other side, there will be man, who is not directly and inwardly affected by these rules, but is faced with the task of harmonising his life with them, getting accustomed to them, obeying them. This means that we shall have to presuppose that the human will is *free*, so that man has at least *some* possibility of keeping these rules. This will be true even if we add that the free will alone is insufficient and needs help or that man is imperfect and therefore needs to be forgiven all imperfection in his obedience. This was how the Pharisees thought. 1500 years later Erasmus of Rotterdam thought so too. If we start out from the usual way of understanding the Law, we shall automatically be led to adopt that position. Erasmus also thought it natural.

But if we turn to the New Testament, we shall see that it does not share those presuppositions on the basis of which we are led to formulate the theory of the free will. It does not share the idea that the Law is a system of rules that men have to face. Christ *was* the new Law. *To believe* means being in Christ, so that we live in Him or He in us. It is not a case of our having to face a Law that commands us to adopt a certain type of behaviour or a certain state of mind. Instead we have the Law written in our hearts. This means that it is not a rule outside of us which we have to obey. It is not even correct to say that we fulfil the Law by means of a new power given us by the Spirit. For the Law no longer exists for us as a set of rules of this kind. It is not *we* who have to *do* what the law demands: that which the Law ordains *is* fulfilled *in* us (Rom. 8.4). We live in the will of God and the will of God lives in us. Christ lives in us and He *is* the new Law.

The New Testament thinks that Christ represents the New Covenant—the covenant of the last days that Jeremiah had prophesied. The Epistle to the Hebrews points to this in ch. 8. And in Jer. 31.33f, it is said of the house of Israel that God will put His covenant in their inward parts and write it in their heart, and that they shall no more teach one another because all shall know the Lord. This is exactly the New Testament view of the Law.

It has often been said that the New Testament teaches a kind

of *mysticism*. If this means that the New Testament reflects Greek thinking, it would not seem to be true. As we have just seen, it is much more such prophecies as Jeremiah's that are the background of the New Testament and have influenced its view of the Law.

According to St. Paul, we learn to know God through the Gospel and we are also known of Him—an even stronger expression (cf. Gal. 4.9). St. Paul sees in this a fulfilment of the Old Testament. As Jer. 24.7 says: 'I will give them an heart to know me, that I am the Lord: and they shall be my people and I will be their God' (cf. Zech. 8.8). The unity between Christ and us, by which Christ dwells in us, underlies also the New Testament view of the Law: it is given in Christ and is fulfilled by Christ living in us.

As we said just now, this is sometimes called Christ-mysticism. However, there is a great deal that distinguishes it from what is otherwise called mysticism and which is of Hellenistic origin. It is not individualistic, i.e. it is not merely a matter between Christ and the individual. What we have said about the unity between Christ and us also applies to the *Church*. For the Church exists only as an instrument for Christ's action. The human organisation or organisations that we usually call 'church' have to be instruments for Christ's action. He must speak in and through preaching; He must come to the individual through the Sacrament of the Altar; He must receive new members into the Church through Baptism—else they are not the Church. If these organisations do not *function* as instruments of Christ's action, they are not the Church. If a community belongs to Christ's body, then it must be an instrument or organ of the living Christ, through which He acts, speaks and gives.

The Church may be compared to a living organism, in which the most important aspect is its functioning. In this organism Christ is the Head, but not so as to be really distinguishable from the body. Christ is the principle of life, as it were the soul of the Church. In this sense we can say that *the Church is Christ*. Where the Church really *is* the Church, there it is an organism in which Christ lives and acts. If we say that the Church is Christ, we mean that there are not merely doctrines or forces *in* the Church, which lead the individual believer to Christ. There is more to it than this: the Christian has by Baptism to be re-

ceived into the Church so that he may be filled with its life, so that he may die and rise with Christ.

We have already mentioned the fact that Christ is sometimes said to *be* righteousness, to *be* love, to *be* the new Law. These expressions point to the fact that in the Church there are not merely systems of doctrine, dogmas, rules and laws that men hold to be true or normative. The relation between Christ and the faithful is much more intimate than that. The New Testament does not think in terms of commandments and rules to which men are subject, nor in terms of an organisation called the Church in which certain commandments and doctrines are accepted. Instead it thinks in what we might call terms of identity. The Church *is* Christ, Christ *is* the Word, Christ Himself speaks, preaches, forgives and renews us in the Church, and He Himself lives in the faithful.

It might be interesting to compare here those expressions that generally have been thought to have an ontological meaning, but which mean different things in different contexts. Thus *logos* in the Fourth Gospel does not mean the same as in Greek philosophy.

Without going further into the matter, we need only point out here that for primitive Christian theology Christ Himself *is* the Word. He has not only spoken the words of the Bible or been the reason for which they were spoken or written. He Himself *is* present in them. He Himself *is* the New *Law*, not only the giver of a new Law. He Himself *is* righteousness, not only One who did righteous deeds. He *is* divine love, not merely the One who acted out of divine love.

But are not expressions such as these, which we find in the New Testament, merely *Hebraisms*? Though the linguistic usage of the New Testament is largely determined by Hebrew usage, the *ideas* that it expresses go further than Hebrew thinking does. But this does not mean that Hellenistic elements have influenced these ideas to the extent of being sufficient to explain them. These ideas are typical of the New Testament and thus essentially different from those of Greek ontology.

The basic ideas of the New Testament are a direct development of those of the Old Testament. In Christ the promise is fulfilled and the Law is accomplished in such a way that Christ in His own person and work brought the whole tradition that

centred upon the Scriptures to its conclusion. And when we speak of His person and work these may appear to be two separate things, but according to the New Testament they are one. The religious tradition of Israel was itself not conceived as a mere theory. It was not words *about* the deeds of God, but a living Word *by* which He spoke and acted and was present there and then. The result is that Christ is the subject of all that is done under the New Covenant. He is the subject, not only the object, of our preaching, of our good works, of the new faith in God that is to be found only in the believer's union with Christ (cf. e.g. Gal. 2.19f; Rom. 6.3ff, 7.4ff, 14.7f; Phil. 1.21). Similarly Christ's becoming flesh, His Incarnation, is not a separate event, distinct from His work of salvation. Otherwise the meaning of the Incarnation would be merely that divine and human substance became united. This is the way in which theologians look at the Incarnation who are influenced by Greek ontology, where substance and similar concepts play an important role. But this is not the case in the New Testament.

But if on the other hand we understand correctly what 'New Testament mysticism' and 'New Testament ontology' is, then their relation to the preaching of the Law will help us to see what distinguishes them from *Greek* ontology and mysticism. At the same time we shall also see more clearly what distinguishes the New Testament preaching of law and ethics from the way in which the Greek world thought of these matters.

Greek thought distinguishes between ontology and mysticism on the one hand and ethics or the teaching of law on the other. In a dogmatic system that is governed by Greek thinking you will therefore always find separate *Dogmatics* consisting of ontological and metaphysical propositions (e.g. on the nature of God, the two natures in Christ, on man and the freedom of the will) and *Ethics* which deals with human actions. To this latter subject belongs the law, the moral rules which show how we are to act.

But this distinction between dogmatics and ethics is foreign to the New Testament. For there the Law, the expression of that which is good, is not, as we saw, given as a system of commandments and prohibitions. It is so to speak incarnate in Christ. In full union with Christ that which is righteous and good is

realised. And what the Law demands is nothing but that which is righteous and good. Through Christ a righteousness 'without the Law' (Rom. 3.21) has been revealed.

This righteousness is granted to us in the life led in the Spirit. But Christ is Spirit, and, where the Spirit of Christ is at work, there is freedom from the Law—a freedom in which, however, that which the law ordains is also in fact accomplished.

Thus in and with Christ we have the New Law which is the fulfilment of the Law. Thus also if we want to preach the ultimate meaning of the Law, we have to preach Christ. What according to Greek thinking is mysticism, i.e. our life in Christ or His life in us, turns out to be the way in which the Law is fulfilled. This is something which for the Greeks belonged to the sphere of law and ethics.

The identity of God and Christ means that the Lord who spoke in the Old Testament speaks and acts again. This in turn means that the Law can now appear as Spirit in the life of the believers. The Christian dogmas, which in Greek terms say that Christ's nature was divine, do not provide us with a particular ontology, but rest upon a fact of revelation, which is best understood in terms of the fulfilment of the Law in and through Christ. For Greek ontology it always was and remains difficult to account for the fact that in Christ divine substance had become united with human substance. But for New Testament thinking this is quite natural and even the only possible thing. God's mighty deeds of salvation were that God let Christ become man. The highest thing divine, the love of God, is not content to dwell wrapped in its own glory and holiness. Instead it empties itself and gives itself and appears in the work of Christ. And this work is not merely that He entered into ordinary mortal, human existence with all its difficulties. Over and above this, He took upon Himself its deepest misery and suffering, sin (2 Cor. 5.20), the curse of the Law (Gal. 3.13). And this He did for the sake of others, so that they might receive blessing and eternal life instead of curse and death.

Thus human and divine are one in the salvation wrought by God. From this men derive their new life, not merely as an inspiration to do good works which they are commanded to do or which they have invented, but as a way in which God and Christ act in and through men. In the life of the Spirit

the law is fulfilled (Rom. 8.4). Thus dogmatics and ethics are *one*. That which in terms of Greek thought is ontology and mysticism is here quite naturally the principle of new life.

Thesis 2: Even though the Law stands in contrast to the Gospel, the ultimate meaning of the Law is manifested only in and through the Gospel.

The starting point of our argument was the question of how we were to preach the Law. Up till now we have found that preaching the Law cannot mean that we preach a system of ethics containing universally valid commandments for humanity in general and for Christians in particular. Instead we found that to preach the Law was to preach the Church's message about Christ. He is the 'new Law' in whose life men may participate and with which they can be united through the ministry of the Church.

But in traditional theological usage the term *Law* is rarely used in that way. It is rather one particular aspect of the Christian message that we usually call 'Law'. In scholastic theology the term covered the natural and the revealed Law. Lutheran theology in its turn distinguishes Law and Gospel as being two Words of God, neither of which can logically be derived from the other. Thus the traditional use of the term 'Law' covers only one aspect of the Christian message.

However, we should always keep in mind the total context of this term. As we now turn to examine the various meanings of 'Law', it will be best to begin with the New Testament itself. There too, the term 'Law' has several meanings. Basically it designates the Law of Moses that is fulfilled in Christ, and which the Jews misinterpreted, making it the basis of a righteousness which is of the Law, or, in modern parlance, of legalism, i.e. of law as a way of salvation. If the Law of Moses was considered as a way of salvation, then it became a means by which men were to obtain a righteousness of their own. Thus it became an idol, a symbol and instrument of the false righteousness of the Law.

However, the Law of Moses as such was holy and good. It had a definite purpose in God's plan of salvation, in His mighty deeds, the apex and end of which was Christ. In this

work of salvation the particular purpose of the Law was to manifest sin and to condemn and kill. That is why its function could be called the 'ministry of death' (2 Cor. 3.7). For the Law could not give *life* (Gal. 3.21). Yet life was necessary if the good, of which the Law spoke and which it ordained, was to be realised. In this context 'Life' and 'Spirit' are interchangeable terms. The Spirit is the Spirit of God, the Spirit of Christ or the living Christ Himself. God had promised life and Spirit. They were to be given to men in the day of salvation, when the Messiah should come and do his work.

That is why the Law could not but kill, unless there was the promise that pointed to its fulfilment by the Messiah. The Law made manifest an important truth, viz. that, by reason of sin, man was subject to death. It gave men commandments, brought them into an enforced obedience, imprisoned and enslaved them—but all this in the hope of the coming liberation, when the curse of the Law was to be taken away and in its stead should come the promised blessing, life and righteousness. That liberation was to carry with it the fulfilment of all the commandments and thus grant men righteousness. For righteousness could not be attained by keeping commandments, nor by doing works, whether outward or 'spiritual'. Outward works could not do it—they were false works, since they were not done in full inward conformity with the will of God. Instead their aim was to provide men with a righteousness of their own. Thus they led away from God's righteousness into idolatry.

In other words, the Law made demands upon sinful men, it threatened them and it promised them life. But none of this could free them from slavery or show them the way to true righteousness. On the contrary, it imprisoned them more and more firmly in sin. The cause of this was *sin* itself, not the Law as such (Rom. 7.13) which was holy and good.

According to St. Paul, God had appointed the Law of Moses to show that from Adam until now all humanity and all aspects of human life were in debt to God. It showed that man belonged to the evil 'aeon' from which nothing but God's own fulfilment could save him.

This function is so to speak the constant and specific purpose of the Law, if Law is not taken to mean the New Law, i.e. the entire Christian message, but only its negative side.

The work of Christ is connected also with this aspect of the Law. He fulfilled the Law on the Cross. He took its curse upon Himself. The curse itself was righteous, it expressed the truth of God. Mankind really *was* sinful and could no more free itself from sin than from death. Christ freed mankind from the guilt of sin and from its power to kill. Nevertheless, physical death remained and men had to undergo it. Similarly sin remained as long as men continued to live on earth. And that is why the Law remains. It goes on revealing that men are altogether sinful and that they cannot by their own efforts obtain everlasting life or make themselves in any way righteous.

This also is the purpose of the Law when we preach it today. We must preach the Law, for only thus does our condition become really apparent. The Law is a *revelation*, i.e. it is not obviously and evidently true. Quite on the contrary, it runs counter to common sense. It seems quite natural to us that we are imperfect and weak. But it is only the work of Christ that can reveal to us that we are separated from God, that we have therefore been cut off from our true destiny, and that our attempts to make ourselves good by observing commandments and by being pious ultimately serve only to reveal our egoism; for we thereby make morality and religion serve our own selfish ends (of obtaining a righteousness of our own, Rom. 10.2f). And since this is revealed to us, we must also preach it. It seems cruel and irrational that we really have *deserved* wrath and condemnation. But that is also why we have to preach the Law: in order to show men the truth and to make sin manifest and bring it out into the open. This can be done in many ways. It is not enough to describe merely the general situation of all men. The fact that we are 'carnal, sold under sin' (Rom. 7.14) is not merely an extremely pessimistic view *about* men. It is a fateful reality which we, at least in part, can see for ourselves and have to acknowledge, if we are told the truth and have our attention drawn to it.

The fact that we are sold under sin is not merely a theory, a dogma, a pessimistic view of mankind that might well be exaggerated and stand in need of revision. It is a reality that manifests itself in many ways. That we are enslaved is evident e.g. in world politics, where apparently fateful events and influences crush and cancel many good and well-meant endeavours.

But the same fact is patent also in the life of every individual. The same is true also of the divisions within Christendom, of the enmity and jealousy among the various churches and sects. Here again it is true that the division of Christendom cannot ultimately be overcome by human endeavour, be it ever so well meant. For our divisions are not only due to serious objective reasons, but also to our enslavement to ourselves, which is a result of the fact that we belong to a world of sin. There are many ways in which people can be convinced that they are not, collectively and individually, as innocent as they would like to imagine.

Nevertheless, if our preaching merely goes to show up the moral shortcomings of individuals and the fatal foolishness and evil in national and international affairs, we shall never be able to get to the roots of the evil. Sometimes revivalist preachers have tried this way. They have spoken of the various sins and the evil of which men can be guilty and have described their consequences in time and for eternity. This has frightened many and often created in large groups an atmosphere of fear of the punishment meted out in hell, etc. Yet even the most terrible preaching about sin and hell can never quite show what evil really is. But it can easily do a great deal of both religious and psychological damage because of the egocentric fears it creates.

On the other hand, that which really shows what sin is and how serious it is, is quite simply *the Gospel*. By this we mean the preaching of the *entire* Christian message, which is the fulfilment of the Law (instead of the Law merely in its restricted sense of condemnation and the manifestation of sin.) Only the Gospel can show us what the Law really is and what sin is. It shows us how immensely deep is the sin that forced Christ to go through suffering and death and even to take upon Himself the curse and the condemnation that was laid upon the unrighteousness that the Law forbade. We might express it by saying that Christ took upon Himself everything that the word 'Hell' means—the terrible separation of the condemned from the God of life—but that He bore it so as to break the power of death to condemn and to curse us.

At the same time, this meant that the immortal life of God was made manifest in the Resurrection. Only the Righteous

One was able to fulfil the Law and to bear its curse. Only He who originated from the life of God and wholly belonged to it could overcome death. Only He who was wholly pure could overcome sin. Only He who Himself was without guilt could 'abolish the law of commandments' (Eph. 2.15) and blot out 'the bond written in ordinances that was against us, which was contrary to us . . . , nailing it to the cross' (Col. 2.14).

Thus Christ, who took upon Himself all the curse and condemnation of the Law, shows us how great and serious are the claims that the Law makes upon or rather against us. We cannot realise the seriousness of our condemnation at the hands of the Law, except through the Gospel. Only when life and righteousness have been revealed to us do we understand what death and sin are.

The same is also true of human corruption and of original sin. Only the Gospel makes it clear that human sin is *total* and that man is wholly subject to condemnation. If these statements are taken as descriptions of empirical fact, they will appear to be terribly exaggerated and wrong. They become understandable only in the light of that righteousness, *for* which man has been created and destined, and in the light of the life that excludes every form of death. Only if we compare Adam and his fate with Christ, the second Adam, and the new aeon that began with Him, are we able to understand what is the original sin to which all mankind is subject (cf. Rom. 5.12-19).

The doctrine of original sin has often been misunderstood in the course of history, because it has not been seen, as in the Scriptures, against the background of the righteousness revealed in Christ. Sin, which is the sign of the 'present aeon', for which Christ gave Himself (Gal. 1.4), is the contrary of this righteousness. We may say that the reason why the doctrine of original sin has been misunderstood is that the Law, which manifests sin, has in its turn not been understood in the light of the Gospel. Instead it has been understood in terms of evident rules which all men can understand. In other words, it has been forgotten that the Law is revealed.

Whenever the doctrine of original sin has been understood to be a statement about the empirical, psychological nature of man, it has always been watered down. Original sin has been equated with the weakness of human nature or with our being

easily tempted. The later generation of Schoolmen called it *fomes peccati*, tinder which it is easy to set alight. In a way, those phases of Christian theology that watered down the doctrine of original sin closely resemble Pharisaism. The Pharisees taught that in every man there is a propensity for good and also evil. The Law strengthened the former and thus helped the free will in its attempts to do what is good. Ever since Erasmus, certain humanist tendencies have at this point come very close to Pharisaic ethics.

We may conclude that it is not possible to speak rightly of the Law, original sin, man's thraldom under death and condemnation, unless we do so against the background of the Gospel, which tells us of God's righteousness and life, of Christ and His work.

But does this not contradict what we said earlier about the Law? For we said that by preaching the Law we convince individual men of sin and guilt. But there is no real contradiction here. It is true that the ultimate meaning of the Law cannot be understood except against the background of the Gospel message. As we said, much of the Law can be immediately evident for us, e.g. that individual men and nations have abandoned truth, law, righteousness, honesty and mercy or that unnatural conditions dominate the life of nations, of groups or of individuals. For we must remember that the message of the Law and of the Gospel is not something completely foreign to human nature. Or, to put it differently, men are created in view of everlasting life and righteousness. A life that is dominated by sin and death is not ultimately *natural* for man. Immorality is unnatural. But we shall never be able to make this entirely clear for our hearers, if we only analyse the conditions of our own 'aeon'. No doubt much immorality and unbelief can be so unnatural, so dangerous to the existence of human society, that it becomes obvious. But it is not easy to determine exactly what is right and wrong. For an outward standard of judgment, of the kind that can be determined in ethical terms, must always represent an ideal which we *can attain*, a law which we *can fulfil*. That is why the seriousness of sin, the corruption of our nature and the fact that we have become estranged from the purpose for which we have been created, can be seen only in the light of the Gospel, which tells us to what end we were

created. For the Gospel on the one hand is completely contrary to the nature of man as it has become corrupted by the fall; but on the other hand it fulfils and realises that nature as it was given us at creation.

But this can never be set before us in terms of commandments or ethical rules for this life which men can follow. This is the mistake made in their day by the Anabaptists, when they took that which belongs to the promised aeon, the Kingdom of God, and applied it directly to our life here on earth by turning it into a number of rules which we can follow. This does not mean that we think there should be no relation at all between the righteousness of men and that righteousness of God that will rule the Kingdom of Heaven, in the new aeon, when it becomes visible at the return of Christ. But the relation should not be such that the righteousness of the Kingdom of God, as it is described e.g. in the Sermon on the Mount, is directly transposed into a set of outward rules for our life here and now.

Thesis 3: The Church has to prescribe laws for this life and to make clear that obedience to the laws of the State and correctness in social life can be God's commandments.

When we set out to preach the Law, it is very important to remember the difference between what is valid for *this* life on earth, and what is valid for the *future* life, the Kingdom of God or the Kingdom of Heaven.

If we forget this difference, one of two things is bound to happen. Either the Christian message will be deprived of all that is radical and new, and degraded to ordinary morality. Or we shall do what the Anabaptists did, and fanatically but unrealistically try to impose laws to make people live here and now a life that is good and right for the world to come, but which is falsified if we so simply apply it here, since the laws by which we try to apply it can never be more than a false imitation of the Kingdom of God. This is what happens when the Sermon on the Mount is made to support the principles of radical pacifism. That was also the way in which e.g. Tolstoy arrived at his ideal of an anarchical society without courts of law, police or armed forces.

Thus on the one hand the Gospel cannot be translated into

a set of practical rules and duties. On the other hand, as we saw, it is not impossible to understand it rightly and well. Hence the Law in its ultimate and most profound meaning—i.e. that side of the Gospel that reveals to us our slavery under sin and death—can be preached and can be accepted by men, although no one can become free or obtain righteousness by obeying commandments.

But our preaching will be falsified if we say that this is something that we have to do by a free decision of our will, as revivalist preachers often do, or if we water down our preaching of the guilt that is ours by reason of our sin.

We may perhaps illustrate the difficulty of finding the true narrow way, by an historical example. The theology of the Enlightenment, which in England counted among its representatives such men as Bishop Butler of Durham and Tindal, who wrote *Christianity as Old as Creation*, declared all theology to be natural theology. At the other end of the scale, Karl Barth has declared that *all* natural theology is wrong. But both these extremes presuppose the same false opposition between natural and revealed theology. Barth has taken over the distinction between natural and revealed theology from scholasticism, and has simply accepted one part, while rejecting the other.

But we have tried to show that revealed theology—by which we mean the Law and the Gospel, which the Scriptures proclaim—is natural theology in a certain sense, though not as the theologians of the Enlightenment wanted it. It is not natural if the term 'natural' means that empirical human nature and human reason, or a reasonable and practically possible human morality, are somehow in harmony with revealed theology. The theologians of the Enlightenment, who wanted to make all theology natural in this rationalistic sense, were quite logically led to reject the doctrines of original sin and of reconciliation. These doctrines are characterised by the fact that they relate this life, 'this present evil age' (Gal. 1.4), to the life to come, and make the aim of our existence here dependent upon that which will be given us fully in the coming new aeon.

It follows that we shall have to preach the Law on two distinct levels and that we shall have to keep constantly in mind the two different contexts to which these belong.

First and foremost we must preach that aspect of the Law which is intimately connected with the Gospel, or even an integral part of the Gospel. In that aspect the Law tells us that we are in our nature, as we are after the fall, condemned and rejected, and that we are judged without appeal. Salvation does not lie in anything that we can do but only in those deeds of God by which He promised to save us and give us life. This promise has been fulfilled in Christ. Christ reveals to us our own reality, i.e. that our nature is now a *natura perversa* and does not correspond to the nature and the aim which we were given at creation. Since Christ has borne the curse of the Law and since His resurrection has manifested life divine in this aeon, life and righteousness can be ours if we submit to God's salvation and trust in the promise of the God who does not fail us. But the Law as such does nothing but condemn us. If we water down this truth, we shall automatically weaken our preaching of the life and the righteousness that are given us by God in Christ. That is why belief in righteousness is inseparable from belief in original sin and original guilt.

But there is also another level on which we must preach the Law. We must also preach it as a concrete Law, with which men can comply. That Law expresses the will of God for the present but it is at the same time connected with a definite period of time. The commandments of God are not abstract rules, independent of time. They are given in time and can therefore also take on completely new forms. They can change. For the limited demands, with which men can comply, do not express the whole will and righteousness of God.

The foremost examples of this are the commandments contained in the Old Testament. Ever since the days of the ancient Church, theologians have asked themselves how they are to be understood and applied. It did not appear possible to impose all of them on all Christians. Some of them had even been abolished outright by the Apostles, e.g. the commandment concerning circumcision, or the other commandments mentioned in Acts 15 in the Apostolic Decree.

There is *one* element in the Law of the Old Testament that is permanent, and *another* that is temporary and changeable so that one rule may replace another. So much the theologians of all the ages have understood. What has always proved diffi-

cult was to define and to distinguish these two elements. Often the distinction was drawn between the *moral law* which was permanently valid and the *ceremonial law* which the Gospel was thought to have abolished. However, a distinction of this kind does not stand up to scrutiny. For one thing moral and ceremonial aspects of the Law were so closely interwoven in Israel that they cannot be distinguished. The worship of Israel was both the basis of its ethics and expressed its ethics. Furthermore, there is no such thing as an eternally valid moral law. Exactly like worship, the moral law is *in one way* time-bound.

We may ask whether all law is *entirely* time-bound so that it has meaning only as an expression for the culture and the social ideals of a certain period. This is how certain contemporary schools of philosophy and psychology have presented the matter.

Nevertheless there is an element in the law which is connected with revelation and which indicates to what end man was created. We have mentioned this aspect several times. The fact that in creation man was destined for life and righteousness can be negatively expressed in terms of human thraldom under sin and death—something that ultimately cannot be overcome by observing commandments. This law then tells the most profound truth about man and his condition, but this same law cannot be fulfilled by men. We cannot comply with it at all. It is not something that our free will can decide. If the demands of this law are to be fulfilled in us, then we must be renewed and live in communion with Christ who really was the image of God. But this implies a new creation, as real and as radical as the creation about which we read in Genesis 1 to 3 (cf. Rom. 8.4).

This law expresses the new life which belongs to God's righteousness, the life that is the condition of righteousness in the most profound meaning of the term.

But there is also an element in the Law of Moses that is not permanent. In 2 Cor. 3.11, we see how the permanent and the passing elements of revelation are contrasted. What remains is the ultimate goal of the law, its *telos*, which is Christ. But even what was passing away had a certain glory. Yet its glory is outshone by the glory of that which remains, of the ultimate purpose to which God's revelation tends. When Christ came,

He took away the veil that covered the ultimate end, that which remains (*to menon*). This enables His faithful to see the glory of God; they are now able to see the ultimate aim and purpose of the Law. They can 'behold as in a mirror the glory of the Lord'.

In the Law of Moses 'that which remains' and 'that which passes away' (*to katargoumenon*) were combined in a particular way. All the commandments which Moses had given had something in them that remained. All of them tell us that we belong to God, that we are bound to honour and love Him. In other words they tell us of all that no man had ever really fulfilled except Christ. But together with this there is that which passes away. This is most obvious in the Ten Commandments, but it is true in fact of the entire Law. In the First Commandment we can see how these two elements are as it were interwoven. The rule that there is but one God and there must be no idolatry is relevant to Israel, which was constantly tempted to adopt the idolatry of the surrounding nations. Yet we can hardly imagine a commandment that has a more permanent value or is more widely applicable. It commands something that ultimately only Christ was able to fulfil, for only in Christ's total obedience to the Law of God and to its fundamental meaning was true honour and worship rendered to God. Christ alone was able to accomplish all the Law. In Him alone we can truly honour God; faith in Him is the genuine and ultimate way of obeying this commandment.

Thus it is with all the commandments and all the laws. We have mentioned before that we must constantly keep in mind the distinction between commandments with which we can comply and the commandment which so to speak lies at the basis of all these commandments. This basic commandment is total in its scope: it demands total obedience and union with God. That is why no movement or decision of our free will can help us to comply with it, as would be the case for outward commandments which have a limited scope.

We must preach both these forms of law. In every age we have *both* to convince our contemporaries that they are altogether guilty and unable to obtain righteousness by their works, *and to give them concrete commandments and prohibitions that are relevant to their present situation.*

People think very often that we cannot put forward particular

rules of this kind as divine commandments unless they are eternal and unchangeable. But this is not the case. A moral law can very well be limited to a particular period and yet in that period and that particular situation express the will of God. This is true of the Law of Moses in the Old Testament. Its concrete commandments were meant to be commandments of God, however much their relevance was limited to a particular situation. Circumcision and Sabbath-keeping are cases in point. St. Paul warns his readers against the rite of circumcision, because in a new situation this former means of salvation has become such as to obscure the Gospel. As for the Sabbath, it was replaced by the Christain observance of Sunday. God commands us now to sanctify the day of rest, as He commanded Israel to keep the Sabbath.

Of course all this implies a very great responsibility for the Church, since it must clearly see and proclaim what is the will of God at a given time and in a given situation.

We shall not be able to escape that responsibility. When we preach the Law, the most difficult part of it will always be to show men what the will of God really is in various concrete situations, and what it is that God asks of us. In doing this it will be important to make it clear for our hearers what a commandment really is. In other words, we must not pretend to give them unchangeable laws which we derive from the Bible; we must show them what is good, righteous, equitable, and charitable *in a given situation.* We must help those that need help, not because the Bible says so, but because the God of love lives and will have it so. It is obvious that the Bible also preaches love. We must *do* what love demands of us; we must—to speak with Luther—'do those tasks that are put before us', without thinking all the time whether or not we are obeying certain commandments. To preach the Law means to show people this and at the same time to denounce all unrighteousness and lovelessness that we find.

Thus, in practice, much preaching of the Law will differ from one age to another and from one country to another. We may therefore ask whether this will not disrupt the unity of our preaching of the Law. This need not, however, be the case. One and the same Spirit can produce different commandments. And in the background we shall always find the most funda-

mental aspect of the Law, that which shows that we are all sinners, condemned to death and subjected to death. We shall best show this in our preaching of *life*. As we said, we cannot simply start by preaching the Law to frighten our hearers with and then preach the Gospel to comfort and console them. For if we preach the Gospel, announcing that life and righteousness are given to men in Christ, one aspect of what we say will by itself reveal the dominance of sin and death. Life itself reveals death, its horror and its power over us. Righteousness itself reveals the depth of sin.

When we preach that aspect of the Law which provides us with concrete rules for a given situation (or—as is the case e.g. for monogamy—for a given cultural tradition), we do not preach commandments which make those who observe them righteous. Yet if we disobey these rules, this will nevertheless always have certain consequences for us either in this life or in the life to come. In other words, we must not dissolve our preaching of the Law into a mere series of rules that are valid only *ad hoc*. There is a connexion between the two aspects of the Law that we have defined earlier: the one which gives rules for our present existence, and the other which goes hand in hand with the Gospel, and which shows the total condemnation of man, and his servitude to sin (Rom. 7.14). The Council of Chalcedon defined the two natures of Christ to be united *asynchytōs*, *atreptōs*, *adiairetōs*, *achōristōs*. We might very well apply this formula also to these two aspects of the Law which we have described.

We have been led to emphasise firstly that the concrete commandments of the Law must not be mistaken for abstract, unchangeable laws; and secondly that we must not preach the new righteousness as if it were a matter of complying with rules and regulations, as we do in secular matters. Keeping this in mind will help us to safeguard the distinction between preaching the Law in concrete situations and preaching the Gospel, as well as the view of man as a sinner which forms the background of this preaching.

However, many things go to show that even when we preach the Law in the concrete and limited sense of the term, we are not far away from the Gospel and that other aspect of the Law which the Gospel contains. Let us take an example. In the

secularised state there is a tendency to consider positive law as absolute. This is true whether we think of the modern National Socialist or Bolshevik totalitarian state, where secularism is official and the laws are proclaimed from above, or of countries like England and Sweden where secularism is only the programme of certain intellectual circles and laws are based on public opinion. In both cases, if these positive laws are considered as absolute, it is very difficult to find a basis on which to oppose those forces that make the laws. But if we turn to the Christian preaching of the time-bound Law, things look completely different. *For these concrete commandments do on the one hand express the will of God for us now, but on the other hand they must never be mistaken for means by which we become righteous.* In other words we must always explain to our hearers that such commandments are in a certain way relative. It is important that we obey the laws of our country, that we contribute to its defence, that we loyally accept the decisions of the majority. Nevertheless there must always be a reservation that what we preach is not as such the whole, absolute, law. If someone has good grounds for maintaining that something else is right, it may be contrary to the norms that have been accepted so far. But since the latter is not a direct expression of the Gospel and the Law connected with it, we must not pretend that what we preach is an absolutely certain interpretation of God's will for every single person. We must admit that God can also use certain individuals in order to show that certain norms are right and good, though they do not appear to be so at first. This is the way in which social reforms have sometimes come about: through individual people who felt very strongly that certain things were right.

Every one of us finds concrete tasks to do and concrete ways of obeying God in his own particular situation; e.g. loyalty to the laws and demands of our own country, to our own family, our work and our surroundings. Thus honesty and helpfulness become absolutely binding commandments for us, though their practical application must differ from one place and time to another. God is at work in the situation in which we find ourselves and gives us His commandments in and through it. In what Luther called the 'secular realm' we are subject to laws that are made by men; but by obeying them we may obey God.

Nevertheless it is the Church's task to make concrete rules and to explain what is the duty of a Christian. It is God's will that the state should serve to uphold *order*, but not all that the state may do or command is necessarily the will of God. If we have a family, we are bound to love it, but not to the extent of falling into a collective family-egoism. The love of which e.g. the Sermon on the Mount speaks, may be concretely realised in various ways. It is the Church's task to help every man to find out what is right for him, both in the cure of souls and by preaching.

Since the practical law that we preach is relative, there will always be a difference between the official laws and real ultimate justice. Official justice can be explained and defended, but it cannot be identified with the righteousness of God. Therefore, when we preach what is right in a certain situation, this will always be an interpretation of God's will. But every interpretation may be insufficient, one-sided or false. Thus we can see that the concrete commandments are always relative.

In order to explain both the relation and the difference between the two aspects of the Law—the concrete, practical law and the one that preaches the righteousness of God—we may point to the equality and the inequality between men which the Law creates.

That aspect of the Law with which we can comply always leads to inequalities among men. Some observe the commandments better or more fully, others less so or not at all. The law of the Israelites created an inequality of this sort, since those that possessed and observed the Law were circumcised, while the others who stood outside the Law were not. Even within the community of circumcised Jews there were those who gave all their time and energy to the observance of the Law in all the details of daily life and those who did not observe the Law thus. Differences between the pious and the indifferent, the moral and the immoral, result inevitably from preaching the concrete and practical commandments of the Law.

If we now turn these commandments and prohibitions into the ultimate expression of the will of God, then we make inequalities of this sort absolute and valid both in this life and in the life to come. That is what happens so easily in all forms of religious moralism. That is also what happened in Pharisaism,

which interpreted the laws of the Old Testament in terms of good works done in compliance with the various commandments. Those to whom the Law had been given and who therefore knew the difference between good and evil were able to do these works and were bound to do as much as they could, if they were to be accounted pious. This led automatically to the kind of inequality of which we have been speaking.

We should be careful to note that these inequalities were given absolute value only because the Pharisees thought of the concrete practical commandments, which Jews had to obey, as the only and absolute form of righteousness. As we have said, the Church, too, must preach concrete commandments, which Christians can obey. But we must not think of them as something ultimate, if our preaching of the Law is not to become Pharisaical.

St. Paul opposed the Pharisaic view of the Law by preaching the Gospel. But to the Gospel belonged a law that revealed the total condemnation of man. According to this understanding of the Law, no one could become righteous by means of the Law and the differences between men were no longer of absolute value.

When St. Paul preached that no one could become righteous by doing the works of the Law, this meant on the one hand that the ordinances of the Law could not have absolute value, since they were not a means for obtaining righteousness. But on the other hand, it also meant that he thought that the Law demanded much more than the Pharisees had ever admitted. If we were to obey the Law, we should have to possess a righteousness that was life-giving; we should have to possess the life for which we were created, the righteousness and the life of the messianic age. For the messianic age was to restore and fulfil that which we had been given at the creation. Man was created in the image of God, and what the Law ultimately asks of us is that we *should be* the image of God. But this is not possible except in communion with the Messiah, with Christ who is *the* image of God. Since the Law commands us to be absolutely righteous, it must condemn us, if we merely do what we can. But in Christ the condemnation of the Law is taken away so that 'there is now no condemnation to those that are in Christ' (Rom. 8.1).

This gave new meaning to the commandments of the Law and to their concrete application. St. Paul was quite ready to circumcise Timothy (Acts 16.3f) because there was no danger that this action would be interpreted as an act of compliance with an absolute and ultimate law. Timothy was circumcised because his mother was a Jewess, i.e. because he belonged to the Jewish community. But St. Paul opposed circumcision every time he felt that it might be misunderstood as a condition for full salvation. He anathematises those who thus pervert the Gospel, and says that he wishes they would not only be circumcised but even mutilated (Gal. 1.7ff, 5.12).

We may thus say that the rule that all men must be circumcised, if they wanted to be saved, turned the Law into an absolute and exclusive principle which governed our striving after righteousness and gave life. But this was wrong. It contradicted the Gospel and in the last analysis was contrary to the Law itself. St. Paul taught that the Law was not the highest thing (Gal. 3.15ff, 19, 21) because it had not been given from and to all eternity. But it *did* fulfil a certain purpose during a limited space of time. It had been given 'through angels by the hand of a mediator'. This expression means that the Law as such was holy and good but that its purpose was limited to a certain period of history. 'It was added because of transgressions till the seed should come to whom the promise hath been made' (Gal. 3.19). The Law of Moses—understood in terms of concrete ordinances—could fulfil its true purpose only if it was *not* taken to be something absolute, as the Jews wanted. The Jews argued that the Law had existed before creation. St. Paul emphasised that it was 'added' afterwards.

This does not mean that the Law is not holy and good. Some modern exegetes have speculated whether the passage that we have quoted should not be interpreted as an echo of Gnostic conceptions. But this merely shows that they have not understood that for St. Paul the Law of Moses is holy and good if taken as a limited law. As a limited law, men can obey it, fulfil it, but thereby it is also limited and its validity is restricted to a certain period. In other words, the Law of Moses, taken as an outward, practical law, was to be valid only for a time and then cease. But this was not the case with the more profound significance which the Law of Moses and all its ordinances

contained. According to the latter, man by himself was entirely condemned; but he had also received a promise of life and righteousness. This promise would be fulfilled in faith, by the coming of the Messiah by the coming of Christ. This function of the Law was therefore to point forward to its own fulfilment and accomplishment. When this fulfilment had come, the prophetic function of the Law was not thereby abolished but accomplished. But the way in which this fulfilment came could only be prophesied, not entirely determined in advance. For by its very nature the fulfilment was a new creation.

When we preach the Law we must therefore distinguish between these two aspects of law: one aspect which we can comply with and fulfil and which is valid only for a certain time; and one that is directly related to the message of the Gospel and which, taken by itself, totally condemns us. This latter aspect of the Law is not made up of commandments or prohibitions that are directly applicable to our life here on earth, as is the case with the other aspect of the Law, which we can obey with our will. In other words, it is not in our power to apply the Law which has its roots in God's own righteousness and which commands us to be as righteous as He is. We cannot translate it directly into a set of rules so that some men observe them and are righteous, while others break them and are unrighteous. No one can fulfil that Law as it should be fulfilled—except Christ.

But this does not mean that the proclamation of God's righteousness has nothing to do with practical rules of conduct which are relevant to our life here on earth. On the contrary, the fact that the absolute aspect of the Law also contains concrete commandments, shows that the world in which the righteousness of God rules supreme is not wholly foreign to the world in which we live. That which we can in this world know to be just and good *is* related to the righteousness of God. As we said before, the two forms of the Law are related to one another as the two natures of Christ: they are united without mixture, change, separation or disunity.

The Sermon on the Mount may serve as an example of such concrete commandments, which yet cannot be fulfilled by our free will. That is why they cannot be transposed into a system of rules to which all Christians can and must conform. They

cannot and they must not be applied as such rules are applied. Not to 'resist evil' can in this life often be unsuitable or even unjust. These words are related to a life and a righteousness, which ultimately belong to a future age, a life when those to whom these words are spoken will be righteous from within. And yet these words *are* applicable also in this life, though not as if they were simple ordinances. Not to resist evil, to give to those who ask of us, to lend and to hope for no return—all these point to a righteousness that is different from the Jews' righteousness which originated from the Law, which they used as a complete set of unchangeable rules for right living. But these words are concretely applicable as a permission, that we may use in certain cases, as a generous joyful way of living, as a freedom to suffer wrong without desiring revenge or asking to be paid damages or demanding legal rehabilitation. If someone is slandered, it may not always be the right thing to expose the slander as false—it may be right to let it stand and to wait until the truth comes to light of itself. If we do not resist evil, evil may in the end sometimes do itself out of its gain, as it did at the death of Christ on the Cross, which overcame evil at the very moment when evil seemed to have triumphed over Christ, its adversary. In the ancient Church this was sometimes called *pia fraus*. Love can forgive evil without asking for revenge. Thus we can sometimes catch a glimpse here on earth of something of that divine love which is *one* with God's righteousness. Though kindness and love which in a way are natural to man go against established systems of justice, they may thus sometimes be practically applicable in this world (cf. the story of the Good Samaritan). This shows also that the justice which practicable laws can establish here on earth is not the only and ultimate form of justice, but that there is a higher justice which is identical with the love of God. It shows furthermore that the true nature of man is not the self-assertion by which we live here, but that it is a life of love, which ultimately belongs to another age, in which the aim and purpose of creation will be fulfilled and in which all that is here corrupt, perverted and twisted will be made whole.

We may perhaps say that St. Paul's exhortations are not rules, but rather examples of how the Gospel can be applied in practical life. We should not be conformed to this world, the

Apostle tells us (Rom. 12.2), but transformed by a renewing of our mind. Pieces of concrete advice, meant for particular situations, are so to speak explanations of what the practical consequences of the Gospel are.

Why then do we preach the Law in two ways? Because according to the New Testament we live now in an age that lies between Christ's life on earth and His return. Until Christ's return, we are subjected to sin and death. Hence outward legal rules and ordinances are needed. These can be different for different times, but they are fully valid until a greater justice breaks through them or—we might say—until God with a greater word sets aside an earlier word, or shows men that they have misunderstood His word. As the glory of the Mosaic Law was outshone by the glory of Christ, so one word of God can set aside another which He has spoken earlier. One law can replace another. The law that was given in the particular commandments of the Old Covenant could be set aside by a new Word of God, revealing a better law and a greater justice, in which the real aim of the former law is even more clearly apparent. This is what happened in Christ.

In our age, which is the age of the Church, the age that lies between the resurrection and the parousia, both these Words of God, both forms of the Law must be preached, the one that we can obey and the other that belongs to the Gospel and that no human works can fulfil. When Christ comes again, there will be no other righteousness but the righteousness of God, and sin and death shall be no more. But until then we must either abandon the outward law or turn the righteousness of God into a set of rules. That was the mistake of the ancient Anabaptists. By making this mistake, they destroyed both the practical commandments and the true understanding of God's righteousness, which is revealed in the Gospel and which both shows us that we are totally corrupt and condemned and gives us eternal life and the righteousness of God. We must preach that it will come in the future, but that every believer can live in communion with it even now, in faith; and also that every now and then we can catch a glimpse of it in our world. The New Testament tells us that we now live by faith and not by sight. But when the new aeon is fully revealed, then we shall see face to face that which now we must believe. Then we shall

receive that which now we hope for. Then all that now prevents fulness of life and of righteousness, will be taken away. Then the practical law that we can fulfil will become superfluous, since God will—as Jeremiah prophesied of the New Covenant—write His law and His righteousness in our inward parts and in our hearts.

PAUL TILLICH AND THE IDEALISTIC APPRAISAL OF CHRISTIANITY

by The Rev. KENNETH HAMILTON

The 'philosophical theology' of Paul Tillich is one of the most remarkable features of today's theological landscape, and obviously impressive on any estimate. Yet it has given rise to a great deal of puzzlement. This is not simply because the tightly systematised nature of Tillich's thought has led him to wrap up his ideas in a special terminology. Although the volume of his work in English is now reasonably large, so that his technical vocabulary is no longer unfamiliar, there still seems to be considerable uncertainty about just what is involved in the synthesis between philosophy and religion upon which his theology is based.

It may be that our difficulty in this respect springs largely from the fact that we no longer read the works of those thinkers who believed that this same synthesis had been achieved on the basis of Hegelian idealism. I imagine that the generation which read (among other things) John Caird's *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, or listened to the same author's Gifford Lectures on *The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, would not be at all perplexed by many of the statements in Tillich's writings which we find obscure. On the Continent more than in either Britain or North America, perhaps, the bright summer of philosophical idealism has lived on in memory in spite of the subsequent autumn days of empiricism, logical positivism, and linguistic analysis. At any rate, in pre-Hitler Germany Brunner took for granted that Tillich belonged in the line of those who, from the time of Hegel, had occupied themselves with 'the speculative philosophy of religion'.[1]

Of course, Tillich is too original a thinker to be written off as a Hegelian *simpliciter*. His philosophical 'pedigree' has been well traced by Dorothy Emmet[2] and by John Herman Randall Jr.[3] He himself has put on record that the greatest influence

[1] *The Divine Imperative*, p. 585, n. 6.

[2] Review of *Systematic Theology I*, in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, New Series, vol. IV, part 2, October 1953, pp. 294ff.

[3] 'The Ontology of Paul Tillich' in *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, pp. 132ff.

upon him has been, from the nineteenth century, the later work of Schelling and, from the twentieth century, the existentialism of Heidegger. He believes that Hegel's system has failed. And he does not advocate idealism as an epistemology. In spite of all this, his conception of the relation between philosophy and religion is in line with the stand adopted by philosophical idealism, and, in particular, his appraisal of Christianity is the idealistic appraisal. It is worth noting that Donald Baillie, on the strength of one book of Tillich's (*The Interpretation of History*), pronounced his view of faith and history to be fundamentally Hegelian.[1]

My thesis is that Tillich's theological system is best understood when seen in relation to the idealism of Hegel and his followers. And I propose to illustrate this thesis with a comparison between Tillich's views on Christian faith and doctrine and those put forward by Josiah Royce, almost fifty years ago, in his essay entitled 'What is Vital in Christianity?'[2]

I

Royce wrote at length and throughout his career on the subject of religion, and the little essay 'What is Vital in Christianity?' is clearly not an adequate presentation of his thinking. But, though short and popular in its approach, it shares that precision and deftness which characterises everything Royce has written. Just because it is a blocked-in outline rather than a detailed study, it gives us a picture of Christianity interpreted from the general standpoint of idealism without Royce's own particular theories being featured too prominently.

The first half of the essay is given over to an extended examination of the religious dispute—so lively at the time and not quite silent yet—that can best be summed up in the query, *The Jesus of History or the Christ of Faith?* Royce, who was quite out of sympathy with what he called 'modern naturalism' (including, incidentally, 'the new gospel, the glad tidings of the subconscious' preached by his friend William James), had no more patience with the attempt to reduce religion to ethics than with the attempt to reduce it to psychology. And so,

[1] *God Was in Christ*, pp. 74ff.

[2] Delivered as an address at Harvard in 1909. Published in *William James and Other Essays* (1911).

confronted with the choice between Christianity as a teaching concerning the fatherhood of God and the infinite worth of the human soul and Christianity as a set of doctrines concerning the Person and Work of its Founder, he unhesitatingly chooses the second. Not first-century Christianity, but the developed Christianity of the creeds, is for him the true Christian religion. At the same time, he makes it clear that he cannot take at their face value the traditional ecclesiastical formulae. These indeed stand for the 'deeper' interpretation of what is vital in Christianity, but *as they stand* they are the product of other ages and do not necessarily fit our age.[1]

Here, as Royce establishes his position relative to Christian theology, we have an almost exact duplication of Tillich's rejection of liberalism and criticism of static orthodoxy; of his belief, too, that faith belongs to the dimension of 'depth', and that theology should always be an 'answering' theology, concerned to answer the questions which are current in a particular age. Tillich has always described his work as one of mediation. Yet the description of his theology as occupying 'the boundary between liberalism and neo-orthodoxy'[2] is a misleading description in so far as it suggests that his is a compromise position and one which might finally be found acceptable to both sides. Comparison with Royce helps to make this fact evident. Royce's quarrel with the Jesus-of-history school is the same as Tillich's quarrel with liberalism. He too, believing that Christianity is constituted as a faith by the doctrines of incarnation and atonement, cannot conceive of Christianity in a naturalistic setting. In the same way, Royce's quarrel with the orthodox is continued in Tillich's quarrel with the neo-orthodox. Both thinkers state that man cannot accept religious doctrine, once and for ever, on the recommendation of custom and authority alone because man must use his own intelligence and stand on the ground of his own living experience. Unlike Tillich, however, Royce is quite explicit in saying that, by interpreting Christian doctrine in the way he does, he is probably being quite heretical:

I am of course saying all this not as one having authority. I am simply

[1] op. cit., pp. 155-7.

[2] See, for example, the chapter-heading in William Hordern's *A Layman's Guide to Protestant Theology*.

indicating how students of philosophy who are of the type that I follow are accustomed to view these things.[1]

Royce is speaking *to* Christians, whereas Tillich is speaking, as a Christian, *from within* 'the theological circle'. Royce hoists the banner of heterodoxy openly and even with gusto. Tillich hopes by means of his 'ecstatic' or 'self-transcending' naturalism to pass 'beyond naturalism and supra-naturalism' in a way that shall extract what is true in both views. But the result is another way altogether of regarding the universe, and it is one which has at least a common perspective with the philosophical outlook which Royce claims as his own.

II

Observing the Christian faith from his vantage-ground of idealism, Royce confesses his conviction that Christianity contains a living revelation, disclosing eternal truths. He can hold this faith because the doctrines elaborated by the Church are nothing more—also nothing less—than symbols produced out of the religious imagination and dressed in imagery acceptable in one age, though perhaps not in another. This is his interpretation of the meaning of religious statements, and he adds that such symbolic utterances represent wholly rational concepts: 'The truth in question is independent of the legends. It relates to eternal spiritual facts.'[2]

With these words Royce covers a large segment of Tillich's philosophical theology, for Tillich also divides eternal spiritual facts from legends. The outstanding example of this division is to be seen in his treatment of the Resurrection in the second volume of his *Systematic Theology*.[3] The Resurrection, he says, must be both reality and symbol. It was certainly a symbol widely current in New Testament times, so that there is no need to take it literally as having to do with the revival of a body. And, if we want to know what its reality is, we must seek to know it as the conquest of transitoriness by an eternal spiritual presence. Although the Gospel record tells us of the rising of an individual, Jesus, from the grave, this is not the resurrection *event*, says Tillich. The event was the restitution of Jesus to the dignity of the Christ in the minds of the disciples. If indeed we look for a temporal occasion to which this *event*

[1] op. cit., p. 160. [2] p. 166. [3] pp. 153ff.

may be tied we can have no certainty; it may have happened at any time, and very possibly antedated Peter's confession at Caesarea Philippi.

Undeniably, Tillich asks us to seek for the truth of the Resurrection independently of the 'legends' and to find it in the 'eternal spiritual fact' of transitoriness conquered. He asks us to found our acceptance of the spiritual fact in an event which is not a temporal event for which historical evidence can be sought, but which is an ideal, mental event. At the same time, this event is found in association with a historical person, Jesus of Nazareth, called by His disciples the Christ; so that we are bound to seek for the relation between the completely universal *event* of transitoriness conquered by the divine Spirit and the narrower *event* of Jesus being restored to the dignity of the Christ in the minds of his disciples. This relation appears in Tillich's identification of the title *the Christ* with the category which he terms the *New Being*. While Tillich supports this category of his by identifying it with Paul's words about man in Christ being a new creation (2 Cor. 5.17), the New Being derives its meaning from Tillich's own ontological doctrine which takes as its starting-point the dogma that man can be ultimately concerned only about his own being.[1] Because he has laid down the principle that the true interpretation of the statement that Jesus is the Christ must be that Jesus is the bearer of the New Being,[2] Tillich is able to say that what the disciples experienced in the Resurrection-event was the power of the New Being to conquer transitoriness. In this way there appears a tenuous line connecting the 'legend' of the Resurrection with the 'eternal spiritual fact' of transitoriness overcome through the power of the New Being. The line indicates the identity of our living experience of the New Being with the experience of the first disciples.

Even this thread is snapped when Tillich tells us that the reality of our experience of the New Being is based on participation in that Being and cannot be based on any historical considerations. Participation is primary: 'It guarantees a personal life in which the New Being has conquered the old being. But it does not guarantee his name to be Jesus of

[1] *S.T. I*, p. 14; see also *Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality*, p. 59.
[2] *S.T. II*, p. 88.

Nazareth.'[1] Tillich thinks that this conclusion would be historically absurd, but he stresses that it is logically necessary. In making this distinction he might well have been enlarging on the following statement by Royce:

> For Christ's coming means simply our becoming aware of what Eckhart calls the eternal birth; that is, the eternal relation of the real soul to the real God. . . . I maintain also that those who, in various ages of the church, and in various ways, have tried to define and to insist upon what they have called the 'Essential Christ' as distinguished from the historical Christ, have been nearing in various degrees the comprehension of what is vital in Christianity.[2]

Tillich has indeed defined the Essential Christ. In his system this conception is named *Essential God-Manhood*—or, more simply, *essential manhood*, since essential manhood represents God to man. Jesus, as the Christ, or bearer of the New Being, is the man in whom the essential man has appeared.

III

The Essential Christ is necessary, in Royce's view, in order for men to come to know the truth about the incarnation and the atonement; for these doctrines, according to Royce, convey to us by their symbolism those lessons which we need most to learn, and give us necessary insight into the nature of reality, bringing assurance of a higher life than earthbound souls dream of—a spiritual life consisting in the triumph over suffering, sorrow and unreasonableness. The meaning of the life, death and rising again of Christ, once the symbols are removed, appears in the possibilities which are opened up for every life. The lesson of the Essential Christ is the promise that God's Spirit can defeat the limitations of existence: 'God wins perfection through expressing himself in a finite life and triumphing over and through its very finitude.'[3]

The same conception of salvation is brought forward by Tillich:

> In messianic thought, the New Being does not demand the sacrifice of finite being; instead it fulfils all finite being by conquering its estrangement. . . . The appearance of the New Being under the conditions of existence, yet judging and conquering them, is the paradox of the Christian message.[4]

[1] ibid., p. 114.
[2] op. cit., pp. 164, 166.
[3] p. 183.
[4] *S.T. II*, pp. 88, 92; see also *S.T. I*, p. 57.

What is of most interest here in these two parallel accounts of salvation is that both explain the process of being saved as the victory of the infinite over the conditions of finitude *although those conditions continue*. And, for both teachers also, salvation begins when we realise our present condition, not only negatively, by seeing how our unhappiness springs from our finitude, but also positively by realising how we are essentially infinite. That is the force of our knowledge of the Essential Christ. It tells us the truth about our real self.

In keeping with this belief, i.e. that true faith begins by our understanding our union—imperfect though we know it to be—with the divine Spirit which is infinite and eternal, Royce and Tillich alike find the beginning of life in the divine Spirit (or realisation of essential manhood) in the overcoming of the restricting and negative aspects of human existence. This prime virtue is called by Royce 'fortitude' and by Tillich 'the courage to Be'. We can learn, says Royce, to discover 'powers' in ourselves and in others which makes us able to begin 'transmuting all the transient values of fortune into eternal values'.[1] The potential presence of the infinite, says Tillich, is the negation of the negative element in finitude, and man is aware of his potential infinity as he is of his actual finitude. But, because his condition is one of 'estrangement' (the term is Hegel's), man needs to be 'saved'—i.e. healed or reunited with God. He needs to receive the divine Spirit, thus 'reuniting what is estranged, giving a centre to what is split, overcoming the split between God and man, man and his world, man and himself'.[2]

If we ask what is the ground of our hope in the possibility of salvation, and how we can receive the divine Spirit and thus achieve the virtue of courage, Tillich gives us the answer when he affirms that 'Love as the striving for the union of the separated is the opposite of estrangement'.[3] The idea of salvation is made evident through the reality of a love which binds us to God, even under the conditions of estrangement, so that there is revealed to us the knowledge that the negative elements of our human existence themselves bear witness to the power of the positive over us: 'Man's hostility to God proves indisputably that he belongs to him. Where there is the possi-

[1] op. cit., pp. 175-8. [2] *S.T. II*, p. 166. [3] ibid., pp. 45-47.

bility of hate, there and there alone is the possibility of love.' In short, love that has the quality of *eros*, or desire for the infinite, inspires our humanity; or, as Royce puts it, 'the world will desires our unity with the universal purpose'.[1] We inhabit a spiritual universe, and thus it is most natural that, in spite of the existence of what is not spiritual, we should aspire in the power of the Spirit to realise essential manhood, to leave behind our old being and discover the New Being.

Tillich claims that only by envisaging salvation in terms of the New Being can we re-establish the meaning of grace.[2] It may be granted that trust in the essential Christ (or essential manhood) means that we must allow the divine Spirit to work in us, to open our eyes to the truth about our condition, and to reunite us with the ground of our being. But, since we have never really left that ground altogether and still belong to it essentially, since our hatred of God means the possibility of our loving Him, and since the power of *eros* is—potentially—in us because of our humanity, the gift of the New Being cannot be wholly a gift, i.e. that to which we have no right. It is our own, potentially. Therefore the Christian belief in *God as gracious*, through the Cross of Christ extending free forgiveness to those who are as yet sinners, and so wholly undeserving—this belief is nowise present. The end we seek in 'vital' Christianity, according to Royce, is nothing less than *our fulfilment*; and this same self-fulfilment is assumed in Tillich's starting-point of theological reasoning when he argues, 'Man is infinitely concerned about the infinity to which he belongs, from which he is separated, and for which he is longing.'[3] Redemption does not issue in God's receiving back His lost sons with forgiving love, but in our receiving what is our own.

IV

So far we have been seeing Royce and Tillich following exactly parallel paths. There is one point of divergence, however. This divergence is slight, but important nevertheless, and it arises over the definition of God.

Royce does not go far into the question of how God is to be

[1] op. cit., p. 180. [2] *S.T. II*, p. 125.
[3] *S.T. I*, p. 14; cf. *S.T. II*, p. 166: 'It [Salvation understood as the New Being] includes, above all, the fulfilment of the ultimate meaning of one's existence. . . .'

defined, except to say that he is taking for granted the interpretation of God's nature given in idealism. His statement that 'God is the conscious meaning that expresses itself in and through the totality of all phenomena',[1] seems akin to Tillich's definition of God as 'Being-itself or the absolute'—the ground, power and abyss of Being.[2] But Royce also adds that God is to be conceived as 'a spirit and a person' who 'expresses himself in the world'.

Here, in fact, is Tillich's major quarrel with idealism. He counts it of surpassing importance that Hegel 'tried to take existential elements into his universal system of essences', with the result that his system knows 'no gap, no ultimate incertitude, no risk, and no danger of self-loss when essence actualises itself in existence'.[3] Yet this attempt, says Tillich, because it identified God too closely with the universe and made the course of history into God's self-realisation, denied the tragedy of man's existence. Hence Kierkegaard was able to challenge Hegel's identification of the real with the rational, speaking in the name of the individual discovering within himself the irrationality of existence. And hence Hegel's system was disowned by the twentieth century as, disillusionment following upon over-optimism, modern man discovered in bitter experience the negative qualities of human life. So Tillich would not agree that Being directly expresses itself through phenomena; without Being, phenomena could not exist; yet, in existing, they have strayed away from their ground.

Tillich makes the same point in another way when he says that, although Hegel called nature 'estranged spirit', his emphasis was not on 'estranged' but on 'spirit'.[4] Hegel, in other words, minimised man's need of being restored to himself and overestimated the spiritual power of reason actually—not just potentially—within him. Thus Tillich rejects idealism, strictly considered as such, but accepts *in toto* the elements making up the idealistic analysis of the universe.

The key to this state of affairs lies in the analysis of existence made by Heidegger and its impact upon Tillich's thinking. Heidegger accepted Kierkegaard's interpretation of human life conceived in terms of existential anxiety but did not rest content with Kierkegaard's putting existence decisively before

[1] op. cit., p. 168. [2] *S.T. I*, p. 239. [3] *S.T. II*, p. 24. [4] *S.T. I*, p. 99.

Being. Instead, he took as his aim the endeavour to find a way through existence which would enable him to arrive at Being. From Heidegger's quest for a metaphysic—and especially through consideration of Heidegger's preoccupation with the concept of non-being—Tillich saw the way to re-establish metaphysics by passing directly from awareness of existence to awareness of Being. The result has been, virtually, an amendment to the idealistic case, reorganising Hegel to take into account the existentialist presentation of the tragic element in existence. But, in order to develop fully Hegel's notion of estrangement, Tillich moves back to Augustine and to Plato. In line with the Platonic tradition, he introduces a dualistic fashion of regarding essence and existence, which nevertheless is kept from being completely dualistic by a recognition of the essential *relatedness* of existence to Being and by a trust in the power of *eros* to abolish the gap which now divides man's life from the divine and the eternal.

Since Tillich's attention is centred in ontology, the nineteenth-century epistemological struggle between 'idealism' and 'realism' hardly interests him. What he is concerned to do, epistemologically, is to attack the whole of the modern nominalistic tradition and all its works, and to assert the claims of 'ontological' reason against merely 'technical' reason. When reason is seen to be both the structure of the mind and the character of reality, he argues, then 'mind' and 'matter' will cease to be terms to contend about. Such is Tillich's attempt to by-pass the realist-idealist feud. It is a solution which might possibly commend itself to an idealist, but hardly to a realist!

V

However, there is no need for us just now to probe further into something which is a purely philosophical question. Whether Tillich's ontology requires him to provide an idealistic epistemology, and whether the Hegelian elements outweigh the Platonic elements in his system—these are not the points at issue. The problem on hand is whether Tillich's doctrine of God as Being-itself over against an estranged universe makes his interpretation of the Christian message different from the idealistic interpretation which conceives God as Spirit expressing itself in the world.

Judged in the context of the comparison which I have been making, it would seem that the difference between the two conceptions of God is, to all intents, negligible. As far as their view of the historical element in Christianity is concerned, Royce and Tillich are at one, as we have seen. They are united also in their understanding of incarnation and atonement. If Tillich's revised Hegelianism differs from Royce's personal version of Hegelian idealism, it is in being less ethical in tone than the other, and more speculative. Royce stressed the thought that man, in winning union with the divine Spirit, could do so only by learning the worth of suffering shared and by the giving of loyalty. Tillich includes these elements too, though less prominently, but he states that the contrast between essence and existence is 'the backbone of the whole body of theological thought'.[1] It would seem not only to be the backbone; it would seem to be the heart as well.

In the book *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, Reinhold Niebuhr expressed the fear that Tillich ran close to identifying the Fall with the Creation. Tillich answered that actualised creation and estranged existence were indeed identical, but that Creation was not thereby made an evil; for it was not in being finite that evil lay, but in being estranged. This is true, of course, but it is also true that the passage from essence to existence in Tillich's system is *the* inexplicable event which occupies the centre of the picture. Finitude may not be in itself evil, yet it is the occasion of evil; and it is from the tragic face of finitude that man seeks primarily, in Tillich's view, to be delivered. The hub of theology is not found in man's sin and God's righteousness, but in the ontological anxiety which is the consequence of man being created 'finite freedom' and which conveys to him the awareness of his potential infinity, thus enabling him to receive the New Being.

Once Kierkegaard called men to turn away from Hegel's idealism to discover the 'leap' of faith. Now Tillich calls men to turn away from the subjectivity of Kierkegaard to contemplate the 'leap from essence to existence'. Truth, he argues, is not primarily in the individual before God but in the ontological analysis of human existence which reveals explicitly what is implicit in the symbols of religious faith. In

[1] ibid., p. 204.

other words, nothing but the rational—divine-human reason —can find a route to the real. Its concepts state the real directly and show how religious symbols represent partial truths about the totality of Being.

New philosophical theology is but old idealism re-dressed.

THE EPISTLE OF BARNABAS AND THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS: SOME OBSERVATIONS

by The Rev. L. W. BARNARD

The discovery of the Qumran texts, as is well known, has produced a whole spate of books and articles many of which deal *inter alia* with affinities between the doctrinal formularies of the sect and the NT and between its organisation and practice and that of the Apostolic Church in Jerusalem. However, in all this literature, which has now reached unmanageable proportions, it would seem that insufficient attention has been paid to affinities between the texts and Christian post-Apostolic literature.[1] The purpose of this article is to examine the theology of the epistolary tract known as the Epistle of Barnabas in the light of the Qumran scrolls.

I

This Epistle in all probability was written from Alexandria some time in the reign of Hadrian (A.D. 117-138) being addressed to a Christian community elsewhere in Egypt (i.4-5) which was in danger of falling back into Judaism as a result of the activity of militant Judaisers who had been impressed by the promise held out by Hadrian to the Jews that the Jerusalem Temple would be rebuilt (xvi.3-4). This was the 'final stumbling block' (iv.3) against which the writer argues so vehemently.[2] The authorship of the Epistle is unknown. In favour of the view that the writer was a converted Jew is the strongly Jewish character of his argument and his familiarity with Jewish rites. Here we may mention the designation of Satan as 'the Black One' (iv.9, xx.1),[3] the invisibility of God (v.10),[4] the land of milk and honey (vi.8), the ritual of the Day of Atonement (vii.1-11),[5] the shrub 'Rachel' (vii.8), the sacrifice

[1] The only writer known to me who has discussed this question is J. P. Audet, O.P., 'Affinités littéraires et doctrinales du Manuel de Discipline', *Revue biblique* (1952) pp. 219-38; (1943) pp. 41-82. He has expanded his views in his important study, *La Didaché: Instructions des Apôtres* (Paris, 1958).

[2] For Hadrian's policy towards the Jews see K. Thieme, *Kirche und Synagoge* (1944) pp. 22-25.

[3] Kidd 30a.

[4] Chullin 60a.

[5] Mishna Menach 11; Talmud Menach 100a; Yoma vi.1-6, 66b.

of the red heifer (viii.1-2), the 'Kingdom of Jesus on the wood' (viii.5), the gematria on the 318 servants of Abraham (ix.8),[1] the interpretation of Psalm 1 (x.10),[2] Moses and Amalek (xii.1-11),[3] Jacob and Esau (xiii.1-7), the celebration of the Sabbath (xv.1-9)[4] and the allegorical interpretation of the six days of creation as the 6000 years of the world's history (xv.4). The Rabbinic character of the Epistle is further illustrated by the division made by the author into Haggadah (i-xvii) and Halakhah (xviii-xx), by its literary style and frequent use of the rhetorical question as a didactic device. The allegorical method of interpreting the LXX which is carried to extreme lengths was doubtless taken over from Philo. These considerations seem to point to Jewish authorship, an opinion maintained by Rabbi Güdemann[5] and other Jewish commentators. The occasional blunders in the details of Jewish rites are to be explained by the writer's knowledge being derived from the Judaism of the diaspora rather than from that of Palestine. The influence of this Alexandrian Jewish background should be borne in mind when we come to examine affinities between the Epistle and the Qumran texts.

II

We now proceed to consider specific parallels:

(*a*) *Method of Biblical Exegesis:* The Epistle of Barnabas adopts *in toto* the allegorical method of interpretation which had reached its zenith in the voluminous writings of Philo. Indeed it is not improbable that the Epistle played a role in the preservation of Philo's writings for posterity for these were certainly preserved by Christians rather than Jews. However, embedded in the writer's fanciful allegorisation is another method of interpretation which has been found at Qumran. This is the quotation of OT texts followed by an application to contemporary events which were believed to have a profound significance for those who could understand and interpret

[1] Beresh rabba 43, 44; Nedar 32a.

[2] Succa 21b; Abod. Sar. 19b.

[3] Mishna Rosh Hash iii.8. In the first two centuries A.D. Amalek, for the Jews, was the eternal enemy. Cf. Justin *Dial.* xlix.

[4] cf. Berachoth 57b.

[5] *Zur Erklärung des Barnabasbriefes*, p. 128. J. Muilenberg, *The Literary Relations of the Epistle of Barnabas and the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* (Marburg, 1929), p. 99 *seq.*

them. Some illustrations of this method may be given chosen almost at random:

Barn. v.3-4: Therefore we ought to give hearty thanks to the Lord that he has given us knowledge of the past, and wisdom for the present, and that we are not without understanding for the future. And the Scripture says, 'Not unjustly are the nets spread out for the birds.'[1] This means that a man deserves to perish who has a knowledge of the way of righteousness, but turns aside into the way of darkness.

Barn. xv.8-9: Furthermore he says to them, 'Your new moons and the sabbaths I cannot away with.'[2] Do you see what he means? The present sabbaths are not acceptable to me, but that which I have made, in which I will give rest to all things and make the beginning of an eighth day, that is the beginning of another world. Wherefore we also celebrate with gladness the eighth day in which Jesus also rose from the dead, and was manifest, and ascended into Heaven.

Barn. xvi.3-4: Furthermore he says again, 'Lo, they who destroyed this temple shall themselves build it.'[3] That is happening now. For owing to the war it was destroyed by the enemy; at present even the servants of the enemy will build it up again.

This method of interpretation is strikingly reminiscent of that found in the Qumran Commentaries on the Books of Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk and Psalm xxxvii and in the Damascus Document where OT texts are frequently quoted followed by a contemporary interpretation. E.g. with the first passage quoted above may be compared the Qumran Commentary on Psalm 37.8-9 (Fragment A Col. i).

'Refrain from anger and abandon wrath; fret not thyself, it tendeth only to evil-doing. For evildoers shall be cut off.' This applies to those who return to the tōrah and do not refuse to repent their evil-doing. Those, however, who are defiant about repenting their iniquity will be cut off.[4]

With the third passage compare the Commentary on Nahum, 4 Qp Nah. ii. 11

'Where is the abode of the lions, which was the feeding place of the young lions.' [This refers to Jerusalem which has become] an abode for the wicked men of the heathen.

Barnabas' use of this method recalls the Qumran word *pesher*, used frequently in these Commentaries, which means the interpretation of OT texts the true significance and application of which is only known by those who possess knowledge and

[1] Prov. 1.17. [2] Isa. 1.13. [3] Isa. 49.17.
[4] I have used Gaster's translations.

understanding.[1] The author of the Epistle is essentially an interpreter of the OT as were the scribes who wrote the Qumran texts.

(*b*) *The idea of the Community:* One of the major differences between the Dead Sea sect and the Apostolic Church is that the former was an exclusive esoteric group which carefully guarded its special doctrines and shunned contact with outsiders, and especially with those who did not reach its standard of purity, while the early Christians, following the example of Jesus, took the Gospel to all and sundry and in particular consorted with sinners. However, in the Epistle of Barnabas we find advocated ideas of exclusiveness which are in striking contrast to the practice of the Apostolic Church. Thus Barn. iv.1-2:

We ought, then, to inquire earnestly into the things which now are, and to seek out those which are able to save us. Let us then utterly flee from all the works of lawlessness, lest the works of lawlessness overcome us, and let us hate the error of this present time, that we may be loved in that which is to come. Let us give no freedom to our souls to have power to walk with sinners and wicked men, lest we be made like unto them.

Barn. x.5:

'Thou shalt not eat', he says, 'the lamprey nor the polypus nor the cuttle-fish.'[2] Thou shalt not, he means, consort with or become like such men who are utterly ungodly and who are already condemned to death, just as these fish alone are accursed, and float in the deep water, not swimming like the others but living on the ground at the bottom of the sea.

Barn. xix.2, cf. xix.6:

Thou shalt not join thyself to those who walk in the way of death.

With these may be compared two passages from the Manual of Discipline I.QS. v:

This is the rule for all the members of the community—that is, for such as have declared their readiness to turn away from all evil and to adhere to all that God in His good pleasure has commanded. They are to keep apart from the company of the froward.

He that so commits himself is to keep apart from all froward men that

[1] *Pesher* is also used in the Aramaic part of the Book of Daniel e.g. Dan. 4.9. K. Stendahl, *The School of St. Matthew* (1954), pp. 181-202, connects the *pesher* type of citation with the 'formula quotations' of St. Matthew's Gospel.

[2] Lev. 11.11.

walk in the path of wickedness; for such men are not to be reckoned in the covenant inasmuch as they have never sought nor studied God's ordinances in order to find out on what more arcane points they may guiltily have gone astray, while in regard to the things which stand patently revealed they have acted high-handedly.

The idea of the Christian community as a closed group involved, for the Epistle of Barnabas, a mutual sharing. So xix.8: 'Thou shalt share all things with thy neighbour and shalt not say that they are thy own property; for if you are sharers in that which is incorruptible, how much more is that which is corruptible?' This recalls the Qumran insistence that those entering the covenant should share their possessions. Indeed to lie in this matter was a serious matter and involved a severe penalty—the holding back of a quarter of the offender's food ration for a year (I.QS. vi). The Epistle envisages Christians as a 'new people' in contrast to the 'former people', the Jews, who had lost their privileges and the blessings of the covenant (v.7, xiii.1), much as the Qumran sect believed that its members were the true Israel of the Covenant in contrast to the Judaism of the urban centres of Palestine. The introduction of such exclusive ideas into Christianity, which find only a limited support in the NT, has usually been explained as due to a legalistic spirit which came to the fore in the sub-apostolic Church. The Qumran texts show that these ideas were present in the Judaism in which the writer of Barnabas was nurtured and which he carried over into his interpretation of Christianity.

(*c*) *The Religious Life:* In the Epistle the distinctive Christian virtues of faith, hope and love play a subordinate role. The main emphasis of the writer is on spirituality as the aim of the Christian life—see the use of πνευματικός in iv.11 and xvi.10. The Qumran texts in a similar way emphasise spirituality as the hallmark of the members of the covenant. Thus I.QS. ix: 'Everyone is to be judged by the standard of his spirituality. Intercourse with him is to be determined by the purity of his deeds, and consort with him by the degree of his intelligence. This alone is to determine the degree to which a man is to be loved or hated.'

A prominent feature of the Epistle is the emphasis upon knowledge, which is used in three senses:

(i) 'Knowledge' is often coupled with 'faith' and has ethical consequences (i.5, v.4, xviii.1). The practical nature of this knowledge is illustrated by xix.1: 'Therefore the knowledge given to us of this kind that we may walk in it is as follows. . . .'

(ii) Sometimes this knowledge refers to the interpretation of events in the past, present and eschatological future. cf. v.3: 'Therefore we ought to give hearty thanks to the Lord that He has given us knowledge of the past, and wisdom for the present, and that we are not without understanding for the future' (cf. ii.3-4).

(iii) This knowledge is mediated through the allegorical interpretation of the OT (e.g. vi.9, xiii.7) and is also the gift of God (i.7, ix.8).

The idea of knowledge (*da'ath*) in the Qumran texts[1] shows marked affinities with that found in the Epistle of Barnabas. With (i) we may compare I.QS. ix.17 *seq.*:

'With those however that have chosen the right path everyone is indeed to discuss matters pertaining to the knowledge (*da'ath*) of God's truth and His righteous judgments. The purpose of such discussions is to guide the minds of the members of the community, to give them insight (*b'da'ath*) into God's inscrutable wonders and truth, and to bring them to walk blamelessly each with his neighbour in harmony with all that has been revealed to them.' Cf. I.QS. iii.2, v.9, 12, vi.9, vii.3-4.

Knowledge has an inexorable connexion with the way of life to be followed by the members of the sect. The idea of knowledge as the interpretation of the past, present and future (ii above) is found in a number of passages in the scrolls. Thus I.QS. iv.18 *seq.*: 'Howbeit God, in His inscrutable wisdom, has appointed a term for the existence of perversity. . . . Then truth will emerge triumphant for the world. . . . Like waters of purification He will sprinkle upon him the spirit of truth, to cleanse him from all the abominations of falsehood and of all pollution from the spirit of filth; to the end that, being made upright, men may have understanding of transcendental knowledge and of the lore of the sons of heaven and that, being made blameless in their ways, they may be endowed with inner vision.' A similar eschatological reference for *da'ath* is found in the Habakkuk Commentary I.Q p. Hab. ii.14: 'For the earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the glory of the Lord as waters cover the sea.' This statement refers to the fact that when God eventually restores them to their former glory

[1] The most detailed study of this is by W. D. Davies in *Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. XLVI (1953), pp. 113-39.

[ ] falsehood [will] [ ], and thereafter knowledge will be revealed to them, abundant as the waters of the sea. With (iii) above may be compared the close association of *da'ath* in the scrolls with the tōrah (cf. I.QS. iii.1).

The Qumran conception of knowledge gives an insight into ideas which existed on Palestinian soil coeval with the rise of the Church. The sect was not concerned with the anthropological and cosmological doctrines beloved of the later Gnostics but with that knowledge of the tōrah which issued in obedience to God's commands in the present and in the future—a thoroughly Jewish idea. However, as W. D. Davies points out,[1] the strong emphasis which the sect placed on *da'ath*, in comparison to other Jewish literature, may well reflect, in a subtle way, Hellenistic influences which had been entering Palestine since the Maccabaean period much as St. Paul and St. John use terms prominent in the Mystery Religions and Gnosticism without essentially modifying the Hebraic connotations of their thought. It is now increasingly recognised that a sharp dichotomy based on language and culture between the Hellenistic Judaism of the diaspora and Palestinian Judaism did not exist prior to A.D. 135. This fact throws some light on the background of the Epistle of Barnabas. It is remarkable that its author hardly draws on NT ideas of knowledge; we find no subordination of knowledge to love and no focusing of knowledge upon the person of Christ. Indeed most of what is said about knowledge in the Epistle might have been written by a Palestinian Jew rather than a Christian. It is a reasonable inference that the author brought over his conception of knowledge into Christianity from Alexandrian Judaism. It follows then that the Judaism of the Egyptian metropolis in the early decades of the second century was of a mixed character —not solely Greek and Hellenistic but also containing ideas which can be paralleled in pre-Christian Palestinian sectarian Judaism. The new discoveries reinforce the opinion of Professor G. D. Kilpatrick given before the advent of the scrolls: 'It is natural to make a division in the Judaism of this time, one side being Greek in speech and Alexandrian in culture, the other Aramaic in speech and Rabbinic in culture. . . . The two Gospels (i.e. St. Matthew and St. John) warn us against

[1] op. cit., p. 135.

identifying the linguistic frontier between the Greek and Semitic worlds with the cultural frontier between Hellenism and Judaism.'[1] The Epistle of Barnabas is of significance in being a document, later than the Gospels, which reflects this mixed background before the triumph of Pharisaism produced a more rigid demarcation between the cultural and linguistic boundaries.

(*d*) *Other Parallels:* A few other affinities between the Epistle and the Qumran texts may be briefly noted. Both exhibit an antipathy towards the Jerusalem Temple and its cultus—indeed the Epistle goes as far as to say that the Jews before A.D. 70 consecrated God in the Temple almost as the heathen (xvi.2). The Epistle here presents a closer parallel to the scrolls than that provided by the Apostolic Church for the latter did not entirely separate itself from the Temple although the group associated with St. Stephen appears to have adopted a more independent policy. In eschatological teaching the Epistle and the Qumran texts exhibit a similar outlook. Both believed that the last times had dawned when the works of evil were everywhere in the ascendant Satan and his hosts having been let loose. The prime need in the present was therefore to guard against the entry of Satan (described in the Epistle as the Black One and in the scrolls as Belial) into the human heart. It is, however, noticeable that the Epistle exhibits a greater reserve in its eschatological teaching than the scrolls; this is especially true of the picture drawn in the War Scroll.

III

The Two Ways Section: As is well known chs. xviii-xx of the Epistle contain a section on the Two Ways of life which bears a marked similarity to a section in the Didache (chs. i-v). The question of the exact relationship between these versions has been much discussed during the past forty years, particularly in the pages of the *Journal of Theological Studies*. A group of English scholars, among them Dom Connolly, Dr Armitage Robinson, Professor F. E. Vokes and Dr W. Telfer, has maintained with great conviction that no Jewish pre-Christian manual containing Two Ways teaching ever existed; that the

[1] *The Origins of the Gospel according to St. Matthew* (1946), pp. 105-6.

author of the Epistle of Barnabas was the first to compose such a manual which he added as Halakhah to the Haggadic section of his work (chs. i-xvii) and that the author of the Didache had the Epistle before him when composing his treatise. The main argument of these scholars was the silence of Jewish sources as to the existence of a Two Ways manual and the alleged chaotic order of Barnabas' Two Ways section which, in the Didache, is brought into a more formal order by careful rearrangement. However, many scholars were dissatisfied with this somewhat tidy theory and have continued to maintain that both versions of the Two Ways in the Christian documents were based on a Jewish-Christian manual suitable for the instruction of catechumens, which itself went back to an earlier Jewish manual or manuals used by the Rabbis for the teaching of proselytes and perhaps in the synagogue exposition. In 1945 Dr E. J. Goodspeed[1] made the brilliant suggestion that the source used by Barnabas and the Didache was none other than the Greek original of the Latin text entitled *De Doctrina Apostolorum* which, he believes, shows primitive traces incompatible with its being a later Latin translation of Did. i-vi. It is beyond our purpose here to enter into the details of this debate[2] except to observe that one of the main planks of the English scholars' argument, viz. that a Jewish Two Ways never existed, cannot now be maintained in the light of a section headed 'Of the Two Spirits in Man' found in the Qumran Manual of Discipline[3] which was, in all probability, an expository sermon used by the priests of the community.[4] We now proceed to compare Barnabas' Two Ways section with this version:

(*a*) *The Introduction:* Barn. xviii.1-2 reads:

'There are Two Ways of teaching and power, one of Light and one of Darkness. And there is a great difference between the Two Ways. For over the one are set the light-bringing angels of God, but over the other angels of Satan. And the one

[1] *Anglican Theological Review*, Vol. XXVII (1945), pp. 239-47.
[2] See the present writer's article in *Church Quarterly Review*, Vol. CLIX (1958), pp. 211-30.
[3] I.QS. iii.13-iv.26.
[4] On the meaning of the title 'for the *Maskil*' see T. H. Gaster, *The Scriptures of the Dead Sea Sect*, p. 47.

is Lord from eternity to eternity, and the other is the ruler of the present time of iniquity.'

With this may be compared this passage in the Manual:

'Now, this God created man to rule the world, and appointed for him Two Spirits after whose direction he was to walk until the final inquisition. They are the Spirits of truth and perversity. The origin of truth lies in the fountain of Light, and that of perversity in the wellspring of Darkness. All who practise righteousness are under the domination of the Prince of Lights, and walk in ways of Light; whereas all who practise perversity are under the domination of the Angel of Darkness and walk in ways of darkness.'

The resemblance here is superficially impressive—especially the occurrence in both versions of the realms of Light and Darkness presided over by the angels of God and Satan. However, the metaphor of Light and Darkness, representing good and evil, was well known in Judaism where it had probably come in under Iranian influence.[1] It is also prominent in the NT and, at an early date, came to be associated with baptismal instruction.[2] Later it passed into patristic thought where it became especially congenial to Alexandrian thinkers.[3] Moreover the Qumran conception of the Two Spirits, created by God, struggling for the possession of men's hearts, which is ultimately based on Iranian teaching,[4] is not found in the Epistle of Barnabas.

(*b*) *The Way of Light:* Barn: xix.2-7a reads:

'Thou shalt love thy maker, thou shalt fear thy Creator, thou shalt glorify Him who redeemed thee from death, thou shalt be simple in heart, and rich in spirit; thou shalt not join thyself to those who walk in the way of death, thou shalt hate all that is not pleasing to God, thou shalt hate all hypocrisy; thou shalt not desert the commandments of the Lord. Thou shalt not exalt thyself, but shall be humble minded in all things; thou shalt not take glory to thyself. Thou shalt form

[1] Test. Levi, xix.1; Slav. Enoch xxx.15.

[2] Eph. 5.8; Heb. 6.4; 1 Pet. 2.9; cf. Luke 16.8 and John 12.36.

[3] Clem. Alex. Exh. to the Greeks xi. The metaphor is also prominent in the Enneads of Plotinus.

[4] cf. Yasna xxx.3, 5. H. Michaud, 'Un mythe zervanite dans un des manuscrits Qumran', *Vetus Test.*, V (1955), pp. 137-47, thinks that Zervanism, a special branch of Zoroastrianism, was the determining influence on the Qumran theology.

no evil plan against thy neighbour, thou shalt not let thy soul be froward. Thou shalt not commit fornication, thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not commit sodomy. Thou shalt not let the word of God depart from thee among the impurity of any men. Thou shalt not respect persons in the reproving of transgression. Thou shalt be meek, thou shalt be quiet, thou shalt fear the words which thou hast heard. Thou shalt not bear malice against thy brother. Thou shalt not be in two minds whether it shall be or not. Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord in vain. Thou shalt love thy neighbour more than thy own life. Thou shalt not procure abortion, thou shalt not commit infanticide. Thou shalt not withhold thy hand from thy son or from thy daughter, but shalt teach them the fear of God from their youth up. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's goods, thou shalt not be avaricious. Thou shalt not be joined in soul with the haughty but shalt converse with humble and righteous men. Thou shalt receive the trials that befall thee as good, knowing that nothing happens without God. Thou shalt not be double-minded or talkative.'

There follows a social code governing the relationship between masters and slaves (xix.7b) which is also found in the NT Epistles; this was based on the *imitatio Christi*. Then comes further teaching about the sharing of private property and the duty of almsgiving with the command to love 'as the apple of thine eye all who speak to thee the word of the Lord' (xix.9). The Way of Light ends with a request to hold fast the traditions and to abstain from schism.

The Qumran list is as follows:

'This is the way those spirits operate in the world for the enlightenment of man's heart, the making straight before him all the ways of righteousness and truth, the implanting in his heart of fear for the judgments of God. A spirit of humility, patience, abundant compassion, perpetual goodness, insight, discrimination, a sense of Divine power that is based at once on an apprehension of God's works and a reliance on His plenteous mercy, a Spirit of Knowledge informing every plan of action, a zeal for righteous government, a hallowed mind in a controlled nature, abounding love for all who follow the truth, a self-respecting purity which abhors all the taint of filth, a modesty of behaviour coupled with a general prudence and an

ability to hide within oneself the secrets of what one knows—these are the things that come to men in this world through communion with the spirit of truth. And the guerdon of all that walk in its ways is health and abundant well-being, with long life and fruition of seed along with eternal blessings and everlasting joy in life everlasting, and a crown of glory and a robe of honour, amid light perpetual.'

The resemblance here is not so close. The Qumran list, which is much shorter than that of the Epistle, deals with the inner attitude required of members of the sect which is in line with the devotional spirit of their Thanksgiving Psalms. Here was a community of pious individuals who believed in religious inwardness. Barnabas' list, on the other hand, is more externalised with the emphasis on correct behaviour. The use of so many negative prohibitions reflects a tendency towards the codification of ethical precepts which came to the fore in sub-apostolic Christianity.

(*c*) *The Way of Darkness:* Barn. xx.1 reads:

'But the Way of the Black One is crooked and full of cursing, for it is the way of death eternal with punishment, and in it are the things that destroy their soul: idolatory, frowardness, arrogance of power, hypocrisy, the double heart, adultery, murder, robbery, pride, transgression, fraud, malice, self-sufficiency, enchantments, magic, covetousness, the lack of the fear of God.'

The Qumran list reads:

'But to the spirit of perversity belongs greed, remissness in right doing, wickedness and falsehood, pride and presumption, deception and guile, cruelty and abundant insolence, shortness of temper and profusion of folly, arrogant passion, abominable acts in a spirit of lewdness, filthy ways in the thraldom of unchastity, a blasphemous tongue, blindness of eyes, dullness of ears, stiffness of neck and hardness of heart, to the end that a man walks entirely in ways of darkness and of evil cunning.'

The resemblance here is closer than in the corresponding sections of the Way of Light. We know that the Jews drew up catalogues of sins one of which, known as the *Vidui*, was recited on the Day of Atonement. It is an interesting fact that the *Vidui* list contained twenty-two sins, the same number as

appears in the Qumran way of darkness,[1] in the lists in Rom. 1.29 and Did. v.1; five of the six sins which Rendel Harris[2] thought might belong to the original *Vidui* are found at Qumran. Whatever be the explanation of the connexions between these lists it is clear that the list in the Epistle of Barnabas, which only contains seventeen sins, cannot be *directly* derived from the *Vidui*, although an indirect connexion is not excluded.

(*d*) *The Social Code:*

Both the Epistle and the Manual of Discipline contain a code dealing with social relationships. In Barnabas the slave-master theme, familiar from the social codes underlying the NT Epistles, appears within the Two Ways section. The command to slaves to obey their masters is probably pre-Christian although in Christianity it was given special emphasis as an opportunity for the practice of the *imitatio Christi*. Such social relationships did not apply in the case of the Qumran community, whose members had surrendered their wealth and status on entering the covenant. Accordingly the Qumran Social Code, contained in a section[3] separate from that on the Two Spirits, deals with the relationships appropriate to the members of an exclusive sectarian group. In particular the covenanters are exhorted to obey the decisions of their priests, the sons of Zadok, who have the deciding word in all doctrinal, economic and judicial matters.

The evidence given above does not appear to prove that the author of the Epistle of Barnabas, in his Two Ways section, was *directly* acquainted with the corresponding Qumran version. The differences are too great to be explained in this way. However the Manual of Discipline version is of great value in demonstrating, for the first time, that a written Two Ways manual or expository sermon, containing lists of virtues and vices, was known in Judaism in the pre-Christian era. What had long been suspected is now removed from the realm of conjecture. The resemblances, in general, between the later

[1] There appears to have been some connexion between the beliefs of the sect and those of the Jerusalem Temple, where the *Vidui* originated. See further K. G. Kuhn in *The Scrolls and the N.T.*, ed. K. Stendahl (1958), p. 69.

[2] *The Teaching of the Apostles* (1887), pp. 82-86.

[3] I.QS. v.1-7.

Christian and the earlier Jewish versions are to be explained as due to the vicissitudes of oral and written transmission. We know that in late Judaism instruction was given by the Rabbis and naturally varied in accordance with the audience addressed. Sometimes it took the form of expository discourses, based on passages of the tōrah, delivered in the synagogue service; at other times it formed, with circumcision and baptism, the conditions for the acceptance of a proselyte to Judaism. It is likely that this teaching took the form of a Two Ways discourse described metaphorically as the ways of Light and Darkness. This teaching circulated among the Rabbis in the pre-Christian era in both oral and written forms and one example of the latter is found in I.QS. iii.13-iv.26, an expository sermon which the sect may have taken over from the usage of the synagogue, although the Qumran scribes subsequently worked this over and incorporated into it certain theological ideas of their own. The exact form of this Two Ways teaching probably varied from place to place and teacher to teacher—sometimes it may have contained a code dealing with social relationships. Christianity, which was otherwise heavily indebted to Judaism, as it developed its mission in the Graeco-Roman world took over from the diaspora Jewish forms of ethical instruction. Among these was a Two Ways teaching which may have been known to the early Church in both oral and written forms. One such Jewish written version was the source of the original Greek text of the *De Doctrina Apostolorum* which is now only known in a Latin version. The writer of the Epistle of Barnabas used this Two Ways, which formed the substance of the Greek Doctrina, when compiling the Halakhic section of his work. Thus between the Qumran version and that of Barnabas lies a number of oral and written stages which accounts for the similarities and differences which exist between the two versions.

IV

The evidence given in this article will be variously estimated according to the predisposition of the reader. The parallels do not seem to me to prove a *direct* influence of the Qumran theology on the Epistle of Barnabas. Others may judge differently and believe that some survivors of the Qumran com-

munity came to Alexandria[1] after the destruction of their headquarters in A.D. 68 and there propagated distinctive sectarian doctrines which later became known to the writer of the Epistle. However great caution is needed in estimating the influence of the doctrines of one set of documents on another and it seems best to withhold judgment on this difficult question. In any case the discovery of the scrolls has thrown a flood of new light on the Jewish background of early Christianity and in the study of this fascinating subject we venture to think that the Epistle of Barnabas will repay careful examination. As suggested earlier it appears to reflect closely a mixed type of Judaism which flourished in Alexandria in the early second century A.D. This Judaism had affinities on one side with the Hellenism of Philo yet also embraced doctrines which have now been found on Palestinian soil in the teachings of the Qumran sect. The triumph of Pharisaism was however soon to deal this liberalism a death blow. The Epistle of Barnabas reflects this interesting Jewish background with greater clarity than the NT documents. This is because its writer was less markedly under the influence of the life, teaching and example of Christ than the early Christian writers. In spite of the violence of his anti-Jewish polemic he remained in outlook a Jew and brought with him into the Christian fold the exegetical methods and traditions of the synagogue.

[1] Y. Yadin, *The Message of the Scrolls*, p. 131, asserts that members of the sect lived in the diaspora on the basis of the reference in the War Scroll to the 'wilderness of the peoples'. This, however, is quite uncertain.

THE TEACHING OF CHURCH HISTORY

by The Rev. R. T. HALLIDAY

What does the Church expect of her historians? What kind of person does one imagine when one speaks of a teacher of Church History? Is it too much of a caricature to say that one expects him to be a venerable scholar, steeped in learning, meticulous and perhaps a trifle pedantic, inclined to be sceptical about the motives of men in the ecclesiastical crises of the past, and above all characterised by an academic detachment which can clearly do more good in a library writing books than in a parish in the cure of souls?[1]

What is it that is wrong with the teaching of Church History in the universities and theological colleges of this country? Attendance at classes in Church History is expected as a normal part of the curriculum of any school for the training of men for the Ministry, yet theological students generally regard the subject as a not altogether unpleasant academic study to be undertaken as prescribed by the authorities and then left behind when the practical work of the parish begins. And one suspects that if the departmental discipline were more arduous the protests would be much more numerous, more vocal, and more persistent. What is stranger still is that teachers of Church History similarly seem to lack a conviction of the relevance of their subject, and to acquiesce in the relegation of their subject to a position of tolerated inferiority to the main disciplines of theology and biblical studies. This does not appear to have been the kind of view of Church History held by the early Church.

Perhaps two main sources of this unofficial doctrine of the irrelevance of Church History can be isolated. The first is Christian disunity. The continued existence of a multiplicity of denominations claiming to be part of, or simply to be, the Church has naturally resulted in the growth of denominational traditions. The teaching of the history of the denomination became part of the denominational college's Church History

[1] Any resemblance to any Church Historian known to the author is purely coincidental.

syllabus. Inevitably the loyalty of the teacher to his own tradition produces a certain doctrinal bias in his lectures: 'What this Church has always stood for' is tacitly assumed to be the truth of God, and those denominational precursors who suffered and died for their witness thereto are canonised (in practice where not in theory) as confessors and martyrs of the Church—the Covenanting forefathers of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, the extruded and imprisoned Bishops and priests of the Scottish Episcopal Church after 1689, the Roman Catholic 'English Martyrs', the persecuted pioneers who followed Wesley into unwilling schism, and so on. But the martyrs of the early Church were murdered by the world, not by wrong-headed fellow-Christians: the witness of the confessors was that of the whole Church against the world, not that of a prophetic rebel against a convention-bound Church. Amid a welter of denominational loyalties, Church History has been made a means of asserting the preconceived theological superiority of a denominational tradition, and so the need for a *theological* critique of that tradition is evaded, and the study of Church History is debased beyond recognition. The true perspective of Church History has been lost, and needs to be rediscovered.

The second factor is the almost exclusive prevalence of a radically secular approach to Church History. Church History is seen solely as a specialised branch of 'world history', as the scientific study of the past existence of one institution among many. The best training for a Church Historian is therefore assumed to be a good degree in history, and, while he is expected to be an ordained man, he is not expected to be a theologian of any standing. The consequent divorce of Church History and theology has an important bearing upon that sense of the irrelevance of Church History which is constantly being manifested in such phrases as, 'We live in the twentieth century, not the second.'

No responsible Christian historian or theologian can ignore the valuable work done in the scientific and critical study of the records of the Church's past. Historical accuracy is the only antidote to the religious humbug which thrives, for example, upon the Jenny Geddes legend, or upon the naïve assumption that conditions in the early Church were those of the Garden of Eden. Historical accuracy, too, can contribute

to the destruction of the sectarian pride and prejudice which are partly the cause and partly the result, as noted above, of an over-optimistic and self-righteous account of denominational history. Historical accuracy, indeed, is desirable for its own sake as belonging to the truth of God. But historical accuracy is not enough. The task of the Church Historian is merely prefaced, not finished, when he has given a matter-of-fact, chronological account of what has happened in and to the Church in the last nineteen centuries. For Church History is part of 'salvation-history', and the relation between Church History as a part of 'world history' and Church History as part of 'salvation-history' is that of the history of Israel to the Hebrew interpretation of the history of Israel, i.e. to Old Testament theology. It has been said that to discern the significant in the historical is wisdom. It might also be said that to see the eschatological in the historical is faith. The Church Historian who concentrates exclusively on attempting to give an impartial presentation of the bare facts is falling into the same error as the liberal scholars of Old Testament study who are now criticised for not seeing the wood of biblical theology for the many trees of literary criticism and oriental history.

'The contours of salvation history are subject to normal historical analysis and fit, to the superficial glance, into the categories of historical causation and analogy, but when the ocean of faith flows in they become filled with the dimension of eternity. So the prophets may be accounted for in terms of abnormal psychology, and the events in which Israel was judged or delivered may be fitted into the scheme of historical cause and effect; but . . . there is always in salvation history an enigmatic element to which the historian does violence if he pursues this method.'[1] The Church Historian who is content to treat his subject as a branch of 'world history', to teach the history of Christianity devoid of Christian interpretation, has departed radically from the biblical and patristic view of the history of the chosen people, has perpetuated the schism between Church History and theology, and has neglected to impart that understanding of the importance of history and of the individual within it which is vital to a realistic pastoral and preaching

[1] E. C. Rust, *The Christian Understanding of History* (Lutterworth Press, 1947), p. 76.

ministry. 'Our final interpretation of history . . . is our decision about religion, about our total attitude to things, and about the way we will appropriate life. And it is inseparable from our decision about the role we are going to play ourselves in that very drama of history.'[1] It follows that the Church Historian must be a Christian theologian, having and imparting 'a living insight into the present condition of man in history as containing in itself the meaning of history', by which is meant not 'a completely realised eschatology, brought directly into the sphere of history by the sheer fact of the incarnation', but a Hebraic conviction that 'the right hand of God is here in the life of man in history, and this is where the Word may be encountered'.[2]

There are several dangers implicit in an insistence that Church History is part of salvation-history. One is that of preaching the expansion of the Church in such a way as to invite support for the Church as the winning team instead of commitment to Christ as the living Lord. This was one of Kierkegaard's accusations against the Church of Denmark. No such Historical Proof of the Existence of God can be adduced. But it remains true that, *within* faith in Christ, the history of the expansion of the Church cannot be without theological significance. The Church is hastening to the ends of the earth and to the end of time: *vexilla regis prodeunt.* This insight by no means necessarily implies complacent acquiescence in the Church's human sinfulness.

Another danger is that of identifying salvation-history and the history of the Church. Dr Brunner has warned Church Historians against any theory 'which introduces the concept of Providence in the philosophy of development. God has so ordained it, at least so permitted it, hence such a development must be right.' This kind of reasoning he brands as really 'a mode of the Hegelian principle: "the real is the rational".'[3] There is a certain truth in the principle that antedates Hegel considerably (see Acts 5.38-39), but the assumption cannot be made general unless the Church and the Kingdom of God are precisely co-extensive. As it is, however, Satan is at work upon

[1] Butterfield, *Christianity and History*, p. 25.
[2] R. Gregor Smith, *The New Man* (S.C.M. Press, 1956), pp. 47-48.
[3] *The Misunderstanding of the Church*, p. 41.

the Church as well as the Holy Spirit, and not without success. The freedom of man involves the freedom of God's people to break the Covenant, and in so far as they opt to do so the chosen people are under the judgment of the Kingdom that is in process of coming. Again, since salvation-history concerns the sovereignty of God and its coming, it embraces the history of the world (and of all creation), not just the history of the Church. The very hostility of those who oppose God is made to serve His purpose (Ps. 76.10; Exod. 9.16-17; Isa. 44.28f; John 13.27). And indeed, the Church is not concerned merely with her own history, but is turned outward towards the world: 'the Church does not exist for itself, but for those who do not belong to it.'[1] Salvation-history is more than the history of the Church.

Nevertheless the history of the Church is at the centre of salvation-history. The election of Israel is as central to the NT as it is to the OT (e.g. Rom. 3 and 9). The election of Israel was to missionary instrumentality, not to otiose privilege (and the prophets had to recall Israel from the latter to the former understanding of the recognised event of election). 'Biblical man conceived himself as existing in a particular, unique history which possessed significance because God through it was revealed as in process of redeeming all history.'[2] Now the NT speaks of the Church as continuous with Israel (e.g. Rom. 11, Eph. 2). The Church is the new Israel, the faithful remnant. With this consciousness went a vivid awareness of missionary responsibility. 'The Primitive Church . . . was conscious that every day it was carrying forward the divine redemptive history; it was the instrument of the divine redemptive activity; it was taking part in a process which was as much a redemptive process as that which took place before the incarnation, and as will be the final period which is still to come.'[3]

It is in the Church that men recognise in this way the theological significance of Church History and consciously seek to fulfil their vocation within it. This commitment is the acknowledgment of the Lordship of God, and that is the coming of the Kingdom. It is because the Kingdom comes in this way in the

[1] André de Robert, at a Protestant-Orthodox-Catholic conference at Villemetrie, December 1955. The point was made somewhat earlier by the author of the Book of Jonah.

[2] G. Ernest Wright, *God Who Acts* (S.C.M. Press, 1952), p. 42.

[3] Cullmann, *Christ and Time*, p. 167.

Church that the Church can transform the society or successive societies in which it lives. Thus the history of the Church is at the centre of the history of the world in salvation-history. There is no room here for an unbiblical distinction between a visible and an invisible Church, for that distinction resolves the eschatological tension which God has set at the heart of the Church and at the heart of discipleship. 'The Church, as a community of sinful men in the midst of this world, also lives through a thoroughly secular history, full of illusion, guilt, the struggle for power and all that is transitory. Thus although sacred history and Church history can never coincide, the Church, in spite of her own worldliness, remains the bearer of sacred history within secular history.'[1]

Fr Mascall, therefore, makes two mistakes when he says[2] that 'from the Incarnation onwards the history of the world is the history of the Christian Church', for the history of the world *centres* upon the history of the Church in which the mighty acts that God is doing in the history of the world are acknowledged, and the Incarnation is the mid-point of the process, which has been going on at least since the faithful migration of Abraham. But he is right when he continues, 'and the end to which the whole process is moving is the remaking and gathering together of the whole human race through incorporation into Christ'. In the NT the summons to repentance and faith cannot be separated from the summons to Baptism. Life in Christ is life in His Body, the Church, and though that does not exhaust the meaning of life in Christ, it is indispensable to it. The individualism which is able to interpret the mighty acts of God simply in terms of personal salvation, to conceive of the election of individuals apart from the election of the Church, and to interpret the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers as if it meant the independent priesthood of each believer, is a heresy which is utterly foreign to the Old and New Testaments, and which has been perpetuated by the theological obscurities consequent upon the fragmentation of the Christian people. Baptism is not merely the outward profession of the individual's inward (and saving) faith; it is an act of God the Father in and

[1] H. D. Wendland, in *The Kingdom of God and History*, ed. H. G. Wood, pp. 52-53. Quoted by E. C. Rust, op. cit., p. 266. See also Cullmann, op. cit., pp. 151ff.

[2] *Christ, the Christian, and the Church*, p. 144.

by His elect people, of Christ in and through His Body, of the Holy Spirit in and with His community. And Baptism, the sacrament of incorporation into the Church, is the gate of the Kingdom. Baptism is not an objective guarantee, irrespective of faith and its works, of salvation (and the Catholic doctrine of sacramental efficacy *ex opere operato* could never mean this), yet entry to the Kingdom is through this gate.

The first work of faith, therefore, is to seek Baptism (Acts 2.38, 8.36, 16.30-33), whereby the believer is incorporated into Christ and into His Body, into the new Adam and into the redeemed humanity. The Church exercises a God-given priesthood between God on the one hand and mankind and all creation on the other. This priesthood is conferred by grace in the Divine election of a people. But grace is never given without vocation, and the priesthood of the Church is a missionary ministry, to proclaim to all men the saving acts of God and to seek to incorporate all men into the redeemed humanity of Christ-in-His-Church. 'You are the elect race, the royal priesthood, the consecrated nation, the people who belong to Him, that you may proclaim the wondrous deeds of Him who has called you from darkness to His wonderful light.'[1] It is precisely the knowledge of the centrality of Church History within salvation-history that prevents the believer, in 'his glad acceptance of his Divine election within the election of his people to do the work God has called him to do',[2] from ever regarding himself as an insignificant cog in an impersonal machine or as the helpless victim of a blind or malevolent Fate.

'Thus the meaning and purpose of the present time, between Christ's coming and His coming again, is that in it the Church is to prosecute its apostolic mission of witness to the world. . . . We do not know the times or seasons. But we do know that God has, in the mystery of His mercy, entrusted to His Church a responsibility for making known to all men the salvation which He has wrought. He has made us His ambassadors, beseeching all men to be reconciled to Him. Therefore the answer to our question, "Lord, how long?" is not a theoretical but a practical one. Ye shall be my witnesses. Go ye unto all the world. The Bible compels us to say, what we would not dare to say for ourselves, that God leads the world to its consummation through

[1] 1 Pet. 2.9 (Moffatt). [2] *God Who Acts*, p. 25.

the Apostolate of the Church.'[1] And because of the hostility of the world to the Church's proclamation of the mighty acts—the hostility of the present age to the overlapping age to come—the Church's vocation to ministry and priesthood involves persecution and suffering, after the pattern of the ministry of her Lord.[2]

What is the bearing of all this upon the study and teaching of Church History as a subject? It is that at present the teaching of Church History is done in a way which tries to ignore the 'teaching' the early Church found in Church History. Something is being lost in the attempt to be strictly and solely scientific. There are no such things in historical study as 'bare facts'. Facts are remembered because they are meaningful, and the question is what meaning is to be found in them. 'We habitually use the word "history" in two senses. Generally we mean by history the books that we read, that is, what people tell us about the evidence or about part of the evidence. History it has been said, is not what happened but we happened to remember. But history has another meaning, the past itself as an expression of the mind of man.'[3] A complete objective knowledge of history in the latter sense is utterly unattainable, for only a minute proportion of the totality of past events remains in the corporate memory of mankind, and it is from this selection—already interpreted by society—that the individual historian selects material for analysis and re-interpretation. The impossibility of isolating bare facts from interpretation is conveniently illustrated by the fact that Professor Powicke's last eight words as quoted above are themselves indicative of a particular interpretive approach to the past—one which would be unacceptable to a historical determinist, for example. 'In our day scholars increasingly recognised that there is no such thing as the uninterpreted presentation of past events. The process of selecting, interrelating and understanding what took place in the past involves the scholar in an interpretative procedure. Whether he knows it or not, he must assume certain principles and pass crucial judgments. All history is thus a

[1] Lesslie Newbigin, *The Household of God* (S.C.M. Press, 1953), pp. 138-9.

[2] See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *The Cost of Discipleship*, and T. F. Torrance, *Royal Priesthood* (Scot. Jour. of Theol. Occasional Papers, No. 3, 1955), pp. 82, 83.

[3] F. M. Powicke, *History, Freedom and Religion* (Riddell Memorial Lectures for 1937, O.U.P.), p. 14.

combination of the past event and discerning interpretation.'[1]

There is no excuse at this point for denying the importance of the scientific method in historical research and seeking to substitute interpretation for knowledge. It is not permissible for a Christian historian to short-circuit scientific study by refusing to attribute various historical effects to any historical cause other than the hand of God.[2] God is not to be seen at work *instead of* historical causes, much less (*o infandum!*) in the gaps between known historical causes, but just precisely *in* them. Professor K. S. Latourette seems to be in danger of the latter error when he writes, in the Introduction to his vast history, that he has 'been unable to avoid calling attention from time to time to facts which he regards as insufficiently accounted for on the assumptions of the [anti-supernatural] school of history in which he has been reared'.[3] One may account for the past *entirely* in terms of 'natural' causes (including, unless one is a determinist, creative human initiative). The recognition, as a major factor in history, of the creative power released by religious belief would do nothing to answer the vital question as to whether that belief be true or false. The content of a course of lectures on Church History will be profoundly affected by the historian's decision for a biblical or secularist interpretation: for the importance he attaches to different events and themes will vary accordingly, and this will be reflected in the allocation of time in the course. On the biblical view, it becomes necessary to discuss not only the historical evolution of the Christian Church, but also the Church's understanding of its evolution (which itself has a history).

For example, a great deal of valuable work has been done on the development of the Catholic Ministry, and useful historical criticism has been made of the idea of Apostolic Succession; yet there has been no significant Protestant attempt to evaluate for faith the early Church's interpretation of the development

[1] Floyd V. Filson, *The New Testament Against its Environment* (S.C.M. Press, 1950 etc.), p. 46.

[2] Professor Butterfield recollects 'taking part in a *viva voce* examination in Oxford . . . when we were left completely and permanently baffled by a candidate who ascribed everything to the direct interposition of the Almighty and therefore felt himself excused from the discussion of any intermediate agencies' (*Christianity and History*, p. 20).

[3] *A History of the Expansion of Christianity*, I, p. xvii. Cf. esp. E. C. Rust, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

of the threefold Ministry. Granted that the unbroken tactual succession of Bishops from the Apostles is not only not proven but highly improbable, was the early Church right or wrong in believing the Apostolic Ministry to have devolved upon their bishops, priests, and deacons, and in asserting the importance of tactual succession in the future? It cannot simply be assumed that the crystallisation of the Ministry in that form was a regrettable fossilisation. Value-judgments are similarly required of the gradual establishment of the NT canon, the growth of the creeds out of the apostolic tradition, the formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity, the very rejection of the law and circumcision which transformed the sect of the Nazarenes into the Catholic Church.[1]

The presentation of Church History without reference to grace, the activity of the Holy Spirit, is a departure from the biblical view held by the Church in the first century in favour of a tacitly secularist interpretation which is disguised as an impartial, scientific approach. For the Church to acquiesce in the exposition of her history as if it were the history of one merely human, merely intra-historical institution among many others, would be a radical breach of the Covenant, a denial of the self-disclosure of God in history (Jer. 5.12-14). Dare the Church be content to countenance the teaching of her mere historicity, without reference to the supra-historical within the historical, the eschatological in the ecclesiastical, the pneumatic in the somatic? For the Church to cease to judge, to cease to distinguish between the leading of the Spirit and the snares of the devil, is to seek to withdraw from obedience into impartiality, is to deny the reality of salvation-history and to surrender mankind to the world, the flesh and the devil.

[1] See Brunner's defence of the idea of legitimate development in tradition, *The Misunderstanding of the Church*, pp. 37-39; and note that no amount of merely scientific historical criticism can enable anyone to draw his distinction between 'development' and 'distortion' on p. 39.

ESSAYS IN CHRISTOLOGY FOR KARL BARTH

Edited by T. H. L. Parker

by The Rev. William Nicholls

This is another, and excellent, example of the growing category of *Festschrift*, or birthday-book, in which the birthdays of the eminent are suitably celebrated by a series of essays on subjects connected with that in which they have themselves made their contribution to learning. Thus the gratitude of the eminent man's colleagues enriches scholarship, and the general public is edified. In this case, the eminent one to be celebrated is 'the great white whale' himself, as the Editor pleasingly calls him in his prefatory letter to the volume by an allusion to words of Karl Barth's own in the English preface to the translation of Weber's résumé of the *Church Dogmatics*.

The theological eminence of Karl Barth is evidently much less in dispute in the English-speaking world than was the case ten years earlier, when the last volume of this kind came out in his honour, *Reformation Old and New*, edited by F. W. Camfield. Nor is there the same ignorance of what Barth actually teaches, so that this book, unlike its predecessor, has no need to include any account of Barth's own work, which is now rapidly becoming available in English, thanks in large part to the devoted labours of a team of Scottish-led translators. None the less, it is still very common to read, even from those whose position in scholarship obliges them to be well-informed, attacks upon Barth's teaching, or upon its supposed effects, which do not seem to disclose that the attacker has to any notable degree grasped the nature of Barth's central concerns, whatever may be his acquaintance with the text of his work. It is accordingly both instructive and appropriate that the group of 'younger theologians' who put this book together have decided to make it a series of essays in Christology, for it is surely in the pre-eminence of Christology, and not in the mere negation of what is thereby relegated to a subordinate position, that Barth's own real concern as a mature theologian lies.

Once this central concern has been grasped, it is easy to see that those who accept the same discipline for themselves need not take the trouble to deny that they are Barthians, or to quote the master's own well-known pleasantries about his self-appointed disciples. The pre-eminence that Barth assigns to Christology is just what is most classical, and ecumenical, in his position, and it is this that has made his work fertile, not only in his own communion, but amongst

Romans, Anglicans, Lutherans and perhaps even some of the younger Orthodox. (Indeed, it is possibly to be regretted in this connexion that no essay in the volume comes from a Roman Catholic source.) It is this, too, which has made Karl Barth a great witness to Christian truth in circumstances where such a witness was both perilous and crucial to make, as we are well reminded by the extract from the Barmen declaration which forms the epigraph to the book.

The subject matter, as well as the quality, of these essays provokes reflection upon the influence of Karl Barth on British theologians. Thus, the dozen essays in this volume range over more or less the whole field of systematic theology, with a natural stress upon dogmatic questions, and especially those in which the christological discipline might be expected to bear fresh fruit. Here at once, though no special attention is drawn to it, if I am not mistaken, in the volume under review, is one of the principal results of Barth's work. Dogmatics, that is, that part of systematic theology which endeavours to present the content of Christian doctrine in an intelligible and scientific form, had almost disappeared from the theological world in Britain, under the influence of the liberal reduction of theology to a branch of historical studies. Indeed, surprising as it may be to theologians working in other countries, to this day dogmatics is not taught in English universities, except as a historical subject, comparable with biblical criticism or church history. If there are now a few voices raised to question the rightness of this eclipse of dogmatics, once regarded as the centre and apex of the theological scheme, and if scholars are again prepared to devote their spare time, since outside Scottish University divinity faculties they cannot in Britain well devote their teaching or research time, to work on dogmatic questions, it is largely because Karl Barth has again made dogmatics intellectually respectable, at least in the eyes of the theologically discerning. He has done this very simply, through his often-expressed insight that dogmatics is *a critical science*, as well as by the immensity of his own labours in the field. Dogmatics cannot today, if indeed it ever could, consist of the untrammeled speculations of the Christian consciousness. It is an objective discipline, subject, like all other disciplines, to appropriate norms and criteria of truth, and its practice requires a discipline of mind equal to that demanded of the historical theologian, and indeed in the last resort necessary to him too, if his own study is to be fully objective so far as objectivity is possible to man. Dogmatics, like all other disciplines today, must undergo the purgation of theocritical method, with its healthy stress upon the need for an empirical grounding for all statements that are made. At least dogmatics cannot now evade

the question, how do you know that to be true? Probably only Karl Barth's own insight of the centrality and critical function of Christology in Christian thought could have made the rehabilitation of dogmatics possible in so empirically minded an age.

The revival of dogmatics, of which in this country there are still at most foretastes and harbingers, comes at an opportune moment. 'Biblical theology', the offspring of the critical study of the Bible, is beginning to disclose its own ambiguity, as something rather like what it did in patristic times. Under its respectable umbrella has gathered much contemporary Christian thought, some of it perhaps not altogether deserving of the titles, 'biblical', or 'theology'. Some of it, indeed, is exegetically and philosophically somewhat questionable, but the use of 'biblical' or 'Hebraic' 'categories' disarms much criticism. The trouble is that 'biblical theology', unless it is defined as carefully as it is in the first essay in this volume, can easily escape from the two exact disciplines that are properly adjacent to it in the theological scheme, exegesis on the one hand, with its insistence upon the original meaning of the author's words, and dogmatics on the other, with its grasp of the unity and priority of the revelation in Christ, and of the way in which all other doctrines must be corrected by it.

In fact, 'biblical theology' has surely become something equivocal, a way of doing dogmatics while not seeming to do so, a way, which, it is presumably hoped, will give the learned world the impression that 'scientific objectivity' is being maintained, and no awkward dogmas, still less dogmatism, being introduced, while escaping, in a manner which is hardly professional, the proper discipline, both doctrinal, historical and philosophical, that dogmatics itself entails. If, however, we are to learn again to practise this most searching and glorious of all the traditional theological disciplines, we shall no doubt have to take Barth as one of our principal teachers, and learn from him both a method, and a respect for tradition and the Fathers, as well as Holy Scripture itself, which will show us why it is not enough to use biblical terms, as it proved not to be enough at the time of Nicaea, and why we must be more philosophically sensitive and critical than the 'existentialist' and 'personalist' 'biblical theologians' of today. And, as we have said, all this in no way implies that we must all become Barthians, with our conclusions prescribed in advance by the master's own findings. Professor Torrance's essay, which stands first in this book, will sketch out for many an outline of the work which might be constructed on such foundations. It is already notable for the implied correction of old and unbalanced denominational positions, whether popular or well-founded in official teaching, which will clearly be brought about

wherever the Christological criticism of doctrine is pursued. Particularly valuable in this connexion is Professor Torrance's emphasis upon the manhood of Christ and its implications.

To assign such a position to Christology implies, of course, that a far-reaching decision has been taken to accept, at least in general terms, the Christology of the Councils as a valid interpretation of the New Testament evidence. It is interesting to note how much more assent this acceptance wins from British theologians today than a quarter of a century ago. Here, perhaps, the influence of Barth is not especially to be discerned, except in so far as his own early work is one of several sources of the reconsideration by contemporary theologians of many assumptions that their liberal predecessors took for granted. The recent publication by Professor Alan Richardson of a major work on the theology of the New Testament is an indication of how far New Testament theologians are now prepared to go, both in admitting the legitimacy of a systematic treatment of the New Testament teaching, and in regarding the tradition of the early Church, as it has been preserved for us in the decisions of the Ecumenical Councils, and in the writings of the Fathers, as important evidence for the faith of the Apostolic Church itself.

The theological renaissance in the midst of which we live, and of which Barth is one of the leaders, began in renewed understanding of the theological message of the Bible. It is now evidently proceeding to rediscover the Fathers, and here Karl Barth's own unequivocal rejection of many widely repeated but none the less unfounded clichés about the unbiblical character of patristic thought has contributed much to the willingness, which can be observed growing in Protestant circles, to take the Fathers seriously as guides to Christian truth. It seems, moreover, probable that the characteristic insight of the primacy of Christology, to which the authors of this book in differing ways bear witness, will also influence the strictly historical study of the Fathers, by shedding fresh light upon their method of thought. In the present volume, Professor Haire's essay, 'On Behalf of Chalcedon', bears witness to this revived Protestant interest in the thought of the Fathers. As he reminds us, it is not long since the phrase, 'the bankruptcy of Chalcedon', was common coin. Today even those who are unsatisfied with the actual terms of the Chalcedonian formula are prepared to regard it with respect as an attempt to express the Christological mystery; they no longer see it as merely an unacceptable Hellenistic rationalization of the living unity of the Incarnate Lord. More surprising still, in the perspective of the recent history of theology in this country, is the readiness of several contributors to this volume, taught by Karl Barth himself, to make use not only of the Chalcedonian formula,

but even of later Byzantine reflection upon its implications, in the form of the terms, *anhypostasia* and *enhypostasia* as guides and criteria in their own theological work.

This classical and patristic quality of Barth's work, superficially so surprising if one thinks of him as the archbiblicist, but most striking to the unprejudiced reader of his work, is no doubt the secret of his ecumenical influence. Barth is not normally thought of as a theologian of the ecumenical movement. His own utterances on ecumenical subjects have shown much more interest in persuading the existing churches to 'draw near to Christ', and so to become 'the real Church', than in the details of comparative ecclesiology or reunion schemes. His one famous incursion into ecumenical controversy at Amsterdam, recorded in the volume of preparatory essays, resembles his work on Baptism in not revealing him at his surest as a dogmatic theologian, though it is said on the other hand that he was also in large degree responsible for the dialectical method of seeking agreements in disagreements, and disagreements in agreements, which seems to have been fruitful at Amsterdam itself, though not much employed since. It is rather when he sticks to his own dogmatic last that Barth becomes an ecumenical theologian. For here he shows the way back to our common origins in the Apostolic Tradition, and in that later ecclesiastical tradition that continued to preserve it more faithfully than Protestant theologians have until recently been accustomed to suppose, and so he takes us behind our denominational disputes to the great doctrines which alone give them even partial relevance and justification, and in which alone they can find resolution.

When he does this, and speaks simply as a theologian of the Church, expounding the faith he has received, he becomes an inspiration even to those of quite different traditions, who could by no means follow him in the details of his exposition of the Reformed faith. This is no doubt the reason for the interest he has aroused in some of the best of contemporary Roman Catholic theologians, notably Hans Urs v. Balthasar, whose work is referred to in the last essay in the present volume. Roman Catholic theologians see in Karl Barth not only the supremely authoritative interpreter of Protestants who look to other teachers, but also as someone who in large degree speaks a common theological language with themselves, as someone with whom a genuine and therefore fruitful conversation is possible.

In quite another way, Barth has exerted an ecumenical influence out of all proportion to his personal contribution to ecumenical discussion through his principle of the correction of other doctrines by Christology, already referred to. For it was when at Lund in 1952

theologians of several different traditions joined together in urging this idea upon a somewhat deadlocked conference that the possibility of real progress in Faith and Order began to emerge, and this central insight is now being followed up, both in the long-term work of a Theological Commission, and in certain publications by its members on both sides of the Atlantic, and by other interested theologians. In the present volume, this kind of influence is to be noticed at several points, particularly in the essays by Professors Reid, Cairns and Jenkins, as well as in the massive opening essay by Professor Torrance, who of all theologians in Europe has perhaps carried this idea furthest and most systematically.

There is, however, another side of Karl Barth which seems to have had much less influence on the composition of this volume, and this is, in my opinion, a misfortune. Barth is a *pastoral* theologian; that is, his dogmatic work exists for the sake of the Gospel, and of the ordinary men and women who are to hear it through the proclamation of the Church, which dogmatic theology serves by performing a critical function towards it. For this reason Karl Barth is at bottom a *contemporary* theologian, and not just a re-stater of traditional truths, traditionally expressed. The design of his dogmatic work, classical as it indeed is, responds to the spiritual condition of the people of our time. In fact, he has recently been reproached for this, with acute insight, if with insufficient sympathy, by the Lund theologian Gustaf Wingren, in his *Theology in Conflict*. Wingren, writing from a more traditional Lutheran position, charges Barth with having forgotten the biblical teaching about the Law which is written in all men's hearts, so that they are without excuse before God. Barth instead picks up a complementary facet of biblical theology, and recognises that contemporary people find God unknown, and that the knowledge of God must be brought to them through the revelation in Christ before they can know anything of the problems of the relationship of God and man with which the Law and the Gospel deal. It is for this reason too that Barth inverts the traditional order of Law and Gospel, which Wingren wishes to restore, and places the Gospel first. Barth is not therefore primarily to be seen, as he so often is, as the puller down of human pretensions, the great breaker of the idols of metaphysics and natural theology. Rather does he identify himself with the agnosticism of modern man, in all its philosophical purity and modesty, and refuse to offer men a way to God which they cannot accept because of the unavailability to them of the rational grounds on which belief was formerly defended. In making belief stand strictly in revelation and faith, Barth offers a way which need not necessarily compromise the integrity of present-day people in their striving to use language which has been properly

criticized and tested, though it is indeed possible to wonder whether in the next period those who seek to build on the foundations of Barth's recovery of the Gospel will not have to wrestle with the problem of language at an even deeper level than Barth himself has found it necessary to do. In any case, there is nothing irrational in Barth's procedure, once it is understood. It is no inconsistency, but of the essence of his method, that Barth so largely employs reason in defence of his so-called irrationality.

This contemporaneity, as I have called it, of Barth's theology seems to have received less attention in this country than it might have. Indeed, it has sometimes seemed, and there are subordinate aspects of even the present volume which might seem to lend faint colour to the suspicion, that Barth's influence has proved more reactionary than his actual teaching. It would be the profoundest pity if Barth's rehabilitation of a theology based on the Gospel were to be used merely to bolster up a conservative position in theology, which could not meet the pastoral needs of the proclamation of the Gospel in our time. The reviewer, as a Chaplain to students, who reflect so sensitively the spiritual situation in which we have to preach the Gospel, can bear witness to the fact that orthodoxy is not enough, even though the orthodoxy is of the breadth and range and balance which Barth can teach.

The problem is not to be identified solely with that of theological terminology, as if the problem were simply one of translation, as those who speak of the 'problem of communication' are apt to suppose. There is no difficulty in seeing that theology, like any other discipline, generates a technical vocabulary, and that it would be condemned to imprecision if it did not do so. It is of interest, however, that although Barth has no hesitation in employing the full vocabulary of traditional theology, as well as some newer expressions which have become technical for him, he uses it in a characteristically lively way, mixed with more conversational and even slangy expressions, at least in his smaller works, which reflect more closely the spoken style. In this he shows an awareness of those who will hear what he has to say which the theologian ought not to neglect. The theologian has the right and the duty to give his work all the precision that a technical vocabulary can offer him, but he ought also to evince an awareness, to put the matter as mildly as possible, that the language of traditional theology creates for most people today a difficulty which goes far beyond the fact that they have not yet heard of certain technical terms. A technical term can easily be explained, provided it belongs within the universe in which the hearer's mind operates. If it does not, the simplest translation will remain unintelligible to him.

It seems inescapably true that, if theology in the second half of the twentieth century is to be worthy of men of the calibre of Barth, it will not be sufficient to repeat what Barth has said, or to develop his theology in directions he had not the time to explore. Unfortunately, a schism seems rapidly to be developing, and perhaps not least strikingly in Scotland, land of passionate conviction and therefore of separations, between those whose primary concern is to articulate the traditional understanding of the Gospel, along paths mapped out by Barth, and those others, for whom Bultmann and Bonhoeffer are more characteristically the prophets, who wish to identify themselves with their contemporaries in order to preach the Gospel to them. If the massive achievement of Barth is not in the end to be left behind by the changes in the culture of men, so that it becomes simply a monument to past faithfulness, and not the inspiration of a living proclamation to the men of today and tomorrow, it will be necessary to heal this schism.

It is perhaps not altogether a true reflection of the concerns of the contributors to this volume that it shows little sign of a wish to leave the Christian 'ghetto' and engage our fellow-men in conversation in the Holy Spirit. It is not that the essayists use terms which would require explanation outside theological circles; as we have said, vocabulary is one thing, language another. It is rather that they have, with almost complete unanimity, chosen to write of subjects, and in a fashion, that belong to the inner life of the Church. Whatever one may know of the contributors from external evidence, this book does not (with significant exceptions of which more will be said in a moment) suggest that they would be at home wrestling, alongside Barth himself, with the problems of the life of the Church in a communist society, where politics begins the moment you open the Church door. We do not find in this volume an essay on the implications of Christology for the nuclear deterrent, or for the personal anxiety which is endemic in Western society. Yet there can be no doubt both that Christology has such implications, and that Karl Barth himself is well aware of them. Nor does one feel, though one may be wrong, that the 'Christological humanism' of the later Barth, with its implications for the whole life of man outside the sphere of 'religion', has much excited the majority of these writers. Where Barth himself might show the way to a reintegration of the liberal insights and concerns back into the authentic Gospel of redemption, and to grounding the liberal spirit in the freedom that the Gospel alone can gaurantee, his followers seem more anxious to continue the increasingly unnecessary polemic against the weaknesses of liberal theology. There is a danger of being on the wrong side if we continue to fight old battles after they have been won.

For these and other reasons, the essay which seemed to the reviewer to be the most appropriate and welcome of all these tributes to the influence and inspiration of Karl Barth was the last, on *Philosophy and Christology*, by Professor D. M. MacKinnon. Professor MacKinnon, as an Anglo-Catholic (if the word is still permitted, for here too the danger may be of fighting by-gone battles), is perhaps the furthest of all these writers from taking Barth *au pied de la lettre*. But if what we have just been saying of Barth is at all justified, he, along with Dr Whitehouse, whose essay on Creation is of the greatest interest in the light of these reflections, is the nearest of all the contributors to Barth's own concerns. His article is of major importance as a testimony to the nature of Christian existence for an educated person in our time. It is characteristic of Professor MacKinnon that he does not allow himself defences against the truth, and especially does he forbid himself the enervating defence of premature clarity. For this reason some find his writings confusing and obscure, but such readers are those who will not follow him in his search for honesty and precision. To those who are willing as they read to share this discipline with him, his writing has the clarity that comes from touching the nerve of the problem under discussion. His reflections here upon the complex relations of Christology and contemporary philosophy, illuminated by analogies taken from theology, both historical and dogmatic, from the experiences of persons who undergo psycho-analysis, and above all and most profoundly from the ascetic and mystical life of those who are set by Baptism upon Christ's way, display a spiritual and intellectual integrity, exactness and honesty that are in their smaller compass a worthy response to Barth's own. If he also resembles Barth in an occasional harshness of judgment upon those who will not measure up to his own standards of integrity, this is something he can be forgiven. The book is worth buying for this essay alone, and we have, it is to be hoped, made it clear that this is by no means the only good thing in it.

It remains to say that other readers have evidently found the book as valuable and provocative of reflection as ourselves, since, as we have been told, in the interval, for the length of which we humbly apologise, between the publication of the book and the appearance of this review, the book has gone out of print. Perhaps the appearance of these reflections will encourage the publishers to reprint the book, for it is one that ought to be available continuously. When they do so, perhaps they will consider furnishing readers with an index, and also correcting a fairly large, though probably not exhaustive, list of typographical errors that we shall be glad to pass on to them.

BOOK REVIEWS

Dogmatics. By HERMANN DIEM. Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1959. Pp. 375. 30s.

Der irdische Jesus und der Christus des Glaubens. By HERMANN DIEM. J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Tübingen, 1947. Pp. 20. DM. 1.90.

DIEM'S *Dogmatics* has a depth of scholarship and richness of content that make it one of the most important works in dogmatics in recent years. However, it is scarcely a book for beginners, for it presupposes acquaintance with much theological literature. Diem's own views are presented in subtle dialogue and debate with the theologians whose positions he examines. He wishes to show how a proper understanding of the function of dogmatics avoids on the one hand a dissolution of the object of faith into the form of faith and, on the other hand, avoids a fusion of exegesis and dogma characteristic of Roman Catholicism.

The dissolution of dogma on the contemporary scene Diem associates primarily with Bultmann, whose understanding of the kerygma means that the inner life of the believer takes precedence over the concept of faith. The *fides quae creditur* and *fides qua creditur* merge into a common ground. From this point of view there is really no longer any distinction between exegesis and dogma because there can be no objective conceptualisation and systematic understanding of the truth realised only in moments of personal self-understanding,

The existentialist dissolution of dogma into this self-understanding Diem traces to the influence of Kierkegaard, though with right he indicates clearly that Kierkegaard is not to be identified with this position. Diem could have shown even more fully that there is a development in Kierkegaard's own view in respect of the historical object of faith when we compare *Philosophical Fragments* with *Training in Christianity*. Whereas in the former, the objective structure of faith is assimilated into the sheer fact of paradoxicality itself, in the latter work it is the biblical picture of Jesus Christ that occasions faith. In other words, faith is confronted by a definite history with its own content. However, Diem shows that the distinction between the paradox of the God-man and the appropriation in faith of this primary event is blurred and indeed obliterated in the existentialist interchangeability of kerygma and faith which fails to allow preponderance to an objective factuality and givenness in the saving event itself.

Diem also criticises the fusion between exegetical and dogmatic statements in Roman Catholic theology, where the period of revelation is extended to cover the history of the Church itself so that neither the event of the incarnation nor the canon of Scripture is considered qualitatively distinct from the later tradition of the Church. Diem sees Schlier as an exponent of the Roman Catholic view according to which the decisions of the Church's *magisterium* are final '. . . The Roman Church . . . knows very well what it is doing when it regards preaching as unessential to the life of Church worship' (p. 110). Diem indicates how the Roman Catholic claim that its magisterially defined teaching arises out of the deposit of the Church's tradition allows an uncritical development in which the Mariological dogma actually forces the text of Scripture to say something which is radically opposed to its intrinsic meaning (p. 354f).

By means of his conception of kerygma, paradosis, canon and dogma, Diem argues against the Roman Catholic conception of dogmatics as the unfolding of revealed truth immanent in the Church, and against the neo-Protestant conception of *Glaubenslehre* as the expression of the inner life of faith itself. In his *Der irdische Jesus und der Christus des Glaubens*, Diem makes clear the importance of kerygma for a proper understanding of the New Testament. We may not go behind the kerygma to seek a basis for faith, but we cannot overlook the fact that the kerygma proclaims the actual occurrence of a specific saving faith (p. 9). The kerygma, properly understood, reveals the whole content of the Gospel message which flows from the actual history of Jesus Christ. Diem's basic contention in this book is that the faith of the primitive Church depends for its validity on the identity of the Lord it proclaims with the earthly Jesus (p. 19). Diem's interpretation of the historical Jesus has affinity with that advanced by Kähler who denies that it is the purpose of the Gospels to serve as a scientifically constructed biography of Jesus. Their intent is to awaken faith in Jesus through the concrete proclamation of His saving activity. Kähler argues that the reconstruction of a *Leben-Jesu* behind the Gospels is really an abstraction for which no sound warrant exists, given the actual character of the New Testament witness. Efforts to reconstruct a historical Jesus behind the Gospels cannot compass that which is really determinative of the whole: the resurrection. Kähler insists that a proper study of the Gospels will recognise this and will provide a method of interpretation which takes the fact of revelation into account as a presupposition. (*Der sogenannte historische Jesus und der geschichtliche biblische Christus*, 2nd ed., Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1896, pp. 66ff). Diem, like Kähler, insists that the historical factuality of

the sort which concerns us in the Gospels involves the reality of the divine revelation mediated to us in and through the historical reality.

Der irdische Jesus und der Christus des Glaubens raises a basic question which Diem poses even more effectively in his *Dogmatics*: Was Jesus in reality the one whom the kerygma proclaimed Him to be, or was it only the kerygma which invested Him with such claims? Whereas the answer to the question concerning Jesus' messianic self-consciousness is usually felt to depend on the question of the relation of the preaching of the first Christians to that of Jesus Himself, this question ought to be seen in connexion with the implications of Jesus's preaching as a whole. The Gospels represent Jesus as the One who in His preaching proclaims Himself. What the Messianic titles imply in their application to Jesus cannot be understood from the titles themselves, but only from a study of Jesus's preaching as a whole (*Dogmatics*, p. 133; the remaining page references in Diem are to his *Dogmatics*). Diem's analysis exposes the inadequacy of an approach to Christology by inferences derived from psychological reconstruction of Jesus's self-consciousness. The real nature of Christ's person does not stand somehow ineffably behind His actual words and deeds but is concretely embodied in them. Diem's position contains an implicit criticism of such a view as that advanced by Cullmann in his *Die Christologie des Neuen Testaments*, where Cullmann tends to speak of the life of Jesus and His self-consciousness as though these were interchangeable terms.

Diem asks whether Barth does not overlook the distinction between the history of Jesus Himself and the witness of Scripture to Him (p. 146). Further important aspects of Barth's Christology have become available since Diem's work was first published in 1955. Barth makes clear the manner in which the history of Jesus in its wholeness is the content of revelation by means of which tradition and dogma are to be articulated and critically tested. It is Barth's conception of 'Gospel history' (*Evangelische Geschichte*) rather than simply the Word of God which forms the basic norm for dogmatics. A fuller appraisal of Barth's own interpretation of the kerygma as that activity of proclamation of which Jesus is both the subject and the object is needed. (See especially *C.D.* IV/2, p. 196f.) Barth's interpretation, 'The Royal Man', is an effort to show how the unity of what is denoted in the New Testament concept of kerygma consists in the convergence of what Jesus proclaimed and the Gospel that proclaimed Him.

To the history of Jesus Himself there corresponds a history of the preaching about Him, which becomes also a human history of transmission, so that we can say that the Church has a history of

relations with Christ, the history of the proclamation and response to the evidence of Christ's own history.

Diem shows that the rise of the *paradosis* is not the beginning of a deviation, for the idea of tradition stands in indissoluble connexion with the New Testament, so long as the teaching of this tradition is a development within the framework or the Gospel proclamation. κηρύσσειν and διδάσκειν belong together. Diem exposes one of the defects of the *formgeschichtliche* method: it has taken too little notice of the relevant analogies in the Palestinian conception of *paradosis*, and their significance for the understanding of the transmission of the Gospel history itself. Jesus does not overthrow doctrinal teaching, but corrects the corruption of *paradosis* for which the Rabbis became responsible, inasmuch as they treated their tradition of the Torah as an absolute. Jesus restores the *paradosis* to its place within the pattern of the Covenant itself. Jesus becomes the subject of the tradition and His Church is built up by its delivery from one human hand to another. While the Apostles became the bearers of the *paradosis*, this does not mean that the Christian *paradosis* is to take the form of a Scribal orthodoxy. Christ by reason of His resurrection remains Lord of the tradition, and hence the tradition has eschatological significance. The *paradosis* is ultimately maintained and validated by the Lord Himself who acts in and through the human delivery. Thus we are to think of *paradosis* in terms of *traditum* and *actus tradendi*. Further, there is no apostolic paradosis which replaces the one-for-all event of the incarnational *paradosis*, i.e. the whole movement in which God has given Himself to man by entering into the place of man and offering up Himself on man's behalf.

The meaning of the canon as the demarcation of the Scriptural *paradosis* lies in the recognition that the Church has heard the Word of God in the proclamation of the witnesses in the canon. The fact of the canon protects interpretation from arbitrary judgments and from the danger of its own preconceptions that might prevent the texts from speaking for themselves (p. 236). The canon is in a process of continual incorporation into the thought of the Church, in so far as the Bible is understood afresh, explained and interpreted. A proper critico-historical approach to Scripture has actually helped to give us a better understanding of the Bible in the multiplicity of its testimony and the concrete humanity of its witnesses.

Arduous exegetical study is the foundation for real theological work. Diem shows that dogmatics exists as a discipline in the process of listening to the Scriptures, in which the various aspects of exegesis are shown to be compatible and help to provide for us actual orientation to the texts themselves. Reflection on the explication of Scriptural exegesis engenders a scheme of interpretation in which doctrine

achieves an inner coherence. Diem illustrates how dogma serves exegesis by reference to the doctrine of predestination, Christ's return from Hell, and His ascension. These examples make clear that dogmas do not invoke isolated texts as *dicta probantia*, but rest upon the testimony of Scripture and are congruous with this testimony taken as a whole.

A fuller consideration needs to be given to the utilisation of philosophical categories in dogmatic discourse. It is Barth who clearly indicates that dogmatics must have the freedom to use philosophical concepts in taking up questions and concerns which cannot be answered directly either by individual Scriptural phrases or by reference only to biblical thought. However, this does not mean that a philosophical framework should become determinative as such for our statement of dogmatic truth. This is the danger to which Tillich's work succumbs, for in Tillich the conceptualisation of theology has its essential content in philosophical expression which articulates the meaning of what in the kerygma and event of proclamation is only symbol and myth. This is actually another form of the dissolution of the distinctive task of dogmatics itself. Diem might well have made reference to it, for he shows us that dogmatics involves its own mode of rationality, in which appropriate concepts are engendered by obedient reflection on the object with which theology has to deal. DANIEL DEEGAN

Religion and Culture: Essays in honour of Paul Tillich. Edited by WALTER LEIBRECHT. S.C.M. Press, London, 1958. Pp. 400. 45s.

PAUL TILLICH, fully active and vigorous in his seventy-fourth year, stands in unchallenged pre-eminence in the field of Protestant philosophical theology. The essays in this volume, representing as strong a concentration of the leading theologians of our day as have yet collaborated within the covers of one book, are published in Tillich's honour. They are not discussions of his thought, but independent papers on a wide variety of subjects—including theology, art, psychiatry, politics, semantics, history, philosophy, the life of the Church, and the culture of the East—each of which topics, however, has its place both on the map of Tillich's interests and in the twenty-nine pages of the Tillich bibliography which this volume usefully includes.

To review such a collection of essays is virtually impossible. Each paper is a distinct work from a different pen, and would require separate comment. The most useful service that I can render the reader is to list in full the contents of the book.

The editor, Walter Leibrecht (Director of the Evanston Institute

of Ecumenical Studies), opens with an introductory paper on 'The Life and Mind of Paul Tillich'. This is an illuminating, but almost entirely non-crtitical, exposition. The next three essays are by the psychiatrist Erich Fromm on 'The Limitations and Dangers of Psychology'; by Karl Jaspers on 'The Individual and Mass Society'; and by Reinhold Niebuhr on 'Biblical Faith and Socialism: a Critical Appraisal'. The following section consists of Karl Barth's delightful panegyric of Mozart, to whose music, he says, he listens every morning before turning his attention to his *Dogmatik*; and Nels Ferré on 'Presuppositions for a Creative Culture'. Stanley Hopper of Drew University opens another group of papers with 'The Modern Diogenes: A Kierkegaardian Crotchet'; followed by two Roman Catholic contributors (both Jesuits), Erich Przywara of Münich on 'Christian Root-Terms: *Kerygma*, *Mysterium*, *Kairos*, *Oikonomia*', and Gustave Weigel, one of America's leading Roman Catholic theologians, on 'Myth, Symbol and Analogy'. (This is one of the most valuable papers in the volume, and highly relevant to the American theological situation.) In the next section Heinrich Bornkamm of Heidelberg writes on 'Faith and Reason in the Thought of Erasmus and Luther'; followed by Georges Florovsky, Professor of Eastern Orthodox Church History at Harvard, on 'The Predicament of the Christian Historian'; the American philosophical theologian Charles Hartshorne on 'A Philosopher's Assessment of Christianity'; Karl Heim on 'Christian Faith and the Growing Power of Secularism'; Karl Loewith of Heidelberg on 'Knowledge and Faith: From the Pre-Socratics to Heidegger'; and Gabriel Marcel on 'God and Causality'.

Having absorbed all these contributions the reader is gorged with good things. But when he returns with renewed appetite he finds that there is equally rich fare to come. James Luther Adams of Harvard discusses 'Rudolf Sohm's Theology of Law and the Spirit'. There follow Rudolf Bultmann on 'Preaching: Genuine and Secularised'; Paul Lehmann of Harvard on 'Religion, Power and Christian Faith'; Kurt Leese of Hamburg on 'The Church of the Future and the Homeless Man of Today: The Vision of Friedrich Naumann'; and Wilhelm Pauck, of Union Theological Seminary, New York, on 'Theology in the Life of Contemporary American Protestantism'. The next section contains Emil Brunner describing 'A Unique Christian Mission: The Mukyokai (Non-Church) Movement in Japan', and Yoshinori Takeuchi, a Buddhist philosopher, writing thought-provokingly on 'Buddhism and Existentialism: The Dialogue between Oriental and Occidental Thought'. Finally, turning to tensions on the current world scene, John C. Bennett writes on 'The Demand for Freedom and Justice in the Contem-

porary World Revolution'; Helmut Thielicke on 'Christians and the Prevention of War in an Atomic Age'; and Charles Malik on 'The Spiritual Significance of the United Nations'.

That the writers should, with two exceptions, be either Germans or Americans (whether by birth or naturalisation) is to be expected, since Tillich's life has been lived in Germany and the United States. It would, however, have been interesting to have included a Jewish scholar; and also a secular philosopher—Hartshorne and Jaspers occupy chairs of philosophy, but both are essentially theologians.

All that needs to be added is that the contributions are each of the kind and quality characteristic of their respective authors. The editor is to be congratulated on having assembled a collection of essays of such varied interest and uniform distinction.

JOHN HICK

Existentialism and Religious Belief. By DAVID E. ROBERTS. Oxford University Press, New York, 1957. Pp. 195. $5.00.

DAVID ROBERTS was Professor of the Philosophy of Religion at Union Theological Seminary, and had prepared this book long before his untimely death in January 1955. In fact I recollect hearing most of it in lecture form during 1952 and 1953. However, as the book reveals, he was a painstaking scholar and evidently was too critical of his own work to succumb to the popular demand that he publish what everyone knew was ready. The book is a study of existentialist philosophies beginning with Pascal. The philosophers examined are: Pascal, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre, Jaspers and Marcel. Apart from Kierkegaard, to whom two chapters are devoted, each is the subject of a chapter. The introduction and the conclusion represent material written for other purposes which has been reworked and expanded to make an appropriate beginning and end to the book. The whole book has been extremely well edited by Professor Roger Hazelton (the editing seems to have consisted mostly in choosing between four or five versions of each chapter or in piecing the versions together).

Roberts begins by repudiating the idea that existentialism means Sartre's particular brand of nihilism and insists that it began as a frankly Christian mode of thinking. Indeed the thesis of the book—if one may so describe the point of view the author displays—is that what is valuable and illuminating in existentialism can be held in perspective within the Christian faith, but, when sundered from such faith, these emphases become 'particularly vivid expressions of the spiritual disintegration of our age'. The chief value of existentialism for the author is that of being a corrective. It is never very clear, however, what is to be corrected; nor are we told what the

philosophical underbrush is which will thus be cleared. Indeed what the book lacks is a clear vision of the philosophical significance of existentialism, and this may well be because the author's conception of philosophy is at least one-sided and possibly even outmoded. One feels this especially with regard to Kierkegaard, for Kierkegaard's contribution to philosophy is hardly mentioned and to talk of Kierkegaard as an irrationalist is merely to multiply confusion. Similarly, when judged from this point of view, the treatment of Pascal, another genius whose philosophical significance is now widely admitted, is weak. Yet it must be admitted that the book is extremely informative. The chapter on Heidegger boldly attempts to translate some of Heidegger's more mystifying language, and the attempt is successful. For though Roberts is blind to the fact that Heidegger talks a lot of nonsense about metaphysics he does make clear Heidegger's illuminating insights into the insecurity of the modern denial of metaphysics. Illuminating too is his own suggestion that there are important similarities between Heidegger's ontology and mysticism: 'For him (i.e. the mystic) too man is thrown into an alien world, but in the course of this brief transit which leads inexorably to death, he may discover that existence is a pilgrimage and a vocation' (p. 189). Equally full and useful are the chapters on Sartre and Jaspers where the author examines the denial of the possibility of a theism which could meet Heidegger's criticism. Perhaps the best chapter is that on Marcel, for clearly the author felt a profound sympathy for his Christian existentialism. He endorses Marcel's emphasis on the rationality of faith and the possibility of group relations in religion as well as the possibility of a new sort of metaphysics.

This survey of existentialism is a valuable addition to the mass of books on this contemporary phenomenon inasmuch as it is both full and yet selective. It deals with its subject, as the title suggests, from the standpoint of the religious encounter with existentialism, and is indeed, despite its one-sided metaphysics, a powerful presentation of the claim existentialism rightfully exerts on religious people and their response to it. J. Heywood Thomas

The Gospel of the Incarnation. By George S. Hendry. Westminster Press, Philadelphia. Pp. 174. $3.75; and S.C.M. Press.

This book, containing the Croall Lectures for 1951, is not a systematic treatise on the doctrine of the Incarnation, but an essay with a distinct, and timely, thesis.

Dr Hendry's concern is for what might be called an ecumenical Christology. He shows how the several Christian traditions have each attached special importance to some one aspect of the total fact

of Christ, to the comparative disregard of other aspects; and 'this kind of preoccupation with single elements of the gospel, such as the incarnation or the atonement, to the relative neglect of others, has been the bane of Christendom and has much to do with our unhappy divisions' (9). For example, the Eastern Church, with its theology of incarnation, emphasises Bethlehem; Protestantism, stressing the atonement, lays its emphasis at Calvary; and Catholicism takes its stand upon Pentecost and our continuity with the first Christians. Although neither has any theological animus against that which the others emphasise, yet each organises its thinking around a different centre, from which have proliferated theological theories to feed back new differences strengthening the original divergence of interest. Again, even within the Reformation tradition, Protestant orthodoxy focuses upon the Christ of Calvary, to whose atoning act we look back across the centuries; whilst Protestant pietism focuses upon the Christ of Easter, the living Lord with whom we seek communion. Hendry is concerned in this book to urge a reintegration of the fragmented fact of Christ. In particular, he concentrates upon repairing the theological schism which sunders the Christ of Bethlehem and of Galilee from the Christ of Calvary. He wants to see the life and the death of Christ in relation to one another, believing that only in this way can either be understood without distortion.

In the critical section of the book Hendry reminds us of the way in which the Gospel according to Protestant orthodoxy tends to pass straight from the birth to the death of Christ, leaving His teaching and healing ministry virtually out of account. This foreshortening tendency, Hendry believes, has its roots in the New Testament itself, where both Paul's letters and the apostolic sermons in Acts show comparatively little interest in the earthly life of Jesus. The tendency reaches its *ne plus ultra* in Kierkegaard's famous statement: 'If the contemporary generation had left behind them nothing but the words, "We believed that in such and such a year God appeared among us in the humble figure of a servant, that he lived and taught in our community; and finally died," it would be more than enough.' Yet if we knew nothing whatever about that which led the first Christians to this faith, what basis should we have for accepting that faith for ourselves? Hendry believes that the rediscovery of the Jesus of history was an advance, and that recent reactions against the Jesus of history movement show danger of relapsing again into deliberate nescience. In opposition to all such tendencies, he insists that the Christ of Galilee is no less a part of the total fact of Christ than are the Christs of Bethlehem, of Calvary, and of Easter.

In a series of historical chapters, Professor Hendry discusses the

variant conceptions of the humanity of Christ in Eastern and Western theology; the rationalist dehistorisation of the Gospel; and the attempts of more recent theologians to accommodate the full humanity of Christ. He then turns to certain attempts to replace the impersonal and static category of *ousia* with categories drawn from the sphere of personal life. He discusses the idea of 'progressive incarnation' introduced by Dorner and taken up by Forsyth and Mackintosh, and the christological teaching of Barth's fourth volume.

Having reminded us of the ways in which the Christ of Galilee has been construed without reference to His death on Calvary, Hendry then reviews the traditional atonement theories, which adopt the same procedure in reverse by isolating Christ's death from His life.

The way is now prepared for Hendry's own endeavour to see the life and death of Christ together. This profoundly thoughtful and finely written section is the heart of the book. Dr Hendry's thesis is that the reconciliation between man and God took place in the personal relationships between the historical Jesus and those with whom He had to do, and that the death on Calvary was simply the consistent climax of Jesus' reconciling life in His encounter with sinful humanity.

> 'It is here in the encounter of the incarnate Christ with men that the decisive event took place—not in some metaphysical transformation of the situation beneath the level of existence, but in the establishment of a new relationship at the level of existence. It was the mission of Christ to be the human agent of this purpose of God, and his whole life is the record of his fulfilment of it. By his life among men and for men he wrought salvation for them; salvation was not a result of something he did in entering humanity or of something he did in dying a human death; it was the work of his life and his death to relate himself freely to men and them to himself: and this relation is the core and foundation of their salvation.' (133-4)

And concerning the cross, 'Forgiveness has its reality in a personal relationship in which alienation is countered by an acceptance that transcends it. . . . [It] is not as the victim of the divine judgment that [Jesus] suffers; it is as the victim of sin, to which he delivers the divine judgment in the form of forgiveness. . . . His final exclusion from mankind in death was his final inclusion of mankind in forgiveness' (142-3).

To this reader, at any rate, Dr Hendry's words point eloquently in a right direction. My only criticism of his book is the suggestion that the constructive section might have been developed at considerably greater length, even at the expense if necessary of the critical sections, valuable though these latter are. Although, in a

sense, the whole volume is devoted to Christology, yet in another sense it stops short before offering a Christology. The humanity of Christ, and the saving work of Christ, are finely set before us; but the conception of Christ's deity which is implicit in the soteriological discussions remains implicit to the end.

JOHN H. HICK

The Way of the Cross. By WILLIAM MANSON. Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1958. Pp. 91. 7s. 6d.

BY the death of Professor William Manson in the early hours of Good Friday 1958 the Church of Scotland lost one of her noblest sons and the whole Church on earth a truly great New Testament Scholar. In this book, which he completed shortly before he died, he has left us five studies based on addresses delivered in Holy Week 1957 in St. Giles' Cathedral, Edinburgh, on the form and structure of the Christian life. Professor J. S. Stewart has contributed a fine and moving appreciation of the author.

This is a book to read not once or twice but many times. While the careless and superficial reader may manage to skim through it without much profit, for those who are prepared to weigh each sentence and to reflect on what they read it contains an abundant treasure of surpassing worth. It is very much to be hoped that it will be read and re-read alike by the academic theologian and the busy parish minister, by the divinity student and the thoughtful layman. The subjects indicated by the five titles (The Coming of Christ, Fellowship with Christ, The Overcoming of Self, Sacramental Life, O All-Atoning Sacrifice!) are treated in simple and striking language and with that sureness, profundity and theological penetration which are characteristic of all Dr Manson's works. There is a nobility about the style which reflects the character of the man and his wholehearted self-commitment to the Gospel which he taught. The prayers printed at the end of each study would by themselves make the book well worth purchasing.

Where all is gold, it is difficult to know what to single out for special mention; but it is possibly worth recording that the present reviewer has so far found the last three studies even more stimulating and rewarding than the first two. What a wealth of insight and suggestiveness, of sound theology and deep feeling, is contained within the compass of thirteen pages on the sacramental life!

Here is refreshment indeed for the minister who is feeling 'stale' and discouraged. May this little book be valued as it deserves not only throughout the Church whose ministry its author adorned but throughout all the English-speaking Churches!

C. E. B. CRANFIELD

A Christian Theology of the Old Testament. By GEORGE A. F. KNIGHT. S.C.M. Press, London, 1959. Pp. 383. 30s.

THE title describes the book plainly and boldly. This is a Christian book dealing with Old Testament Theology. Indeed there is no other way for a Christian to write about the Old Testament. The idea that any book can be 'unbiased' is foolish. Every book must be written 'from a point of view'. If the book is written without any theme, then its theme is that there is no theme, and that everything is just one demented thing after another: no cause, no effect, no purpose—'Odtaa', as Masefield's novel puts it.

The author wrote this book whilst he was still Professor of Old Testament Studies at Knox College, Dunedin, New Zealand. He is now a lecturer in the University of St. Andrews. The fact that the book was written in New Zealand probably accounts for the way in which the author sometimes pays heed to what is written in some books, and also apparently unaccountably does not refer to books to which one would have expected him to refer. And continuously I have found myself vacillating between: 'Is this a first-class book?' and 'Is this a good second-class book?' This attitude persisted until I reached chapter 16, rather more than half way through the book. It was then that the pattern became clear, and I think the reader should read, first the introduction, then chapter 16, and then begin at the beginning.

The book consists of four parts, of which the fourth part is easily the longest. The first three parts are of unequal length, and the chapters are sometimes disconcertingly short. One result of this is that one gets the impression that everything is 'bits and pieces'—until, again it should be said, one comes to chapter 16. The first part is intended to show what the Old Testament has to say about the Person of the living God. The second part portrays God's attitude to the universe, including man. His attitude must be one of wrath since both angels, men and creation have fallen. Part three emphasises the significance of the Exodus, and then gives a series of six silhouettes, six figures (metaphors) which Israel used to describe her own relation to God (Vine, Son of God, Son of Man, Bride, Rock, Servant). And so to the fourth part, which tells us why God did what He did, as described in part three. There are five things for which we must watch: the 'moments', times of crisis when God 'visits' His people, each visitation being a compound of both judgment and mercy: and every moment is eschatological in the sense that it has relevance for the End of the divine plan. There are three moments in human life, birth, marriage, death; but Israel has five, the other two being the resurrection after the death of the exile,

and the final 'marriage with God' and share in the total reconciliation of the cosmos. The author claims that this five-moment scheme gives a new content to the word 'eschatology'.

I still think that the book is mostly bits and pieces, and that it is difficult for the reader always to be aware of what Dr Norman McLeod years ago called 'The Golden Thread' which leads us to the End. But the book is full of ideas, contains any number of new ways of looking at things, and cannot fail to stimulate renewed and careful thought. It certainly is a good book to read.

N. H. Snaith

Moses. By Neher André, translated by Irene Marinoff. Longmans (Men of Wisdom Series), London, 1959. Pp. 192. 6s.

This is the English translation of the original French edition *Moïse et la vocation juive* published in the series 'Maîtres Spirituels' in 1956.

The author's aim is to show that Moses has a real significance for the present time and to set him in his true place among the great men of wisdom and action, no longer as a myth or as a type, but as the one in whom 'the unique vocation of the Jewish people is realised'. The author builds up his picture on an emotional reaction to the conditions of the 'house of slaves' of the biblical narrative by references to the Third Reich treatment of the Jews. This may be useful for his case of presenting 'Israel's Task of Suffering for All' and her 'Calling and the Redemption of the World' in his closing chapters under these titles; but the distinction is *not* noted that the Hebrews in Egypt were suffering *before* they had the Moses' faith, whereas the Reich Jews suffered because they were the moderns who claimed this faith as their own.

The chapter on 'The Historical Moses' is a summary of the biblical narrative with 'some judicious' additions from Jewish oral traditions and apocryphal material. The summary is arranged in terms of the two well-known chronologies for Moses, namely in the fifteenth century B.C. or the thirteenth.

The recognition that the Decalogue is the foundation of 'a far more comprehensive spiritual structure' (p. 95) serves to introduce the description of the Revelation when the Law was given and the Desert with the Covenant between God and His People. The attempt to present the Jews as primary to history and religion is well worth the attention of those who see religion from the standpoint of another faith. The illustrations on almost every page help to underline the Jewish tradition.

R. A. Barclay

The Acts of the Apostles: An Historical Commentary. By E. M. Blaiklock. Tyndale Press (Tyndale N.T. Commentaries), London, 1959. Pp. 197. 9s. 6d.

The seventh volume to be published in the series of Tyndale New Testament Commentaries is 'The Acts of the Apostles' by Doctor E. M. Blaiklock, Professor of Classics at Auckland University. The sub-title describes it as 'An Historical Commentary', and this indicates its chief excellence. Professor Blaiklock is clearly an enthusiast for the history of the ancient world, and in the introduction finds space to give admirable 'potted' histories of Rome, Greece and Israel, and in the body of the commentary notably warms to his task as he describes the significance, in the life of the ancient world, of Athens, Corinth or Ephesus, or as he gives brief character studies of Hadrian and other lesser officials of the Roman Empire.

As in all this series, exegesis is the main aim, though the need of the preacher is borne in mind. Critical questions, however, are dealt with scantily and inadequately. This is a legitimate procedure, but it does mean that many questions in the mind of the student are hardly raised, and the assumption that there can be no error in Scripture rules out certain possible explanations even before they are discussed. It is assumed, for instance, that there cannot be any real discrepancy between Acts and Galatians, and such differences as have been noted are only apparent. The sermons and speeches of Acts are treated as accurate representations of what was actually said on the occasion. No consideration is given of the opinion that they are largely Lukan creations; yet, oddly enough, the author pauses to show how many similarities there are between the language of Paul's address at Miletus and that of his surviving letters, thus conceding by implication that this is not true of the other speeches attributed to Paul.

The exegesis is historical and practical rather than theological, indeed the theological teaching of Acts is not strongly emphasised at all. Occasionally a presupposition in the mind of the writer seems to impose itself on the text, as when the deficiency in Apollos's preaching, so discreetly rectified by Aquila and Priscilla, is said to be probably his failure to emphasise 'the atoning death which marked Paul's gospel', when the context surely suggests that it was rather some inadequate understanding of the gift of the Holy Spirit.

Students, therefore, who desire a critical or theological commentary will need to look elsewhere, but readers who desire a plain straightforward practical commentary, with an emphasis on historical matters, a conservative approach, and a pleasing clarity of style and presentation, will find this a commentary of special interest and attractiveness.

C. Leslie Mitton

A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. By C. K. Barrett. A. & C. Black, London, 1957. 25s.

This volume of translation and commentary will certainly be indispensable for many years to come. There are few commentaries on Romans, if any, which illuminate so clearly the detailed movement of Paul's thought; the careful treatment of chapter 4 (a chapter which deserves more consideration than it sometimes receives) is a particularly good example of this. The commentary is woven into the translation, which is in itself a form of commentary, since Dr Barrett does not hesitate to supply additional phrases in order to clarify what he believes to have been Paul's meaning. The volume is one in a series intended for the general reader, and he who has no Greek can indeed follow the argument throughout, although his literary and theological education must be fairly well advanced (he is expected to know, for example, what adoptionism, asyndeton and brachylogy are); and in spite of the considerable detail he will certainly find that the main contentions of Paul's great letter stand out clearly in Dr Barrett's exposition.

Introductory matter is wisely cut to a minimum, but there is enough to indicate that Paul's Rabbinic training and background are not going to be forgotten when it comes to exegesis. The author considers that the belief in the Messianic affliction was probably the starting-point of Paul's understanding of the Cross (p. 122) and that his Pharisaic eschatological beliefs were changed rather than abolished by the conviction that God in His mercy had anticipated the judgment of the Last Days and revealed His love and His wrath simultaneously in the death of Christ: 'the Cross anticipates the results of the last judgment: the Judge of all the earth is seen to do right, and, since He chooses to bear Himself, in the person of His Son, the affliction antecedent to the Age to Come, He is able righteously to justify those who believe' (p. 80). From this point of view the combination of tenses, past, present and future, which Paul summons to his aid in describing the life in Christ (e.g. in 6.1-14) can be convincingly explained. What is perhaps not quite so clear in Dr Barrett's exposition is that in 3.21-31 (and elsewhere) there is a deeper understanding both of sin and of redemption than could have been reached simply by the notion of an anticipation of the Messianic affliction. The Cross does indeed anticipate the results of the last judgment; but it also transformed Paul's very notions of what sin and judgment were.

And of what the Law was and is. Paul's uses of the word *nomos* in Romans have proved a constant source of difficulty to commentators. Dr Barrett rightly rejects the quasi-philosophical meaning 'principle' (p. 83), substituting for it (in addition to the narrower

meaning 'Law of Moses') the meaning 'religious system' or even simply 'religion'. This stresses admirably the contrast between the gospel of the grace of Christ and all other religions or religious systems. They are all 'laws of Works', whereas God's righteousness in Christ is established by a 'law of faith' (Rom. 3.27); or to put the matter in another way they are all attempts to establish a human righteousness pleasing to God, whereas the 'law of faith' is that a man (or Man) should submit to God's righteousness (10.3). What Dr Barrett's rendering does not make so clear, however, is that the coming of Christ itself reveals the inner meaning of God's Law and so sets it forth afresh. Thus it may be questioned whether 'the law of the spirit of life' is simply 'a rhetorical rather than a substantial parallel' (p. 155) to 'the law of sin and death' (8.2). It may of course be held that in this question of God's law Paul himself was struggling to express something upon the inner meaning of which he had not been able fully to lay hold. This much can perhaps be said: there is a sense in which law and Christ are opposites (p. 198), but there is also a sense in which law continues under Christ, and not only because 'as the story of the Jews constantly pressed home upon Paul, allegiance to the principle of Works remained possible "after Christ" ' (p. 198) but also because the Christian is *ennomos Christou*, under obedience to Christ who not only demonstrated by His life but was and is in His person the fulfilment of the law. The fact that this Christian obedience is fulfilled not by a new legalism but in the life of the Spirit did not, I think, mean for Paul that it ceased altogether to have the character of obedience to law; the very meaning of the words 'obedience to law' was now transformed, as Dr Barrett clearly and forcefully points out in his excellent comments on the closing verses of chapter 2 (see especially on 2.27). It is perhaps arguable that the exegesis of certain later sections of the Epistle (especially chapters 8 and 13) might have been strengthened even further by a fuller attention to these questions connected with the meaning of the law for Paul and the manner of its continuance 'after Christ'.

But it is perhaps idle to ask for a fuller treatment of this matter in a volume which perforce covers the whole epistle in less than 300 pages. In a host of ways this commentary throws light on Paul's argument: to take two examples only, the treatment of chapter 7, with its insistence that Paul is not answering a psychological question but one concerning the nature and status of the law, and the compressed but masterly exposition of chapters 9-11, with its stress on God's purpose of mercy as the ultimate operative force in history, will be valuable to all students of the epistle. It seems to this reviewer that there exists no commentary on Romans which can

be more confidently recommended to those who are prepared to study that great work seriously. R. S. Barbour

Jesus and the Servant. By Morna D. Hooker. S.P.C.K., London, 1959. Pp. 230. 27s. 6d.

From time to time a work is produced which challenges widely accepted views and seeks to show us the error of our ways. In recent years, for example, the Q hypothesis has been attacked. It is entirely right that results which have been tested and accepted as proven by most scholars should be subjected re-examination. But there is just as much danger in following uncritically, in the first flush of enthusiasm, suggested correctives of almost universally cherished assumptions, as there is in clinging uncritically to these assumptions.

Miss Hooker, in this scholarly and painstaking book, sets out to show that the traditional view that Jesus regarded His mission as a fulfilment of the ideal of the Servant of God rests on very insecure foundations, and further that, to judge from the New Testament evidence, Isaiah 53 was not used by the early Church as extensively as has been thought. Her contribution lies not so much in the thesis itself, which has been favoured by others before her (Rashdall, Kümmel), as in the thoroughness with which she examines the evidence. A good many side issues, important in themselves, arise out of her studies; for example, she rejects Dodd's now well-known theory that the New Testament writers quote small portions, often a single sentence, from Old Testament passages regarded as wholes, in favour of the 'atomistic' view held by Cadbury (pp. 21-23).

There is, it must be admitted, great force in Miss Hooker's case. At the same time, it may be suggested that sometimes she is right, but not necessarily for the correct reasons. Thus the present reviewer would agree that Mark 8.31, 9.12b, 9.31 and 10.33f, even if authentic utterances, provide insufficient evidence for the claim that Jesus, in referring to the sufferings of the Son of Man, had the Servant concept in mind. It is arguable, however, whether these passages are relevant to the issue, although they must be included in any inquiry into early Christian belief in Jesus as the Son of Man. However this may be, it is not true that if these sayings are not, even in substance, held to be dominical, 'we reject at the same time the idea that Jesus spoke about the meaning of his death at all' (p. 93). Here the classic work of Jeremias on the Servant of God should be taken more seriously into account.

Further, the evangelists themselves did not have the Servant in mind. This was impossible, it is urged, 'for the simple reason that there was not, and never had been, a "Servant-figure" with whom

to identify him' (p. 157). 'Servant' in Deutero-Isaiah is not a concrete figure, but Israel in relation to Yahweh. The background is rather to be sought in the apocalyptic movement and in the sufferings of the righteous, culminating in that of Jesus-Son of Man.

Miss Hooker finds more use of the Servant concept in Acts, the Pauline epistles, Hebrews and 1 Peter, but even here the results are more meagre than many would allow. 1 Peter contains 'the earliest definite proof for the full identification of Jesus with the Servant in all its Christological significance' (p. 127). Elsewhere the use of the Servant concept or of Isa. 53 scarcely advances from the idea of suffering to that of redemptive suffering. Perhaps, however, the last word on Mark 10.45 has not yet been written. A. J. B. Higgins

Biblical Exegesis in the Qumran Texts. By F. F. Bruce. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1949. Pp. 82. $2.50.

Books have been written in abundance about the Dead Sea Scrolls, all too many of them to a stereotyped pattern. It is pleasant to report on one which is really concerned with the texts themselves. Based on lectures delivered in Holland, these seven short chapters give a lucid and interesting account of Qumran exegesis. The first sets out the principles and methods employed by the sect in their reinterpretation of the OT, while the second deals with the new situation which they had to face and the third with interpretation in the Zadokite Work. The fourth and longest is devoted to Messianic interpretation, the fifth to Servant of the Lord and Son of Man, and the sixth to the interpretation of Daniel. The final chapter compares the exegesis of Qumran with that of the New Testament. Five pages of notes reveal the range of the author's reading, but no index is provided. For those who have neither time nor opportunity to follow the technical literature, this is an excellent book. Some positions, of course, are debatable, but Professor Bruce is always judicious. The closing chapter, for example, not only notes the similarities but is careful to mark the differences. Most of the Qumran testimonies relating to the Davidic Messiah are applied to Jesus in early Christian literature, but 'the military language of some of these "testimonies" . . . has been strangely changed in significance when their fulfilment is sought in Jesus!' The book's chief fault is that it is all too short. One could have wished for more.

R. McL. Wilson

The Mass and the English Reformers. By C. W. Dugmore. Macmillan, London, 1958. Pp. xiv + 262. 30s.

The profound theological discussion on the sacrament of the Eucharist in the sixteenth century was no mere theologians' exercise

in dialectic; for it involved not only discussion of the person and work of Christ but also of the way in which Christ made Himself known sacramentally to men: it brought to a focus men's commitment in faith. This sacrament was in England the subject of one of the two literally burning questions at the Marian trials. The Protestant reformers are frequently criticised for making divisions in Protestantism on this sacrament which should be the sacrament of unity; but divisions arose because the Eucharist brought to the test the innermost theological convictions of a reformer.

Dr Dugmore has written what was much needed, a documented account of the purposes and achievement in eucharistic theology of the English reformers during the reigns of Henry VIII and his children. More than this, he has admirably set before that discussion an equally extensive and careful account of the development of eucharistic theology from the Fathers, through the Schoolmen, to the unsatisfactory situation in scholastic and popular conceptions of the Mass on the eve of the Reformation. Dr Dugmore has here provided the standard work on this subject, a quarry from which other workers will be able to dig much for their profit. In method he has broken away from that of the protracted pamphlet controversy on whether Cranmer was a Zwinglian or not. Instead of arranging patterns of selected texts from Zwingli and Cranmer and others, Dr Dugmore has turned the discussion into the perspective of the development of eucharistic theology from the divergent emphases of St. Ambrose and of St. Augustine up to the English situation out of which Frith and Lambert, Ridley and Cranmer, came.

Yet when Dr Dugmore claims that the whole approach of the English reformers was different from that of the continental divines (p. vii) he is guilty of an oversimplification which distorts the evidence. It is plain that he intends to persuade us that the English reformers found for themselves another way which implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, he regards as different from, and better than, that of their continental brethren—the way of following the 'auncient doctors'. But it is surely historically invalid to assume that the English divines went their own way in eucharistic theology without reference to the aims and achievements of the continental Protestant writers. Cranmer, for example, sought a common Protestant understanding in face of Tridentine Catholicism, and, therefore, worked for agreement in eucharistic theology with Melanchthon, Bucer, Martyr and Calvin; he was familiar with the writings of these men and sought to bring the first three to England. Dr Dugmore does not seem to realise the close agreement which these men had together in eucharistic doctrine. In fact some of his statements about them are misleading, for example (p. 148) he states that Martyr and Bucer

accepted Zwinglian doctrines. Nor does he make sufficient allowance for the fact that the *Consensus Tigurinus* was not Zwinglian. If it had been, Calvin would never have signed it. Calvin in an *Explicatio* of the *Consensus* in 1556 says, 'The sacraments are helps and media by which we are either inserted into the body of Christ, or being so inserted, coalesce with it more and more till He unites us with Himself in full in the heavenly life.' And Calvin insisted always, as Bucer had come to do, on the relation of the sign to the thing signified, whereas Zwingli had separated these too far for real relationship. When Dr Dugmore uses his newly coined term 'Reformed Catholics' as a peculiar definition applicable only to Cranmer and Ridley in distinction from continental divines he makes a distinction where there was none—by his way of defining, Calvin, Bucer, Martyr and Melanchthon were all 'Reformed Catholics'. This passion for finding a unique and English Churchmanship distinct from all foreign influences can lead to his statement (p. 207) where, referring to the English refugee congregation at Frankfurt, he writes, 'while the Knoxians were Calvinists to a man, the Coxians were Reformed Catholics of the Ridley-Cranmer school, who had absorbed something of the doctrine expressed in the *Consensus Tigurinus*.' Now it is plain from *The Troubles at Frankfurt* that the difference between Knox and Cox was not in eucharistic doctrine, but in ceremonies and the power of the civil authority regarding them. Could Cox have gone further than Knox's 'reformed catholicism' shown in the Scottish *Confession of Faith* of 1560? There, in a full account of this sacrament, we read that '[the faithful] are so made flesh of His flesh, and bone of His bones, that as the eternal Godhead shall give to the flesh of Christ Jesus . . . life and immortality, so does Christ Jesus His flesh and blood eaten and drunken by us, give to us the same prerogatives.' (Moreover, the bread broken is called the communion of Christ's body, and the cup blessed is the communion of His blood.) This preoccupation of Dr Dugmore's with the assumption that the English took another way, distinct from all others, may account for his not emphasising the extraordinary force of biblical humanism which quickened men's minds and renewed their faith, and drew them not only to the Scriptures in the original tongues but to the Fathers of the ancient Church. This movement was common ground to all the reformers continental and English. Oecolampadius, for example, was not alone in reading the Fathers to get behind medieval definitions and practices concerning the Eucharist; his book of 1530 on patristic evidences was widely influential and certainly known to Cranmer. All these men belonged to the 'Republic of Letters': they all rediscovered the Augustinian emphases in eucharistic theology.

This criticism has been made at some length because, amid the admirable extent and quality of Dr Dugmore's exposition and analysis of his theme, in both parts of his book, this would be the only obvious occasion for doubts about his method and terminology. But, this means that the last word has not yet been said about Cranmer's theology of the Eucharist, although Dr Dugmore has come nearer than others to saying it. In doing so he has pointed to the weakness in Professor C. C. Richardson's argument (an argument too widely accepted as conclusive), that Cranmer was a modified Zwinglian.

It is regrettable that Dr Dugmore follows Batiffol, in his first chapter, to the point of assuming that Loofs in his *Realencyklopaedie* article on *Abendmahl* calls Augustine's theology 'pure symbolism' where in the pages referred to Loofs uses no expression which could be so translated. And has not Loofs' learning worn better than Batiffol's whose book was largely an experiment in the passing theological fashion of Roman Catholic Modernism? Yet it would be unjust to end on this point, for Dr Dugmore has produced the most usefully documented account of English sixteenth century thought about the Eucharist that has yet appeared, as well as a survey of patristic and mediaeval discussion upon it. He shows himself as much at home, for example, with Ratramnus' replies to Paschasius' questions, and with Lanfranc's formulations, as with the pattern of difficulties set by Tudor policy, 'Wily Winchester', and Hooper's Zürich-centred enthusiasm. BASIL HALL

The Biblical Doctrine of Baptism. St. Andrew Press, Edinburgh, 1959. 10s. 6d.

THE Church of Scotland is to be congratulated on the excellent study document produced for it by its special Commission on Baptism. It is one of the many fruits of the revival of Biblical Theology that the Church is coming to be so much better served by its theologians in matters like this.

The emphases of this Report are all ones that have come out of the new 'high' doctrine of the Church and Sacraments that is characteristic of the Ecumenical Movement. There is a stress throughout on the grounding of the Church's sacramental action in the One Baptism accomplished for all in God's saving act in Christ, and on the Christocentric and corporate character of Baptism as 'initiation into a saving relationship with Christ, rather than the mechanical receiving of a gift'. The Report also comes out strongly on the side of the congruity of infant Baptism with the practice and even more with the doctrine of the New Testament.

The purely biblical part has been excellently done, though there

are important Baptismal passages, such as the extremely difficult one in 1 Peter. 3.18-22, which one wishes had been treated to more than a passing reference. And there are no references at all to a number of Johannine passages which some recent biblical scholarship at any rate would see as very significant for understanding the relation of the Sacrament to the Salvation events (e.g. John 13.1-11, 19.34; 1 John 5.6-8).

But the interest of the Church in general will probably focus on the last section of the Report, entitled 'Towards a formulation of the doctrine of Baptism', in which 'a change of emphasis' is acknowledged to be required 'in much of our traditional language, and even of our thought about Baptism'. This section, if it was to be attempted at all, might well have been fuller. It is not, of course, easy for an Anglican to judge what are the issues on which an unbiblical attitude of mind needs to be redressed in the Church of Scotland. But there are certain perennial sources of misunderstanding, on which it is difficult to believe that that Church is so fortunate as to be beyond confusion, which receive no treatment from the Commission.

What, for instance, is the relation of Baptism to original sin? The common notion of Baptism as a sort of spiritual inoculation, derived from the Church's traditional teaching about the washing away of 'birth sin', is something, in England at any rate, which needs a very great deal of clearing up, and is indeed perhaps the greatest psychological obstacle to the recovery of a truly biblical and corporate understanding of the sacrament.

Again, there has been a recurrent source of misunderstanding in the failure to differentiate between 'regeneration' and 'conversion'. In rightly insisting upon 'Baptismal regeneration' the Commission might have gone further in clearing themselves, and the Church, of misrepresentation at this point.

What, too, of the destiny of those who die unbaptised, sub-Christian fears on which have led to a good deal of unsatisfactory Baptismal practice and theory? What of the whole business of clinical Baptism, of christening babies simply because they are going to die? And what of the wider issue of indiscriminate Baptism in our secular age? The Reformers laid it upon the minister as one of his most urgent duties to seek out those who were unbaptised and bring them to the font without delay? Are we so sure? And what are the principles by which we decide *to whom* to administer Baptism? The Commission is doubtless right in insisting that faith is not a theological condition of Baptism; but some faith somewhere is clearly a practical precondition of its administration. 'What prevents this man being baptised?' That, unlike some of the pre-

ceding, is a scriptural question, and it needs a careful answer in our situation.

Again, what is the relation between infant Baptism and its completion in adult Church membership? This is a question that has bedevilled the theology of Baptism in almost every branch of the Christian Church. The Church of Scotland may be able to produce a report on Baptism without even mentioning Confirmation or the laying on of hands and get away with it in its own situation; but it certainly could not get away with it in any serious ecumenical encounter. The Church of South India, for instance, is at this moment in the process of revising its Confirmation service. This Report would give its ex-Presbyterian members no guidance whatever as to what should be in such a rite or what its relation should be to the Baptism service.

This raises the wider issue of ecumenical responsibility. The very fact that I as an Anglican have been asked to review this Report (a compliment which I frankly cannot see being returned) is sufficient comment on the ecumenical concern which the Church of Scotland (or at any rate the *Scottish Journal of Theology*) feels in these matters. But the question arises, should we be content to hold these sort of commissions separately at all? May not a task such as defining 'the biblical doctrine of Baptism' be one of the things to which the Lund principle applies that we should not do separately what we are able to do together? Even if we cannot agree on Bishops, I raise it as a serious issue whether we are not being impoverished in our theology by the ecclesiastical compartments in which these things are still being contained. At the same time as the Church of Scotland was producing this valuable report on the doctrine of Baptism, the Liturgical Commission of the Church of England was wrestling with the rewriting of its Baptism and Confirmation services. It is obvious from the results that there has been no communication between them. The Anglican work would certainly have benefited by much more searching subjection to the judgments of Biblical Theology. And I cannot help feeling that the Scottish Report would have been the better for taking much more seriously the principle from which the English Liturgical Commission started that the theological norm of Christian initiation is the whole adult rite of Baptism, Confirmation and First Communion. There is a real danger in having as high a doctrine of Baptism as Scripture demands and then transferring the whole of it without remainder to Infant Baptism. It is the Commission's failure (which is also the whole Church's failure) to define what of the totality of Christian initiation is *not* exhausted in infant Baptism which is perhaps one of the most serious weaknesses of their Report.

PACIFIC SC

For myself I cannot be too grateful for what the Church of Scotland has given us and I hope it may now make unnecessary a similar time-consuming enterprise by the Church of England.

JOHN A. T. ROBINSON

Christian Baptism. Edited by A. GILMORE. Lutterworth Press, London, 1959. Pp. 343. 27s. 6d.

THIS is a symposium by a number of younger Baptist ministers, reviewing the whole subject of Baptism in the light of present-day scholarship. E. A. Payne contributes an introductory outline of recent discussion. S. F. Winward discusses the problem of Scripture and tradition, recognising that Baptists have been in error in ignoring the tradition of the Church Universal. A. Gilmore deals with Jewish antecedents of Baptism, and recognises that the New Covenant is not merely with individuals, but is also corporate. The New Testament teaching is examined by R. E. O. White, S. I. Buse, G. R. Beasley-Murray, and D. R. Griffiths. In this section there are many points of detail which could be criticised. These often show a rather thin Liberal approach, but there are also pointers to a more adequate grasp of Biblical Theology, e.g. when White says of our Lord's Baptism: 'the rite which had expressed mainly what man does to fulfil God's will becomes now also a rite expressing something God does to make man's obedience effective.' Buse is right in rejecting Markus Barth's view that Baptism is 'a more or less purely human action', and in rejecting self-baptism. Beasley-Murray is to be commended for taking into account the work of R. Schnackenburg (*Das Heilsgeschehen bei der Taufe nach dem Apostel Paulus*), with its stress that being 'in Christ' involves sharing the passion 'with Christ'. The review of the early Christian centuries by A. W. Argyle is misleading in its interpretation of the evidence of Justin, Irenaeus, and the case of Polycarp. W. M. S. West deals with the Anabaptists and the rise of the Baptist movement, and D. M. Himbury reviews baptismal controversies between 1640 and 1900.

The most satisfying chapter is that on 'The Theology of Baptism' by Nevile Clark. One cannot but feel that the whole volume would have been more valuable if it had been re-written by him. Manifesting an intimate familiarity with the recovery of Biblical Theology which is such a hopeful concomitant of the Ecumenical Movement, he is not afraid to point out the weaknesses in the traditional Baptist position. Thus he sees that 'the Baptist case persistently violates the unity of *Heilsgeschichte*, sundering old covenant and new covenant, old Israel and new Israel'. Again: 'Baptism is a sacrament of the Gospel, not of our experience of it; of God's faithfulness, not of our

faithful response to Him; and any theological formulation which lends itself so readily to an interpretation of the rite primarily in terms of a public confession of faith must at once be suspect. That baptism is "unto faith" all would agree; but that initiation into the Israel of God is no longer possible without a prior individual act of faith and repentance is an assertion involving apparently sweeping distinctions between the old covenant and the new which may not hastily be accepted. Any attempt to distinguish between the old and new convenants by setting a natural and racial succession determined *by birth* over against a supra-racial succession determined by human choice and divine election conspicuously fails to do justice either to the religious basis of old Israel or to the continuity of sacred history. Nor is an explanation in terms of development from primitive ideas of collectivism . . . to the rich flowering of the recognition of individual personality any less misguided.'

Clark recognises that the children of believers are 'specially related to the Body of Christ'; yet on a Baptist definition of the Church this is impossible. He tries to solve the difficulty by distinguishing 'insertion into the Body of Christ' in Baptism from a 'relationship to the Body of Christ, which is grounded in the "one flesh" union of two of its members'—but this is not tenable. He goes on: 'We are not basically concerned with human vows, human acts, human promises. We are concerned with the recognition and declaration of an act of God, by which a child has been specially related to the redeemed community, and with the claim and demand which that *opus dei* imposes upon church and parents alike. . . . If Paedo-Baptists have sown theological confusion by the introduction of infant baptism at this point, the persistent Baptist myopia in respect to the prevenience of divine grace, so far as infant blessing is concerned, has been scarcely less disastrous.' The proper conclusion to draw from this is that Baptism is the seal of God's election of the children of believers, and that in it Christ lays His hand upon them in blessing, grafting them into the Church, His Body, where, surrounded by the influences of His Spirit, they may grow in grace, and come in the fulness of time to a conscious personal faith and self-commitment. This is what the great majority of Christians practise, following the ancient pattern of initiation by Baptism, the laying on of hands, and first Communion.

Clark also shows that a right understanding of the once-for-allness of Baptism rules out the Baptist practice of re-baptising those who have been baptised in infancy. 'The assertion of the partial nature of infant baptism and the serious theological distortion it involves does not carry with it the unqualified dismissal of it as "no baptism"; rather does the eschatological nature of the rite forbid so negative a

verdict. For no baptism can lack its proleptic element, and every baptism points forward to its completion and fulfilment. So unqualified a denial of infant baptism could be theologically justified only if accompanied by a willingness to "unchurch" all Paedo-Baptist communities and to uphold separation at this point in the name of the One True Church. Can we, in this day and age, follow our forefathers to so radical a conclusion?'

Though we must disagree with many conclusions of this writer, we can only thank God that there are in the Baptist Churches some men of such a mind, for it is through them that their brethren may yet be led into a true sacramental unity with the whole of Christendom in the coming Great Church. JOHN HERON

The Spiritual Crisis of the Scientific Age. By G. D. YARNOLD. George Allen and Unwin, London, 1959. Pp. 207. 18s.

Science, Medicine and Morals, A Survey and a Suggestion. By CHARLES E. RAVEN. Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1959. Pp. 189. 15s.

Psychology of Religion. By PAUL E. JOHNSON. Abingdon Press, New York, 1959. Pp. 204. $5.

THE three books under review touch in diverse ways upon the relations between scientific and religious thought. Dr Yarnold here presents three essays around this theme. In the first part of *The Spiritual Crisis of the Scientific Age*, he works towards an up-to-date theology of nature. Although theology should not pretend to pronounce upon what the fundamental laws governing the external world are, the gap between theology and science can be bridged through the acceptance of three principles: (1) that the external world is created by God; (2) that in scientfic discovery we make contact with the divine Mind; and (3) that the fundamental laws of nature are what they are because God has so ordered the world which He has created. Dr Yarnold goes on to suggest that, in view of the failure in the notion of physical causality regarding microscopic events, we may perhaps invoke another kind of causality here —namely the personal control of God. (Compare how statistical laws of human behaviour are compatible with individual freedom.) Dr Yarnold also hazards a similar thesis regarding the operation of the human will. These suggestions are attractive, although some scientists may still feel that there is something contingent about the admitted theoretical impossibility of knowing simultaneously both the position and momentum of a moving particle. Yet the suggestions could be worked out in an interesting manner.

In the second part, Dr Yarnold examines biblical criticism, with a view to showing how a misguided 'scientific' prejudice against supernormal events has sometimes vitiated historical investigations.

On this and allied themes, the author writes freshly and incisively. Finally, in the third part, he considers the sociological and political questions arising from the advent of modern technology. His remarks on the childlike character demanded by Christ (pp. 153-5) are especially good; but the overall conclusions about automation, the H-bomb, etc., are less inspiring. It is a pity that he has not treated these problems separately. There is little immediate connexion between his interesting earlier investigation of the nature of science and the results of the last part of the book.

Dr Raven's *Science, Medicine and Morals* suffers from a similar fissure. Although the ostensible plan of the book is that a survey of the history of science with special reference to medicine should introduce the thesis that medicine is too much concerned with the individual, and should be more sociological, the marvellous mass of allusive learning in the historical part is not always strictly germane to the later theme. Moreover, since the concept of social health rests largely upon moral and political notions, it is necessary to have clear and agreed ideas on these matters; and it is not always evident that Dr Raven's value-judgments would command the support of most reasonable and/or Christian men. Consider his criticisms of professionalised sport (p. 169) and of the raising of taxes on alcohol and tobacco (p. 169), and his remarks about Oradour and Hiroshima (p. 156). Undoubtedly there are many evils in modern society, but one is uneasy at the prospect of medical men studying 'the corporate illusions and diseases of our time'.

Paul E. Johnson's *Psychology of Religion* has had some American success and now reappears in an enlarged and revised version. It is a hefty text-book on a confused subject. Some of the surveys of the views of others and of case-histories and statistical results are of considerable interest. And the bibliography is most useful. Philosophically, however, Mr Johnson is sometimes naïve—compare the way he treats the statistics about prayer (pp. 132-3) and his failure to consider how expressions like 'integration' (p. 98), 'total experience' (p. 199), 'superstition' (p. 188) and 'motivation' (pp. 83 and 203) require more conceptual clarification. More generally, there is a frequent oscillation between description and evaluation (cf. p. 187: 'Is doubt always an evil?', p. 144: 'prayer is often misused', etc.), and between description and practical advice (e.g. on how to treat religion with children, pp. 83ff). But at least Mr Johnson's book has few satisfactory competitors. This is partly because the psychology of religion can hardly be considered a science, though it has scientific aspects (regarding the use of social surveys, etc.), and the employment of semi-technical jargon gives one the pervasive feeling that it is not we human beings who are being spoken

of. Still, Mr Johnson does make some attempt to get below the surface by using biographical material. NINIAN SMART

Vivre l'aujourd'hui de Dieu. By ROGER SCHUTZ. Les Presses de Taizé, 1959. Pp. 144. Fr. 540.

La Confirmation. Consécration des laics. By MAX THURIAN. Delachaux et Niestlé, Neuchâtel, 1957. Fr. sw. 4.50.

L'Eucharistie. By MAX THURIAN. Delachaux et Niestlé, Neuchâtel, 1959. Pp. 286. Fr. sw. 8.50.

La Liturgie Eucharistique a Taizé. Les Presses de Taizé, 1959. Pp. 64. Fr. 900.

THESE four works all issue from the same community, set in the village of Taizé, in the district between Lyon and Dijon. This coenobite community took shape in 1947 when seven frères took life vows of celibacy, community of property, and acceptance of the authority of the community, all with a view to exercising a ministry of service in the Church and in the world. The Rule of the community was formulated in 1952, and contains what is regarded as essential for the edification of the community in Christ and for self-consecration to the service of God. The community is a most interesting experiment and much could be said about its lessons for the Church. Here we are concerned with four of the volumes which have come from members of the group.

Roger Schutz is Prior of Taizé, and his small book presents a challenge to present-day churchmanship as well as to the individual Christian. It is important that the Christian and the Church should refuse to be tied to the past, and that they should face up to the challenge of today, and that they should consider what answer they can make to it. This book does not pretend to give the answer in detail but rather to indicate the great principles which must reveal and illuminate the answer.

The first part is called 'Les dominantes du monde d'aujourd'hui'. Over against the millions of Christians divided amongst themselves, there are far more non-christians, even an increasing proportion of them. There is a tremendous increase in the world's population; scientific development is becoming more rapid; hunger is a pressing problem in many areas, and so on. Secondly, there are 'valeurs dominantes de la vie intérieure'. The heart of this interior life is contemplation, the contemplation of God in Christ, and its spiritual results are of the greatest value, not only for oneself but also in respect of one's neighbour. 'The sign of authenticity in all interior life . . . is the discovery of one's neighbour.'

This all leads to the third subject—'Vivre dans l'église', and here we come on one of the central principles of Taizé, 'to be one that the

world may believe'. And the ideas which should inspire and guide the seeker after unity in the Church are conversations and discussions, purity of intention, prayer, patience, and poverty of spirit. The following chapters deal more directly with the message of the community to the world at the present time, taking the three vows one by one and showing their implications. And this leads to the last few pages which underline the central and most important principle—'to let Christ light up in us the fire of His love'.

This little book can be strongly recommended to all who wish to understand the spirit of the community, as well as to all who seek for greater unity in the Church. It is moreover very excellent as a guide for personal meditation.

Max Thurian is a Frère de Taizé, and his name is already well-known as one of the outstanding theologians of the community, especially in connexion with the liturgical movement in the Reformed Church of France. He has brought forward some suggestions with regard to Confirmation and its relation to Baptism. He points out that the Reformed tradition rejected the early doctrine and practice of Confirmation, replacing it by a ceremony variously called reception, admission, or sometimes confirmation in the subjective sense. The inquiry is whether this is all in conformity with the thought of Christ and His apostles. The introduction notes the ideas of the Reformers, especially those of Calvin. The first section deals with the New Testament teaching on the baptism of water and the baptism of the Spirit. In the second the practice of 'confirmation' as reflected in Hippolytus, Tertullian, Ambrose and other early Fathers is discussed. The term itself comes into use about the fifth century, and the development towards the full Western medieval rite in which baptism and confirmation are completely separated, as if the first were the baptism of water and the second the baptism of the Spirit, is examined. Then we come to the writer's positive suggestions.

He feels that if the principle of infant baptism is accepted, it should be in what he regards as the full New Testament idea that it is a total baptism of water and of the Spirit, a sacramental act which confers the gift of the Spirit. Biblically the two cannot be separated, though the Western Church before the Reformation had disrupted their unity. The baptised-confirmed person must receive proper teaching, through preaching, bible study, catechism and worship, and only when he can discern the Lord's Body be admitted to first communion. But this should not be regarded as an end, as confirmation often is today. Confirmation in Thurian's plan is a 'kind of new consecration to the service of Christ and the Church', in which there will be another laying-on of hands. It 'will confer

the renewal of the Spirit and the gifts necessary for service in the Church; it will take up again the idea of illumination and of consecration signified by the biblical symbol of anointing'. For the lay person thus confirmed, there are three possible forms of service, as catechist, as reader, or as visitor.

In all this there is much worth thinking about. But, one may ask, if baptism ought to include both baptism and confirmation in the sense of the Western Church, what is confirmation to be other than admission to some special lay service in the Church? Will this confirmation be given to all who have been baptised, or only to those who come forward for such special service? The proposals would seem to alter the content of the word 'confirmation', so that another word would seem to be required. It appears unlikely that Thurian's proposals will be acceptable as they stand. But one is grateful for his approach to the problem, and for many fine things he has said here.

His book on the Eucharist is much larger, as befits the subject. It is significant that two quotations given as a kind of motto at the beginning come from Calvin's *Institutes*, and from Du Moulin's *Bouclier de la foi*, indicating the Reformed basis of the discussion. At the same time, there is, as might be expected, a strong ecumenical interest. The sub-title—Mémorial du Seigneur. Sacrifice d'action de grâce et d'intercession—indicates the main points discussed.

After a brief introduction, the author begins with an exhaustive study of the Old Testament prototypes and their connexion with the framework of the Eucharist. This indeed takes up almost half the book. The word that gives the key-note here is memorial, memorial of the Passover, that of oblation and that of prayer. The second part is a consideration of the memorial in the New Testament and the sacrificial significance of the Eucharist. This involves a careful examination of the words of Christ at the Last Supper, leading on to sections on the doctrines of the eucharistic sacrifice and of the Real Presence. In the conclusion much of what has been argued for is summed up in these words—'By the Eucharist, we can lift up to God our most sincere thanksgiving for all His blessings and our most ardent intercession for all our needs; by the Eucharist the unique sacrifice of Christ is present in the midst of us and we thus receive through it all favours for ourselves and for all men; by the Eucharist we are united with the heavenly intercession of Christ and associated with the praise of all the saints; by the Eucharist we receive truly, really and substantially the body and blood of Christ, the fulness of His divine and human person: by the Eucharist we are united with all the members of the Church, and deepened in charity, as nowhere else.' This, Thurian pleads, should make Christian pastors and

people alike desire a more frequent celebration with its wonderful fruits.

This volume concludes with an outline of a Eucharistic service. The same service is given in full in *La Liturgie Eucharistique*, beautifully printed and arranged. This contains the service for Sundays and Feasts, and for weekdays, and provides twenty-one proper prefaces. It claims to be founded on Holy Scripture and to be strongly ecumenical. The service is divided into three parts. 1. The Liturgy of the Entrance, with opening Psalm and Antiphon, Confession of sins, Kyrie, Absolution, Gloria in Excelsis and short prayer. 2. The Liturgy of the Word, with Old Testament Lesson, Psalm, Epistle, Alleluia, Gospel, Canticle, Sermon, Silence, Hymn, Creed, and Prayer of Intercession. 3. Liturgy of the Sacrament, with Offertory Hymn, during which the offerings are received and the bread and wine are brought in, Offering Prayer, the Eucharistic Prayer, containing Sursum Corda, Preface and Sanctus, Epiclesis (Invocation of the Spirit on the elements), Words of Institution, Memorial of the mysteries of Christ, Invocation of the Spirit for the Communion, the Lord's Prayer, the Fraction, Agnus Dei, Prayer and Kiss of Peace, Invitation, with 'Holy things to the Holy', Communion Hymn, the Communion, Prayer of Thanksgiving, and Benediction.

It will be seen that much of this follows the usual pattern, while the changes are of interest. The whole service is important as an adaptation of Reformed custom to ecumenical need.

JOHN A. LAMB

The Preacher's Calling to be a Servant. By D. T. NILES. Lutterworth Press, London, 1959. Pp. 144. 12s. 6d.

THE complaint might be made of this book that it is not about preaching at all. It might look as if the well-worn character of the Warrack track had led to the exploration of side-tracks, lest vain repetition bore the hearer. In truth, little attention is paid to the preparation and delivery of sermon material. Those who open it in the hope of finding a 'Brush Up Your Preaching' book will be disappointed—and rightly so.

Dr D. T. Niles does a most important thing. He puts preaching into its large content. He sees it in the light of the ministry of Jesus Christ. He points to its place in the ministry of the whole Church. Once the importance of the approach is appreciated the book will be found to be continually illuminating, to give indeed just such an understanding of the character of preaching as is needed in a Church now become more acutely aware of the rich and manifold nature of its ministry. The whole Church in word, in deed, in compassionate life, in loving fellowship shouts out the presence and power of Jesus

Christ, the Head of the Church and the Lord of the world. Within this large proclamation, the particular proclamation called preaching has its place: and it is good to see it treated in this perspective. Two verses from the book make the point: 'The preacher cannot merely say: I am called to preach, that is my function. Rather, he must learn to say: I am called to be a preacher, I must so conduct my ministry of preaching that it is seen as belonging to the more inclusive ministry of the whole body.' Is our preaching easily so seen?

Preaching is understood in the light of the personal commitment of the preacher. Dr Niles points out 'it is not merely to the service of preaching that one is called, but rather to be servant to those to whom one preaches'. Men need a theology of their lives. This the 'pure preacher' just cannot provide. The preacher must be a servant like his master.

I am in debt to 'D. T.' for the insight continually shown into human nature, for the large compassion of his faith, for the constantly biblical character of his utterance. I think the lectures may be better read than heard—there is a quality about them which fits them for meditation, which entices one to lay down the text from time to time, and cup the chin in the hands, and follow thought and insight through to a reorientation of life, to a new consecration. Moreover, I believe I could hand this book to a mature theologian and a mature layman, and find them both enriched in faith and obedience. Is this not a rare thing—much, much too rare a thing?

IAN M. FRASER

Liturgical Renewal. By J. D. BENOIT. S.C.M. Press, London, 1958. Pp. 112. 8s. 6d.

THIS little book forms part of that now familiar and useful series *Studies in Ministry and Worship* edited by Professor G. W. H. Lampe. The author is a distinguished professor of theology in the Protestant Faculty of Theology of the University of Strasbourg, and perhaps he may suitably be described as the doyen of French writers on Calvin, not least for his editorial work on the very scholarly edition of Calvin's *Institution* of 1570 now in progress. In this volume Professor Benoit is not concerned with writing a scholar's monograph, rather his book is the substance of a series of talks he gave at a Conference of French Pastors and Anglican clergy at Lambeth in 1956. These talks are informative without being too detailed, devotional in manner rather than academic. The first part outlines and discusses liturgical developments in the French-speaking Reformed Churches, giving among other subjects a useful account of the new liturgy of The Lord's Supper in the Reformed Church of France. One slight

criticism of this first part might be allowed: more emphasis on the relation of theological renewal to liturgical renewal would have been useful. The second part provides a well-informed and sympathetic account of the recent liturgical developments in the Roman Catholic Church; but this discussion is almost wholly confined to French Catholicism. 'Evening Masses' and the 'theology of the Word' preached at the Eucharist while not startling notions to Protestants are signs of a new departure in Catholicism! (Nevertheless in Protestantism Word and Sacrament could well be quickened by more of theological and liturgical renewal.) Whether these and other associated aspirations of men like Fr Bouyer and Fr Congar will be approved and fulfilled in world Catholicism is yet to be seen. This book is further evidence that French Protestantism and Catholicism show a higher level of mutual understanding and charity than obtains elsewhere. BASIL HALL

BOOKS RECEIVED

John Baker: *The Approach to Calvary*. Independent Press. 6s. 6d.

J. Barkley: *A Short History of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland*. Publishing Board of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, Belfast. 3s. wrappers, 4s. 6d. boards.

Owen Brandon: *The Battle for the Soul, Aspects of Religious Conversion*. Hodder and Stoughton. 4s. 6d.

E. H. Brooks: *The City of God and the Politics of Crisis*. Oxford U.P. 10s. 6d.

R. Bultmann: *Jesus Christ and Mythology*. S.C.M. Press. 6s.

Calvin: *Tracts and Treatises* (editor, T. F. Torrance). Oliver and Boyd. 3 vols. £5 5s.

B. S. Childs: *Myth and Reality in the Old Testament*. S.C.M. Press. 9s 6d.

C. J. Dumont: *Approaches to Christian Unity*. Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd. 25s.

Carl Henry (editor): *Revelation and the Bible*. The Tyndale Press. 17s. 6d.

Robert E. Hume: *The World's Living Religions* (revised edition). T. and T. Clark. 21s.

Hubert Jedin: *Ecumenical Councils in the Catholic Church, An Historical Survey*. Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd. 21s.

G. A. F. Knight: *Hosea* (The Torch Bible Commentary). S.C.M. Press. 9s. 6d.

Theodor Lanaras: *Extract from 'The Holy Scriptures above Science'*. Church of Christ, Athens. no price.

R. P. Martin: *The Epistle of Paul to the Philippians, Introduction and Commentary*. Tyndale New Testament Commentaries (General Editor, R. V. G. Tasker). Tyndale Press. 8s. 6d.

Pierre Maury: *Predestination and Other Papers*. S.C.M. Press. 12s. 6d.

R. G. Milburn: *Significant Church History*. James Clarke and Co. Ltd. 7s. 6d.

Basil Minchin: *Every Man in His Ministry*. Darton, Longmann and Todd, Ltd. 16s. (From the series *Worship in the Body of Christ* by Basil Minchin.)

J. Cesar Mota: *'Tito, Meu Filho . . .' Comentário à Carta de São Paulo a Tito*. São Paulo, Brazil; Reis, Cardoso, Botelho, S.A.

Lesslie Newbigin: *The Reunion of the Church* (revised edition). S.C.M. Press. 21s.

I. T. Ramsey: *Freedom and Immortality*. S.C.M. Press. 16s.

T. A. Roberts: *History and Christianity Apologetic*. S.P.C.K. 25s.

William Robinson: *What Churches of Christ Stand For*. The Berean Press, Birmingham. 3s.

—— *The Administration of the Lord's Supper* (reprint 1959). The Berean Press, Birmingham. 2s. 6d.

Erik Routley: *Church Music and Theology*. S.C.M. Press. 8s. 6d.

Eduard Schweizer: *Lordship and Discipleship*. S.C.M. Press. 9s. 6d.

E. Stauffer: *Jesus and His Story*. S.C.M. Press. 12s. 6d.

Williston Walker: *A History of the Christian Church* (revised edition). T. and T. Clark. 42s.

J. C. Winslow: *Confession and Absolution, A Short Guide for Today*. Hodder and Stoughton. 3s. 6d.

Printed in Great Britain by Robert Cunningham and Sons Ltd. Alva

THE HISTORICAL JESUS AND THE ORIGINS OF CHRISTIANITY

by The Rev. Professor HUGH ANDERSON

The problems of Christian origins are many and varied. Even an incomplete bibliography of works devoted to the beginnings of Christianity, as M. Goguel remarked, would fill a volume of over five hundred pages. But the central and crucial problem, and certainly one of the liveliest issues in theology in our time, is the question of the relation of the historical Jesus to the Christ of the Church's faith. The twentieth century has been marked by a great shift away from the historical Jesus as the centre of theological interest to the Kerygma, the Church's proclamation, the Christ of faith, to *Gemeindetheologie* and *existentialistische Exegese*.

This quite distinctive change has been produced by a number of factors, the more important of which we may now briefly review.

1. *The demise of the Liberal view of the historical Jesus*

A. Schweitzer castigated the Liberal Lives of Jesus of the nineteenth century as unjustifiable modernisations. The great weakness of the Liberal quest was not only that it sought to bring Jesus up to date so as to suit the modern idealist, rationalist, socialist or romanticist, but also that it really separated the historical Jesus from the Christ of the Church's faith in its search for a historically proven and easily understandable Lord. The outcome was that the Liberals gave us in their Jesus a Figure not nearly big enough to account for Christianity.

In contrast, although Schweitzer's own delineation of Jesus as a fanatical futurist, a deluded visionary, a throughgoing apocalyptist has not evoked widespread sympathy, it has nevertheless brought us closer than the Liberal critics of the von Harnack tradition to the *Mysterium Christi* which pervades the Gospels. Schweitzer indeed compelled criticism to come to grips with the central eschatological element in Jesus' message, and created conditions favourable for the movement of theological interest from the Jesus of history to the Kerygma

by his impassioned demonstration of the illegitimacy of the Liberal quest.

2. *Scepticism concerning the Gospels as sources for the history of Jesus*

Hand in hand with the recognition of the illegitimacy of the Liberal Quest has gone the growing conviction of its impossibility. Even if we wished to break through to Jesus as He actually was in His history, we could not, for the only sources available to us are inadequate, biased, and written by men who already believed in Christ as Lord. The Gospels are no longer to be regarded as in any real sense histories or biographies, but as theological documents, written 'from faith to faith'.

In the last few decades New Testament criticism has in fact depicted the Evangelists as interested primarily in anything but the history of Jesus. Recently Austin Farrer,[1] C. F. Evans,[2] and P. Carrington[3] have argued that the Gospels are structured on the most elaborate and intricate architectonic designs, involving a complicated pattern of cycles and sub-cycles, all determined either by the Evangelists' preoccupation with Old Testament prototypes or with the lectionary and cultic needs of the early Christian community.

It is, however, the scepticism of radical Form-Criticism that has been most far-reaching in its effects. The Form-Critical School, led by M. Dibelius and R. Bultmann, engaged upon an exhaustive examination of the traditions that circulated in the 'twilight period', and of the laws governing their formation into written records, and so performed a most notable service to New Testament scholarship. But their findings led them to the negative conclusion that we can never get back beyond the tradition to Jesus Himself, and that the real dynamic behind the shaping of the Gospel material was not regard for accurate historical reporting of the *Verba et Acta* of the Jesus of history, but rather the dictates of the *Sitz im Leben der alten Kirche*. Bultmann's verdict was: 'I do indeed think that we can now know almost nothing concerning the life and personality of Jesus.'[4] We see from this how the pendulum had swung the

[1] A.M. Farrer, *St. Matthew and St. Mark*, London, 1954.

[2] C. F. Evans, 'The Central Section of St. Luke's Gospel', *Studies in the Gospels*, ed. D. E. Nineham, Oxford, 1955, pp. 37-53.

[3] P. Carrington, *The Primitive Christian Calendar*, Cambridge, 1952.

[4] R. Bultmann, *Jesus*, Berlin, 1929, pp. 11 and 12.

whole way since Weinel's pronouncement in the heyday of the Liberal Quest: 'We can know Jesus very well.'

3. *The alleged limitations of Historicismus*

The advent of the Higher Criticism introduced a period of detailed historical investigation on analytical-scientific lines into the New Testament documents as source-books. All the increasing resources available to historical research from archaeology, philology, psychology, textual criticism, etc., were called up in order to take us right back into the world of Jesus or of Paul. But in 1921 Karl Barth,[1] while not altogether repudiating the worth of historical criticism, relegated it to a subsidiary place and advocated the supreme importance of 'theological interpretation' to bring us face to face with the theme of the New Testament writings, namely the Christ, in its meaning for us. What was implied in this was of course the insignificance of historical investigation or 'critical theology' for Christian faith.

Subsequently R. Bultmann, from the standpoint of the existentialist theologian, completely disparaged the value of historical criticism, as applied particularly to the Gospels, by taking up and developing the challenge of Martin Kähler's work, *Der sogennante historische Jesus und der geschichtliche, biblische Christus*. Claiming to follow Kähler, Bultmann distinguished between the categories of the 'historisch' and the 'geschichtlich', first referring to that which is objectively verifiable and can be scientifically studied, the second to that which, while it is a past event, continually impinges upon present experience.[2]

Bultmann understands the Cross and the Resurrection as 'geschichtlich', and so includes them within the orbit of New Testament theology and Christian faith. But the history of Jesus, in so far as his drastic surgery on the text of the Gospels leaves him any data, he regards as 'historisch'. He thus denies the decisiveness of the historical Jesus for the origins of the Church's faith, pushes Him back into the realm of Jewish history, and considers His message to be only one among other presuppositions for New Testament theology. His resultant picture of Jesus as rabbi, wonder-worker and prophet of the coming End of the Age, summoning men to a radical obedience

[1] K. Barth, *The Epistle to the Romans*, 2nd ed., Preface, London, 1921.
[2] R. Bultmann, *Kerygma and Myth*, London, 1952.

in the face of this impending crisis, has become familiar to us.[1] We may suppose that his chief motivation in isolating the Christ of the early Church's faith from the message and career of Jesus, has been to preserve the 'unprovability' of the Christian faith, and safeguard it against the vagaries of subjective, historical criticism. Certainly by treating the ministry of Jesus as merely 'historisch', he rejects the creative significance of Jesus for the origins of Christianity. Christianity begins with the Kerygma.

It is necessary to add here a further word about the relation in which Bultmann stands to Kähler. Kähler was among the first to react against the nineteenth-century Life-of-Jesus movement, and to affirm that we cannot go behind the Kerygma, or the testimony given to Jesus the Christ in the light of the Easter faith. Kähler's reaction to the Liberal Quest, his shift to the Kerygma, his suggestion about the distinction between 'historisch' and 'geschichtlich', are taken up but altered through the work of W. Herrmann to culminate in Bultmann and Gogarten.[2]

[1] Bultmann's Portrait of Jesus is contained in his *Theology of the New Testament*, Vol. I, 1952, pp. 3-32.

[2] Bultmann was a pupil of Wilhelm Herrmann. His theology has at several stragetic points come under the influence of his teacher, e.g. at the point we are discussing, and also in his understanding of the nature of faith as being its own ground and object. Kähler thought of the 'historisch' as the 'past' which comes under the scrutiny of the historian as observer. The 'geschichtlich' on the other hand is for Kähler the 'historical' in the sense of what *really happened* (Geschehen). Herrmann accentuated the distinction by viewing the 'historisch' in a more objective and positivistic way than Kähler as causal sequence of past events. The ministry of Jesus as 'historisch' in this sense was in Herrmann's view inaccessible to us. Herrmann then understood the 'geschichtlich' in a pyschological sense of the 'inward consciousness' of Jesus, of the impact of His personality upon us. Now Kähler wished to show that the Christ-event in its reality, in its 'geschichtlich' character, is Jesus clothed with or indwelt by His Gospel, Jesus imbued with His message. It is precisely here that Bultmann is indebted to Kähler, since for Bultmann too Jesus and His message are quite inseparable. But Bultmann has gone beyond Kähler and stands closer to Herrmann, except that the 'geschichtlich' is interpreted by him existentially rather than pyschologically. Bultmann would not speak like Herrmann of the 'inward consciousness' of Jesus, nor of the impact of His personality, since for Bultmann the Christ-event has objective reality only when and where it confronts me through the Church's proclamation of its message, and effects a change in my understanding of myself. For Bultmann the Christ-event is 'geschichtlich' or 'escatologisch' as happening here and now for me in and through the Church's preaching. On the other hand Bultmann has always insisted that he accepts the 'having happenedness' of the Christ-event. In its 'pastness' it is 'historisch', though for Bultman all we can know about what really happened is that Jesus preached a message about the impending event of the kingdom of God and died on the Cross. We see how Bultmann has rather radically revised Kähler's position, transferring to the 'historisch' much of what Kähler meant by the 'geschichtlich'. But we do detect throughout Bultmann's work Kähler's notion of the inseparability of Jesus and His message.

Nevertheless in one sense Bultmann's position represents a radical departure from Kähler's. Indeed Paul Althaus has recently attempted to revive Kähler as a counterpoint to Bultmann. For whereas Kähler did want to go back to the 'image' of the historical Jesus, Bultmann has rejected this harking back (Zurückfragen) to a 'concrete personality'. Althaus admits that the harking back to the 'character image' of the historical Jesus is of a 'pre-scientific' nature, yet claims that we are constrained to do just this, namely presuppose and affirm a 'concrete personality'. Althaus himself then accepts Bultmann's position in so far as he agrees with Kähler, but rejects Bultmann's separation of the Christ of the Kerygma from the historical Jesus, since thus the biblical Kyrios is deprived of His historical image, and contends that the historical Jesus originates the Kyrios-Christology (P. Althaus, *Das sogennannte Kerygma und der historische Jesus; zur Kritik der heutigen Kerygma-Theologie*, Gütersloh, 1958).

4. *Evolutionary or genetic views of the rise of Christianity*

At the beginning of this century when the comparative-religionist method began to be applied to the study of the growth of Christianity, the phrase which became current was: 'Christianity is a syncretistic phenomenon', a great blending of many tenets and practices drawn from the religious faiths of the ancient Near East. As fresh information continually came to light thereafter concerning the world in which Christianity was cradled, scholars seized with avidity on certain facets of the new knowledge, and made them the foundation of successive theories of the sources of the Christian religion. In 1925, for instance, the publication of the texts of the Mandaean sect by Mark Lidzbarski,[1] was followed by what M. Goguel called 'une fièvre mandéènne'. For a while it was fashionable to trace the main features of the Christian religion to sources in Mandaeism. There have been recurrent 'fevers' ever since. Most recently sweeping claims have been made that in the Qumran texts we have at last the clue to the roots of primitive Christianity.

Reitzenstein closely scrutinised the Hellenistic world. Dalman and Billerbeck concentrated on Judaism and the Rabbinic

[1] M. Lidzbarski, *Mandäische Liturgien*, 1920. Also Giza, *Der Schatz, oder das Grosse Buch der Mandäer*, 1925.

literature. The Cult of the Roman Emperor, Gnosticism and the Hermetic literature were also extensively studied. We owe a lasting debt of gratitude to those whose devoted labours have so greatly enriched our store of knowledge of the environment of nascent Christianity. It may be claimed that these background studies have served to show the uniqueness of Jesus, standing in isolation over against His environment in the existential decisiveness of His Person, and in the supreme authority of His claim. But in point of fact background studies have frequently led instead to overemphasis on the evolution of Christianity from its surroundings by a process of direct borrowing, and so to a bypassing of the historical Jesus in His formative significance for Christian faith.

For example, W. Bousset, adopting von Harnack's thesis of 'the acute Hellenisation of Christianity', argued in his influential work, *Kyrios Christos* (1936), that the Christian Church took over from Hellenism and applied to Christ the titles 'Kyrios' and 'Son of God'. 'Kyrios' was widely used as a cultic name for the deity in the Mystery Religions, and for the Emperor in the official worship of Caesar, as Deissmann has shown from a variety of papyrus fragments.[1] 'Son of God' was closely connected with the cultic redeemers or 'divine men' of Gnosticism. In his recent book, *Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting*, Bultmann, on lines similar to Bousset, holds that the Christological formulations of the early Church were derived from the mythical cults of Hellenism.[2] Here again we come upon the transferring of the locus of revelation from the history of Jesus to the primitive Church's witness to the Christ, and the rejection of the creative importance of the historical Jesus for Christian origins.

We have so far then reviewed a number of the chief causes that have contributed to the twentieth-century movement away from the historical Jesus to the Kerygma. Undoubtedly Bultmann's position has been most disturbing to conservative 'critical' theologians. The main line of attack against Bultmann has been that he has seriously imperilled the very heart of Christianity by severing the Christian faith from its roots in a historical event, the career and message of Jesus of Nazareth,

[1] A. Deissmann, *Light from the Ancient East*, London, 1927, pp. 349-62.
[2] R. Bultmann, *Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting*, London, 1956.

and so dissolving it into an abstract mysticism or the vague Docetism of a Christ-idea or Christ-principle, empty of specific and concrete content. So strong has been the reaction in places to Bultmann's de-historicising of the Gospel that there has now ensued a considerable revival of concern with the historical Jesus, and the whole question of the importance of the message and history of Jesus for Christian faith has been thrown open once more.

It has to be said here that this new revival of interest in the historical Jesus has nothing to do with a felt need to prove His historical existence. So far as I am aware no one has seriously tried to deny the historical existence of Jesus since P. Couchoud's rather eccentric monograph 'Jésus, Mythe où Histoire?', published in 1924. Nor again is it a throw-back to the Liberal-type Quest (although it may accept values latent in that Quest). 'Kerygmatic theology' has made this impossible by demonstrating that the notion of a historically authenticated Lord is absurd, and that Christ is Lord only to faith's venturesome 'Yes'. Rather the movement of New Testament theology back to the historical Jesus aims to establish the decisiveness, the regulativeness and creativity of the ministry and message of Jesus for Christian faith.

In this movement there have emerged two different emphases—what we may call (*a*) the Gospels-as-history emphasis, and (*b*) the Gospels-as-'kerygmatic-history' emphasis. Risking an over-simplification at this point we may say that typical representatives of the Gospels-as-history emphasis maintain that to know the message and career of Jesus is essential and indispensable for our understanding of the Kerygma, whereas representatives of the Gospels-as-'kerygmatic-history' emphasis hold that our principal source for comprehending the meaning of the historical Jesus is the Kerygma. It will appear in the sequel that what is really involved is two different views of history.

Meantime let us consider some of the more important approaches under the first category.

A. 1. It is fitting that we should begin with R. H. Fuller's[1] attempt to rehabilitate the historical Jesus in the creative

[1] R. H. Fuller, *The Mission and Achievement of Jesus*, London, 1954.

significance of His mission and message for Christian faith, for Fuller has reacted more mildly than most recent champions of the historical Jesus to Bultmann's de-historicising. Fuller accepts Bultmann's distinction between the dawn (*Anbruch*) and the irruption (*Hereinbrechen*) of God's Reign. The Reign of God is already dawning in the activity of Jesus, but it has not yet fully broken into history. Fuller renounces C. H. Dodd's 'realised eschatology', and interprets Jesus' sayings and parables about the coming Reign of God entirely futuristically, and His exorcisms and mighty works as proleptic or preliminary assaults upon Satan, pending his complete overthrow at the End. Jesus is indeed the Messiah-designate and the Son of Man-designate. His whole activity is keyed up to the decisive future event of His death, through which God will inaugurate the final blessings of the End. The message of Jesus is that God is *about to act* decisively and eschatologically in Him. The Church's kerygma proclaims that He has so acted. There reside then in His earthly ministry the 'raw materials of Christology'.[1]

This treatment, interesting though it is, does not, it seems to me, really establish the decisiveness of the historical Jesus for Christian faith. Rather it isolates the exalted Lord and Christ of the Church's faith from the Jesus of history, by positing that in His earthly ministry He *was* still something different from or less than the believed Lord. Moreover the true cruciality of the Cross is not that it stands at a strategic chronological position at the end of the public ministry, but that it is the final realisation of the *meaning* of His whole career. The impression conveyed to us by the Gospel record is of One whose life is all of a piece, lordly all through, yet Cross-centred

[1] Fuller, op. cit., pp. 79ff. In contrast to Fuller's view that Jesus' eschatological words are to be futuristically interpreted, that the Kingdom of God is only proleptically present in His earthly ministry, and that he becomes Messiah and Son of Man *only after* His death, W. G. Kümmel in his Detailed study of the eschatological message of Jesus (*Promise and Fulfilment*, Eng. Transl. of *Verheissung und Erfüllung*, 1957) maintains from the texts that 'Jesus saw the future eschatological consummation to be effective already in the present in that the *eschaton* showed itself to be effective in His own person' (p. 105). Whereas, for example, Fuller sees Mark 3.27 as denoting a *preliminary* assault upon Satan prior to his final overthrow at the End, Kümmel argues that the fight *has already been won*, because Satan must *already be* bound if he can be robbed of the children whom he has dominated—'it is the meaning of the mission of Jesus, when announcing the approach of the Kingdom of God, to make this future at the same time already now a present reality' (p. 109).

all through. I agree with Bishop E. G. Selwyn's remarks that the life of Jesus is neither un-Messianic (Bultmann), nor pre-Messianic (Fuller), for 'He is what He was, and He was what He is'.[1]

2. Remarkably, just when everyone had written off the possibility of constructing a factual life of Jesus, E. Stauffer has lately come forward with the pronouncement that the chief task of New Testament criticism is to get behind the theologising interpretations of the Gospels to the 'bare facts' of the history of Jesus.[2] In his own reconstruction of the facts Stauffer leans heavily upon the Fourth Gospel, thinks in terms of a four-year ministry, harmonistically fits synoptic elements into a fundamentally Johannine framework, and favours Luke where Lucan details accord with the Johannine. In so doing, incidentally Stauffer (*a*) evidences the new regard of criticism for the Fourth Gospel's authenticity in historical detail, and (*b*) pays insufficient attention to the thesis of M. Dibelius[3] and H. Conzelmann[4] that Luke is a *Tendenz* document, in which the eschatological tension in the primitive Church has been consistently toned down.

The implication of Stauffer's work is that historical research into the 'facts' may elucidate the final authority of Jesus. Thus he really raises in its acutest form the question of what historicism can or cannot do. Finally we are justified in asking whether his own presentation of the facts is more likely to be reliable or accurate than many other possible reconstructions.

3. British New Testament scholars have reacted chiefly against the scepticism of the Form-Critics and have taken their stand by T. W. Manson's dictum: 'The further we travel along the Wredestrasse, the more we realise it is the road to nowhere.'[5] They have therefore been led mainly to a defence of the accuracy of Mark as historiographer. In *The Life and Ministry of Jesus* Vincent Taylor bases his account of the

[1] E. G. Selwyn, 'Image, Fact and Faith', *New Testament Studies*, Vol. I, No. 4, p. 246.

[2] E. Stauffer, *Jesus, Gestalt und Geschichte*, Francke Verlag, Bern, 1957.

[3] M. Dibelius, *Aufsätze zur Apostelsgeschichte*, 1951.

[4] H. Conzelmann, *Die Mitte der Zeit*, 1954.

[5] T. W. Manson, *The life of Jesus: some tendencies in present-day research*, *The Background of the New Testament and its Eschatology*, ed. Davies and Daube, p. 216. Manson's reference is of course to W. Wrede's *Das Messiasgeheimnis*, in which Wrede discredited the historical reliability of Mark on the ground of Mark's use of the Messianic secret.

ministry of Jesus on the Markan outline as framework, but draws upon all the Gospel sources to fill in the gaps.[1] Although Taylor is aware of the need for openness to the Kerygma, he nevertheless is concerned mainly to validate the historical trustworthiness of the Gospel records, and prefaces his section on the Passion and Resurrection with the remark that 'the first narrators felt that it was enough to relate the events, without commenting upon them, and without making Jesus the mouthpiece of their doctrinal views'.[2]

4. In a lucid paper, Dr J. Jeremias has seriously challenged Bultmann's views.[3] He admits that the dream of the possibility of writing a life of Jesus is over. But he uncompromisingly states the prior importance of the ministry and message of Jesus, claiming that the origin of Christianity is not the Kerygma, nor the Resurrection experience of the disciples, nor the Christ-idea, but the historical appearance of the man, Jesus of Nazareth. We need not today fall heir to the Liberal temptation to modernise Jesus, Jeremias suggests, since we are so much better equipped to know Him as He really was, through literary criticism, through study of the formation of the Gospel tradition and of the environment of Jesus, through our increased knowledge of His mother-tongue, Galilaean Aramaic, and of the eschatological nature of His message. If we treat the Gospels as history, and with all conscientiousness use the critical sources at our disposal to get back to the historical Jesus, we invariably find ourselves in the presence of God Himself.

This brings us to a short evaluation of the 'Gospels-as-history' approach. It certainly represents a welcome defence of the Gospel against the docetising tendency to dissolve Christianity into the abstract mysticism of a Christ-idea, it does justice to the affirmation that 'God was in Christ', it makes possible a worthy and full Incarnational theology, and it rightly stresses that, since the good news is fundamentally historical event, Christianity can be said to begin, chronologically speaking at least, with the event, Jesus of Nazareth.

On the negative side there are four things to be said: (*a*) We

[1] V. Taylor, *The Life and Ministry of Jesus*, 1954.
[2] V. Taylor, op. cit., p. 46.
[3] J. Jeremias, 'The Present Position in the Controversy Concerning the Problem of the Historical Jesus', *The Expository Times*, Vol. LXIX, No. 11, pp. 333-9.

must with resolute honesty confess that we have no access to the history of Jesus save in the records of the Evangelists who have themselves already responded in faith to Him as Christ and Lord. To fail to admit this is always to run the risk of dissociating His history from the Church's faith in Him as exalted Lord. Yet it is only from within the context of the Church's faith in Christ as Lord that His history is understood as God's history, that is eschatological history. This is to say that it is only from the standpoint of the existential decision about His Lordship that we are brought into touch with His true Selfhood. (*b*) Although the revelation is historical, yet revelation in and by itself cannot be subjected to historical criticism or scientific analysis. We must therefore beware of stretching the capacities of historical research too far. While historical criticism can enlighten us on many interesting questions raised by the New Testament documents e.g. about His birthplace, His family, His ministry's duration and the order of events in it, the legality of His trial, etc., it cannot *per se* lay bare the significance of the career of Jesus as the revelatory and redemptive action of God. (*c*) Does the suggestion that the continuous process of unearthing new knowledge about the sayings and deeds of the historical Jesus by our own highly developed skills and techniques brings us ever closer to the reality of His Selfhood, involve a denial of the absolute finality of the Gospel's witness to Him? We may long to have more information about Him in His history, yet we have all we need to know. The Gospels confront us with One as Lord and Christ, whose own understanding of His existence and real Selfhood is not hidden from us, in His triumphant negation of the world and the world's standards, culminating in a real death upon the Cross. (*d*) At the present moment in the Jesus of History-Christ of Faith controversy, it is not enough merely to assert the priority of His career and message to the Church's proclamation of Him as Lord. We must be concerned to show the integral place His History occupies within the context of the early Church's faith.

It is appropriate to close this section with a consideration of William Manson's important book, *Jesus the Messiah* (1946), for it is, I think, more incisive in its insights into the true issues involved in the Jesus of history-Christ of faith controversy

than other British works; it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds just mentioned, and in a real sense it bridges the gap between the 'Gospels-as-history' and the 'Gospels-as-kerygmatic-history' approaches.

Manson stands in line with Martin Kähler in insisting on the need to affirm a 'concrete personality' as the ground of Christianity. 'The groundwork of the Gospel is, and continues to be a human story. It was in a life of earthly humiliation and conflict, the life of a *viator*, that the Messianic destiny of Jesus was disclosed' (p. 29). But like Kähler also, Manson reveals a genuine openness to the Kerygma. He acknowledges frankly that we see Jesus only through the tradition of the Church, and in the light of the community's faith and love (pp. 54 and 55). Moreover he is in sympathy with Kähler's concept of the *Übergeschichtlich* when he claims that the New Testament's Christological language is only the vehicle of the 'historical-suprahistorical meaning which Jesus as personal spirit has for faith' (p. 217). Again, stressing the creative significance of the historical Jesus for Christian faith, Manson writes: 'It is the human figure of the Man of Nazareth that gives its peculiar point and pathos to the evangelical doctrine of redemption and that gives it also its historical reality' (p. 215).

In his emphasis on the decisiveness of the Jesus of history for faith, Manson parallels the position of G. Bornkamm, E. Fuchs and E. Käsemann, who have lately embarked on a new quest of the historical Jesus, as we shall see below, and who dwell upon 'the *constitutive significance* of the historical Jesus for Christian faith'.

Manson does, however, make much more of the 'mighty works' and the message of Jesus than any of these German scholars, and sees particularly in the community's possession of the tradition of the teaching of Jesus a powerful formative influence on the Christian conception of the revelation of God in Christ (pp. 79ff). E. Fuchs on the other hand rejects the possibility of isolating historically the message of Jesus concerning Himself, and concedes that Jesus can be sought in the New Testament only as an object of the Gospel message.[1]

[1] E. Fuchs, 'Christus das Ende der Geschichte', *Ev. Th.* 1948/49, 449, note 6. W. G. Kümmel holds on the contrary that it is quite wrong to exclude the message of Jesus himself. In the oldest tradition of Jesus' message, which can be ascertained by critical methods, we meet with the Jesus whose historical message alone con-

But even here in dealing with the message of Jesus Manson is not so interested in establishing the historical authenticity of the sayings of Jesus, as in their existential import for faith. 'There can never have been a time', he writes, 'when the words of Jesus most vitally present to the Christian consciousness were not felt to involve it in a sense of crisis, in that the prophetic urge and challenge of the words flung the existing achievements and practice of the Church into deep shadow by the side of the transcendent ideal which they revealed, and so summoned Christians afresh to repentance in the name of the kingdom of heaven' (p. 86). Nowhere in his chapters on the teaching of Jesus is Manson concerned with Jesus' words from the point of view of their contribution to the ongoing history of ideas. Jesus' words throw us primarily not upon ideas but upon God. The teaching of Jesus and *crisis* are inseparably united. 'In the teaching of Jesus the essential fact which confronts us is a spiritual encounter of our souls with him in which Jesus of Nazareth so interprets and represents to us the meaning of the Eschaton or Reign of God that henceforth there can be for us no separation of the Messianic good from the revelation of God in the spirit of Jesus' (p. 209). In this way Manson comes close to Bornkamm's contention (*see infra*) about the immediacy of the presence of Jesus Christ Himself in His words and acts, although Bornkamm is sceptical in a way Manson is not about what are actual words of Jesus.

I have quoted rather extensively from Manson's work because I see in it a singularly valuable contribution to our subject. It is not bound by the limitations of *Historicismus*, it manifests a real openness to the Kerygma, and its chief concern is with the decisiveness of the historical Jesus for Christian faith. This last will be the theme of the latter part of this paper.

We now turn therefore to the 'Gospels-as-kerygmatic-history' approach.

B. There is no doubt keen suspicion in many quarters that to put the Kergyma in the forefront of our theological concern

firms the correctness of the apostolic message. To set forth this oldest message is therefore not only a historical task, but one that is theologically indispensable and no hermeneutic mistake (Kümmel, op. cit., p. 105, note 1). Incidentally this is the only point in his work at which Kümmel raises the question of the historicity of the sayings of Jesus.

involves a dismissal of the historical Jesus. That need not be so. For, even if we possessed no Gospels, the very existence of the Church and the fact of the New Testament itself bear irrefragable witness to the historical reality of Jesus of Nazareth. The event itself is so deeply embedded in the Church's interpretation of it, as John Knox has shown,[1] that any denial of it would be inconceivable and absurd to the Christian. The event in its totality, as Knox suggests, is not to be understood merely as past occurrence, but as that inward depth of meaning in the occurrence to which men react and respond. Further Nels Ferré, in his most recent work, describes the life or history of Jesus as 'event-meaning'.[2] This is in line with the modern view of historiography.

In a penetrating essay on 'The Problem of Hermeneutics',[3] R. Bultmann has shown how Willhelm Dilthey precipitated the new view of history by asking whether knowledge of the great forms of 'individual human being' is possible. Bultmann rejects the traditional hermeneutic principles as inadequate for the comprehension of literary texts, and suggests that historical phenomena, in so far as they testify to 'individual human being', really only become historical phenomena when they assume significance for a subject which itself stands in history and is involved in them. History is not external occurrence, but *what is taking place in* the occurrence, the real meaning of which is revealed not to the passive spectator but only to the one who becomes personally involved in it. The self of the interpreter of a work is deepened and enriched when he is able to relate his own singular historical existence to the possibilities of human being revealed in the singular historical existence of the subject of the work.

On the basis of this modern understanding of history, a group of German New Testament scholars, G. Bornkamm, E. Fuchs and E. Käsemann, have in the last few years urged the need for a fresh evaluation of the historical Jesus. The group's primary emphasis is on the Kerygma as confronting us with the true Selfhood of One whom we can encounter historically, a THOU with whom I can share in a dialogue. The Gospels are

[1] J. Knox, *Criticism and Faith*, 1952, and *Jesus, Lord and Christ*, 1958.
[2] Nels Ferré, *Christ and the Christian*, 1958.
[3] R. Bultmann, *Essays*, London, 1955, pp. 234ff.

not objective historiographies, nor, as in the view of Form-Criticism, merely testimonies to the history of the early Church. Investigation of the Evangelists' aims and motives shows that they were devoutly interested in the history of Jesus, and describe their own situation and experience in the Church not in general religious and spiritual terms, but in the particular and specific terms of His life, in which as 'event-meaning' they themselves were participants. The writers of the Gospels, their memory of Jesus sustained and stimulated by the Tradition, record His history kerygmatically in the light of their faith in the risen Christ. In the profoundest sense then they confront us with the reality of His individual Being. The Kerygma opens up the possibility of encountering Him in His 'history' (*Geschichte*), since it has preserved enough of His own understanding of His existence, even if we can never verify or establish the topography, sequence of events, etc., of His history (*Historie*).

Bornkamm's *Jesus von Nazareth*[1] is fairly representative of the work of this group of scholars. It opens with a section on the relationship of Faith and History, in which Bornkamm holds that the decisive importance of the earthly life of Jesus falls within the context of the primitive Church's faith in the risen and ascended Lord.

The message of Jesus concerns the breaking in of the Kingdom of God, which is still veiled from those who have not faith's vision. The present coming of the Kingdom opens up the certainty of future judgment and salvation. The future will only corroborate and confirm the present as a day of decision. Thus Jesus understands Himself as the One who introduces the eschaton and so confronts men with the radical, insistent divine demand for commitment.

Bornkamm recognises the life of Jesus to be Messianic, but in rather a special sense. Jesus did not Himself use such titles as Messiah, Son of God, Son of David and Son of Man. But the early Church thought Him to be Messiah because they encountered His Messiahship in the inward meaning of His words and acts. The inference to be drawn from this is that the secret of who Jesus really is, His Selfhood, His life, is disclosed independently of the historical inquiry about whether

[1] G. Bornkamm, *Jesus von Nazareth*, 1956.

He employed certain titles of Himself during His ministry.

What conclusions then are to be drawn from this particular approach to the problem concerning the historical Jesus? Dr J. M. Robinson has been led to declare that we now 'have a second avenue of access (to the historical Jesus) because of the rise of scientific historiography since the enlightenment'.[1] The Kerygma and modern historiography both alike, according to Robinson, mediate an existential encounter with the historical Jesus, and so modern historiography is very significant for Christian faith. The theory of two avenues of encounter with the historical Jesus is, I think, somewhat misleading. It seems to me to be less ambiguous to say rather that modern historiography offers us a valuable clue to the Evangelists' purposes in writing Gospels, helps us to penetrate into the world of the Gospels, and illumines for us the true nature of the Kerygma by making it clear that the kerygmatic history of the Gospels conveys to us not primarily a temporal sequence of events, but the existential meaningfulness of a Person.

Bornkamm, Fuchs and Käsemann are inclined, I believe, to understate the importance of the Resurrection.[2] That is, I suppose, because they are so intent upon demonstrating the meaning of the historical Jesus for faith that they tend to restrict the pivotal importance of the resurrection for the Kerygma. But I suggest that one of the inescapable facts of the New Testament is the kerygmatic indissolubility of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus the Christ. 'God hath made him both Lord and Christ, this Jesus whom you crucified' (Acts 2.36). The dominant and regulative event for the faith of the New Testament is the resurrection. The Kerygma itself derives from it. The existence of the Church depends upon it. Now whatever else the resurrection implied for apostles and disciples in terms of its cosmic implications, it certainly meant the revival of Jesus in the fulness of His transcendent Selfhood. The Easter glory shines back upon His earthly path, the Via Dolorosa, even as the Cross reveals who this One is who is risen and exalted.

[1] J. M. Robinson, 'The Quest of the Historical Jesus Today', *Theology Today*, Vol. XV, No. 2, July 1958, p. 192.

[2] 'Fuchs, G. Bornkamm, and I see ourselves compelled to restrict the assertion that Easter founded the Christian kerygma; we must inquire as to the meaning of the historical Jesus for faith' (E. Käsemann). *See* J. M. Robinson, op. cit., p. 194.

Tillich is, I think, quite right in suggesting that we cannot hold any crudely physical view of the resurrection of Jesus the Christ, nor yet should we surrender to any psychological theory of it. His own 'restitution theory', only briefly expounded in his *Systematic Theology*, Vol. Two, points us toward a fuller understanding. Something so decisive happened in the resurrection that the disciples discovered that the power of the New Being was and is present in Jesus the Christ.[1] The resurrection is not to be understood as the elevation of Jesus to a status which had not been His before His death, but as the climactic disclosure of the meaning of His person. Luke's story of the Emmaus walk contains the most developed 'philosophy of the resurrection' in the Gospels. The chief feature of the story is the recognition of who Jesus is, the Exalted One who in fulfilment of the Old Testament 'testimonies' had to suffer and die. The same is true of the record of the appearance to Thomas (John 20.27ff).[2] The risen Christ is the Man who was crucified. Even as we have no record in the Gospels of any appearance of the risen Christ save to those who had known Him 'in the flesh', so also it is true that only those who encountered Him risen came to know Him 'in the flesh', that is, as He really was and is.

The import of the resurrection narratives is that the encounter with the risen Christ is encounter with the Selfhood of a Person. The exalted Christ, who is the object of faith for the Christian, is no vague Christ-Idea or religious Ideal, but a quite definite and particular historical Self. While the Gospels leave us in no doubt about His contemporaneousness, they also emphasise the 'pastness' of His history. It is this historical particularity which constitutes the offence of the Gospel, for by it we are placed in the situation of having to make the existential decision about a Lord who lived an obscure life and died a criminal's death on a Cross. The most serious criticism against Bultmann is indeed that by making Christianity begin with the resurrection, and severing it from the locus of the history of Jesus, he really removes Christianity from history's

[1] P. Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. II, Chicago, 1957, pp. 156-8.

[2] The *ἀναγνώρισις* is common to all the narratives of the resurrection appearances of the Christ. *See* C. H. Dodd: 'The Appearance of the Risen Christ: an Essay in Form-Criticism of the Gospels', *Studies in the Gospels*, ed. Nineham, Oxford, 1955, p. 14.

ambiguity and so gets rid of the offence of the Gospel.[1] For, as Kierkegaard has written: 'The possibility of offence accompanies the God-Man every instant, a man's shadow does not accompany a man more inseparably than the possiblity of offence accompanies the God-Man, for the God-Man is the object of faith.'[2]

This is brought home to us not by theoretical knowledge, but by our own basic religious experience. In a talk broadcast posthumously in a radio series entitled 'Why I Believe', Dr John White, eminent Scottish churchman, declared: 'I believe because I met a Man.' We encounter the Jesus of History in the Christ of Faith. Sacheverell Sitwell relates somewhere that when he visited the Temple of Christ Pantocrator in Athens, he had an irresistible longing to climb up into the half-lit dome and strike matches in order to see better the lines of agony on

[1] Bultmann does not regard the resurrection as in any sense an event at all, but simply as the Church's way of describing the release and perpetuation of the Word of the Cross.

One of the principal charges levelled against Bultmann by his German critics, e.g. Helmut Thielicke, and others, is that his existentialist interpretation of the Christ-event makes the event no more than an act of the human consciousness, and that he has revived Schleiermacher's notion of *Erlebnis* (psychological consciousness), a catch-word of German theology before the First World War. Bultmann has tried to counter this criticism by affirming the actuality of the Christ-event as real past happening. We know and experience human love only in concrete encounter here and now with the beloved who loves us, and the encounter effects a change in our understanding of ourselves. Although this change in our self-understanding is the all-important thing, no one would care to deny that the beloved exists outside of ourselves. In the same way, to Bultmann's mind, the significant thing is the change in the self-understanding produced by encounter with the Word of the Cross in the Church's preaching, but this does not mean that the redemptive act of God in Christ is not an event outside of ourselves. Nevertheless Bultmann's understanding of the Christ-event is so contemporary, so anthropological, so experience-centred, that the event is really bereft of objective reality. Bultmann does seem to have removed the event from the locus of the historical existence of the Person of Jesus of Nazareth. Has he not thus deprived us of the mystery of the God-Man, and left us merely with the Church's message of the Word of the Cross as God's statement of grace and pardon? Many certainly would feel that Bultmann gives us a poor substitute for the ontological reality or for the spiritual presence of that Other One, who in the abiding mystery of His Person companies with us still. Bultmann's anthropological and experience-centred interpretation of the Christ-event stems of course from the understanding of human existence established by his Heideggerian brand of existentialist analytics. For Bultmann, *Dasein*, human being, is choice, free personal decision. Human being is a series of encounters and decisions in every concrete moment of the 'here and now' of existence. In this way Bultmann appears to deny to human existence temporal continuity and participation in all the relativities of history. It is Bultmann's view of *encounter* with the Word of the Cross in the Church's preaching that is being called in question in the following pages of this paper, as over against the Church's continuous experience of Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ, in the mystery of His Person.

[2] S. Kierkegaard, *Training in Christianity*, 1941, p. 122.

the face of the great figure of the triumphant Christ. Here is a vivid artistic symbol of the New Testament Kerygma's identification of the lowly with the glorified Christ, to which we shall have occasion to return later.

It could be contended that the regulative significance of the historical Jesus for faith is refuted by Paul's resolve to know Christ no more after the flesh (2 Cor. 5.16). But the Apostle is not here betraying unconcern with the historical Jesus. There are many evidences in the Epistles that he was profoundly interested in the *Acta et Verba Christi*. There is further his massive concentration upon the Cross and Christ crucified (1 Cor. 2.2), manifesting his awareness of the scandal of the historical particularity of the Gospel, a 'stumbling-block to the Jews and foolishness to the Greeks' (1 Cor. 1.23). By 'knowing Christ no more after the flesh', Paul is not, I submit, denying the historicity of His life, but is refusing to seek the security of a historically accessible and verifiable Lord, and is expressing his openness to the encounter with His Person or Selfhood in the Christ of faith.

We are, I think, justified in concluding that the key to understanding the Kerygma's proclamation of the Christ and the relevance of His history for faith is the paradoxical fusion of the humiliated and suffering One with the exalted Lord.

The form and setting of the Gospel record has been conditioned and 'coloured' by this fusion. The story of the Transfiguration in Mark (Mark 9.2-10) shows most clearly how His career and message had been 'transfigured' by the Easter faith of the Evangelist, so that His transcendental splendour shines through into His earthly life, and it appears already who He truly is. Despite the presence of the Transfiguration story in Mark, however, there are indications that Mark has sought to dichotomise, though not very successfully, the earthly career of obscurity and suffering and the post-resurrection glory of the Christ so as to give edge to his exhortation to a Church suffering persecution to be steadfast now in the hope of glory hereafter.[1] Even if this thesis could be substantiated with regard to Mark, it is certainly not true of the Fourth Gospel, where the hour of Christ's passion is already the hour of His

[1] T. A. Burkill, 'St. Mark's Philosophy of History', *New Testament Studies*, Vol. 3, Jan. 1957, No. 2, pp. 142-8.

glorification or exaltation (John 3.14; 7.39; 8.28; 12.16; 12.32-34; 13.31; 17.1-5).

The Kerygma both of the Evangelists and Paul then confronts us with One who is encountered not as abstract principle or philosophical theory or impersonal Absolute or mystic Idea, but as meaningful Person.

It is necessary at this point to ask what is meant by 'encounter' with the Person of Jesus the Christ. And in answer we may begin with that most characteristic and fundamental of Paul's concepts, *ἐν Χριστῷ*. This undoubtedly implied for Paul the most intimate kind of personal communion with Christ, but the true meaning of this communion has been obscured by widespread use of the term, Christ-mysticism. The significance of being *ἐν Χριστῷ* for Paul can be explicated only by reference to other passages, in which the preposition *μετά* is richly suggestive, e.g. Rom. 6.4, 6, 8; 8.17; Gal. 2.20; Col. 2.12; 3.1. To suffer with Christ, to be crucified with Him, buried with Him, risen with Him, here is the unfolding of what is involved for Paul in being 'in Christ'. 'The union of the individual with Christ', writes W. D. Davies, 'is such that the experiences of Christ are re-enacted in the experience of the individual Christian. The life, death, resurrection and glorification of Jesus cease to be mere external facts of history but living realities in the Christian's own life. The latter appropriates to himself the past events of the historical and risen life of Jesus so that they become his own.'[1]

This is connoted also by the word *ἀνάμνησις* in the Pauline formula of institution of the Lord's Supper (1 Cor. 11.24). *ἀνάμνησις* means no mere remembrance of Jesus Christ as past event, but a calling into our present of the revelatory events of the past in all their depth of meaning.

Paul's concept *ἐν Χριστῷ*, involving as it does participation in His historical experience, is certainly not unique in the New Testament. The Gospel writers too, by setting us down beside the contemporaries of the historical Jesus, bring us into the closest proximity with Jesus in His life, and summon us to participate in His history, so that we are constrained to make the existential decision about His Person—at the Transfiguration, in Gethsemane, at the Cross. This can be illustrated

[1] W. D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*, 2nd ed., London, 1955, p. 88.

particularly from Mark, where the reiterated idea of going 'with Jesus', or being 'with Him' is highly significant. Mark effects the transition from the preface or introduction to his Gospel by recording the proclamation of Jesus—'The time is fulfilled and the Kingdom of God is at hand: repent ye and believe the gospel' (Mark 1.15). Then in the immediate sequel it is made clear to us that Mark will not define repentance in spiritual or religious terms, but rather in terms of the direct relationship of his (and our) own historical existence to the historical existence of Jesus the Christ. From verses 16-20, in which Simon and Andrew, James and John are shown leaving their everyday occupations and 'following' Jesus, it becomes evident that repentance means for Mark breaking with the present evil age, turning right about, and entering the new age now inaugurated in Christ, by going *with* Jesus. From this point on, this 'being with' Jesus is a central motif of Mark's Gospel. The twelve are ordained in order to 'be with Jesus' (3.14; cf. 5.18; 5.40). They receive esoteric teaching (e.g. 7.17; 9.28; 10.10), are given special power and authority (3.15; 9.38). and are admitted to intimacy with the Christ in His greatest experiences (e.g. 9.2ff; 14.22ff; 14.33).[1] The theological significance of the role of the disciples for Mark is that they constitute the nucleus of the New Israel, the Church in embryo, as it enters into the eschatological existence of communion with the Christ. The crucial importance of 'togetherness with' Jesus Christ for the New Testament and the Church has been underlined by modern New Testament scholarship from another angle, namely in the hypothesis, suggested particularly by Dr T. W. Manson, that 'in the earlier predictions of the sufferings of the Son of Man, Son of Man still has its collective sense of 'the people of the saints of the Most High' and that what is pictured in these sayings (the Passion predictions) is the realisation of the ideals represented by the Servant of the Lord through the service and sacrifice of the Son of Man, who comes upon the stage of history in the corporate body formed by Jesus and his disciples.'[2]

Now independently of whether it can be proven that Jesus

[1] J. M. Robinson, *The Problem of History in Mark*, London, 1957, pp. 78-80.
[2] T. W. Manson, 'Realised Eschatology and the Messianic Secret', *Studies in the Gospels*, ed. Nineham, Oxford, 1955, p. 216.

used the title Son of Man of Himself, or saw His own mission as the fulfilment of the destiny of the Suffering Servant, the considerations suggested above justify us in saying that the notion of a 'corporate body formed by Jesus and His disciples' represents an accurate exegesis of the aims and intentions of the Evangelist, who understands and describes the Church of his time as the eschatological society, in which is continued the disciples' communion with Jesus in His history.

Participation in the history of Jesus the Christ is neither for Mark nor Paul, however intimate the personal relationship with Christ implied, a purely individualistic mystical experience. It is achieved in depth only through sharing in 'the common life in the Body of Christ'. Encounter with the Christ is not then to be confined to the climactic experience of an isolated moment in time. It is rather the continual recapitulating, re-enacting and re-living of the history of Jesus the Christ, in which the members of the Church in fellowship together are regular participators. This is best illustrated from an appeal to liturgy, the liturgy first of all of the Jewish Church.

Martin Noth has shown how in the Jewish cult the great events of Israel's past history were actualised (*vergegenwärtigt*) and appropriated through a re-living of them.[1] The use of the Psalms in the cultus of the Jerusalem Temple no doubt brought home to the worshipping congregation their solidarity with the Hebrew people past and present. The parenetic sections of Deuteronomy clearly reveal the same trait, e.g. Deut. 6.23: 'And he brought *us* out from thence that he might bring *us* in to give *us* the land which he sware unto our fathers.'

Similarly the liturgy of the Christian Church calls us to the realisation of fellowship with Jesus Christ through participation in the Christ-deed in the totality of its meaning as the redemptive action of God. As in the Gospels the first disciples 'followed' the Christ as the nucleus of the community of the New Israel, so we, while in our own specific historical situation, are constituted true members of the eschatological society by 'following' the Way of the Lord, that is, by re-living His history. His history, in the sense of His Selfhood, His Person, His Intention, is not hidden from us. For just as the Kerygma,

[1] M. Noth, 'Die Vergegenwärtigung des Alten Testaments in der Verkündigung', *Evangelische Theologie XII* (1952), pp. 6-17.

as we have seen, proclaims the existential meaningfulness of a Person, so the Church's liturgy repeats and re-enacts it, and in particular in the Eucharist the Bread and Wine are visible symbols of the living presence of One who died and rose again, in whose Life we thankfully participate. Within the continuing historical existence of the Church, the liturgy, which is the very essence of the Church's life, perpetuates the Kerygma's fusion of the humiliated and crucified with the risen and exalted Lord. The Church therefore can never dispense with the historical Jesus in view of His inescapable relevance for its faith and worship and life.

Theological thought then has in its latest phase already advanced beyond Bultmann to a new concern with the historical Jesus. This paper has pointed to some aspects of this advance, and may have prompted us to ask how we ever can have done with the Jesus of history. We would not repeat the mistake that Liberal historicism made, of thinking of His history as series of events objectively available for scientific analysis, and so severing His life and ministry as historical phenomenon from faith. Nor is it only that Christianity can be said to begin with Him in the sense that His history and message precede the Church's Kerygma in point of time. When indeed we simply claim that His mission and teaching come before the Church's faith in temporal sequence, we have hardly done justice to the creative significance of His history for faith. If we compare nascent Christianity with Hellenism, Judaism or the Qumran movement, and investigate all the similarities, we are always left with an inescapable differentiating factor, with the irreducible surd of Christology, with the uniqueness of a Person as the root and ground of Christianity.

Even although we cannot now recover the history (*Historie*) of Jesus, yet His self-understanding, His intention, His meaning, as modern historiography has shown, are not concealed from us. His real Selfhood is immediately present in the words and acts, recorded of Him in the Gospels by men who, confronted with the Christ-deed in its totality, His life, death and resurrection, saw His meaning steady and saw it whole, and thereby knew who He was and is. His unique historical existence is the origin of Christianity. His Selfhood has creative and constitutive significance for Christian faith, for the Kerygma,

identifying the humiliated with the exalted Lord, confronts us with the existential decision about a Person. If it is objected that this leaves faith open to the ambiguity, insecurity and subjectivity of history, all we can say is that it is easy to be offended at the offence of the Gospel, at the Mystery of the God-Man.

That encounter with the Christ is encounter with a Self, a Person is not a theoretical proposition. It is the verdict of our common religious experience. It is also the heart and soul of the Church's liturgy. At this point, 'participation' is a better key-word than 'encounter' to a deeper understanding of the decisiveness of His history for us. We are called to participate in His history, in His Self-understanding, in His intention, to share in His experience, to re-live Him. We are to 'follow' Him, to be 'with' Him, taking our place with the first disciples in their togetherness with Jesus the Christ. Participation 'with' Him means passing through the gates of death 'with' Him to that new life, which partakes already of the blessings of the Reign of God. It means breaking in the here and now of our existence with the present evil age, and realising our membership in the eschatological society.

THREE PHILOSOPHERS ANALYSE CHRISTIANITY

by The Rev. DONALD D. EVANS

'What sort of meaning does Christian discourse have?' The question seems misleading, for *within* Christian discourse there are many different kinds of meaning—moral, historical, symbolic, exclamatory, etc. Modern philosophers recognise this, but they are mainly interested in the sort of meaning which is characteristic or distinctive of a realm of discourse, comparing and contrasting this with other uses of language. In this essay, we shall consider the varied analyses given by three contemporary philosophers.[1] Each philosopher, in his analysis of Christian discourse, suggests a different non-religious use of language as the illuminating logical model. Naturally, there is more in each book than the outline and application of the logical model, but I shall concentrate on this.

I

It is convenient to begin with Michael Foster's *Mystery and Philosophy*. In this profound yet lucid book, Foster argues that the Christian idea of mystery is incompatible with the approach of modern philosophy to philosophical questions, scientific problems, and moral deliberation. *Philosophical* questions are seen as purely conceptual puzzles, confusion arising from misuse of language. If something gives rise to unclear statements, if a non-scientific problem seems insoluble, there is a remedy: logical analysis. A mystery is merely a muddle. *Scientific* method—to which philosophy refers all non-conceptual problems—excludes wonder, except incidental aesthetic emotion, or wonder at human scientific achievement. For there are two criteria for scientific evidence: (1) It is specifiable, i.e. in principle verifiable by anyone receiving the appropriate scientific training. (2) It is producible, i.e. repeatable at will,

[1] M. B. Foster, *Mystery and Philosophy*, S.C.M., London, 1957; John Wilson, *Language and Christian Belief*, Macmillan, London, 1958; Ninian Smart, *Reasons and Faiths*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1958.

at human command. But a mystery (for example 'peace' or 'holiness', in the biblical sense of these words) 'cannot be achieved by technical means, because we cannot specify in advance what would count as having achieved them', and 'ability to specify is closely linked with ability to produce by scientific means'.[1] *Moral* problems tend to be viewed by modern philosophy in a broadly utilitarian way. That is, moral rules derive their authority from conduciveness to human happiness, which is not a mystery, but something specifiable—and since specifiable, in principle producible by scientific means. Christian moral rules, on the contrary, are relative not to happiness but to holiness, which is a mystery, which man alone can neither specify nor produce.

What is this 'holiness', then? Foster contrasts it not only with the specifiable, producible goal of utilitarian morals, but also with the 'numinous', as expounded in Otto's classic book, *The Idea of the Holy*.[2] For Foster, to say that a man is holy is not to refer to an uncanny or occult property which he possesses. This pagan supernaturalism, he asserts, is not the biblical notion of holiness; it is mere superstition, rightly warred upon by advancing science. Nor is holiness a property discernible by men who are specially privileged in having a special religious sense, analogous to the sense of sight. Rather, holiness is not a property of the person at all; it is his status in relation to God. 'We might think of shops which are "by Royal Appointment". To believe this about them is not to believe that they have a particular property but to believe that the King has acted in appointing them.'[3]

Foster does not elaborate his 'Royal Appointment' example, but it seems to me that it provides the clue to his position. According to him, fundamental Christian statements do not rest on evidence which is either producible, or specifiable, or observable even by the special access of an alleged religious sense. His example suggests why this must be so: what is implied rather than stated in his book.

Let us consider a similar example, ignoring for the moment its application to a theological context. One might say that to

[1] ibid., p. 64.
[2] R. Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, translated by J. W. Harvey, 2nd edition, Geoffrey Cumberlege, London, 1950.
[3] Foster, op. cit., p. 49.

believe that Mary Brown is 'adopted by the King' is not to believe that she has a special royal property, observable in a special way; it is to believe that the King has acted in adopting her. A similar analysis is warranted for such phrases as 'legally-justified by the King' or 'owned by the King' or 'married to the King'. Note that in each case the conclusive evidence is legal rather than scientific in form: (*a*) The conclusive evidence does not consist of any characteristics of Mary Brown, not even an elusive characteristic discernible only in a special way; it consists of certain ceremonies or documents. (*b*) Moreover, unless one is the King, one cannot 'produce' such evidence, except in the sense that one may discover it and show it to others; the evidence is not of an experimental-scientific kind, where anyone with training can 'produce' it, i.e. bring it about or repeat it at will. (*c*) Note also that various generally-observable characteristics of Mary provide *prima facie* evidence that she has in fact been appointed by the King, or adopted by the King, or justified by the King, etc. Such evidence would be her own claims of such status, various signs of the status (e.g. the royal seal on her letters), and her appropriate behaviour (e.g. dignity, loyalty to the King). All together, this would be *prima facie* evidence, perhaps overwhelming evidence, but not conclusive evidence. For Mary might be either craftily hypocritical or tragically self-deceived. And Jane Brown, on the other hand, might have such status, and yet not be aware of it, or not behave appropriately. (*d*) Note that in these non-theological cases, there is nothing mysterious about having a status, rather than having a property. One can specify, with as much exactitude as in a scientific experiment, what legal evidence would prove a status. The mystery arises, not in the analogy of legal status as such, but in its application in a theological context.

Such application is not strange, for the examples are all biblical ones, used to elucidate the notion of 'Christian holiness'. We now see the logical basis for Foster's position concerning the (conclusive) evidence for such a statement as 'Jones is holy'. (*a*) The evidence is not *specifiable*, for no observable characteristics of *Jones* show conclusively that God has appointed (adopted, justified, etc.) him. For Jones might claim to be one of the elect, etc., and behave appropriately,

without having such status in fact. Smith, on the other hand, might have such status yet not realise it, or not behave appropriately. Even if Jones has various 'supernatural' characteristics accessible only for those with a special religious sense, this is not conclusive evidence; for *no* characteristic of Jones proves that God has appointed him, adopted him, etc. (*b*) The conclusive evidence is not *producible* at human command, like scientific evidence, for it is God who freely appoints, adopts, justifies, etc. (*c*) What Foster does not point out, though presumably he would grant, is that various characteristics of Jones could provide *prima facie* evidence of his status in relation to God. Christians are not left entirely without evidence that Jones is related to God as an appointed representative, or an adopted son, or a justified sinner, or a treasured possession, or a member of the Church which is the Bride of Christ. Some of the evidence would be generally-observable: Jones' moral conduct and religious profession. On the other hand, Foster's example does not rule out the relevance of characteristics discernible only by those 'whose eyes are opened'. And without some special-access evidence, I do not see how Christian status-claims can be made plausible. (*d*) But even this sort of evidence is indirect.[1] That is, it is analogous, not to witnessing the King signing a decree, but to a glimpse of the royal seal under a garment. Why is this so? There is no reason inherent in the idea of legal status as such. The mystery arises because the status is a status in relation to *God*, who cannot be observed 'signing the decree', or be compelled to sign it. Our status in relation to God is both His secret and His choice.

I have tried to show why Foster holds that the conclusive evidence for 'Jones is holy' is neither specifiable in terms of

[1] The word 'indirect' refers in part to the fact that a statement of the evidence is not the same in *meaning* as a statement of the status-claim. It is interesting to compare the relation of 'characteristic' to status with the relation of 'feature' to value (cf. part III). Note that 'features' are sometimes treated independently as if they were what the value-word *means*; e.g. when '*X* brings great unhappiness' is viewed as a contradiction of '*X* is good', rather than as adverse evidence. Similarly the 'characteristics' may sometimes be treated independently as if they were what the status-word *means*; e.g. when 'Jones sins' is viewed as a contradiction of 'Jones is holy', rather than as adverse evidence (a perennial theological category-mistake). Note however that value-judgments differ from status claims in a crucial way: the important contrast concerning the latter is between *direct* evidence and *indirect* evidence, whereas the former contrasts the *expression* of the speaker's response and the *description* of supporting evidence, which evidence is not significantly distinguished into 'direct' and 'indirect'.

natural (or supernatural) characteristics of Jones, nor producible at human command. Jones' holiness is not a property of Jones, but a legal sort of relation to God, depending on God's free and secret grace. Thus we cannot bring Christianity into line with scientific method, even if we invoke a special religious sense, as a faculty for religious experience.

II

What Foster denies, John Wilson explicitly affirms. In his *Language and Christian Belief*, he accepts the scientific-philosophy dogma: if a statement is to be informative concerning objective fact, there must be an agreed method of verification. Indeed, he appears to accept the dogma in its most extreme and phenomenalist form, that the meaning of a statement of fact *is* the method of its verification. Accepting this dogma, he claims that religious statements fulfil the requirement in terms of religious experience, as other statements do in terms of sense experience.

He does not attempt to show a logical parallel between religious statements and all existential (i.e. objective) statements, but gradually narrows the range of comparison. He notes several conditions which are sufficient for objectivity, but which religious statements do not satisfy, and which fortunately are not *necessary* for objectivity: (1) We may be able to make scientific tests for our experience, e.g. measure light-waves relevant to 'The sky is blue'; but though tests must be public, they need not necessarily be scientific. (2) The experience may be shared by a majority of people; but even if it is not—e.g. hearing bats squeak—this is not detrimental to an objectivity-claim. (3) The testing-system may be universally adopted so that terms have a consistent meaning for anyone; but this is not a necessary condition—consider colour-words, which differ in use in different ages and countries, the tests being similar only in being applied to one type of experience, namely seeing. (4) We may be able to predict events which are causally-related to the experience, e.g. from 'The sky is blue' predict 'No rain immediately'; but 'There is a table in the next room' need involve only a prediction of what is involved in what we mean by 'table'. Thus Wilson shows that, for 'There is a God' to be an existential statement, it need only

display a logical parallel with 'There is a table (or an elephant) in the next room'.

What does such a statement mean? According to Wilson it means that if you and I and other reliable people were to enter the room we would have such-and-such sense experiences. If it is objected that more is meant for the statement to be existential or objective, Wilson asks, 'What else could it mean?' The meaning of the statement is the method of its verification. But is not this the positivist or phenomenalist doctrine which is fatal to religion? Not at all, for Wilson. Suppose I say, 'There is a God', and you say, 'What do you mean?' I then describe various religious experiences which I have had. You say that these are of merely autobiographical interest. But I say that these experiences are available for you too. Moreover, Wilson continues, 'There are large groups of religious believers who do use the same system of verification for religious assertions, by means of their common experiences. These experiences are not only common (i.e. shared by all of them), but they are also co-recurrent. By this I mean that a number of numerically different experiences recur together in the same contexts. Further, having one or more of these experiences enables them to expect or predict other experiences. For instance, supposing a believer has experience of love, grace and power, he can predict the result of a further test, e.g. what will happen if he prays, or confesses his sins. (Of course these words are technical terms to believers; if they worry non-believers we can say that experiences *e*, *f*, and *g* allow one to predict experiences *h* and *i*.) This seems to me precisely similar in point of logic to the case with assertions like "There is a table". My having had certain visual experiences (seen a table) enables me to predict other experiences (touching it, putting things on it, etc.).'[1]

But Wilson concedes that religious experiences are not yet defined or related as precisely as sense-experiences, and that various religious groups have different 'verification systems'. His recommendation accordingly is that religious believers 'should be able to put forward a clear and unanimous programme, describing some approved method of obtaining the experiences which are relevant to the key assertions of their faith. . . . Until they lay down some sort of agreed tests for

[1] Wilson, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

their assertions, by means of religious experience, I do not see how they can expect anyone to place rational belief in them. What we need . . . is a combination of mystic and of analytical philosopher. Perhaps this is too much to ask.'[1]

Not at all. Gautama Buddha (not Jesus Christ) was just such a person, and Hinayana Buddhism roughly fulfils Wilson's requirements.[2] But it is a religion of pure mysticism, without God. Christianity, on the contrary, includes and stresses the element of mystery which Wilson strives to eliminate —our human inability to specify or to produce holiness, which is the hidden relation to God, the Christian's basis and goal. This is not to deny that Christianity is, in some sense, lived as an 'experimental' religion, based on the broad and mysterious covenant-promises of God. God has promised forgiveness, His Spirit, the body of His Son, etc., to those who are penitent, dedicated, trusting, etc. But these gifts of grace are not equivalent to specifiable religious experiences which predictably come whenever we carry out certain tests.

And how are we to interpret Wilson's phenomenalist analysis of elephant and God? One might view it (as I do) as an *ad hominem* argument against positivist critics of religion: 'On your unsatisfactory theory, some religious statements are logically parallel to statements about elephants and tables, so that God is no less real than these substantial objects!' But Wilson *accepts* their theory, and seriously asks us to construe both God and things as logical constructions out of (religious or sense) experience—i.e. actual and *possible* experiences. Thus, when no one is experiencing God or the table, they exist merely as possibilities-of-experience. Is this what people mean?

Moreover, his argument rests on an undefended assumption: that religious experience is both distinct from sense experience and logically parallel to it. He does not consider an alternative analysis: that religious experience (and aesthetic experience which he regards as logically similar) is an *interpretation* of sense-experience. On such a view, since religious interpretations vary, Wilson's notion of a common religion (as if it were like a common zoology) is too simple. Furthermore, non-

[1] Wilson, op. cit., pp. 30-31.
[2] cf. Smart's discussion, op. cit., chapter II.

religious interpretations are possible and plausible, e.g. an agnostic's Freudian interpretation, so that Wilson's religious apologetic is unduly confident in tone.

Yet he is a very clear and stimulating writer, dealing with many aspects[1] of Christianity in his short book, so that he is worth reading if only to find out what an articulate 'positivist Christianity' would be. For example, in his chapter on religious ethics, there is nothing resembling Foster's 'holiness' as a distinctive and mysterious Christian standard or goal. For Wilson, men's values and ends are straightforward and are largely unaffected by Christianity, which is relevant to moral choice only in pointing out supernatural facts knowable through religious experience, much as science is relevant as the means of knowing natural facts.

III

Our general question is: 'What sort of meaning does Christian discourse have?' Suppose we agree with Foster that it is not the sort of meaning which is identical with its methods of verification. If not that sort of meaning, what sort? An *evaluative* meaning; this is Ninian Smart's suggestion, in *Faiths and Reasons*.

Before outlining his position, I should sketch the current[2] philosophical analysis of evaluative meaning on which Smart bases much of his argument. Consider the statements, 'Jones is a good man' or 'That is a beautiful landscape', where the words 'good' and 'beautiful' are given an evaluative meaning or use. Broadly speaking, there are three logical elements involved in such a use: (1) The speaker expresses a response, or implies that he has a response, to Jones or the landscape. The response may be a feeling, an attitude, a choice, or a disposition to choose; philosophers differ concerning which type of response to include in their definition of 'evaluative judgment'. (2) The value-judgment is 'feature-dependent'. That is, the speaker is logically committed to making the same value-judgment where the relevant features of the situation are the same, and to defending his judgment by reference to these

[1] e.g. immortality, the problem of evil, judgment, sacraments, etc.

[2] e.g. in *Ethics*, by P. Nowell-Smith, Pelican, 1954; *The Language of Morals*, by R. M. Hare, Oxford, 1952; *A Modern Introduction to Moral Philosophy* by A. Montefiore, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958.

features. The response is in view of certain features or properties of Jones or the landscape, which when repeated in another person or another scene commit the speaker to the same value-judgments: 'Smith is a good man' or 'That scene is beautiful too'. The words 'good' and 'beautiful' do not refer to any additional moral or aesthetic property, beyond the relevant features; they are used to express the speaker's response to these features. These features can be described, but goodness and beauty can only be expressed. (3) The third element is not always contained in the various definitions of a value-judgment: that the speaker uses the evaluative word or sentence in order to invite or exhort someone (himself or others) to respond in a similar way.

This is the philosophical background for what I take to be the key argument in Smart's book, in so far as it deals with Christianity.[1] For Smart, Christianity depends largely[2] on the concept of the numinous, the holiness of God. So I shall sketch his application of value-judgment analysis to this concept.

Let us consider the statement, 'God is holy'. For Smart, this is an expression[3] of a feeling of awe, dread, or worship in view of certain features of the world (and, possibly, inviting others to respond in a similar way). What are these features? They are whatever the speaker finds marvellous, mysterious, numinous in the world: 'the majesty of the nightscape, the thunderstorm, the seeming transitoriness of human existence, the beauty and pain of life, and strangeness that anything should exist at all'[4]; or the religious man, absorbed in what is veiled from ordinary people, yet displaying moral power which disconcerts and alarms us.[5] 'Whatever it is that we do find marvellous, a monotheistic or monistic scheme attempts to

[1] It is impossible to summarise *Reasons and Faiths*, which is a monumental work. It includes analyses of several great religious, fundamental religious concepts which he classifies as 'numinous', 'mystical' and 'incarnational', the role of morality, etc.

[2] Largely, but not entirely, for Smart contrasts the incarnate deity with saint or prophet (who are analysed in terms of the numinous), in terms of the special *status* needed by a Saviour of the world. Smart's brief chapter on incarnation, incidentally, is an example of the amazing compression of his writing, for it also includes brilliant outlines of a doctrine of the atonement, a theory of 'kenosis', and the essential contrast between Christian incarnation and Hindu avatara.

[3] Smart does not use the alternative form 'implication that one has' such-and-such response.

[4] Smart op., cit., p. 33.

[5] cf. ibid., pp. 73-75.

link up these astonishments. . . . If there is anything which is marvellous or sublimely mysterious, there is something behind it more mysterious, and at that we marvel by worshipping.'[1] 'In a monistic or monotheistic scheme, in place of a picture of the world containing a number of independently holy and mysterious objects, we have a unitary world behind which lies a single mystery, of which the sublime and awe-inspiring features of the universe are regarded as traces.'[2]

These quotations suggest to me a fundamental difficulty in Smart's evaluative-use analysis. When we refer to God, we refer to 'something behind' the universe. But when we say 'God is holy', expressing our awe, the features on which the value-judgment depends are not features of God, but features of the universe. These features are surely not reasons for expressing worship, unless they are somehow linked with features of God. It is as if we called Jones 'good' in view of features possessed by Smith.

Smart insists that since 'holy' expresses the speaker's feelings and does not describe an additional property possessed by mysterious things or by God, the holiness of God is (logically) impossible to describe. Indeed, he points out that the worshipper's verbal insistence that God's holiness is indescribable is a way of intensifying his expression of awe and wonder. (Cf. intensifying one's expression of gratitude by saying, 'I just can't describe how wonderful you've been!')

The holiness of God is indescribable. But is God Himself similarly impossible to describe, i.e. logically impossible? Has He any describable features on which the value-judgment 'God is holy' depends? The wonderfulness of a sunset is logically impossible to describe (rather than express); but the sunset is not. Though it is difficult, one can describe the features of the sunset in view of which one responds with wonder. Is there nothing parallel in the case of God?

Suppose we describe God as 'the Creator of the world', or as 'something which is behind and beyond the universe', or as 'the Ultimate Reality'. Then in view of these features of God, we respond with appropriate worship, expressing our feeling by saying, 'God is holy'. Would Smart allow this? No. For these putative descriptions of God are to be analysed in the

[1] Smart, op. cit., pp. 33-34. [2] ibid., p. 35.

same way as 'God is holy', i.e., the predicate is an expression of the speaker's feelings, not a description of God. 'God the Creator' expresses 'the contingency of the world'[1] (i.e., presumably, it expresses the speaker's feelings in view of the contingency of the world). 'God is behind and beyond the universe' is an expression of 'our reactions to the numinous in the world'.[2] 'God is the Ultimate Reality' ascribes a purely-evaluative expression to God, for ontological terms such as 'real' are 'devoid of descriptive content',[3] even if intensified by superlatives such as 'ultimate'.

Apparently, for Smart, *all* words applied to God are used purely as expressions of human response to various features of the world. So God is indescribable; i.e., not merely very difficult to describe, or impossible to describe literally and precisely, but logically impossible to describe. All putative descriptions are really disguised emotive expressions, related to features of the world, not to God.

Now Smart is surely right in stressing that for theists the primary function of religious language is the expression of worship, not the description of God. But if no description at all is possible, the evaluative-use analysis breaks down: there are no features of God in view of which one responds with awe, as one responds to a landscape with wonder or a man with approval. Suppose we explained the evaluative meaning of 'The Sqump is good' by pointing to the good-making features of Tom, Dick, and Harry and asking the person to note his response to these features; and then we analysed *every* statement of the form 'The Sqump is X', by pointing to X-making features of various things and the correlative response. We then are asked, 'But what is a Sqump?', and rightly so.

Smart's view could easily be modified so as to overcome this difficulty, but the modification raises another difficulty. For example, he might affirm as a fact, not merely an expression of feeling, that God is the Creator of all those features of the world which arouse wonder; this 'feature' of God then arouses the appropriately deeper wonder called 'worship'. Such a view seems implicit in some of the language that he uses (e.g. 'traces'); and he sometimes seems to allow that his analysis covers only 'in part' what various theistic terms mean. Why

[1] Smart, op. cit., p. 52. [2] ibid., p. 43. [3] ibid., p. 138; cf. p. 90.

is he reluctant to modify his position so that his evaluative-use analysis will fit, and so that believers need not conclude that worship is a ludicrous shouting into a void? His reason is presumably that if 'God is the Creator' is viewed as some sort of description of God, a putative statement of fact, then the traditional problem of philosophy of religion arises once again: How can words used to describe things and people be used to describe God, who is believed to be utterly different from things and people?

Perhaps Smart had hoped to exorcise the perplexing notion of 'analogous description' from the analysis of Christianity. His own analysis shows what a great deal can be done without it, in terms of what we might call 'analogous evaluation'; indeed his account has much more of the style and atmosphere of language in ordinary religious contexts than has the cool speculation often found in discussions of 'analogous description'. But it seems to me that this latter notion is indispensable if Smart's analysis is not to emerge as a purely emotive theory of religion. We thus need to turn again to the inescapable and perennial problem of analogy.

THE SAMARITAN DOCTRINE OF MOSES

by The Rev. J. MACDONALD

The Samaritan doctrine of Moses is the second tenet of the Samaritan Creed. Before realising the centrality of this tenet, it is necessary to relate it to the others. Then it will become clear that the second tenet is the one which, as it were, binds all the tenets of the Creed together.

The Creed is a statement of fundamental belief, consisting of five tenets with the addition of a sixth which may be regarded as later or merely supplementary. The first is belief in the Oneness of God; this belief the Samaritans hold no less strictly than Jews, Christians or Muslims, but the emphasis is on the Oneness, not the Unity of God. The unpartnered, unassisted, un-seconded God is sole Creator, ruler of men's spirits in a royal sense, king of rulers in an historical sense, and, as the Muslims too put it, 'Lord of this world and the next'. The One God chose to express His relationship to His creatures pre-eminently through Moses, and it is solely in terms of Moses that God's will and purposes for mankind are to be interpreted.

The second doctrine or tenet is that about to be discussed, the Prophethood of Moses. The third is belief in the Law (the Samaritan Pentateuch). The covenant relationship between God and His people is expressed there and only there; it was only through Moses that God's Law was revealed to mankind. The earlier revelations to the Patriarchs and Joseph merely led up to the final and supreme revelation in and through Moses. The Law itself makes it clear, say the Samaritans, that God revealed Himself through a pure chain, consisting of the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, then 'King' Joseph and finally Moses.

The fourth doctrine concerns Mount Gerizim, the only ultimately sacred mountain. This, according to Samaritan belief, is the only true site of the divine sanctuary, not Mount Zion as claimed by the Jews. It will become apparent when considering the supplementary doctrine, the sixth if we may so term it, that Moses as the Samaritan 'Messiah' is very much concerned with the sanctuary in his role of Restorer.

The fifth and final basic doctrine of the Creed is belief in the Day of Judgment and Recompense. Here again the Restorer is involved and it will be seen how Moses is to be the ultimate intercessor for those going to the garden of Eden as their reward for worshipping at the sacred mount, keeping the Law, believing in and praying for Moses and trusting only in the one God—and, perhaps surprisingly, the ultimate intercessor also for those destined by their works to be sent to the Fire.

The exaltation of Moses is a unique Samaritan doctrine unmatched in Jewish, Christian or Muslim belief. It has to be remembered that the Samaritans had only the Pentateuch and therefore only one prophet. They believe, as the west did until comparitively recent times, that the Pentateuch was the composition of Moses. They had only one prophet to exalt and only one Law (received through him) to obey. It is, nevertheless, remarkable that the Samaritans should believe the things they did and still do about Moses. In the concluding observations a possible explanation of this phenomenon will be offered.

It seems best to follow a chronological pattern in the study of the second doctrine, beginning with Samaritan belief about the coming of Moses to earth, his earthly birth and its immediate consequences; then to consider his attributes and functions, to take special note of his role of intercessor, observing at the same time the efficacy of praying for him. Finally, we shall pay some attention to his future role as Taheb (Restorer), showing how he is expected to function on the Day of Vengeance and Recompense. After briefly summarising these points, a few questions for future study will be raised.

The Birth of Moses

Moses has, in Samaritan theology, the title 'The Speaker'. It was he, as the Samaritan theologians put it, who on God's behalf or acting as spokesman for the Godhead said the creative words 'Let there be light'. There is some uncertainty with regard to the precise nature of Moses' pre-earthly existence; some writers, connecting the divine name (Tetragrammaton) with the Hebrew word for 'let there be', also derive Moses' name from God's. Howbeit, Moses as distinct from all other creations is first thought of as having been in existence either before or at the initial creative process, but it was for the putting

into effect of creation that God created him. As other theological writers express it, nothing was created except by or through Moses. There could have been no creation if he had not first been created (cf. John 1.3).

Moses was the source of the world's light (cf. ibid. 1.4); his spiritual light surpassed the light of the physical sun and moon in sheer brilliance. Himself the Star by attribute (cf. Matt. 2.2), he outshone everything created from light. God, in order to reveal His will and self, created all things and the means He took to express Himself and illumine what He created was as follows.

He placed the light (which had at creation been distinguished from the negation of light) within His own hidden will, so that it could only be manifested in those capable of receiving it. When such men eventually arose in the world, the light was revealed in them. There was a pure chain of pious men, the three righteous patriarchs and Joseph being the first. The actual manifestation of the light was in the divine image within the soul or spirit of these men. When God decided to reveal His love and mercy to the generations (who could not, for the most part, apprehend or comprehend the light), it was in Moses that the light finally shone forth in full clearness, but it was passed on from the divine image in the pious ones, on to Levi and then into the constellation of Qohat. This was, in human thought, the light of understanding, illumining the soul of man.

The light (or Star) entered the firmament of Amram and reached into the womb of Jochebed. Considerable detail is supplied in some versions of the birth of Moses. When God decided on the departure of Moses earthward, He sent an angel to Amram (cf. ibid. 1.20) and the angel informed Amram as follows: 'Rise now and go to Jochebed, but do not be afraid of the people of the land, lest they fail to accept your explanation' (cf. ibid. 1.19). Amram went obediently to Jochebed (but cf. ibid. 1.24). The Lord (i.e. the angel) was with Amram during the intercourse. As a result of the divine will and human compliance the wife of Amram bore a son, to be called The Man (Aramaic Son of Man). The angel 'ministered to him wondrously' and comforted his mother with secret counsel. She kept his words to herself (cf. Luke 2.19). In the end the hostile people wearied of questioning Amram, while Jochebed

placed her trust in the perfect Godhead. She concealed the babe for three months, but was unable to conceal him longer (cf. Matt. 2.13ff or Luke 1.56?).

According to another, more mystical version, the glory or radiance abode on Jochebed; she became, as it were, clad with light, the holy light being centred on her face. When the babe was finally born, light from *the* Light came forth and the babe received glory for his preservation. From the Light appeared the evangel creating gladness for all generations. This seems to mean that the good news was manifested from Moses' inward light (cf. Luke 2.32).

After the birth, according to the mystical version, the heavenly hosts blew the trumpet of freedom because of his safe entry into the world (cf. ibid. 2.13-14). Other versions emphasise that Moses was born 'in peace'. The angels spoke thus to one another: 'We are given good news this day, for the pure one has been born. Come, let us go down to meet (or greet) him and let us see this Speaker who is the fount of all understanding' (cf. ibid. 2.15, which shows that the angels actually left their heavenly abode or state); they then descended and 'ministered to him', each one protecting him.

On the human side men were gathered together, joyfully proclaiming the advent of the 'Lord of the world' (but cf. ibid. 1.14). The glorifying of Moses' attributes takes the following form: 'The faithful one of the Godhead has come! The Man of God (or Divine Man) has come, whom God chose and sent! The rock of salvation has come! He who frees captives from captivity has come! The saviour of his people from all affliction has come! Moses, whose name is connected with the Lord's name, has come!'

Other versions put it thus: 'The light of holiness has come! The chosen servant has come! The Star of sun and moon has come!'

These versions then proceed to give a statement made by God on the occasion: 'This is the one whom I have chosen and in whom I have placed my desire (or will)' (cf. Matt. 3.17; Mark 1.11; Luke 3.22). According to the mystical versions Moses was anointed with water and given the crown of glory, which statement, in view of these New Testament references, appears to suggest a sort of baptism and ordination.

Angels play a great part in the life of the now born Moses (as in the life of Jesus), but that has lesser significance. The angels Kebala, Penuel, Anusa and Zilpah are stated to have come down from heaven when Moses' mother later put him in a basket on the Nile. They 'ministered to him', lifting up the cradle as they stood in the water. The light shining from the child's face was so brilliant that as it shone upon the face of the daughter of Pharaoh her afflictions were instantaneously cured.

The Attributes and Functions of Moses in the World

Most of the Samaritan story of the life and activities of Moses follows that of the biblical narrative, with many additional details not of Jewish origin, and need not concern us here. Of greater interest and importance is the Samaritan view of his functions. We have seen how the notion of light and Star is applied to him. He was possessed of the 'Image' (of God) in the full sense. From Adam who was created with it, the pure, holy chain passed it on until it reached its maturity and greatest brilliance in Moses—suggesting that the light grew brighter as it expressed itself in men. His prophethood, apostleship and role of Speaker are interwoven in the liturgical compositions, so that a clear-cut picture is not readily gained. But it seems certain that it was by virtue of his prophethood that he was chosen to receive the Ten Commandments, and it was by virtue of his role as Speaker that the true, inner meaning of the Decalogue was revealed to wise men in the true Israel. The significant point is that the light which had been generated through the pure chain from Adam (the human race), coming to full blaze in Moses, was the light of knowledge and understanding. Just as wisdom was in the beginning with God according to ancient Jewish tradition, so the light of illumination was God's first creation. Moses was that light and it was only directly through him that the mysteries of God could be comprehended. When God chose him especially, He gave him the gift of prophecy, not the gift of foretelling the future, but the imparting and revealing of truth through the right interpretation of God's will, this last dependent on the apprehension and comprehension of the Light. The final authority accorded to the Pentateuch was the authority of Moses. He was no mere amanuensis. The

events at Sinai were much more wonderful than that. When Moses ascended the mountain he went into the very heart of heaven, walled in with the ultimate divinity by a cloud and darkness that may not have been of a physical kind. God and Moses spoke 'face to face', which in terms of the Samaritan de-anthropomorphising process to be referred to below means a spiritual and not a physical meeting; but Moses received, as well as laws applicable only to human society, inner instruction that could only be passed on through generations of men of spiritual insight. This was to be the great mystery, understood by few, possibly in earliest times (and probably in later) only by the Samaritan High Priest. From Moses to these wise men came knowledge of the meaning of God's name, of the real significance of the calendar and of the movement of the heavenly bodies, as well as of the rules for the good life. When the wise, thus specially endowed, give forth their teaching to their sons, they do so in the form of oral instruction from Moses by the mediumship of the light of knowledge.

That light could not penetrate any wise man who was not pure; thus wisdom and self-affliction through fasting and long prayerful meditation went hand in hand. As Moses fasted before God for forty days, so the wise must do the same if they are to receive the Light. Fasting came to be a basic element in the atonement rites among the Samaritans, chiefly because Moses had fasted. Another aspect of pious living that was to receive a vital place was prayer. When through political events it became impossible to continue the sacrificial system, prayer became a sacrifice. On the Day of Atonement prayer took the place of the sacrifice prescribed in the Law. But there is more to prayer here than seems evident at first sight. Moses had prayed to God on behalf of the people while he was on earth, and accordingly the Samaritans developed a doctrine of intercession. Moses was the great intercessor; only through him could prayer be efficacious (cf. Heb. 5.7, 9). We shall return to this belief in connexion with the Day of Vengeance and Recompense, but here it is worth while noting that the actions of Moses' earthly life were to become more than mere models for later generations. What he did in fasting and particularly in praying opened the gate of acceptance and forgiveness, so that all who did as he had done would pass through it and be

accepted and forgiven—but provided that it was through the intercession of the prophet. As the Law received its authority by virtue of the authority of the Star and by his prophethood, so fasting and prayer became valid only through his intercessory role.

The Muslim Tasliya (prayer for Muhammad) has its parallel in Samaritan belief, for it is a virtuous act indeed to pray that God's blessing may be on Moses. This may seem hardly necessary in view of the divine authority vested in Moses, but no doubt the prayer for Moses is indicative of a long process of doctrinal development, out of which arose the basic concept that the worshipper's right belief in Moses as expressed in his prayer for Moses brought efficacy. The significant thing about the Samaritans is that belief, rather than actions, was the fundamental virtue and prerequisite of acceptance by God. True faith and belief are not acquired by pious acts or mere outward observance of religious rites, but (*a*) by having a spirit of understanding, the light of knowledge which comes through Moses, the Light of the World; and (*b*) by the intercession of Moses on behalf of his worshipful people.

Moses the Taheb

From the time that the false tabernacle was established at Shiloh under Eli, a period of divine disfavour began. This period is still in force and will end only when true repentance on a national scale comes into being. The period of divine favour is to herald in the end of the world and the destruction of all evil. The new era is not thought of in terms of conquest and victory of a physical nature, but is to be a period, unspecified in duration and time, of peace and freedom—the very things the Samaritan community lacked for so long. It is to be compared with the idea of the kingdom of heaven rather than with any Palestine-based theocracy governed by priests. Using Deut. 18.15, 18 as the proof text, the Samaritans expect one from the tribe of Levi to arise, a prophet like Moses. In some versions of this additional or sixth doctrine, the figure of the prophet to come is left vague and unreal; in others the prophet is clearly to be Moses returned (cf. Luke 7.16, 9.19; and especially John 1.21, 4.19, 7.40, 9.17). As will be seen, below, the Day of Vengeance and Recompense is associated

directly with the intercessory function of Moses. The new prophet is called the Taheb, which means Restorer. When he has accomplished the task of restoring the true community and worship, he will die. There is a tradition in Josephus (*Ant.* xviii.4) that a man went up Mount Gerizim and promised to restore the hidden vessels of the Temple. He seems to have received the support of the people. Pontius Pilate sent troops to quell them and as a result of such high-handed and unwarranted action a complaint was lodged in Rome. Pilate was dismissed from his office.

This tradition seems to give weight to the Samaritan expectation of the Taheb. Perhaps the story of the woman at the well and the success of Jesus in Samaria link with that expectation. The Samaritans are truly expectant to a degree that few Jews or Christians are today.

We shall now glance at the activity of Moses the Intercessor on the Day of Vengeance and Recompense. A fourteenth-century writer, of great authority in the eyes of the Samaritan community, wrote a religious system in rhymed verse in which he claimed his teaching was revealed to him through Moses. He begins by urging his people to make continual commemoration of Moses, then lists Moses' distinctive attributes, stating that all creatures were made for his sake, and it could therefore be only Moses who could have ascended Mount Sinai to commune with God. The light that shone from him on his descent was too bright for the people and would remain so until they did what he commanded them. It is an interesting thought, theological truism though it may seem to us, that the divine light was unbearable only when God was not being obeyed, for it means that the Samaritan theologians of early times had conceived the idea that 'a saint is one who lets the light shine through him'. The composition goes on to describe the Taheb, how his purity would be manifested when he grew up. He would (again) receive Scripture and the gift of prophethood. The tabernacle and temple vessels would be revealed to him. Then true worship would be restored as a result of the Taheb's work. Having offered the burnt-offering, all Israel would live in security and peace. Then those who were possessed of true knowledge would be exalted. An unending kingdom would come into being during which the non-

Israelite (i.e. the non-Samaritan) would question the validity and efficacy of the Taheb's ministry. In the end they too would come to believe in God, in Moses and in the Law (cf. Luke 2.32).

A stanza is then devoted to an elaborate Tasliya, where the writer offers his prayers through and 'by the merit of' Moses. The phrase *bi'amal* in Samaritan Hebrew can mean 'for the sake of' or 'by the merit of', depending on the context, but the translation should always be the latter in petitions to God. This minor point receives importance because it links up with the larger question of intercession 'by' or 'through' Moses, rather than with the lesser question of praying 'for' Moses.

Tahebship is the true role of Moses. His rule will be distinguished from all others by the righteous judgment without anger; the Taheb will not sin, for he has the Light and must therefore be pure. When his rule is ended he will be buried with his fathers the three patriarchs, Joseph and Joshua. What he achieved will continue. In the end (time unspecified) the earth will suffer destruction, as at the Flood, and the sun's light will be paled; the moon and stars will fail to shine. Mountains will be brought down and valleys made level by the shaking and rending caused by the advent of the Day of Vengeance. The apocalypse in Samaritanism, typically Semitic and belonging to the inter-testamental apocalyptic style in all probability, is far from dissimilar from the apocalyptic expressions in Mark 13.

The writer claims that he must next reveal the glorious mystery of the Day of Recompense, because no other can expound; he is in direct descent from the chain of those who received the Light. His own life and the life of his forefathers had been such that the true knowledge of the last mysteries could come through them. He is, he claims, the progeny of the Prophet. When the Day of Vengeance is come, the rending of the ground will open graves, and souls (or spirits) will come forth. These resurrected souls are the souls of the truly penitent, the prophets and priests. In their midst will be Moses and he will illumine them by his light. It appears that the Samaritan theologians had never reached complete agreement on the question of the return of Moses. None of them speaks of the Taheb as Moses resurrected—at least not ex-

plicitly—but after the fashion of John 5.28 it seems that this is what he was, for Moses (in his role of Taheb) has an intercessory role to play in his resurrection.

The resurrected Moses is to address God, asking Him to forgive those resurrected with him on the ground that they are His firstborn (hence elect?) and because of the covenant. God will reply, 'I have gladly received your prayers.' The 'Muezzin' will take his place and the assembled angels will move forward one by one, making inquiry of each other as to the doings of humanity. The pure three (i.e. the patriarchs) will go forward and seek forgiveness for the people. Then Moses and the Aaronites are to follow, a belief that implies that Moses is now again Speaker, while priestly functions are left to Aaron. Moses is to ask forgiveness for the people, while Aaron and his sons make atonement in the usual, prescribed way.

The people are next divided into two groups, the holy innocents who are to go straight to the Garden of Eden (a state rather than a place) and the guilty are to go straight to the fire (in Muslim style). But Moses will pray for the guilty and save them! However, Samaritan theology generally finds no place for any fundamental belief in the idea of universal salvation. That is the picture presented by a writer who next claims that he has reaped the Word and has given his teaching from its harvest.

From other sources we learn that as Moses in life drew near to Mount Sinai, so will he draw near on the appointed day with prayer. The scene on Mount Sinai will be duplicated or reproduced on the Day of Recompense. In connexion with the resurrection the trumpet will be sounded before the dead bodies revive, when their spirits at the signal will return to them.

Concluding Observations

Before observing the possible significance of some of the points raised, let us remind ourselves of the chief features of this Samaritan Doctrine of Moses.

The whole Creed is centred on its second tenet, belief in Moses. The exaltation of Moses is not matched in Jewish faith. Bound to the Pentateuch, having only one prophet, the

Samaritans concentrated on him, as it were. It is possible, too, that a de-anthropomorphising process took place over many centuries in Samaritan theology. Whether this process can be ever traced directly back to the original Northern Kingdom, Ephraim, whose E document in the Pentateuch was notably less anthropomorphistic than the Southern Kingdom's J, is at present doubtful. It has to be born in mind in this connexion that there is every likelihood that the Samaritans have occupied their ancestral territory in Palestine without a break from very early times—at least from the days of Ezra and Nehemiah. It is thus probable that E's avoidance of anthropomorphic concepts has left its mark on the Samaritan liturgy, in which the Doctrine of the Oneness of God is hardly paralleled in the liturgy of any other religious body.

The chief spokesman of the people of Israel on earth, Moses came to mean to them their chief intercessor on the last day. Source of all light, the manifestation of God on earth through a birth that was natural, yet not by human will, rather by divine will, his star appeared in the heavens (like the Star of Bethlehem), angels proclaimed his advent, his mother received secret counsel from an angel and kept what she heard to herself; after birth he was anointed with water and described by God as the one whom He had chosen, in whom He had put His will or pleasure. His life often linked with angels, the wonders he did on earth were but an expression of his divine nature. His light was the light of creation; it was a holy light, which yet he sheds on men of understanding. Men coming into the world receive light from him and they have the Image which is Moses. He is verily the true light that lighteth every man entering the world. The light of knowledge shines from pure soul to pure soul in a direct line, both before and after its supreme expression in Moses. The ideal man, in his fasting and prayer, he became in the eyes of his people the model for spiritual behaviour. Prayer on his behalf is efficacious, while, on the other hand, he is the intercessor for God's people.

He will come again at the Resurrection, will gather his people together, the dead and the living, restore true worship, and bring in an era of peace. In God's own time will come the Day of Vengeance and Recompense when he as Intercessor will save his people.

Before raising some queries with further research in mind, a word must be said about the dating of the material on which this Doctrine and its description are based. We have no way of knowing exactly how old the various points are. The story of the birth of Moses is only preserved, as far as available extant material goes, in fourteenth-century didactic, metrical compositions. It is certain that the story is ancient, but whether A.D. or B.C. we cannot yet say. Perhaps further material will come to light. Moses' divine relationship to God during his earthly ministry is expressed certainly in theological writings of the fourth century A.D. As far as the Doctrine of the Day of Vengeance is concerned, one of the chief sources, known as the Asatir, has been shown by M. Gaster to belong to the third or second century B.C.

Let us note that the Doctrine of Moses is not in any way dependent on Jewish legend. The Samaritans to this day have no dealings with the Jews. As far as Christian sources go, there is no evidence that the Samaritans borrowed from them—or from any other source—or that Christian writers borrowed from Samaritan sources. The whole history of the people shows that they were forced back by circumstance upon their own devices and devisings. They were and are the only people to observe the Mosaic Law to the full, according to their own estimate. Whence then the birth of Moses story and what looks like an account of a Baptism and Ordination?

When we think of the Gospels, we note that Matthew, writing for Jews, is hostile; Jesus, we read, told the disciples not to enter the cities of the Samaritans. Mark, writing (it is usually thought) for Romans, has nothing to say about them. Luke (9.52ff) mentions the refusal of a Samaritan village to give Jesus hospitality, but elsewhere shows favourable interest —10.33-37, the story of the Good Samaritan, 17.11-18, the story of the Samaritan leper who was the only one to return and thank Jesus.

John's attitude is distinctive. Jesus is the prophet who was to come—based on Deut. 18.18 as in Samaritan doctrine. Dr J. Bowman in an article 'The Fourth Gospel and the Samaritans' (*Samaritan Studies*, reprinted from the *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, vol. 40, no. 2, March 1958) has pointed out the following: Jesus admits to the Samaritan woman that He

is the Messiah (John 4.26); Jews claim that Jesus was a Samaritan and had a devil (ibid. 8.48). Jesus denies the allegation about having a devil and no mention is made of the other allegation. Yet He was not a Samaritan by birth. He has sheep of a fold other than the Jewish (ibid. 10.16). Jesus found a rich harvest in Samaria (ibid. 4.35ff). Jesus and the disciples would reap there what they, Jews, had not sown. We observe that this story follows that about Nicodemus, where he, an educated Jew, was unable to comprehend the idea of spiritual rebirth—a Samaritan would have understood.

It is more than possible that John, in his maturity, was of the belief that Jesus was the fulfilment of *all* Israel's hope, both Jews' and Samaritans'; or he may have thought that there was more chance of Jesus being recognised by Samaritans than by His own people.

If John was thus impressed, we can understand that he used Samaritan philosophy or theology to some degree. God created by Ten Words and it was with the first Word (the basis for monotheism) that all else came to be, primarily through Moses, the holy light, the holy spirit. Creation was for Moses' sake. For John the pre-existent Jesus was active in creation. Moses' light, in Samaritan theology, was the origin of the light of the stars and the spirit of prophecy, active in creation and in men before Moses himself came in flesh.

More could be said to show that John's theology was not independent of the Samaritan and will be said elsewhere. At this point, as we draw to a close, we cannot fail to note that, whatever the date of the Samaritan material, the Samaritan theologians thought in terms not unlike John. Until evidence for dating the material is to hand—and the field is yet young—questions like the birth of Moses must remain of academic interest. Were the Samaritans trying to give a semi-miraculous interpretation of the birth of Moses? He was not born of a virgin; nowhere is this asserted. But, on the other hand, the tradition of the virgin birth of Jesus was not settled everywhere in Christendom in the second century. The two Old Syriac codices, Sinaiticus and Curetonian, suggest this, and it should be observed that there are strong affinities between Samaritan Aramaic and the Eastern Aramaic of the Syrian Church. We cannot enter yet into the question of the priority of Christian

or Samaritan sources, but have to content ourselves by noting the interesting way in which the latter explain the light that was in the beginning at creation as entering in the fulness of time into the Prophet Moses, whose coming was foretold in Holy Scripture as the Samaritans see it.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE REVIVAL OF WORSHIP IN THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND TO PROBLEMS OF CHRISTIAN REUNION[1]

by The Rev. A. K. ROBERTSON

From 1857, when Dr Robert Lee introduced his 'innovations' in public worship at Greyfriars' Church, Edinburgh, until the reunion of the Church of Scotland and the United Free Church of Scotland in 1929, there was a relationship, sometimes direct and conscious, sometimes indirect and unconscious, between the revival of public worship in the Church of Scotland and the problems of Christian reunion.

In recent times, the experience of the younger Churches has been the chief factor in quickening the Christian conscience regarding the sin of schism. Similarly, the first urge to reform the public worship of the Church of Scotland came from the British colonies, where Scottish Presbyterians, often cut off from the services of their own denomination, and worshipping in Anglican churches, asked themselves why the worship of their own church was so bare, and sometimes even perfunctory. For such colonists the first prayer book to be published by the Church of Scotland since the Westminister Directory was issued in 1859, and out of his experience as colonial chaplain, G. W. Sprott wrote his pamphlet, 'The Worship, Rites, and Ceremonies of the Church of Scotland', which pointed out the path to the reform movement.

Railways and a growing daily press broke up provincialism at home, while an expanding Empire took many overseas, who returned critical of the ways of the Church in the homeland. Shame and regret were now openly expressed that the Church of Scotland, alone among the Reformed churches, had ceased to observe the Christian Year, and that it was the only great national Church without a liturgy. Scots became self-conscious about the rude architecture of many of their parish churches, in whose construction cheapness and seating

[1] Being the substance of the Lee Lecture, delivered in St. Giles' Cathedral, Edinburgh, 25th May 1958.

capacity had too often been the determining factors, and about the unmusical praise which prevailed, where organs were unknown and precentors were often untrained. The Scots began to ask themselves seriously why their worship took the form it did. They began to re-study the history of public worship in Scotland. The influence of the Gothic Revival and the Oxford Movement aroused fresh interest in the externals of worship.

At the same time, when potential lay leaders were seceding in large numbers to the fashionable Scottish Episcopal Church, the Established Church, already weakened by the Disruption, and fearing further losses or another split over public worship, was almost obliged to adopt a tolerant, accommodating attitude to liturgical reform.

As a result of this self-criticism and self-comparison many misunderstandings were cleared away and new insights gained. It was established, for example, that the complete disuse of read prayers had not been the practice of the Church of Scotland since the Reformation. Usages obtaining in other Reformed Churches were recognised as part of a common Reformation heritage, and therefore as legitimate for the Church of Scotland. In particular, it was established that neither Calvin nor Knox objected to read prayers, and that both wished to see the Lord's Supper celebrated every Sunday; that Holy Baptism ought to be administed in church; that the Scriptures ought to be read at every diet of worship; that the Lord's Prayer, the Apostles' Creed, and the great Christian festivals are not peculiar to Anglican worship, but belong to the whole Church, Catholic and Reformed. One hundred years ago, most Scottish Presbyterians would have condemned as 'popery' or 'aping Episcopacy' modes of worship which most of their descendents now recognise as Catholic and Reformed.

In this ecumenically minded age, when wild accusations and a rigid, misinformed outlook are still with us, we can profit by the mistake of those who opposed changes in public worship for mistaken reasons. The ecumenical movement now, like the liturgical movement of last century, has need in Scotland of those who will compare the polity, doctrine, and liturgy of the Church of Scotland with those of other Churches, always in submission to the Word of God, and in obedience to Christ,

the Head of the Church, and who will without fear or favour propose and act upon the changes which they believe to be necessary to bring that Church closer to every Church which is seeking unity in the same submission and obedience.

The revival of worship achieved much that directly furthered the ecumenical movement. Sprott and others aimed at building up a strong position for the Church of Scotland as the true representative of the Catholic Church in this land. The Church Service Society endeavoured to include in an act of worship all the essential elements of Catholic worship. The liturgy of the Catholic Apostolic Church exercised an important influence upon the revival in fostering a liturgical eclecticism which sought to gather up and use every pure and precious thing which had been developed in the Church in all ages through the guidance of the Holy Spirit. This liturgical eclecticism found expression in *Euchologion* (1867), which in time did much to turn the devotions of the Church of Scotland into more Catholic channels.

In this way the revival of worship made a notable contribution to ecumenism. It brought those who had been rigidly Calvinist in theology, and whose public worship was fettered by a common use and wont, which could justify itself neither historically nor doctrinally, to sing and love hymns written by Roman Catholics, Anglo-Catholics and Methodists. It brought many to see the sacramental nature of the Church and of its worship. It fostered a sense of the historical continuity of the Church in Scotland by the restoration of ancient churches and cathedrals.

Experience of ecumenical gatherings has proved that when Christians worship together, when members of one Church see the sincerity behind a form of worship which differs greatly from their own, a big gap is bridged. Theology remains for the few; worship is for all. Moreover, as it has been pointed out recently, 'In most cases the forms of worship give us true insight into the life of another Church, which when studied from its dogmatic statements, records and documents always remains remote, is not understood from within and loved. "Come and see"—this Gospel finds fruitful application in ecumenism.'[1]

[1] L. A. Zander, *Vision and Action*, p. 166.

The revival of worship made another important contribution to reunion by clarifying the Church's mind and unifying her practice liturgically. It did much to provide a form of worship to which, whether written down or not, those of other denominations could point as being the accepted mode of worship and the forms for the administration of the Sacraments in the Church of Scotland. Without a modern, accepted directory or liturgy of some sort, as a guide to its belief and practice, no Church can expect to make progress in union negotiations with other churches.

Dr Lee's aim was to provide a form of public worship in every parish which would be dignified and yet appropriate to the needs of the people. Under the leadership of Principal Tulloch and Principal Story the cult of 'national religion' was fostered. Confronted with vigorous dissenting Churches, and threatened with disestablishment, the Church of Scotland was urged to take seriously its task as the national Church, and part of this task was seen to be the provision of more fitting and acceptable forms of worship. One may question if the general level of extemporary prayer was ever as low as some have made out, but certainly prayers tended to be ill-ordered, verbose, and oratorical, while in the sacramental and occasional services there was particular need for dignity and uniformity.

Especially through the use of *Euchologion* and through the example set by the public worship in St. Giles' cathedral under Dr Cameron Lees, a more formal, liturgical type of service was evolved. After long hesitation and experimentation the Church finally published a service book for use in public worship in church. This appeared as *Prayers for Divine Service* in 1923.

This book, and even more so the *Book of Common Order*, 1940, when it appeared, was an important contribution to the cause of reunion. Knox's Liturgy had been in disuse for centuries. The Westminster Directory had not been made legally binding upon the Church in 1693, and was more honoured in the breach than the observance. Quite apart from the issue as to whether read or free prayers were the traditional Scottish usage since 1560, and quite apart from the question whether the books of 1923 and 1940 were representative of the prevailing mode of worship, ecumenically considered, it was a major

step in the direction of unity that official recognition should be given to service books which even summarised on broad lines the belief and practice of the Church, particularly with regard to the Sacraments.

Like the modern ecumenical movement, the revival of worship flourished where confessionalism had become less rigid. The breaking up of the old theological orthodoxy, the plea for a relaxed formula for subscription to the Church's subordinate standards, and the memory of the harsh treatment meted out to Edward Irving and McLeod Campbell, all made liturgical reform easier. In the changing theological atmosphere the Church was able to embark upon many experiments in worship. Organs, hymns, anthems, robed choirs, chancels and prayer desks, appeared in pseudo-Gothic churches, which were embellished with heavy furnishings, fussy decoration, and sentimental stained glass. Popular taste, rather than clear-cut conviction as to sacramental grace or ministerial order, dictated the changes, but that same taste resisted anything which suggested priestly claims, adoration of the eucharistic elements, or undue stress on symbol and ceremony.

While many improvements were effected, there were losses. As the old Communion Seasons disappeared with their ancillary services, frequent Communion did not become general; as standing at prayer went out, kneeling did not come in; as aids to the conduct of public worship became more accessible, the discerning claimed that extemporary prayer declined in power.

The criticism can be made of both the revival of worship and the ecumenical movement that they are the children of theological relativism, but the former movement shows that freedom to question and re-examine faith and practice, opportunity to search around and move on, can in the end lead the Church into a fuller realisation of its heritage.

Although Broad Churchmen were prominent in the movement for improving Church worship in Scotland, and although the popular demand for 'innovations' may not have known clearly whither it was leading the Church, yet from the outset there were leaders like G. W. Sprott, Thomas Leishman, John McLeod, and James Cooper who acted out of loyalty to a vision of Reformed Catholicism, and ultimately prepared the

way for an ecumenical outlook within the Church of Scotland. Conservative in their theology, with Edward Irving they read high sacramental doctrine into the Church's subordinate standards. They preferred with him the Scots to the Westminster Confession, and shared with Matthew Leishman of Govan, the leader of the Middle Party at the Disruption, a concern over schism which was all too rare at the time.

Irving's preoccupation with the Second Coming of our Lord and the place which he accorded to the Holy Spirit in the life of the Church of the present day greatly influenced the revival of worship, particularly through the teaching of John Macleod of Govan. At the present time, when we have come to see the place which eschatology and the Person of the Holy Spirit must occupy in the search for unity by the Churches, we stand amazed at the insights of those who, amid so much opposition and misrepresentation, sought to turn the Church of Scotland into more Catholic ways of thought and devotion. Amid the fragmentation of the Church which they saw all too clearly before their eyes, they held fast by a vision of larger union, refusing to be turned aside by union at a purely Presbyterian level, and seeking only such reunion as could eventually further the reunion of the whole Church. They succeeded in doing what the Church must needs do now, if it is to receive of the fulness of the eschatological unity which Christ wills to give—they guided their Church between the Scylla and Charybdis of theological relativism and rigid confessionalism, seeking to rely upon the guidance of the Holy Spirit and acknowledging Holy Scripture as the supreme rule of faith and life.

As William Nicholls has put it in *Ecumenism and Catholicity*,[1] the Churches must suspend judgment on one another while continuing the search for agreement—'This suspension of judgment involves a recognition that my own theology is provisional, that it represents only an attempt after truth that will be understood only when we shall know even as also we are known. This recognition of the provisional character of theology in no way relativises the revelation which theology endeavours to explicate, but it does rule out a certain idolatry of terminology, which after pride and lack of love for the

[1] p. 62.

brethren, has been, and is today, the most fruitful source of Christian disunity. The ecumenical discussion is only possible where theology is seen eschatologically as *theologia viatorum*. The hardening of confessional positions, both Catholic and Protestant, to be seen in circles opposed to the ecumenical movement, seems to be associated with a blindness to the eschatological element in the biblical faith.'

The revival of worship in the Church of Scotland entered upon a new phase in 1892 with the formation of the Scottish Church Society, part of whose aim was to check changes in worship which amounted to mere 'trimming' and aestheticism, and to restore in popular thought and worship the Catholic doctrines of the Church, the Ministry, and the Sacraments. These views were held only by a minority within the Church, but in time they did much to prepare the way for ecumenical advance. The sin of schism was but partially recognised by many. Denominational rivalry was held to be healthy. For some the Church was a religious club where a common, intensely individualistic evangelical experience was pooled; for others it was primarily a philanthropic society whose purpose was to be busy about temperance, slums, foreign missions. Few viewed the Church as supernatural in its life and heavenly in its calling or recognised that the Church is an organism, not an organisation or a mechanism.

Today, when in all ecumenical discussion it is recognised that the crucial difficulty is the need for a clear definition of the doctrine of the Church, we in the Church of Scotland realise the debt we owe to the re-statement of that doctrine found in volumes such as *The Pentecostal Gift*[1] and *A Manual of Church Doctrine*.[2] There the Ascension and the Holy Spirit are accorded their rightful place in the doctrine. By reminding us that the Church receives all its authority and validity from an organic relationship with Christ as its Head, this new phase of the revival of worship delivered us from a narrow, complacent confessionalism, which knew itself to be right because it taught correct dogma, and the humanist identification of authority and validity with some particular historical expression of Church life and order. This prepared the way for the con-

[1] The Scottish Church Society, *The Pentecostal Gift*.
[2] Wotherspoon and Kirkpatrick, *A Manual of Church Doctrine*.

temporary recognition of the fact that the unity of the Church is eschatological. It interpenetrates history, but also transcends it. It is not within man's grasp, who must ever receive it anew from Christ's own hand. 'He alone', as Barth has written, 'in the power of His endless life is so triumphantly adequate to deal with the sins and errors of the life of the Christian Church that He can both preserve and save it. He alone is the hope of the Church.'[1]

It was now taught that 'the presence of Christ in the Church which all Christians confess, must not be interpreted to mean that by an ethical process, the Church is permeated by His teaching and exhibits His temper; it means the transmission to the Church through the Divine Spirit, as mediated by Christ, of the actual energy of that Humanity which is taken up into the God-head. It means an objective extension of the personal consciousness and volition of the Ascended Son of Man—an actual presence of His complete life correlating to Himself and to each other the individual human personalities which this Divine human activity seizes and assimilates to form of them for itself an organism—His Body.'[2] From the ecumenical point of view this assertion is important because it implies that the essential historical continuity of the Church lies not in some unbroken line of priests but in the whole Body of believers. There is historical continuity in the Church only because its members are constantly renewed in faith and obedience by Christ its Head. The Church is in the Apostolic Succession, when Christ can say of it: 'He that heareth you, heareth Me.'

'The Body of Christ, which has ascended into Heaven, and will come again at the Second Coming, which remains indissolubly united to His Divine Person, is known on earth, mediated by Word and Sacrament, as a society in history. Its heavenly unity is for us on earth as an historical unity and continuity in faith and in sacramental fellowship. The NT never speaks of the divine reality of the Body of Christ except as a society in history. The Church is the concrete reality given by God in which two ages are linked together. We participate in the heavenly reality, by participating in the life

[1] *The Universal Church in God's Design*, p. 72.
[2] The Scottish Church Society, *The Pentecostal Gift*, pp. 93-94.

of the earthly society. The Christian life is eternal life in historical time. Both the preaching of the Church and its Sacraments are the historical actualisations of the eschatological events of our salvation. In the proclamation of the Word and in the administration of the Sacraments, the once-and-for-all events of our salvation are re-enacted eschatologically, or rather we say that time is overcome, and we are present simultaneously at the death and resurrection of Christ, and at His Second Coming, and at the same time we are in the historical moment of the Church's action. It is by Word and Sacrament that the Holy Spirit unites the eschatological and the historical, and makes the Church.'[1]

This unerring insight, taken from a brilliant piece of modern ecumenical thinking by William Nicholls, was at least foreshadowed by the sacramental teaching of the Scottish Church Society about the close of last century. This teaching stressed the importance of Holy Baptism for the whole of life, and saw in the baptised a special priesthood set apart to worship God and to bear witness to His Word. The baptised have been baptised into one Body, and this, rather than some narrowly held doctrine of apostolic succession through a tactual succession of bishops, was seen as the vital factor in determining membership of the visible Church. The reminder that all the baptised stand in a covenant relation with God and have been joined to one another as well as to Christ strengthened the argument for reunion at a time when Churches were all too content to be race, or class or national Churches. In the face of Protestant individualism the collective nature of the Church and the Church members' social responsibilities were stressed. This teaching on Baptism saved the Church of Scotland from becoming 'a gathered church', and from the heresy of 'believer's Baptism', which amid the sectarianism of the time, and the contemporary preaching, with its emphasis on Christ, divorced from the Church and the Sacraments, offered a real threat to the Church's spiritual heritage.

But, most of all, by the teaching on the Eucharist which this group of churchmen advanced, the foundation was laid for a Catholic doctrine of the Church and of her worship. John Macleod held that all changes in public worship which stopped

[1] W. Nicholls, *Ecumenism and Catholicity*, p. 53.

short of restoring the Eucharist as the normal act of Sunday worship were secondary and even trifling. At the end of last century the Lord's Supper was still widely viewed in Scotland as a solemn commemoration of Christ's Death, a pledge to saving faith of the promises of the Gospel, and an occasion for repentance, renewal of faith and self-dedication by the converted. Through the influence of the Oxford Movement and the Catholic Apostolic Church, and through the writings of William Milligan, John Macleod and H. J. Wotherspoon, the anamnesis was shown to mean the re-presenting before God of a past event so that that event becomes operative at the present moment by its effect. The Church on earth enacts sacramentally that which Christ does in Heaven. The assumption was that Heb. 13.10 refers to the Eucharist and that the Ascended Christ is engaged not merely in Intercession, but also in pleading His Eternal Sacrifice. Since all ordinances in the Church derive their efficacy from His Heavenly Life, by His own appointment the Eucharist is a sacramental pleading of the Eternal Sacrifice in Heaven. Whether many can go all the way with this identification of the earthly and the Heavenly Sacrifice is open to question. It has not been taught continuously or widely throughout the Christian Church. It is doubtful, too, if those who advocated it in our Church could do so, without jettisoning Calvin's doctrine of Christ's presence in the Eucharist. Nevertheless, the linking of what is sacramentally enacted in the Eucharist with the Ascended Saviour who in Heaven *is* the Sacrifice was great gain. It brought objectivity to eucharistic worship and linked the Scottish rite with precious elements of Catholic devotion which were all but lost sight of. It was realised that the Eucharist was the God-appointed form of public worship through which Christ ever re-creates anew His Church making it to be His Body, giving it that unity which by no effort of its own it can ever acquire, breaking through time and the physical world, to permit the historical Church to share in the reality of the eschatological. This was most important for Christian reunion, which can never become a reality until the Churches realise the place the Eucharist must occupy in the Church's life. As Professor Florovsky has recently pointed out, it is likely that St. Paul spoke of the Church as the Body of Christ because of his

experience of the Eucharist. 'The Church is one in the Eucharist, for the Eucharist is Christ Himself, and He *sacramentally* abides in the Church which is His Body. The Church is a body indeed, an *organism*, much more than a society or a corporation.'[1]

The place afforded to the Ascension and to the Holy Spirit in this teaching on worship was, at a time when many glossed over the former as of doubtful credulity and by-passed the other as a doctrine which they had not fully clarified, an insight fully justified by later experience in ecumenical discussion. It is increasingly apparent that unity cannot be attained by turning back to some point in the Church's history and agreeing that here we have the model period in its history, the pattern to which all the Churches must conform. Nor can it come by our agreeing to accept some historical formulation of doctrine as an agreed minimum corpus of belief. It can only come eschatologically—when the Church submits itself to the Ascended Lord, who wills to give His Church that unity, which, left to itself in this sinful world, it must ever break into fragments. Our unity is beyond history in the Ascended Christ. We can participate here and now in that unity by the power of the Holy Spirit.

While taken as a whole the revival of worship made no mean contribution to the cause of reunion, there are one or two results which may be said to have acted adversely to the interests of unity. One of these was a diminished sense of the authority of Holy Scripture. The older type of service was largely a preaching service. Worshippers talked of going to hear a sermon when they meant they were going to share in public worship. Change of emphasis was overdue. The change worked much good, yet in some parishes, perhaps, a rather nondescript type of service appeared, where full realisation of the function of preaching was lost. The devotions were made out to be the 'objective' part of the service, and the sermon sometimes descended to the level of a few devotional or topical comments by the minister. The old-fashioned, thoroughgoing, exhaustive and authoritative exposition in lecture and in sermon at least left the hearers in no doubt as to the supreme authority of the Word of God for faith and life. The change

[1] *The Universal Church in God's Design*, p. 49.

would possibly not have been so serious in its consequences, had it not taken place when Biblical Criticism was undermining a simple trust in the Bible as a record. No single factor did more to empty the churches, and ecumenically the result has not been happy. For urgently the Churches must return to the authority of the biblical witness and theology, if agreement is to be reached.

Also, while the revival set out to remind the Church of Scotland of its heritage and legitimate liturgical usage, and in the main succeeded very well in so doing, the licence allowed to ministers and congregations to make changes sometimes had the opposite effect. Some, for example, were foolish enough to be ashamed of our inheritance of extemporary prayers and central pulpits; others thought the Anglican way of conducting worship the inevitable norm for all; while many leant heavily in the direction of Nonconformity in the tone and temper of their services. Much of this obscured at times the high sacramental doctrine and the ideals of liturgical dignity and order inherent in our own tradition.

This had an unfortunate effect ecumenically. Many of our people are still confused as to what is good Presbyterian practice and as to what is bare-faced copying of Anglicanism. Some indeed would be more at home in the ethos of Nonconformity. An initial step to ecumenical discussion is that each Church should know where exactly it stands.

Further, we must admit now, it seems, that some of those who in their zeal to reform the Church's worship were at the same time most conscious of the sin of schism, were sidetracked by two High Anglican errors, namely the exaltation of a doctrine of tactual succession in ministry to be of the *esse* of the Church and the implication that the pre-Nicene Church is an infallible guide in all matters of doctrine, polity, and liturgics, and that consequently this period of Church history can be invested with an authority not to be given to later periods.

Whenever wider Church union was discussed (and many of those who did most for the revival of worship were concerned with this issue, hoping for some union between the national Churches of Scotland and England which might provide a united Church for the British Empire), the discussion too often

centred upon apostolic succession. Sprott and others were at pains to establish that the Scottish Church had some sort of tactual succession in ministry. There was a failure to recognise what recent research has made all too plain—the fact that the Scots Reformers could easily have made sure of such tactual succession at the Reformation, but declined to do so, because they believed the real succession was not lineal descent from the Apostles, but succession in the Apostles' doctrine; and also the fact that lay power was very prominent in the early Reformed Church in Scotland, and that ordination was conferred at the wish, or at least always with the consent, of the people. Much valuable time has been wasted by well-wishers of the cause of reunion, who have been influenced by the Anglo-Catholic interpretation of apostolic succession to the extent of attempting to read some similar theory into our history in the Church of Scotland. The Word, the Sacraments, and discipline rightly administered were said to be the notes of the true Church. Nothing was said of apostolic succession, nor of parity of ministers in the earliest period after the Reformation. Another impediment to reunion was the mistake of imagining that reunion would be achieved by the Churches accepting certain fundamentals as the essential truths of Catholic Christendom. This would have been all very well if the historical Church were ontologically the Una Sancta, and not merely eschatologically. Reunion on the basis of the ancient creeds was a slogan for a time. It was suggested that the English and Scottish Churches should return to the mutual relations which obtained between them in the post-Reformation period, thus permitting inter-change of ministries. A cautious and wistful looking back to past epochs fostered a conservatism and even a prejudice which hindered the recognition of the fact that unity can come only when the Church is willing to receive it from Christ as something which exists already eschatologically and can be made actual in the historical Church by our obedience to the Word of God, but cannot be reconstructed by us out of the fragments of past Church order.

On the positive side the gain was great indeed. It is impossible to conceive of the Church of Scotland taking the part which it is taking in ecumenical study and discussion, had

there been no revival of worship. The revival lifted its worship out of a narrow provincialism, freed it from the dead weight of a rigid use and wont, which could justify itself neither on account of its intrinsic merit, nor on account of its loyalty to its own heritage. It broadened its sympathies and focused its worship on the Incarnation, indicating the sacramental nature of the Church. All this prepared the way for modern attitudes to the question of reunion. Especially in the work of Professor Cooper, whose deep interest in liturgical reform was inspired by an unwavering devotion to the cause of reunion, we see a foreshadowing of insights and conclusions which are only now beginning to be brought home to most Scottish Presbyterians.

After the great missionary expansion of the Church last century, the revival of worship was, for the Church of Scotland, the factor next in importance in quickening a sense of sin regarding schism, and fostering a search for corporate unity.

The criticism can be made that certain aspects of the revival of worship manifested an attempt to incorporate extraneous doctrine and an alien piety within the Church of Scotland. Examples of this might be the use of symbol and ceremony, and a doctrine of Baptism which could not be held along with the doctrine of the Double Decree. Significantly, too, some of the most spiritually minded and scholarly leaders of the movement indicated that they did not find complete spiritual satisfaction within the Church of their Baptism. John Macleod worshipped regularly in the Catholic Apostolic Church of which he was a sealed member. Dr Thomas Leishman, shortly before his death, contemplated joining the Anglicans. Others appear at times to have entertained misgivings as to whether the Catholic positions they sought to teach could really be held within the Church of Scotland. Admittedly, there was in some pure hearts a tension between deep loyalty to the Church of their fathers and yearning for a fuller and freer Church life—doctrinally and liturgically. There was a tension between the Catholic view of Christianity with its sacrificial type of worship and its sense of the Church as embodied in the continuity of a historical society, and the Evangelical view of Christianity as an Event wherein the Word of God apprehends and changes men in every generation, with its view of worship as focused in the proclamation of that Word

whereby the Church is constantly renewed. They came as near as possible to a resolution of the tension when they put the Eucharist as the Divinely commanded, supremely objective act of worship at the centre of Church life, without for one moment gainsaying the place preaching, as an all but prophetic function, has always occupied in the Reformed Scottish Church. Here they came to the very heart of the ecumenical problem—how the two historical expressions of Christianity—Catholic and Evangelical—are to be united in one Church, or how the tension between them is to be resolved. It may be, as Nicholls has suggested, that unity will come only when the Catholic and Protestant positions co-exist dialectically in the Church.[1] The deepest cleavage between the two positions is one of eschatology—disagreement as to how far the Kingdom is realised in the Church. The doctrine of the Holy Spirit is the key.

The greatest figure in the revival of worship which we have been discussing was John Macleod. Neither in his lifetime, nor since, has the Church of Scotland realised all that he stood for, and all that he has to teach it. In the light of ecumenical problems his teaching sheds hopeful light upon the pathway to reunion, and his personal example challenges us to follow in his steps. Like a man born before his time his insights were prophetic. With his deep personal piety and his great gifts in evangelical preaching, he stood for the whole Gospel at a time when most thought that the Church could profitably be selective in her belief. A man whom his contemporaries felt to be filled with the power of the Spirit, he was a convinced sacramentalist. A practical Church reformer, and a tireless shepherd of the flock, his whole work and thought were dominated by the Second Coming, while unswervingly he maintained the vital significance of the Ascension for Church life and worship. In all this he crystallised what in the revival of worship in our Church is most relevant for ecumenical discussion now; in all this he pointed the way which even yet it is not too late for us to take.

[1] W. Nicholls, op. cit., p. 154.

THE MYSTERY OF GOD AND REVELATION

by The Rev. W. J. PETER BOYD

Exod. 33.23: '. . . and you shall see *my back* (אֲחֹרָי), but *my face* (פָּנַי) shall not be seen.'

In his lecture on 'Eschatology in the New Testament',[1] delivered to the Society for the Study of Theology, at its inaugural meeting in Cambridge, in July 1952, the late Professor William Manson put forward an ingenious theory. He claimed that there is a specific Old Testament eschatology, which arose in the life of Israel from a primarily religious interest which viewed all human affairs in the light of an 'ultimate transcendent Event, an End, towards which under the judgment and mercy of God, the world is hastening'.[2] This conception which links history with eschatology, can be traced as far back as the events which gave rise to the traditions, embodied in the Yahwist narrative, about the revelations given to Moses.

His theory is based on two pieces of evidence: the divine name of Exod. 3.14, and the text, Exod. 33.23. The name ought to be rendered, 'I will be that I will be', which demonstrates that God does not destroy history, but is always operating in it. This temporal interpretation of the name suggests the key for unravelling the real meaning of the enigmatic passage about God revealing his 'back' to Moses. The divine name (translated with future tenses) 'refers not to the ontological mystery of God's Person, but rather to the inscrutability of God's future purposes from man's present standpoint. God reserves His action. Similarly in Exod. 33.12-23 Moses in the Tent asked to see God's "ways", and receives answer that he shall have God's "presence" and shall know His "goodness", but shall not behold His "glory". Moses will stand in the cleft

[1] The text of his lecture is published in the *Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional Papers*, No. 2, pp. 1-6, of which pp. 1-4 concern the OT.

[2] Actually this view is probably a reading back of the NT standpoint into the OT. Cf. R. Bultmann's Gifford lectures published as *History and Eschatology*, 1957, Edinburgh U.P., pp. 23-29; also S. Smith's trenchant criticisms of eschatological claims for Isaiah in his Schweich lectures, 1940, *Isaiah xl-lv* pp. 18f, 63f, 103-5; also J. Lindblom, *The Servant Songs in Deutero-Isaiah*, 1951, pp. 94-102, 104.

of rock, and he will see God's "back", but he cannot run before God and see His "face". Here again the togetherness of Divine history and eschatology! God has His reserved purposes, and it is to be understood that these will later be revealed. The things which God intends, will be but not yet' (p. 3f).

What is valuable in this presentation is the linking of the two passages Exod. 3.14 and 33.23 for purposes of exegesis. It appears, however, that the exegesis is untenable, for a mistake seems to have been made about the temporal meaning of the Hebrew Word אָחוֹר which in Exod. 33.23 is translated 'back'. Quite clearly this word is taken as referring to the past, 'the divine history', which Moses knows about because Yahweh in making known to him His doings in the past was in fact letting Moses see his 'back'. Naturally the opposite Hebrew word פָּנִים he has taken as referring to the undisclosed future, 'the face' Moses was not allowed to see, and hence the statement that 'God has His reserved purposes'. The truth of the matter is, however, that the temporal meaning of אָחוֹר refers to the future, not the past, as all the grammatical forms of the root אחר when used temporally can refer only to the future, and quite naturally their Hebrew antonyms such as פָּנִים and קֶדֶם must refer to the past. A purely temporal interpretation of Exod. 33.23 is clearly, then, unsatisfactory, for then what Yahweh readily disclosed would be His intentions for the future, and what He refused to reveal was the past!

The second leg of the theory is equally unstable, namely the translation of the divine name by future tenses, The traditional rendering, 'I am that I am', is far preferable to a future rendering. The Hebrew imperfect denotes actions which are regarded by the speaker as taking place at the time he is speaking. Thus to use the present tense in English translation implies that the action has begun and certainly includes the future. The Hebrew imperfect is essentially a dynamic conception, and so all that the Professor claimed for his future rendering may be regarded as implicit in the present tense rendering. The theory advanced by Manson thus collapses and requires drastic modification.

Our concern, here, is with the proper exegesis of Exod. 33.23,

so we may leave undecided the larger question whether there is such a thing as a true eschatology in the Yahwist narrative. Manson's treatment is valuable because it places side by side in illuminating contrast two passages which are both concerned with divine Self-disclosure. If we use this hint, together with a soundly based linguistic study of the Hebrew words, we can arrive at an exegesis which is linguistically sound and very probable. I have just completed a full-scale study of all the instances of the root אחר in the Old Testament and the larger study suggests that from the linguistic side, the key to the exegesis of Exod. 33.23 lies in the examination of those passages where אחר is opposed to its antonyms. Once these passages are assembled, we find straightaway that there is a Hebrew idiom in which אחר combines with words of opposite meaning to express the abstract idea of 'completeness' where the reference is predominantly spatial, or 'uniqueness' when the reference is temporal.

The temporal formula, when it occurs in full, usually runs, 'there was never anything like —, before — or after —'. It can be applied to distinguished kings like Solomon, as in 1 Kings 3.12 in which לְפָנֶיךָ, 'before you', denotes his predecessors and וְאַחֲרֶיךָ refers to his successors, '(none like you shall arise) after you'. The same Hebrew words are used to describe the unique plague of locusts in Exod. 10.14. The outstanding event when the sun and moon stayed still in the heavens, at Joshua's command is characterised by this formula, in Joshua 10.14, 'There has been no day like it, before (לְפָנָיו) or afterwards (וְאַחֲרָיו) when Yahweh listened to a man's voice.'

The above are examples of temporal prepositions and it may be objected that in Exod. 33.23, the Hebrew word in fact is a noun used as an adverb. This objection need not trouble us, as the various grammatical forms of the root אחר, are interchangeable, and in fact of the total of forty-one instances of the form אָחוֹר, we find that six instances are involved in this special idiom. Ps. 139.5, where the word אָחוֹר is opposed to וָקֶדֶם, means that God completely surrounds His psalmist. In Ezek. 2.10 the contrasted words are פָּנִים and אָחוֹר.

The meaning is that the scroll is completely covered with writing. Three passages refer to being encircled by hostile armies, 1 Chron. 19.10 (פָּנִים and וְאָחוֹר), its parallel passage 2 Sam. 10.9 (מִפָּנִים and וּמֵאָחוֹר), and 2 Chron. 13.14 (פָּנִים and אָחוֹר). In Job 23.8, Job asserts that the most complete and exhaustive search has failed to disclose the whereabouts of God. The writer embroiders the formula קֶדֶם and וְאָחוֹר, by using the variant contrast of the left and right hands, 'Behold I go forward, but he is not there; and backward, but I cannot perceive him; on the left hand I seek him, but I cannot behold him; I turn to the right hand but I cannot see him.'

The review of these examples reveals two points. We can see the origin of Manson's slip; as modern man is used to a rectilinear concept of time in which he stands in the present with his past 'behind' him and the future 'before' him. As we have seen, for the Hebrew precisely the opposite is true. His past is what stands before him; his ancestors are those who have gone 'before', and his posterity consists of those who come 'behind' or 'after him'. This fact was first pointed out by Orelli.[1]

because the first (רֵאשִׁית) means here the beginning of an entire series of generations, periods of time and so on, in which series the Present serves as a link, which the Past precedes (hence קֶדֶם 'Antiquity') and which the Future follows behind.

Secondly, the review suggests that in this antithetic formula each word suffers modification to its normal meaning because both unite to make up a complex idea. I think it is a fair inference to recognise in Exod. 33.23, another example of this construction. The פָּנִים and אָחוֹר of Yahweh together denote His 'uniqueness', just as Yahweh claims sole sovereignty for Himself in the oracle of Isa. 44.6, where the superlative forms of two antonyms are combined:

I am the first (רִאשׁוֹן), and

I am the last (אַחֲרוֹן).

[1] *Die hebräischen Synonyma der Zeit und Ewigkeit genetisch und sprachvergleichend dargestellt* (1871). See Index for אַחֲרִית.

In this passage the temporal terms are used metaphorically. Reverting to Exod. 33.23, we may say that the thought is that whatever Yahweh has revealed to Moses, such self-disclosure in no way impairs or vitiates the uniqueness of Yahweh's Being. The ancients used to think that once the name of a supernatural being was discovered, it lost its power. (Cf. Jacob's question: 'Tell me thy name', Gen. 32.29.) Yahweh, indeed, has revealed His name to Moses (Exod. 3.14), Yahweh has disclosed the future (אַחֲרִי) for the new Israel, which revelation discloses the very heart of God, yet this by no means implies that Moses has pierced the veil of Yahweh's mysterious Being. Moses cannot see His 'face'; he cannot know Yahweh's origin; he cannot comprehend Him who is from all eternity to all eternity.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Gospel of the Incarnation. By GEORGE S. HENDRY. S.C.M. Press, London, 1959. Pp. 174. 15s.

DR HENDRY's book on the incarnation is based on the Croall Lectures delivered in New College, Edinburgh, in October 1951. They were published in America in 1958, and we now have a British edition. The book is as fertile in ideas as was his earlier work on *The Holy Spirit in Christian Theology*. Starting from a phrase used in one of the preparatory volumes for Lund, the 'general fragmentation of the Christian tradition', the author shows that the great constrasts, piety and orthodoxy within Protestantism, 'Protestantism' and 'Catholicism', East and West, arise from concentration on different aspects of the total fact of Christ. His aim is to return to 'the organic wholeness of the Christian faith' by the reintegration of incarnation and atonement.

In pursuit of this commendable aim, the book examines the Jesus of History movement, the doctrine of the humanity of Christ in East and West, and the universality of Christ. 'If Christ is true and complete man, it must be possible to raise the question of his person in terms of psychology and ethics' (p. 91). On this basis the author sketches his Christology. Then after a somewhat briefer historical treatment of the doctrine of the atonement, he reaches a theory which links this closely with the whole life of Christ and with the personal relations which the incarnate Christ established with men at the human level. 'Christ did not make forgiveness possible; he bestows it on us' (p. 147). This leads to a discussion of the Church as the extension of the incarnation and of the sacraments, with some very sound remarks on the real presence.

The author shows a great facility for summarising large tracts of theological thought in a few paragraphs. The familiar surveys of the history of doctrine are constantly lit up by interesting observations. The style, apart from the use of 'climax' as a verb (p. 23n), is lucid and attractive. The very facility with which the book is written must not be allowed, however, to lure us into accepting its views too easily. How does the life of Christ confer forgiveness? Why did the incarnate life lead to the Cross? What after all is the relation between incarnation and atonement? Indeed the book may be said to be itself an example of fragmentation. The author is perhaps compelled by the history of the subject to handle the incarnation and the atonement in separate chapters, but this only whets our appetite for the final reintegration. It cannot be said that the last

chapter really supplies this. The constant stress on the life and ministry of Jesus is hardly balanced by an equal stress on His death and resurrection; and thus it is no accident that the last sentence of the book is itself a glaring instance of fragmentation; it quote as clause from the creed and breaks off at the word 'incarnate'.

This uncertainty about the remedy raises doubts about the diagnosis. The analysis is often penetrating, but is it always fair? Do we hear enough about sin, and holiness, about the Old Testament or the Fourth Gospel? The method of treatment hardly does justice to Irenaeus. Under the heading of the incarnation we read about his physical and ontological views; later, in a very brief and unappreciative account of the classic theory of the atonement he is not mentioned at all. Reflection on the juxtaposition of these themes in Irenaeus might have modified both passages. Again, to link Forsyth and Mackintosh so closely with Dorner and progressive incarnation does less than justice to the kenotic element in their thought, the stress on the renunciation which preceded *plerosis*.

A book, however, which is so full of ideas is bound to expose itself to criticisms of detail. Its value lies not so much in the answer which it suggests as in the stimulus which it affords.

A. Raymond George

The Word Incarnate. By W. Norman Pittenger. Nisbet, Library of Constructive Theology. Pp. xxiii + 295. 21s.

The Word Incarnate is the first American contribution to the Library of Constructive Theology, and since it replaces the volume on Christology contributed by L. W. Grensted in 1933, it is presumably intended to mark the entry of constructive theology on a phase of reconstruction. The author is singularly well qualified to fill this role, for he is one who, besides having been preoccupied with the Christological problem for many years, has himself made a kind of theological pilgrimage from the liberalism of the twenties to a position which he would now wish to describe as 'catholic' and 'modernist'. It is from this position that he approaches his theme. As a catholic, he professes loyalty to the fundamentals of the catholic tradition; as a modernist, he claims that the traditional formulations should be used, not as final statements, but as pointers along the path of theological exploration.

Professor Pittenger finds in the Chalcedonian Definition a statement of the minimum assertions which are demanded by Christian faith and experience on the basis of the New Testament witness, viz. that Jesus Christ is truly God, truly man, truly the personal union of these two. But he complains that, while the reality of the humanity of Jesus Christ was affirmed in word, it was not in fact taken with

full seriousness in the Christology of the patristic period, and he regards the doctrines of the 'impersonal humanity' (*anhypostasia*) and the personalisation of the humanity by the Word (*enhypostasia*) as the logical outcome of the Alexandrian tendency to weight the person of Christ on the side of the divinity at the expense of the humanity. 'It is not really possible to maintain true manhood while at the same time finding for that manhood no creaturely centre' (p. 93). The sanest and most balanced approach to the problem in the classical period is, in Pittenger's view, to be seen in the Antiochene Christology, especially as it is represented by Theodore of Mopsuestia. Theodore's conception of the union of God and man as a union of 'indwelling by good pleasure' is not only defended against the charge of Nestorianism, as that heresy was popularly understood; it is held up as the only one which does not in effect destroy the humanity or change the deity. Pittenger offers this summary statement of his interpretation: 'the Eternal Son or Word so appropriated and employed the humanity which by divine providential operation was conceived and born of Mary that he possessed in that humanity an organ for self-expression which was adequate to his purposes, while the human life which was conceived and born of Mary so appropriated and expressed the Eternal Son or Word that such an organ was in fact available for the Son's or Word's purposes among men' (p. 92).

The modernist element in Professor Pittenger's approach consists in his effort to relate (not to reduce) Christology to modern thought. Its first premise is a vigorous reassertion of general revelation and an attempt to construe the special revelation of God in Christ within this framework. The author finds ample precedent for this, notably in the use of the *Logos* doctrine by the Fourth Evangelist; he claims that, by setting the story of the Incarnate Word within the framework of a doctrine of the *Logos* 'as the self-expressive principle of God at work in the whole creation', the evangelist 'delivered Christian faith from parochialism and related its central deliverance to the whole divine operation in the created world' (p. 81). The distinctively modern feature is the author's attempt to interpret the general revelation of God with the aid of the philosophy of process and the philosophy of emergent evolution (associated with the names of Alexander, Whitehead, Lloyd-Morgan and Hartshorne) and to ascribe the emergence of genuinely *new* levels within the on-going process of evolution to the activity of divine purpose rather than to a purely immanent *nisus*; the 'process' is the *Logos* or self-expression of God, and the union of God and man in Christ is the crown and consummation of it. This use of the process philosophy as a framework for Christology was pioneered many years ago by Lionel

Thornton in *The Incarnate Lord*, but Pittenger is not satisfied that Thornton pursued his line of thought to its logical, or rather its Christological, conclusion, since he left the incarnation standing as a divine action *ab extra* and failed to bring it into an integral relation with the operation of the Eternal Word in and through the organism of creation. Pittenger's view is that when Christology construes the incarnation as an intrusion from without, 'a divine rescue-expedition', the humanity of Christ is imperilled. The revelatory movement he insists, is all of one piece, and Christ is no divine intruder in humanity, but rather the man who actualises in human nature 'the potential God-man relationship which is the divinely intended truth about every man' (p. 285).

The above is only a bald summary of the argument, which is developed with vigour and circumspection. The book invites discussion at many points, of which three may be briefly indicated here; two relate to the 'catholic' side of the author's position, and the third to the 'modernist' side.

(1) Pittenger sees the incarnation, in terms of his conception of general and special revelation, as the *focus* of the revealing action of God in His creation. The resultant question, which he discusses at length, whether the presence and action of God in Christ differs in degree or in kind from His presence and action in other men, is perhaps less important than the question of the implications for Trinitarian theology. If the divinity of Christ means, as Pittenger affirms, that the very *being* of God is active in His human life, and yet Christ is not *exhaustive* of deity—if Christ is *totus deus* but not *totum dei*—can we resist the inference that the being of God is divisible?

(2) The question just raised suggests another, concerning the validity of Pittenger's appeal to Theodore of Mopsuestia as a defender of the true humanity of Christ against the tendency in the dominant Christology of his time to erode it. It is true that Theodore was critical of this tendency, but it was for quite a different reason from Pittenger's. In Pittenger's view, the orthodox Christology was vitiated by the persistent presupposition of a *gulf* between God and His creation, which left them entirely unrelated apart from Christ. But it was because he thought the gulf was not large enough that Theodore opposed it. Theodore's conception of 'the infinite qualitative difference' between the divine and the human, which he sometimes described in terms that are reminiscent of the early Barth, was such as to preclude any union of being between them, and to permit only a moral union, or conjunction, as he liked to call it.

(3) Pittenger's use of the process philosophy is exposed to the same difficulties as have beset all similar attempts to strike an

alliance between Christian theology and some particular philosophy. Either the chosen philosophy must be credited with a power to resist the obsolescence which seems to be built into all philosophies, or it is a philosophy which has been tailored to suit theology. Is the process philosophy the *philosophia perennis*? Professor Pittenger is convinced that, when the current 'veto' on metaphysics is removed and the perennial problems of metaphysics receive the attention they deserve, the process philosophy is the line which will have most attraction for thoughtful men. But, assuming the removal of the veto (perhaps a bold assumption), will thoughtful men be attracted to this way of thinking unless they share Professor Pittenger's theological presuppositions, if it is true, as he maintains—with some plausibility—that the process philosophy itself rests, to some extent, upon them?

Dr Pittenger, who is professor of Christian apologetics at the seminary of the Protestant Episcopal Church in New York, is one of the most prolific theological writers in America. This is his biggest, but not his best book. The development of the argument, which is 'spiral' rather than linear, makes for repetitiousness, and the book is overloaded with quotations, many of which support the position taken but do not add to the clarification of it. Nevertheless, the book presents a comprehensive and well considered statement which will be recognised as an important contribution to Christological thought.

GEORGE S. HENDRY

Jesus the Lord. By KARL HEIM. Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1959. Pp. 192. 18s.

Jesus the World's Perfecter. By KARL HEIM. Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1959. Pp. 234. 21s.

THESE are the second and the third volumes of Heim's *Christian Faith and Contemporary Thought.* The first, *God Transcendent,* has been available in English for some time. *Jesus the Lord* is a translation of the fourth German edition of *Jesus der Herr,* published in 1955. Heim has written a book on Christology in poignant and moving language which is strongly devotional and confessional in character. The book is filled with vivid illustrations and incidents which emphasise Heim's interest in speaking to the questions of his own generation. (See especially the story of the competitor, p. 113; the effect of tragedy, p. 131; the death of the old image of God, p. 186.) If Heim's book is confessional, it likewise contains an element of apologetic: it takes cognisance of the contemporary views of the world in natural science and seeks to show that theological statements do not conflict with the findings of natural science. Heim's intention is to show how the reality of the ego and the reality of the

personal God in fact belong to a 'dimension' which is different from that which is accessible to scientific investigation. The relationship among entities existing in the world is subject to a basic condition of polarity, which means that all distinctions within the world are conditioned by the alternations between rest and movement within the framework of causal connexion. Whereas the technical intellect approaches nature as an observer and looks at it objectively in order to establish the laws according to which it functions, there is another mode of knowing which lies beyond the range of scientific observation, and this knowledge of the ego, the inner life of the self, is different from anything that can be observed in the world of objects (p. 170). Further, the self exists by dint of distinguishing itself from and yet relating itself to the 'Thou' (p. 46). The encounter between I and Thou belongs to the non-objectifiable space to which the reality of the subject, the ego, belongs (p. 18). Heim utilises the concept of dimensionality, or supra-polar space, to indicate our awareness of being in which the whole structure of polarity is transcended. Heim's understanding of the nature of theological truth, his conception of polarity, and his distinction of the I-Thou relation from the I-it relation underlie and inform the whole development of his two volumes on Jesus Christ. His work shows the influence of such thinkers as Kierkegaard, Buber and Grisebach. There is much of personalistic existentialism in Heim, and it is by way of this approach that he leads up to Christology.

In this world man is so infected with sin that it is impossible for him to have direct knowledge of God. The very meaning of the Satanic is the rebellion against God which occurs within the depths of man's being. It is through the Word of God that the relationship between God and man is restored. '. . . There is for us no fellowship with God independent of and apart from the Word embodied in Christ through which He speaks to us' (p. 162). The meaning of the confession of Christ's Lordship is precisely that in Him we have the genuine Leader who embodies the authority of God. The contact that we may have with Jesus in faith Heim likens to the 'I-Thou' relationship which transcends all geographical and temporal distances. In this relationship Jesus becomes our contemporary. This contemporaneity is existential in character: it is related to the way in which the believer in faith decides to be a follower of Christ.

Heim does not clearly indicate the mode of union between God and man in Jesus Christ. He speaks of the paradox of the fact of God's revelation, since God exists in 'infinite qualitative' distinction from all finite being. And in his book *Christian Faith and Natural Science* (SCM and Harper, 1957) Heim says explicitly that we do not know God as He is in Himself but only God as He is for us (p. 164).

This raises the question whether for Heim God may not finally be different in Himself than in His disclosure in Christ.

D. M. Baillie in his *God Was in Christ* has noted that in *Jesus the Lord* Heim does not make much of 'the Jesus of history' as our guide (*God Was in Christ*, 1948, p. 104). In *Jesus the World's Perfecter*, a translation of the third German edition of *Jesus der Weltvollender*, published in 1952, we have a much fuller account of constitutive place of the words and deeds of Jesus. Heim's exegetical comments are often penetrating and highly illuminating. Jesus comes to exercise His authority through the fulfilment of His mission, wrought out in the midst of temptation and suffering. Jesus enters into the sphere of man's alienation and conflict with God. Jesus engages in conflict with the Satanic power which has rebelled against God. This conflict is not a result simply of human misunderstanding, nor is it accidental to Jesus' mission. Rather, Jesus wills this battle and its terrible and decisive character fills the whole of His life (p. 47). 'The removal of the confusion caused by the Satanic rebellion is . . . the ultimate meaning of Christ's mission on earth' (p. 61). Christ's baptism in the Jordan points forward to His baptism by blood (Luke 12.50). Christ's Person is known in His work of Atonement. Heim has some important things to say concerning theories of atonement in Abelard and Anselm (pp. 84-98) and concerning the use of sacrificial and juridical categories in expressing the meaning of Christ's work (pp. 111-13). He criticises those theologians who have avoided interpreting the life-work of Jesus as a battle with Satan (p. 72). Heim suggests that God remains the 'sole Subject' and 'sole Agency' of the atonement. He has not clarified sufficiently the relation between Jesus' human will and the divine in the act of atonement. He does speak of the 'wonderful relationship of two wills' in Jesus Christ (p. 77) but seems to think of the will of the Son as existing before the incarnation and hence, in some sense, belonging to His divinity rather than His humanity. Further, Heim suggests that Jesus' Sonship on earth represents a resignation of divine power which was resumed after His death (p. 160; see also *Jesus the Lord*, p. 159). But a view that God divests Himself of certain of His distinctively divine attributes makes it difficult to affirm that in Jesus Christ we have God and man in simultaneous union. There is a sense in which we can say that it is a manifestation of the freedom of God's omnipotence that without ceasing to be God He can enter into involvement and identification with the creature. (See Gregory of Nyssa, *Or. Cat.* 24.)

The resurrection is the moment of Christ's victory over the Satanic power. It signifies the completed character of Christ's work of the atonement, the inauguration of the new age. The

resurrection as Christ's enthronement and exaltation is on a different level from all other events and is no way an event belonging to the present order of time (p. 166). Heim's view of the super-historical character of the resurrection places little stress on the manner in which the historical memory and identification of Jesus of Nazareth shape the encounter of the disciples with the risen Lord. This is manifest in Heim's identification of the resurrection with the meaning of Christ's exaltation in glory and ascension to the Father (p. 214).

The Church exists between the time of Christ's passion and resurrection and the *parousia.* Heim is critical of an approach to eschatology which substitutes an ever-recurring crisis between time and eternity for the distinction between the present age and the age to come (p. 125). The expectation of the future manifestation of God's power as the consummation of all things is an indispensable part of the Church's faith. (See especially Heim's treatment of Mark 10.35ff, 14.25, 14.61-62 on pp. 130-1.) Heim's view invites us to take seriously the language of the Apocalypse which portrays the conflict between the exalted Christ and the kingdoms of this world. However, at the final consummation, Christ will hand over His authority to the Father. It is for the period between Jesus' earthly life and the *parousia* that we need Him as Leader. Heim interprets 1 Cor. 15.24-28 to mean that in the end, with the restoration and fulfilment of all things in God, Christ's mediation will cease. There is an exegesis of 1 Cor. 15.24-28 found, for example, in Augustine (*On the Trinity* I, chapters 8 and 10) which argues that this passage does not mean that Christ ceases as God and man to be the eternal Mediator, but rather that the relation between the Head and the Body will be perfected when the members of the Body participate fully in the glory of the Kingdom. In this way we may do justice to passages in the New Testament which speak of the eternal character of Christ's priesthood (Heb. 7.24) and royal dominion (Rev. 12.15). While Heim does not want to describe the *parousia* as the submerging of all things in a primordial unity, nevertheless he does believe the differentiation between subjects characteristic of the 'I-Thou' relationship will no longer exist. A further clarification of the distinction and relation between Creator and creature would strengthen Heim's Christology and doctrine of atonement. Heim's view of the restoration of all things in the immediacy of God's eternity still contains an element of *Identitätsmystik* in which any real distinction between God and man is overcome (pp. 138-9 and also *Jesus the Lord*, p. 27). To clarify the manner in which the creature continues to exist as a distinct mode of being over against God would have required a movement in Heim's own

theological method from a conception of polarity to a doctrine of analogy.

An index of scriptural references, authors cited, and subjects is needed for both these volumes. DANIEL DEEGAN

A Theology of Election. By JACÓB JOCZ. S.P.C.K. Pp. 226. 25s.

THE theological volume which most needs to be written for our time is on the Doctrine of Election. On this subject confusion is great. Some statements of it tend to shatter the very Doctrine of God Himself, and others reduce man to a creature wholly devoid of responsibility, while others expound views which are hardly distinguishable from fatalism.

A few years ago Professor H. H. Rowley opened up this controversial field again in *The Biblical Doctrine of Election.* The bulk of that book was given to an examination of the Old Testament evidence and it concluded with a chapter on the Christian Church as 'the heirs of election'. But the specifically theological tangles were scarcely touched. In Dr Jocz's book there is much the same emphasis; and these two books together present the necessary prolegomena to the deeper study that is yet to come.

The emphasis of biblical theology today is all along the line of election and its counterpart, eschatology. Dr Jocz possesses the qualities which are essential to a penetrating examination of the issues. He is an unusually competent biblical scholar and he is a Hebrew Christian. The two highest religions of the world are closely inter-related at this very point of Election, and that fact alone makes this doctrine one of the most crucial of all. Accordingly, this book is dealing with one of the very few Bible ideas which are of the very structure of the Bible.

The main theme is the dialogue between Church and Synagogue, and fully half the book is devoted to a study of the Old Testament in the perspective of that main theme. It is out of the concept of Election that the reasons arise which make Israel's history to be special history. The relationship of the Jewish people and the Christian Church in the modern world are examined, and it is truly said that 'the Gentile Church is in constant danger of forgetting her connexion with Israel. In her effort to avoid Jerusalem she finds herself anchored in strange places.' The special problem of the place of Hebrew Christians within the Christian community is considered. The better relationships which exist nowadays between Jew and Gentile are welcomed, but the conversion of the Jew is still called for; and Dr Jocz has some good pages on Paul's treatment of this in Rom. 9-11. Set over against this, it seems curious and almost inexplicable to find a recent outburst by Professor

Reinhold Niebuhr in which he argues that Christian missions to the Jews are wrong, on the grounds that they are futile and fruitless, that the two faiths are sufficiently alike for the Jew to find God without conversion, and that the symbol of Christ as the image of God is forever disfigured by the behaviour of Christians to Jews in the Christian era.

There is a tremendous fulness and vigour in the whole argument, and the text is supplemented by twenty-one pages of reference notes and four of bibliography. In a short final chapter on 'The Economy of Election', it is described as 'the Keynote of God's testament, his manifesto to mankind'. It is always sinners He elects, for there are none other to choose. But Grace prevails over Judgment, and so the author finishes on the note of universal restoration. 'Election to life is the Christian meaning of election. The road to it, on the plane of history, may lead through Judgment and Death, but at the end of the road is a loving Father waiting for the prodigal Son.'

Predestination is a mystery, 'heavily weighted with theological prejudice', he says. The book on this subject which still needs to be written would have to deal with the relation of omniscience to predestination on one hand, and on the other with the relationship of predestination and human responsibility. In Rom. 9 Paul grapples with this to him very bitter problem; and Professor C. H. Dodd says that the weak point in his argument is in the verses where he uses the analogy of the pot and its moulder. If Paul meant that to signify that man can be compared to an inanimate pot, it is a weak argument, for man is not a pot, but is and is meant to be an articulate person. But it is more likely that Paul chiefly intended to say that man can no more fully discern and understand the affairs of God's sovereign will than the clay can discern and understand what is in the mind and purpose of its human moulder. In other words, essential mystery must always overshadow any study that we make of this doctrine, as indeed of any doctrine. There can never be a merely logical way of stating it. We cannot see it at all from God's side, only from our own. GEORGE S. GUNN

Jung and St. Paul. By DAVID COX. Longmans, Green. Pp. 360. 32s.

THE first reaction to this really important book is that the title might have been reversed. In substance this is done in the explanatory sub-title, 'A Study of the Doctrine of Justification by Faith and its relation to the Concept of Individuation'. The author wrote the book when he was a curate, and he has certainly made a remarkable use of the time which he gave to work not directly concerned with the parish, in respect of which he cordially acknowledges the understanding of the people.

This is the author's first book, and it is to be commended for its thoroughness and clarity. Although it is easy and refreshing to read, it still requires a good deal of re-reading, especially for those who lack an exact familiarity with the language of psychology and psychotherapy. The argument has great positive worth, and it should be a specially helpful book for those inside the Church who have a measure of doubt as to the depth of the account which modern psychology gives of the conflicts and tensions of human nature, and who tend to suspect the methods of psychoanalysis.

A great deal has been written down the centuries expository of Paul's understanding of man's inner conflict in relation to God and his consequent dilemmas and defeats in conduct. Quite recently there has been an excellent study of this by W. David Stacey in *The Pauline View of Man*—a book which might well be considered as a companion volume to this one, and even at certain points as a corrective to it.

Within every man the self is tragically divided, and even enslaved. This indeed lies at the very core of the Scriptures, and the starting-point of all effective evangelism is the conviction that man is in bondage everywhere and that Jesus Christ can set him free. In this book we have discerning statements of the terms in which Jung and Paul understand the radical division within man and consequently of their varying interpretations of deliverance and salvation. The 'individuated man' of Jung is set over against the 'new man' of Paul. There is no trace in Mr Cox's argument of any doubt as to whether the conclusions reached by Jung have now been thoroughly established. On the other hand, Mr Cox is a penetrating exegete of the epistles of Paul, especially Romans. He is not attempting to demonstrate the superiority of the one over the other, and the candid reader will gratefully acknowledge that what Paul has to say is often illuminated by what Jung has to say. But, does Jung believe in God in the full sense that Paul does?

It is evident from the Preface that Mr Cox has undertaken this study partly as an attempt to even up a lop-sided situation. Up till now the greater part of the work of correlating Christian theology and psychology has been done by the professional psychologists. He himself is not a psychologist, but he is well read in the subject, and he approaches it from the theologian's angle. The build-up of the book is very deliberate—a chapter dealing with theological assertions followed by a chapter dealing with psychological assertions. The comparison which runs through the book is most dominant in the final chapter on Christ.

The chapter which raises most questions for the Christian reader is the one on penitence, in which the argument is advanced that it is

by penitence rather than by faith that we are justified, because faith is too man-centred. It could be held that penitence is equally man-centred. John Wesley declared that 'repentance is the vestibule to Christianity, faith is the door'. This is a matter in which the sharp, false antithesis is to be avoided. Penitence and faith have been joined together by God, and it is not for man to put them asunder. 'Repent and believe the Gospel' is the appeal made by Christ in His first sermon—Mark 1.14-15. Faith is at least stirring when a man repents. Repentance opens every closed door and, as they open, faith increases and deepens. GEORGE S. GUNN

Facts and Obligations. By DOROTHY EMMET. Friends of Dr Williams's Library Twelfth Lecture, 1958. Published by the Dr Williams's Trust, 1958. Pp. 20. 3s. 6d.

IT has become almost a dogma in modern philosophy that statements of value cannot be deduced from statements of fact, or, as Professor Emmet puts it, that 'no conclusion as to what ought or ought not to be done can be validly inferred from a set of premisses which does not at least contain one term which states, indicates, or implies that actions of a certain kind ought or ought not to be done'. She examines certain instances where an obligation seems to be deduced from facts to see (i) whether the 'facts' are merely factual and (ii) what kind of 'ought' is to be found in the conclusions and finally (iii) what kind of transition is effected.

Even the prudential 'ought' of hypothetical imperatives does not follow simply from statements of fact, and so Professor Emmet argues that the formal point is sound, that value judgments cannot be deduced from purely factual statements. Having said this, however, she then raises the very pertinent question whether bare factual statements can in practice be sharply distinguished from valuationally loaded statements. So-called 'social facts', she claims, must be described as statements about people occupying various roles, and this notion provides a link between the factual descriptions and moral decisions. Professor Emmet seems then to suggest that the logic of moral statements is like the contract theory of political obligation. Would it still be possible to create moral standards and principles? The answer is doubtful. Nevertheless her final example, that of religious ethics, is well chosen; for here, if anywhere, the statements of obligation do not follow from valuationally neutral statements of fact, and Professor Emmet's discussion is very valuable. One of the most significant things about the whole lecture is the earnestness of its approach to ethics which seems a sufficient refutation of the purely theoretical view of ethics.

J. HEYWOOD THOMAS

The Hebrew Bible. The Law, the Prophets and the Writings. Edited by N. H. Snaith. British and Foreign Bible Society, London, 1958. 17s. 6d.

The problems of the Massoretic text are very technical and minute, and only some more general things will be said here. This is a new text of the Hebrew Bible which is to replace the old Letteris edition as the Bible Society's normal edition. Like the latter, it intends to present only the Massoretic text, giving no reference to LXX or other versions, still less to learned emendations; and thus it does not duplicate the purpose of Kittel's *Biblia Hebraica*. The new edition marks an advance most distinctly in the excellence of its type, which is much clearer than that of either Letteris or Kittel. The letter *samekh*, for example, cannot be confused with the final *mem* by the inexperienced reader as it easily can in Kittel.

Two serious objections must, however, be made. One is the lack of a preface explaining what the editor's methods and intentions were. The Bible Society has just published such a preface for its new text of the Greek New Testament, and one cannot see why it was not done here. All that the reviewer has seen about the methods of the edition consists of a brief notice in *Vetus Testamentum* VII (1957), pp. 207-8, and a three-page folder issued by the publishers to announce the edition. Dr Snaith believes that his edition represents the true Ben Asher text. What we want to know is the reasoning by which he concludes that his text, taken from certain MSS. of Spanish origin and mainly in the British Museum, is in fact a pure representative of the work of the Ben Asher family, and in particular why more so than many MSS. known which are of earlier date.

Dr Snaith notes that his edition comes very close to the text prepared by Kahle for the Kittel Bible, which is from a much earlier MS. and is also claimed to be the work of the Ben Asher family. But the agreement of Snaith and Kahle is not as close as all that. For example, the little sign called *metheg*, a sort of vowel-emphasiser, is distributed very differently in the two texts, as any random comparison will show. The man who in A.D. 1008 wrote the Leningrad MS. which is the basis of Kahle's text did not know the rules for *metheg*, as Davidson's Grammar states them, nearly so well as the scribes followed by Snaith. A matter of minute detail no doubt, but all Massoretic matters are. Snaith's text has at Lev. 6.11 a reading (*yokh^{e}lennah*) which is known to be supported by the rival Ben Naphtali school of Massoretes; another (*kir'oth* with *daghesh*) will be found at Esther 5.2; similar cases of difference may be noted at Ps. 45.10, 1 Kings 1.1, Job 26.13, 36.18.

When we go beyond the consonantal text and consider the pro-

nunciation, the details of vocalisation and accentuation, there is no text we can call absolutely 'the true' Massoretic text. Ben Asher no more had 'the true' text than the Ben Naphtali family. A moment's look at a text like the Codex Reuchlinianus shows what wide differences in pointing there were. Different generations of the Ben Asher family showed slight differences among themselves, as Kahle has pointed out. This is why a preface and explanation is needed; not because it can prove the closeness of the text to an ideal (and probably imaginary) text, but because it can explain what stage and form of a gradually changing tradition is here exhibited.

The other serious objection to this edition is the large number of misprints, which I have noticed especially, curiously enough, in the consonants. The confusion of *he* and *ḥeth* is especially prominent. It seems to me essential that these be corrected before this edition goes too far. Once this has been done it may be of considerable value. The following list of mistakes may be of help to a corrector: Gen. 2.7; 34.21; 41.14, 36; Lev. 1.17; 2.10; 2.11 (two errors); 4.28; 5.5; 7.5; 10.19; Num. 16.18; Judges 5.2; 1 Kings 1.17, 31; 5.17 (margin); Isa. 1.9; 4.5; 45.10; Amos 7.11, 15; 8.9; Zech. 3.5; Lam. 1.2; Dan. 2.7; 1 Chron. 24.16; 2 Chron. 10.2; 14.2. These were noted only in random reading of a few chapters, and I fear there are many more.

JAMES BARR

A Journey through the Old Testament. By M. A. BEEK. Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1959. Pp. 244. 21s.

THIS book by Professor Beek, translated into English from the Dutch by Arnold J. Pomerans, is no more than it claims—a journey, in which certain episodes on the way are worth recording in an easy, pleasing style. So it reads in this English translation of a larger Dutch work first published in 1953, which itself was the outcome of broadcast talks to show how 'exciting a book the Bible really is'. The book is packed with critical scholarly opinions deftly woven into the story. Happily there are no footnotes to distract from the Canterbury Tales atmosphere of the episodes, whether of Abraham's Sacrifice, Jephthah's Vows or Ezra's Task.

Professor Beek does not fashion the material into a Theology. How can he, when he says, at the end of the chapter entitled 'God's Call to Moses', that 'I AM THAT I AM' may be translated as 'What is this to you?' God has refused to divulge His name; Moses had to submit to the Call.

Yet the treatment of the The Lord's Faithful Servant in the chapter of this title is a skilful linking of the New Testament outlook on the Servant with the familiar Second Isaiah passages. Professor

Beek says he is 'inclined to believe that Isaiah was not thinking of any one servant in particular, but of all the true servants of the Lord' (p. 161). The roots of the Christian message 'lie embedded in Isaiah's visions whose scope was so wide' (p. 162).

The last section, entitled 'The Wording of Holy Writ', is a little journey on the themes of the Bible itself, the manuscripts, the translation, and the Word made Flesh—fragments, rather, at the end of the journey which was pleasant, if not exciting!

R. A. BARCLAY

St. John the Baptist and the Desert Tradition. By JEAN STEINMANN. Longmans. 6s.

IT is an astonishing and lamentable fact that no book on John the Baptist has been published in Britain this century. Carl Kraeling's study has appeared in America, but for the rest it is a question of reading French or German. Moreover, all these have now been rendered out of date by the evidence from Qumran. It is a merit of M. Steinmann's little book, translated from the French, that he insists on placing the Baptist not only very fully in this new setting but in the context also of the whole history of desert spirituality down to the present day. At times one may feel that the connecting links are too confidently drawn, and indeed the asceticism of the wilderness can only be fitted into the main stream of Christianity with a certain stretching of the lines. But for a popular book the treatment is admirable. It goes to the original sources, it is informative and accurate. And when we have spoken of the letter-press only the half is told. For the book is crammed with the most excellent and at times moving photographs, which tell more clearly than any words the eery fascination of the Judaean wilderness and the haunting effect which its greatest figure has ever since exercised on Christian art. If the rest of Longmans' 'Men of Wisdom' books are as good, they are remarkable value for 6s.

JOHN A. T. ROBINSON

The Pauline Epistles: Their Meaning and Message. By JAMES T. HUDSON. James Clarke. Pp. 326. 21s.

IT may sometimes be asked if yet another translation of Paul is really necessary in this country. Doubtless it is true that readers who are able to check the translation by reference to the original text will find that each translation has its own light to shed upon the text. Other readers may well be confused by so many renderings. A far more urgent task is the translation of the New Testament and in time of the Bible into some more of the hundreds of languages that do not yet have it at all, but that calls for experts, and they are not too numerous.

Nevertheless, students of Paul would do well to have this book beside them. The cordial commendation given to it by Professor G. H. C. Macgregor is amply deserved. It is a fascinatingly unusual book, in certain respects a unique book; and much detailed, scholarly work has gone into its production.

Mr Hudson, a graduate in Arts and Divinity, is Resident Tutor in Caenwood College, Kingston, Jamaica. In fifty-five compact pages, he gives an account of the letters in their sequence and follows this by a brief chapter on Paul's theology. This is all good summary for those who have access to further study, but otherwise it may be misleading. He gives priority in time to 2 Thessalonians, and his dating of Ephesians is unusual, while he regards it as certain that Paul did not write the Pastoral Epistles, thus accepting Harrison's view as unchallengeable, and arguing that these epistles are by a great admirer of Paul.

The bulk of the book is a translation of the thirteen epistles, with certain words incorporated in brackets to make clearer the connexion of thought. The translation occupies fully half of each page on the right, while on the left there is an analysis of the thought of the verses which stand opposite. This is undoubtedly a helpful arrangement for the reader. Some of the phrases are very telling, e.g. 'to be tightly retained' (Phil. 2.6), 'your sweet reasonableness' (Phil. 4.5), but 'he nonsuited sin' (Rom. 8.3) is not so successful.

GEORGE S. GUNN

Hebrews and the Scriptures. By F. C. SYNGE. S.P.C.K., London, 1959. Pp. vii + 64. 7s. 6d.

IN describing this work by the Principal of Christchurch College, New Zealand, we need to make use of the White Knight's distinction between what the book is called and what the book really is. The title of the book denotes the author's primary purpose as explained in his introduction, an attempt to derive from the use of the Old Testament in the Epistle to the Hebrews guidance in his own use of the Old Testament. This topic is discussed, in fact, in the last chapter of the book only, all too briefly and without any very detailed reference to the epistle. The author argues that, although the writer of Hebrews is a 'Verbal Inspirationist', his strength lies in his understanding of the Old Testament as a book of the Promises of God which are now 'made flesh' in Christ (a principle which, in passing, is stated categorically to be the correct interpretation of John 1.1-14). To this principle our use of biblical criticism must be subject. The clergy are urged to expound the Old Testament in this light and thus to link their exposition of the New Testament with it. In this way, he believes, the relevance of the Old Testament

will become more readily apparent to the modern congregation.

The book really is an exposition of the epistle, undertaken indeed in connexion with this primary task but not very explicitly linked with it. The author lingers from time to time to argue a variety of points with Westcott and Moffatt, on which commentators he seems mainly dependent. The whole of this is confessedly a secondary development and it seems a pity that the author did not set out his opinions in a more formal manner and separate them from his other argument, which is quite distinct. As it is, these chapters read like a series of badly executed lecture-sermons for informed laymen or not so well informed clergy. Dogmatic assertions on complex issues are not infrequent (see the remarks on John 1 referred to above); there are new renderings suggested for some passages, not always felicitous (e.g. of Heb. 2.3, *ἀρχὴν λαβοῦσα λαλεῖσθαι διὰ τοῦ Κυρίου*, 'which was to begin with spoken of in the scriptures through the Lord Jehovah . . .'); and there are other lapses of style in many places e.g. 'Now he can expound Ps. 110 to his heart's content squeezing everything possible out of the fact . . .' (p. 233), and 'If one hitches one's wagon to evolution it is difficult to assert the finality of Christ' (p. 60).

While certain chapters might well have been developed into interesting and original articles (such as those on Faith and on the date of the epistle), there seems to be little justification for the book in either of its purposes as here carried out. It cannot even claim the justifying feature of popularisation since recent work on the epistle by such scholars as Spicq, Héring, Käsemann, William Manson, Michel and Zuntz (to mention but few) finds no mention whatever. At a time when there are so many full and satisfying books on Hebrews and not a few on the problems of the use of the Old Testament there is little need for one so inchoate.

J. Neville Birdsall

Westcott as Commentator. By C. K. Barrett. C.U.P., 1959. Pp. 26. 3s. 6d.

The Bishop Westcott Memorial Lecture of 1958 was delivered in the Divinity School at Cambridge by Dr C. K. Barrett, Professor of Divinity in the University of Durham, under the title: 'Westcott as Commentator'. It is a warm and yet discerning appreciation of one who is today perhaps best remembered as co-editor of the famous Westcott and Hort Text of the Greek New Testament, but well-known also as the author of outstanding commentaries on the Gospel and also the Epistles of St. John, on the Epistle to the Ephesians and the Epistle to the Hebrews.

Dr Barrett pays high tribute not only to the accurate and de-

tailed linguistic scholarship in these books, but also to the author's deep devotion to the Bible as the Word of God, and 'his readiness, or rather his determination, to hear, faithfully and obediently, whatever should be spoken through the written word'.

The lecture reveals the plans laid by Lightfoot, Westcott and Hort to write commentaries to cover the whole range of the books of the New Testament (plans not destined to be fulfilled), and also Westcott's misgivings about Hort's insistence that he should be allowed to bring unfettered inquiry to his study of the New Testament. Hort indeed refused to proceed to his task under 'an obligation to produce results of a predetermined colour'. Westcott, however, wanted to be assured that the Bible would be proved free from error.

We read too of Westcott's serious objection to Jowett's assertion, in *Essays and Reviews*, 'that any true doctrine of inspiration must conform to all well-ascertained facts of history or science', as well as to his rather slighting reference to Westcott's own detailed verbal studies as inappropriate to the colloquial style of the New Testament.

Dr Barrett recognises, however, the enduring value of many of these verbal studies, and testifies to Westcott's vast knowledge of patristic writers, while doubting the wisdom of his rejection of the human element in Scripture. He reminds us that 'Scripture is not authenticated as the Word of God by the denial that the Divine Word is spoken through a variety of human words'.

C. L. Mitton

The Greek East and the Latin West. A Study in the Christian Tradition. By Philip Sherrard. O.U.P., 1959. Pp. 202. 25s.

Dr Sherrard's book is probably of great importance. Its usefulness would have been greater and its importance more evident if it had been written in better English. The sentences are so badly constructed that each one has to be read three or four times before its meaning begins to emerge: and often enough a sentence difficult in itself is repeated and expounded in a series of sentences even more obscure. Words such as 'apophatic' and 'cataphatic' are unnecessary importations into English, as the author admits by conjoining them with 'negative' and 'positive': even Aristotle, their inventor, used them only sparingly, and no other Greek writer seems to have accepted them. Dr Sherrard invariably uses 'Essence' as a translation of *ousia*: the word is misleading, and is far less intelligible than 'substance', which has served this purpose for seventeen centuries and is well understood.

The purpose of the work is to trace the division of Christendom into Greek East and Latin West away beyond its historical mani-

festations into its theological and philosophical origins. The study proceeds, the author says, from an *a priori* acceptance of principles of a 'non-historical' order, and uses these to interpret evidence which in itself is inadequate for a real understanding of the subject. Such a claim (or admission) is no doubt designed to meet the frequently recurring objection of the reader who requires speculation to have some basis in fact, and whose mental comment over and again while reading this book is *Non sequitur*. In the *Filioque* question are involved 'two "world-views", and it is only the acceptance by western Europe of one rather than the other of those views that has made possible the conception, and setting up, some thousand years later, of such an organisation as that of the United Nations'. If this is true, as perhaps it is, it is of the highest importance: yet it must be said that unless the obscurity of the writer's language has dulled the reader's intelligence, neither the *Filioque* clause nor the developments of modern international politics are really shown to depend on the western as opposed to the eastern, the Latin as opposed to the Greek, doctrine of God and of creation: the argument, if there is one, is *per saltum*, and need amount to no more than an *a posteriori* interpretation of historical facts in the light of preconceived ideas. Moreover it sounds impressive, but it is no more than one side of the truth, to say that 'although it may offend human presumption, things are what they are, and the consequences of them will be what they will be, quite apart from whether individuals happen to recognise it or not'.

In spite of such criticisms, the impression remains that this is an important book, and that those who have the patience to read it will be compelled to challenge their own preconceptions at the same time as they severely question Dr Sherrard's presuppositions and his use of his data. Part one, in four chapters, on Christianity and Christendom, discusses the Roman background, the form of Christianity, the division of Christendom, and the differing conceptions of *sacerdotium* and *regnum* in the Greek East and the Latin West. It appears, or it is made to appear, that in Constantinople the relation of the Patriarchate to the imperial court was of such a form that the Patriarchate never laid claim to secular power, and found no eventual difficulty in submitting to Ottoman rule: in the West, the Papacy was continually laying claim to the obedience of secular princes. Much of Dr Sherrard's argument is designed to show, first, that these different points of view had their origin in differing conceptions of the doctrine of God and of creation: and, secondly, that they explain on the one hand the roots of modern democracy, and on the other hand the eastern submission to autocracy, emancipation from which (it is suggested) has been by no means a

boon. So the second part of the work, on the Dissolving Order, discusses the Platonic reaction in the Greek East and the transition from theology to philosophy in the Latin West, with their non-Christian sequel in both East and West in modern times. Here too are important suggestions which, perhaps only because they are so unusual, give the impression of being assumed consequences rather than proved conclusions.

Dr Sherrard refers to a number of writers whose works are well known, and to others who are rarely heard of. His knowledge of late-medieval and modern Greek literature is impressive. His verbal quotations are few in number, so that it becomes difficult (for a reader with limited access to libraries) to check his interpretations of his texts. It may not matter much that he regards the Epistle to the Hebrews as the work of St. Paul, for the writer of it was at least St. Paul's disciple: it may matter rather more that he gives no indication of not regarding 'Dionysius the Areopagite' as a first-century writer. The discussion, in chapter two, of the theology of the Greek Fathers and of their Byzantine successors raises serious questions: for if the data (which are sparsely given) and the conclusions reached are true, it would seem that the Greeks were almost without exception afflicted with a kind of Sabellian pantheism, thinking of the Divine as an expansive impersonal principle (here commonly referred to as the divine Essence) lying behind the three divine Hypostases. 'According to His Essence He is totally transcendent, deprived of every relationship and of all manifestation, even that of His own Being' (p. 37): and again (p. 42), 'Creation is the living body of the Logos, a "sensible God made in the image of the intelligible" '. Such speculations as this, we have to say it, are fundamentally unscriptural and therefore unchristian. Dr Sherrard regularly refers to the Holy Spirit as 'It', observing in a footnote that *pneuma* is neuter gender: he seems unaware that neither in Greek nor in several other languages does the neuter gender imply any denial of personality. It is further suggested that this Greek conception of the deity necessarily involves a denial of the double procession, while the Latin conception of God as essentially personal, and a voluntary Creator, demands the acceptance of that doctrine: but the argument is so abstruse that one confesses one's inability to follow it. If this reading of the thought of the Greek theologians is true, it will call for a revolution in our estimate of them, with either the reluctant acceptance or the peremptory rejection of their fundamental ideas. It seems as if Dr Sherrard would advise acceptance: but he will need to write clearer English if we are to be sure that we follow his thought.

E. Evans

Woman in the Church. By Russell C. Prohl. Eerdmans. Pp. 80. $2.00.

The author is a pastor of the Lutheran Church in Texas, and he acknowledges the kindness of his congregation in relieving him of pastoral duties to pursue this study. A bibliography of four pages reveals that he is familiar with a big range of literature on the subject and on the necessary background material.

'What is the God-pleasing status of woman in the Church?' That is the question Mr Prohl sets out to answer, and he reckons it a question of major importance. To begin with, he accepts the view of Brunner that Redemption in Christ transcends the inequality of the order of Creation. He examines the passages in 1 Cor. 11.2-16, 1 Cor. 14.34-35, 1 Tim. 2.8-15, which appear to restrict the activity of woman in the Church. This is followed by a discussion of Gen. 1, 2 and 3—and, in the light of this, further examination is made of the significance of the practice of the early Church. His conclusions are that, while there is a law of creation which makes the husband the head of the wife, there is no law of creation which makes man the head of the woman; and that the apostolic restrictions were not intended to establish a patriarchal system in the Church for all time, but were a necessary safeguard for woman in the conditions of the time, but have no longer anything to do with her status in the Church. Accordingly, he calls on the Lutheran Church in America to support the Presbyterian Church in the position that 'there is no theological ground for denying ordination to women, simply because they are women'.

The argument is clear and forceful. As the book is brief, it would need to be supplemented by such books as *Women in the Church* by F. D. Bacon, *The Services and Status of Women in the Churches* by Kathleen Bliss, and *The Ordination of Women to the Priesthood* by M. E. Thrall (this being quite the ablest book so far). The discussion of this issue will proceed, for a long time, and therefore what is most needed is a really good book setting forth what may be the reasons in doctrine against the ordination of women. This has been dealt with in articles none so easy to obtain, and in books like Mrs F. C. Blomfield's *Wonderful Order* and Dr F. Zerbst's *The Office of Women in the Church*, but these do not compare favourably with a book like Miss Thrall's. Nearly all the best writing is on one side so far, and that is not profitable for the discussion.

George S. Gunn

The Riddle of Roman Catholicism. By Jaroslav Pelikan. Abingdon Press, Nashville, Tenn., 1959. Pp. 272. $4.00.

This timely work embodies both the assets and the weaknesses of

American theology. Coupled with its winning of the well-known Abingdon Award, the importance of its theme has earned attention for it even beyond the confines of the United States. And considered in itself, Pelikan's book has the virtue of being entertainingly written, with a genial style and colourful use of illustration. It is offered both to the laity for 'information and interpretation' (13) and to theologians of both confessions 'in order to clarify our real differences' (219). In addition to its readability, it shows a thorough acquaintance with the sources, accuracy in historical data, a justified attack on obscurantism and prejudice, and numerous suggestions for increasing the sociological relevance and theological communicability of both Roman Catholicism and Protestantism.

Three major sections treat (1) the evolution, (2) the genius, and (3) the theological significance of Roman Catholicism. A score of variations reiterates one thematic polarity: 'The genius of Roman Catholicism is the unique way it has found in the modern world of combining universality and identity' (172). The following polarities are typical: Catholicism represents universality, the Reformation, identity (50, 185). Theology involves defence (protecting universality) and definition (maintaining identity) (29). It must do 'equal justice' to both 'general human thought and culture' and divine revelation (144), to synthesis and diastasis (160), to culture and cultus (165), to life and liturgy (167). Precisely the greatness of Thomism was its union of intellect and faith (145), of free will and predestination (146), of nature and grace (147) in what Tillich calls an 'answering theology'. Even Mariology partially helps to balance theology, protecting both 'the world of nature' and 'the lordship and the otherness of God' (134), just as the feminine element softens 'an over-emphasis upon the prophetic element' of the austerity of God (139). An ecumenical approach to Roman Catholicism must be both realistic and faithful to the Bible (176), both comprehensive and Christian (227).

The unity we seek is therefore in political theory 'the pluralistic standard of "a catholic church and many other churches in a single secular state" ' (108), in ecclesiology that apostolicity which 'none can have until everyone shares what he has and accepts what the others have' (188), and in theology the great line of Thomas Aquinas, Schleiermacher and Tillich. Protestantism has been making progress toward this goal, and even if it sometimes seems reluctant, the staying power of Roman Catholicism proves that 'Protestants had better give up the hope of ever converting all Roman Catholics to a Protestant point of view' (175). The riddle of Roman Catholicism, on the other hand, is its intransigent opposition to 'a society that is both pluralistic and democratic'

(108) and its failure to see that 'the only way to recover universality is by acknowledging some sort of legitimacy in both Protestantism and modern culture.' (71).

Unfortunately, however, Pelikan's system typifies also the weakness of American theology. What is lacking is any acknowledgment of the two distinct ways in which ecumenism is today being carried on. The first is Pelikan's 'middle way' which he finds in both Thomism and liberal Protestantism (153). The 'tragic' Reformation its rabid polemic and doctrinal extremes on both sides, is supposedly rooted in mutual misunderstanding. The 'universality and identity' shared by each confession must be emphasised and the doctrinal antitheses de-emphasised. The other way of ecumenism, of which Pelikan seems oblivious, believes that, if both sides take their doctrines seriously and carry them to their logical conclusions, one position will be proved right, the other intolerable. From this point of view, the Reformation was an astoundingly accurate understanding of the tendencies of papal doctrine, and if the Reformers could see the later development, Molinism reigning alongside Thomism, papal infallibility, the past century of Mariology, they would be more convinced than ever of the rightness of their conclusions.

The first and classic way of Liberalism may undoubtedly be defended, but only if the necessity of defence is acknowledged. Nineteenth-century speculation, blossoming into the history of religions, ran riot with such polarities as 'Roman subjectivity—Protestant objectivity' (Baur), 'finite purpose—absolute religion' (Hegel), 'legality—faith as value judgment' (Ritschl), 'external Church—saving truth' (Luthardt), all the way to Tillich's 'heteronomy—autonomy'. Kattenbusch, an expert in such morphology (Eastern Church as cult, Rome as sovereignty, Protestantism as *Weltanschauung*), stated the matter precisely: 'It was a great progress in historical understanding, when in the age of Rationalism people ceased judging the confessions by the details of their dogma and began to conceive each one as an entirety in itself and to inquire into its "spirit", "principle", "essence", or "basic article".' While 'dogma' has its criterion beyond itself, in its object, the 'spirit' or 'principle' of Protestantism or any other confession is obviously its own object. *Kulturprotestantismus* may stand at the peak of the various 'stages' of religion, but it cannot call (or be called by) any of the more primitive 'revelations' radically in question. Nevertheless, at least this Liberalism, like that of W. von Loewenich (*Der moderne Katholizismus*), knew more or less where it stood and what it was rejecting. But Pelikan, though editor of the impressive new *Luther's Works* and a bright hope of American Lutheranism,

never whispers that there might be a difference of opinion between Luther and Schleiermacher. Naturally he also makes no practical distinction between Modernism in its newer forms and official Roman doctrine.

If the second way of the Reformation and Trent may be permitted as a criterion, the situation becomes immediately grave. The Reformation 'only' (*sola fides*, *sola scriptura*, *sola gratia*, *solus Christus*) and Rome's 'also' (good works, tradition, merit, Mary) are never seriously discussed. Pelikan's irenic reference to tradition in Protestant *Formgeschichte* and increasing biblical study among Roman Catholics, even if this at all affects the doctrines of authority, would signify exactly Trent's 'Bible *and* tradition'. And as if Rome's single authoritative tradition were insufficient, Pelikan even suggests devices for conserving the 'richness and variety' of 'the several Protestant traditions' (235). As to the sacraments, we need only follow Schleiermacher and abjure both 'magic' and 'bare sign', or 'superstition and rationalism' (236). Another optimistic generalisation is the claim that both confessions have 'one point of agreement' in 'the concrete statement, "The Church is unholy" ' (183). Concerning Mariology, its naïve paganism is not in itself reprehensible, but only its systematisation in dogma and 'merchandised' cult (140). And after all, as Pelikan asks at the close of the book, 'what is the basic difference between the assumption of Mary and the ideas about the ascension of Enoch and of Elijah that formed part of orthodox Protestant theology for centuries and still belong to the faith of many believers?' (239).

So the unsolved problem, which Pelikan never sees as a problem, remains the traditional one of Canon and Church, Scripture and Tradition, the Word of God and the word of man. At times Pelikan seems to favour *sola scriptura*, but he never hesitates to hurry back to the sure ground of revelation *and* culture, etc. The Protestant must only become more 'universal', the Roman Catholic more 'identical'. Of course (as is not mentioned) Tillich might mean 'the end of the Protestant era' in earnest. But suppose this whole philosophical fashion of considering Roman Catholicism dispenses with earnestness, because the 'riddle' is already solved dialectically from the beginning? Then a better point of departure for ecumenism might be the genuinely catholic rule of Augustine (which Karl Barth long ago recommended for Tillich's further meditation): 'In ecclesia non valet: hoc ego dico, hoc tu dicis, hoc ille dicit, sed: haec dicit Dominus.'

GROVER E. FOLEY

Studies on Baptism. Edited by JAMES GRAY. Berean Press, Birmingham, 1959. Pp. 58. 2s. 6d.

THIS little book has been produced by the members of the Union Committee of the Churches of Christ, and is the fruit of two or three years' study of recent work on Baptism by scholars of other traditions. Its aim is to help members of the Churches of Christ to assess what is being thought in other denominations, and also to make some contribution to ecumenical thinking. The general lay-out of the book suggests comparison with *Christian Baptism*, edited by A. Gilmore, but the chapters are shorter and more popular and the book as a whole contains less that is worthy of the attention of the readers of this Journal.

The only exceptions to this that I have noted are (1) the admission by Mr Baker of 'the inescapable fact of the continuation of Jewish covenant and family ideas' in the New Testament, and his further statement: 'In some way, little children would certainly benefit from their parents' baptism. In some way, according to our Lord's teaching and behaviour, little children are already of the Kingdom of God.' This admission is intrinsically destructive of the whole understanding of the Church that is characteristic of believer-baptists. (2) I am also glad to find Mr Mander moving in the right direction from the characteristic Baptist subjective interpretation of Baptism when he says: 'In baptism something decisive is done by God in Christ. It becomes operative when the believer becomes identified with these "mighty acts of God" and appropriates for himself the gift of salvation.' (3) In the last chapter, for which Mr Baker and Mr Gray are jointly responsible, there is a recognition that recent studies by other bodies, such as the Church of Scotland, have brought out more of the fulness of Baptism as it is seen and expounded in the New Testament than has been prominent in the teaching of believer-baptists. It is not surprising to find also a recognition that infant Baptism does meet a real need on the part of parents, but it is even more encouraging to find the recognition that the Damascus Road pattern is not that which is most frequently followed in the religious experience of children born into believing homes. 'This type of experience is much more of a growing into the Church than a new birth, much more gradual than sudden, quiet rather than catastrophic.' There is also an honest admission that not infrequently people have a conversion experience long after being baptised.

The Churches of Christ had their origin in an attempt to abolish the characteristics of separate denominations, and to provide a broad basis upon which Christians of many traditions might unite. Though the judgment of history may be that the method they

adopted was mistaken, since it has in fact simply led to the addition of yet another denomination to the multiplicity which obscures the unity of the Church, members of this body have often shown a broader and more ecumenical spirit than characterises other bodies which practise only believers' Baptism. It is therefore a real disappointment to find in this little book so little recognition of the strength of the arguments against their own position which have been published in recent years, and so much mere re-assertion of the mistaken position which their leaders adopted a century and a half ago.

JOHN HERON

Die Heidenmission in der Zukunftsschau Jesu. By D. BOSCH. Zwingli-Verlag, Zürich, 1959, Pp. 216. DM.19.

IN the considerable literature now appearing on the theology of mission, this book will take a worthy place. It is a notable addition to the series of *Abhandlungen zur Theologie des Alten und Neuen Testaments* edited by W. Eichrodt and O. Cullmann. Its merit lies in its clear understanding that a theology of mission can be constructed only on the basis of the most careful and thorough-going biblical exposition. The result is a book which makes a real contribution not only to missionary strategy but also to Synoptic exegesis.

Too often in the past missionary theology has tended to be one-sided in its emphasis. Thus, when the Kingdom of God was being interpreted in terms of the divine sovereignty over the lives of individual believers and the Kingdom was thought of simply as the sum-total of the converted, the missionary motive was predominantly pietistic. Again, when the social Gospel movement was looking to the creation of a better world through the efforts of a religious-ethical humanitarianism, and hoped to establish the Kingdom on earth by working the command of universal brotherhood into the texture of civilisation ('co-operate with God in building the Kingdom' was the un-biblical slogan), the motive was largely religious-social. On the other hand, when the coming of the Kingdom was thought of only as a future event away beyond human ken at the end of the world, the motive was futurist-eschatological—though sometimes it was believed that missionary activity could condition and speed up the ultimate dramatic *dénouement.* All such view-points, as Dr Bosch shows, fail in some degree to do justice to the New Testament *kerygma*, according to which God's rule is both present and future, both inaugurated in the Christ-event and to this extent realised within history, and destined to be consummated in the fulness of the ages, a time which is known to God alone.

How far did the Gentile mission enter the thoughts and intention

of Jesus during His earthly ministry? This is the specific problem Dr Bosch sets himself to explore. Harnack, in his *Mission and Expansion of Christianity*, almost gave the impression that the mission to the Gentiles lay out beyond Jesus' horizon altogether and came into view only later; and the same position has characterised those theologies which interpret Jesus as a thoroughgoing apocalyptist heralding an imminent end. Dr Bosch's own position on the matter approximates much more closely to that of Jeremias and Cullmann, to whom he acknowledges his indebtedness. Cullmann's article '*Le caractère eschatologique du devoir missionaire*' (in the *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses*, 1936) marked a new stage in the advance towards a truly biblical theology of mission. Incidentally, while Dr Bosch quotes both Munck and Fridrichsen, it is surprising that he has not made greater use of such important work; and John Wick Bowman's *The Intention of Jesus*, which is right along the line of his own thesis, he ignores altogether. Moreover, to my thinking he is a little less than just to the position of C. H. Dodd, whose views on eschatology have not stayed static since he wrote *The Parables of the Kingdom* in 1935 and *The Apostolic Preaching* in 1936.

Dr Bosch approaches the fact of the Gentile mission from the crucial point—the teaching of Jesus Himself. It is a relief to find a writer who, while taking full account of the developments of form criticism, realises the futility of an exegesis which loses the figure of Jesus behind a mass of *Gemeindetheologie*. Jesus in His life and death, so runs the author's argument, was united with the people of Israel. They were His overmastering conern: to them His mission was directed. But this deliberate concentration, this apparent narrowing of the sphere, can be understood only in the light of God's wider purpose; all the time Jesus was conducting His mission to Israel, the way was being prepared for the world mission that was to come. Historically, the proclamation of the Kingdom of God was made first to the Jews: and this priority—'beginning from Jerusalem'—remains, as St. Paul saw, an essential postulate of the eschatological salvation. But when Israel despised and rejected the Messiah, His death had expiatory power not only for those who slew Him but for all the nations: so that now the risen and exalted Christ could send His disciples out to be witnesses to all the world.

Here I would raise a question. Dr Bosch is right to hold that three things belong together—the founding of the Church, the outpouring of the Spirit, and the beginning of the mission. He is right to maintain that the Church in Matt. 16.18 is in promise only, a promise which strictly can find fulfilment only beyond the Cross and the Resurrection. But must one then insist, as he does, that Jesus did not intend during His earthly ministry to bring into being

an ecclesia, a new people of God? Wendland has suggested that there were actually three steps, prior to Pentecost, in the founding of the Church: the call of the disciples, the confession of Peter and the ecclesia logion, the Last Supper (*Die Eschatologie des Reiches Gottes bei Jesus*). But this Dr Bosch disallows, the Church being as he insists the creation of the risen Christ alone. But is this quite satisfactory? When Jesus chose twelve men 'that they should be with Him and that He might send them forth to preach', was this not already a symbolic act representing the new Israel, the nucleus of the new humanity? When He used the Son of Man category, are we to say that there and then the corporate significance was nowhere in His mind? Were there not times—not only in the upper room at the end—when His message was charged with covenant thought and language, as though He had been dwelling on the great new covenant prophecy of Jer. 31? Must not the Messianic consciousness, which can be traced already at the Baptism and at the Temptation, have had the new people of God as its necessary correlative? Must we not think of the points of our Lord's confrontation by the Gentile world—and these are not infrequent in the Synoptic narrative—as the flash-point of the revelation of that 'mystery' which is Christ among the Gentiles, the hope of glory? I think Dr Bosch is perfectly right to insist that not during the earthly ministry but only beyond the Cross and the Resurrection could the Church as such appear. But surely it is not denying or obscuring this all-important fact to hold that already during the ministry something was present alongside of the Messianic secret—and that this something was the secret of the Church, the intention of the new community that was to be.

But this criticism does not in any way detract from the solid worth of this most competent and challenging book. Like Cullmann, Dr Bosch makes us feel the critical urgency of this era between the Resurrection and the Parousia in which our lives are set. 'The mission,' he writes, 'is not only the bearer of an eschatological message, but it is itself a factor in the *Endzeit*.' He makes clear what the Church's missionary function is. All the missionary activity in the world will not produce the Parousia. This lies with God alone. The very use of the passive in Mark 13.10, δεῖ κηρυχθῆναι, underlines this truth. 'Gott selber missioniert, nicht wir.' The word mission itself has to do primarily with God's sending of His Son. Our mission is derivative: 'as the Father hath sent Me, even so send I you.' This forms the dialectic of Christian vocation—God's act, yet our responsibility—a dialectic which runs right through the New Testament: the disciples are seed, yet they are reapers; they belong to the flock, yet they are shepherds. St. Paul gave this

dialectic characteristic expression: 'work out your own salvation, for it is God who worketh in you.' It is the tension and the crisis of Paul's own theology and activity. It must be the dialectic of all missionary strategy still: This is the Lord's doing—therefore necessity is laid upon me. Then cometh the end—therefore here and now I am debtor to Greeks and barbarians. Only God can convert the heathen—therefore woe is me if I preach not the Gospel!

James S. Stewart

Scripture and the Word of God. By Raymond F. Cyster. S.P.C.K., London, 1959. Pp. 117. 10s. 6d.

The author writes this book to help teachers in their preparation for giving religious instruction in school, so that in communicating the truth of the Bible they may communicate life. The very title indicates the urgency of making the written word a place of meeting with the living Word Himself, a place of commitment. This concern is consistently sustained.

Mr Cyster starts with the sense of helplessness experienced by many at the wide span of biblical material with which they must cope. Where are they to start? How are they to handle it all? For answer, the author interprets the Bible as a great drama, in which the doctrines of the faith are set in a significant pattern, and by which a claim on men is pressed home. Justice is done to basic theological words, and to the theological structure of the revelation. There is simplicity and adequacy in this section, and many would find it provided them with a conspectus of the faith which helped this and that bit of teaching to fall into significant relationship to the whole.

I must take the illustrations from mathematics and natural science on trust, being no qualified judge. But the use of this road into the understanding of young people undergoing a particular kind of training is imaginative, and suggests possibilities for different groups. For instance a very different field of interpretative material could be drawn upon for junior secondary pupils.

Help is given on presentation of such material to different age groups; and good sense is talked on the way in which questions might be handled, and scriptural teaching linked to children's own experience.

I could have wished that this clearly written, well-constructed, helpful book had been cheaper in price so that it might have found its way into more hands: for many outside the circle for which it is written, who are also in some way engaged in the teaching work of the Church, would benefit from it.

Ian M. Fraser

I Believe in the Church. By ELMER G. HOMRIGHAUSEN. Abingdon Press, Nashville, Tenn., 1959. Pp. 108. $1.50.

ARE you looking for a book to put into the hands of a mature layman so that he may meditate on the nature and calling of the Church? I think you may find that this is it. It does not start far enough back to be suitable for the inquirer. It does not have a clear enough thread of development to bring the ordinary committed layman from where he is into deeper waters. But for someone who seeks to have his understanding of the Church enlarged and enriched and who, having already grazed around a bit, is prepared to chew the cud, this book is most appropriate.

I like its short sentences. You may think them overdone. I consider them exactly the right vehicle to communicate thoughts which would get tangled in one another if they were not carefully teased out one by one. They carry you along when the argument commends itself immediately, and when there is something on which you feel you must linger, its elements lie clear before you. The author generally throughout maintains a good wavelength of communication. I noted only two interpretative words which I would query—not because they failed to open windows, but because at the same time they closed others: the Holy Spirit is described as the 'executive' of the Trinity, and as the 'substitute' Jesus promised to send in His place. Maybe this is finicky, for all words are beggars for this work.

I thought Dr Homrighausen particularly good on the character of worship, and noticeably weak, both in terms of space allocated and significance accorded, on the sacraments.

No new ground is broken in this book: but excellent work is done on ground already broken. Here is a practical exposition of what is involved in the ongoing life of an obedient Church, and of the fount of that life. It caters for a public for which we must provide more and more work of this standard. IAN M. FRASER

Confession. By MAX THURIAN. Studies in Ministry and Worship. S.C.M. Press, London, 1958, Pp. 152. 10s. 6d.

THIS addition to this admirable series is a translation of *La Confession*, which was published at Neuchâtel in 1953. The author, who is a brother in the Community of Taizé, is rapidly becoming well known in English-speaking countries for his theological writings. This book is a plea for the recovery by Protestants of the sacrament of penance. The first chapter sums up the attitude of the Continental Reformers, who stressed the faith of the penitent, God's promise and God's absolution, rather than contrition, works of reparation and the like. Then comes an exposition of the biblical teaching on sin

and ecclesiastical discipline, which makes it admirably clear that sin is never a merely individual matter; in the life of the sinner the Church is battling with the powers of evil; therefore to the Church is entrusted the ministry of absolution. It will be generally agreed that the Church has the privilege of proclaiming God's forgiveness of sin both in public preaching and in private pastoral conversation, but here we come to the hub of the argument: why must there be a sign of absolution in addition to preaching and to the signs of entry and fellowship, Baptism and the Lord's Supper? The chief biblical passages here adduced are Luke 15 and James 5; there are also arguments from psychology and from Church history. Then the writer stresses the need for spiritual direction and for open-heartedness in the context of our deepening understanding of the Church as the Body of Christ.

We then turn to the more practical aspects of the matter, and the part played by sacramental confession is distinguished from that played by psychoanalysis. Advice is then given to a pastor who is acting as confessor, and the practical details of this ministry are described.

All this is preceded by a Foreword to the English edition by the Rev. Frederic Greeves, the Principal of Didsbury College, Bristol, who cites the views of John Wesley, and a Preface by Dr Marc Boegner, both of whom regret that the author pays no attention to psychological methods other than psychoanalysis; and also by relevant extracts from Calvin. It is followed by a form of self-examination (much better than those in most devotional manuals), som erelevant extracts from Luther, and a short account of Taizé by Roger Schutz, its Prior. These bits and pieces, despite their multiplicity, are all interesting.

It would be a great mistake to dismiss this book as a 'catholicising' work in the pejorative sense of that term; it shows us an important trend in contemporary Continental Protestantism, but it has a wider interest than that. From its insights all pastors have much to learn. There can be no doubt historically that the Reformers contemplated the retention of some kind of private confession, in a form freed of course from Roman errors, yet more definite than that which is commonly practised among their followers today. As Principal Greeves remarks, Protestants often ask, sometimes almost ashamedly, whether we have been right to discard these practices. But while these matters are being debated, people resort, if not to 'tranquillisers', then to psychiatrists and to such ministers as have acquired the reputation of being interested in psychology. These have of course their place, but it would be well if people turned more naturally to the Christian minister as such, not simply as the

recipient of their confidences, important as that is, but as one who will assure them of the divine forgiveness. Many will feel that the arguments which exalt this into a kind of sacrament are rather weak, and we may well prefer to regard it as a kind of individualised preaching; but that is no excuse for neglecting the whole subject. Those who think they will disagree with this book should not fail to read it.

Mr Greeves' name 'Frederic' has wrongly been given as 'Frederick' and at p. 31, n. 3, 'Parke' should be 'Parker'.

A. Raymond George

Ten Years of Discovery in the Wilderness of Judea. By J. T. Milik (translated from the French by J. Strugnell). S.C.M. Press, London, 1959, Pp. 160, 25 plates, 3 maps. 12s. 6d.

The present book comes from the pen of one of the most distinguished members in the team of scholars engaged in the study of the Dead Sea Scrolls. M. l'Abbé Milik has participated in the exploration of the Qumran caves and the excavations at Khirbet Qumran, and he has also taken a leading share in the publication of the documents found. In this slender but compact and at the same time extremely readable volume he gives his readers a comprehensive survey of the present state of Dead Sea Scroll research, enumerating the documents found to date and giving the interpretations which have been offered by various scholars, besides his own.

The book is divided into five main chapters. The first gives the story of the discoveries made at Qumran, Murabba'at, and Khirbet Mird; chapter II deals with the Qumran Library and the various kinds of texts found (i.e. biblical, apocryphal and pseudepigraphal, and sectarian writings). Chapter III, the History of the Essenes, offers the author's synthesis of the various lines of evidence which can be brought to bear on the problem of the Qumran community: the description of the Essenes and other Jewish sects contained in Pliny and other classical writers, the archaeological findings at Kh. Qumran, the testimony of the Dead Sea documents themselves, and the Damascus document. He regards the Qumran community as Essene and sketches out the development of the Essene movement on the basis of the data mentioned above: it originated in a group among the Asideans much taken up with the principle of Aaronite legitimacy besides apocalyptic and messianic expectations, and attributing great importance to a type of calendar at variance with the one accepted as standard by pharisaic Judaism. When the Maccabees assumed both the temporal power and the High Priesthood, it broke with them and retreated into the wilderness: the

'Wicked Priest' of the sectarian writings was Jonathan; the 'teacher of Righteousness' is not identifiable, and little can be said about his career, or his end (there is according to the author no evidence that he was martyred, as certain scholars have held). In the next chapter, IV, Milik deals further with the Essenes' organisation and teachings, their hierarchy, feasts, general religious outlook, etc. Chapter V deals briefly with the overall importance of the Dead Sea documents, and with the light they have shed on the development of the Hebrew language, Hebrew palaeography and onomastics, as well as the wider literary and religious aspects. The book concludes with a chronological table, a very useful classified bibliography, some additional notes, an Index of Subjects, and an Index of Passages Cited.

Based on a comprehensive first-hand knowledge of the subject and its vast literature, this book gives a very fair and balanced as well as concise survey of the present state of Dead Sea Scroll research. Though time and further study and discovery may lead to some modifications in the synthesis of the various kinds of evidence achieved by the author, yet for its compact and eminently useful presentation of a diffuse and refractory subject this book is hard to beat. Well produced and cheap in price in addition, it can be thoroughly recommended both to the academic and non-academic reader.

B. S. J. Isserlin

Liturgies of the Past. By Archdale A. King. Longmans, 1959. Pp. 487. 70s.

This is the final volume of a series of four on the Rites of Western Christendom, and it follows the same style as the earlier volumes. The author is to be congratulated on the completion of an immense task which has involved prodigious labour and painstaking research. The present volume deals with certain rites which are no longer in use, and it is very convenient to have details about them under one cover. The rites concerned are those of Aquileia and of Benevento, the Gallican and Celtic Rites, those of medieval England, and the Rite of Nidaros (Trondheim). In each case the historical background is explained; there are notes where applicable on the church architecture, the calendar, the liturgical books, the chant, vestments, and so on, and each rite is fully described. The reader will be specially interested in the Rite of Nidaros, of which there is no comparable description in English. As in the earlier volumes there is an interesting collection of photographs.

The production of the book is good, the type being clear and readable. There are, however, a good many printer's errors, and

spelling of names is sometimes inconsistent. Thus on p. 196 the name of St. Columban appears seven times, five times as 'Colomban' and only twice as 'Columban'. The bibliographies which as usual appear at the end of each chapter, should prove very useful, though still given in alphabetical order of titles rather than of authors. One feels too that where works have been translated, the English titles rather than the originals would have been more useful for reference by English readers. Thus, Baumstark's *Liturgie comparée*, Cabrol's *La messe en Occident*, and Jungmann's *Missarum Sollemnia*, have all been translated.

But these criticisms are of minor importance. The author has done a remarkable and valuable work in gathering together so much detailed information. Those who are fortunate enough to possess the four volumes will have at hand a very interesting and useful set of reference books on the Western Liturgies.

JOHN A. LAMB

The Gallican Rite. By W. S. PORTER. Mowbray, London, 1958. Pp. 64. 6s.

The Orthodox Liturgy. By AUSTIN OAKLEY, Mowbray, London, 1958. Pp. 50. 4s. 6d.

THESE two publications are numbers in 'Studies in Eucharistic Faith and Practice', a series which should be particularly useful to the general reader interested in liturgical matters. The volume on the Gallican Rite is specially welcome, as there is nothing on the subject in English in such convenient small compass or really up to date. The first chapter discusses the problem of the Rite in relation to other Uses; the next four describe the Rite itself. There is a brief critical chapter entitled 'General Characteristics', and the final part explains the disappearance of the Rite. There is a good bibliography and a useful index.

The volume on the Orthodox Liturgy is an excellent introduction to the subject. After a brief opening section, the four usual Orthodox liturgies are noted. The adjuncts of Orthodox worship—the church, altar, furnishings and vestments—are explained. The liturgy itself is described, with a final interesting chapter on its religious significance. An Appendix gives the text of the formal Office of Preparation and Thanksgiving, and there is a useful short bibliography. These two books should prove to be very helpful, especially to those who wish brief introductions to the problems of Eucharistic Faith and Practice.

JOHN A. LAMB

Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart. 3 Auflage. Band II D-G, Band III H-Kon. Edited by KURT GALLING, in co-operation with H. F. v. Campenhausen, E. Dinkler, G. Gloege, and K. E. Løgstrup. J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Tübingen, 1958-59. DM. 78.80 each.

THE first volume of *RRG* 3 was reviewed in *SJT*, 11.3, 1958. These two further volumes keep up the same high standard of rigorous disciplined presentation of material and superb editing. The international character of these volumes is even more in evidence than in the first—contributors come from many countries outside Germany, Austria, Switzerland, France, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Hungary, Finland, Portugal, Luxemburg, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Syria, even from Hongkong, Japan, Indonesia, Argentina, and from the English-speaking world, Australia, Britain and the United States. Many of these overseas contributions are by scholars whom Germany has exported and through whom it has enriched biblical and theological scholarship in many parts of the world, not least the United States. This wide distribution of contributors helps to balance the fact that some of those writing in these volumes from within Germany are still far too ignorant of important literature published in other countries and languages.

Volume II contains articles on many great themes which makes it a particularly important volume: thus Germany, England, France, all come up for the presentation of their Church history and theology. It is amusing to note that while under *Frankreich* and *England*, subsections appear under the word *Theologie* there is no such subsection under *Deutschland*—that would presumably have required several volumes in itself! Among notable writers in these areas are H. Bornkamm on German Church History, J. Bosc and R. Mehl on French Theology and Philosophy of Religion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Martin Schmidt (one of the most valuable contributors to these volumes) doing yeoman service on English Church History and Theology, and English Deism (also on the English High-Church Movement and John Knox in vol. III), with I. T. Ramsey contributing a useful account of Philosophy of Religion in the last 150 years.

Under other notable articles must be listed those on *Reunion-movements* (by M. Schmidt, H. Schaeder, H. H. Schrey and Stephen Neill), *Demythologising* by H. Ott (who also writes interestingly on Kerygma in vol. III), the idea of *evolution* by C. F. v. Weizäcker, *dialectical theology* by Bollnow and Løgstrup, while under *Gottesdienst* are found the names of Mowinckel, Elbogen, Riesenfeld, Jannasch among others.

Four of the major articles, of special interest to readers of *SJT*,

are, on *God*, with brilliant contributions by Pannenberg and Schlink, both of Heidelberg; *Eschatology*, with contributions by Conzelmann and Althaus (the section on the Reformation is rather weak); on the *Spirit*, where the articles of Gerleman (on OT and Judaism), Käsemann (on NT), M. A. Schmidt (history of dogma) and R. Prenter (dogmatics) deserve particular note; and on *History*, including contributions by Dinkler and Cullmann. The editors themselves have contributed much material, e.g. several valuable articles on dogmatic questions by Gloege. But we must not forget to mention the little article on *Gentleman*—to continental eyes apparently, this is an English contribution to historic and modern religion!

Volume III is equally outstanding, but we begin with some of the disappointments. The writer of article on the Epistle to the Hebrews is unaware of some of the best literature on the subject, but it is not to be found in German. The brevity of the articles on the Virgin Birth and Ascension of Christ is an indication of lack of attention in German theology—more space is given to 'the descent into hell'! There is a competent article on *Hermeneutics* by Ebeling, which is, on the whole, well-balanced, considering the wide divergences that obtain in the views of present-day scholars, but Ebeling has at least a blind-spot as far as Calvin is concerned (and therefore Barth).

One of the major articles is that entitled *Jesus Christ* with a very valuable survey of historic and modern discussion by Conzelmann, with which ought to be bracketed the useful articles on the Gospels in vol. II by G. Bornkamm. Conzelmann particularly has a wide knowledge of literature outside his own country. Thirty pages of excellent writing are devoted to *Judentum* to which the editor, K. Galling, brings his encyclopaedic knowledge. As might be expected, it is W. v. Loewenich that writes on *Catholicism*, but this is augmented by another by Sucker on *Catholicism today*. One of the finest articles in the whole volume is that by Otto Piper on the Apocalypse of John, which outshines the other articles on Johannine literature.

Comparatively the largest section of vol. III falls under the heading of *Church* which reflects, perhaps, the considerable attention given to the doctrine of the Church in modern times. Stendahl of Harvard writes on the early Church, A. Adam of Bethel on the history of the doctrine of the Church, with an excellent section on the doctrine itself by Prenter of Aarhus. There is a vast composite article on *Kirchenbau* with diagrams and illustrations of ancient and modern church architecture which might have included one of Stamford Church, Connecticut, one of the finest pieces of church architecture this century. This article would be of great help to those interested in church extension, if only they would read it.

These volumes contain so much excellent material that we have

been able to spotlight only a little of it. But let this be said in conclusion: whenever this reviewer has turned to them to find information or to stimulate thinking on a subject, he has not been disappointed: they serve their end very admirably. More could not be asked. It is to be hoped that an English edition will receive every encouragement on both sides of the Atlantic.

THOMAS F. TORRANCE

Die Verkündigung des Reiches Gottes in der Kirche Jesu Christi. Zeugnisse aus allen Jahrhunderten und allen Konfessionen. Band III *Von Bernhard von Clairvaux bis zu Girolamo Savonarola.* Pp. 5480. 455. Swiss Fr. Band IV *Zeugnisse vom Anfang des 16. bis zur Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts.* Pp. 508. 40.55 Swiss Fr. Band V *Von der Mitte des 17. bis zur Mitte des 18, Jahrhunderts.* Pp. 532. 43.20 Swiss Fr. By ERNST STAEHELIN. Verlag Friedrich Reinhardt, Basel.

HERE are three more volumes from Professor Staehelin's monumental source-work for the history of Eschatology. (The first two volumes were reviewed in *SJT*, 9.1, 1956.)

The first volume carries us through from Bernard of Clairvaux to Nicholas of Cusa and Savonarola. In it Professor Staehelin has assembled an extremely interesting and exciting series of citations in which it becomes very clear that throughout this period the medieval Church was struggling with the Kingdom of God within its history. Even though there may be much, he says in a brief forward, which does not fall into line with the Apostolic message, there can be no doubt that in those centuries there were wide areas in Christendom where men were gripped with the faith that the Kingdom of heaven breaks in with violence (Matt.11.12). That applies not only to what the late Ronald Knox called 'the underworld' of the Middle Ages but to some of its greatest spirits, like St. Bernard, the Victorines, Hugo and Richard, St. Francis and St. Dominic, and of course in their different ways, Dante, Wyclif and Savonarola, not to mention the most stormy-souled of the lot, Joachim of Fiore.

One thing becomes very clear as one reads these pages: any interpretation of the theology of the Middle Ages that looks only at the calm and poised sentences of the great Scholastics, without taking into fundamental account, the restless seething movements of the spirit, the apocalyptic conflicts of heart and vision that also characterise the same period, cannot be adequate or truthful. But here also are gathered together enlightening citations from more out of the way sources, from Bar Hebraeus the Jacobite Syrian Bishop of the thirteenth century, Solomon of Basra, a Nestorian Metropolitan, Ebedjesus, an Armenian episcopal poet; or, from the West, Peter John Olivi, Arnold of Villanova, or Vincent Ferrer the visionary

and preacher of the Avignon Papacy. Perhaps a Briton may be permitted to wonder why Robert Grosseteste does not figure in the list, but obviously some selection had to be made.

Volume IV begins significantly with Christopher Columbus whose discovery of the new world was apparently not unconnected with apocalyptic intimations. Then come sections on the eschatological thinking of the Reformation Churches, Lutheran, Reformed, Anglican, followed by the Radicals and Anabaptists, concluding with two briefer sections from the Roman and Eastern Churches. Apart from Luther, Melanchthon, Osiander, Johannes Gerhardt the Lutheran authors are not well known to the English-speaking world. But should not more have been made of the hymns? The selections from Luther are well chosen. Butzer is included in the domain of Reformed Christendom, but the citations are restricted to the *De Regno Christi*. Calvin also suffers in the same way—extracts from the Commentaries and Sermons would have served the author's purpose well. Bullinger fares better. The Heidelberg theology has its place, but Du Moulin does not appear for France but another mathematician appears for Scotland in John Napier. Why not also James VI and I? Smallest space is devoted to England though it may well be because more space is given to England in the next volume. Certainly a great host of works on the apocalypse alone appeared in Britain during the seventeenth century, and Scotland was not without its considerable share, e.g. that of James Durham.

The assemblage of material from the radical wing of anabaptists, spirituals and mystical thinkers is most helpful. It does not include Balthasar Hubmaier, but it does include some writing that is not easily available, from David Joris, Michael Servetus, Celio Secondo Curione, or Valentin Weigel, the offspring of low-brow medieval pietism and apocalyptic spiritualism.

Too small a section is given to Roman eschatological thought, dealing with Ignatius Loyola, the *Catechismus Romanus* and Bellarmine, but room might have been found for something from Ribera of Salamanca, Cornelius à Lapide and Thomas Malvenda. Philotheos or Starez of Russia, the Patriarch Jeremiah II of Constantinople and Peter Mogila of Kiev represent the Orthodox Church.

What an immensely interesting compendium! To read the history of Christian thought through singling out one theme like this—and eschatology at that—is most exciting. It throws new light upon all sorts of questions, and raises many fresh problems, but it reveals, as Professor Staehelin has intended it should, the preaching of the Church about the Kingdom of God. Here we stand on ground where comparison with the New Testament shouts for com-

ment. Can there be a more illuminating way to take the pulse of a Church at some period in its history or to test its faithfulness to the Kerygma?

The fifth volume takes us to the middle of the eighteenth century. Here attention is first focused upon England, notably upon the puritans, John Archer and Thomas Goodwin are cited as representatives of millenarianism, like Joseph Mead before them. Cromwell has his place too. Fox the Quaker, Baxter the Anglican, Bunyan the Baptist, John Milton, not without his Calvinism, Jane Leade the theosophical visionary, and Sir Isaac Newton the scientist, all come together in their different ways when looked at in this light—their common eschatological concern.

The selection from North American protestantism hardly does justice to the eschatology of the promised land and of thanksgiving for the new world.

From Holland citations come mostly from Coccejus and his followers, who sought to bring together the concepts of the Kingdom and the Covenant and to provide a more dynamic and historical setting for the systematic expression of the Reformed faith. From Germany, Spener the father of German pietism, Francke and his circle, Gottfried Arnold, make their contribution, and in different ways Tersteegan and Zinzendorf, and above all, perhaps, the great Bengel. Amyraut and John Amos Commenius are others who help to make up the picture of Continental protestantism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Once again two concluding sections deal with Roman and Eastern theology—we mention particularly Angelus Silesius the convert from Lutheranism to Romanism, and Bossuet the great preacher and Bishop of Meaux.

These glances at the volumes under notice do nothing like justice to them. They bring together in carefully chosen citations material that takes the reader on an exciting tour of the history of Christian thought, accompanied all through with judicious remarks and short historical and bibliographical notes by the editor. The translations are lucid and clear and the volumes are well set out. Together they build up a very valuable aid to the student of Church History or the history of exegesis or the history of Christian doctrine, but in them we see above all, from many different types of people, poets and politicians, mystics and visionaries, preachers, dogmaticians, astronomers and scientists also, what a powerful influence the concept of the Kingdom of God has had upon the faith and hope of the Church through the centuries. Prodigious industry lies behind the production of these volumes. In expressing our gratitude to the author, Professor Ernst Staehelin, we would also congratulate him on his

appointment as Rector of the University of Basel during this *Jubiläumsjahr* in which it celebrates its five hundred years of academic life and work. THOMAS F. TORRANCE

Neues Testament. Uebersetzt und erklärt. By OTTO KARRER. Third edition. 1959. Verlag Ars Sacra. Josef Müller (Friedrichstr. 9) München, Art leather. DM. 11.80. Deluxe DM. 38.

THE publication of this new translation of the New Testament (now in its third revised edition) is one of the signs of the biblical revival in the Roman Church on the Continent. Its publication is meant to put into the hands of simple and educated people alike an edition of the New Testament in good, indeed, beautiful German, in a clearly understandable rendering, which can be used for advanced study or devotional reading. It is without doubt an excellent production which succeeds in bringing out the message of the New Testament in a striking fashion. The translations are generally faithful and objective, and make use of the vast research that has been undertaken both in Protestant and Roman Churches in modern times. The 'difficult' passages, which Romans have often exploited through tendentious translations to support their claims, are very fairly dealt with here where the aim throughout is to confront the reader with what the New Testament actually says and to initiate the reader into its depths.

The translation is prefaced by a short and succinct account of the various writings and their authors—the dating of the documents, follows on the whole modern ascertainments, e.g. Fourth Gospel, 90-95. But in the light of recent evidence this will have to be revised for a rather earlier date. The text itself is divided up into paragraphs with headings, which are a help to the general reader, while it is accompanied throughout with short notes, throwing light on the more difficult passages, or obscure references and words. In these notes information is drawn from a wide range of learning, philological, archaeological, historical, theological, while study of the Qumran material is by no means neglected. Altogether the notes are judicious, and commendably brief—they do not get in the way or set out to grind axes.

In the appendix there are some useful helps to study, a list of relevant dates, a table of common elements in the narratives and teachings of the Synoptic Gospels, and an index (some fifty pages) of the main doctrinal material in the NT.

This is a work that can be freely recommended to members of the Evangelical as of the Roman Church. Nothing but good could come of an edition in English. In German it has been beautifully printed and produced. THOMAS F. TORRANCE

BOOKS RECEIVED

A. F. Carillo de Albornoz: *Roman Catholicism and Religious Liberty.* World Council of Churches. No price.

Yorke Allen Jr.: *A Seminary Survey.* Harper Brothers, New York. Pp. 640. $10.00.

Berthold Altaner: *Patrology.* Tr. by Hilda C. Graef. Herder, Freiburg, and Nelson, Edinburgh-London. 1960. Pp. 660. 60s.

W. J. A. M. Beek: *John Keble's Literary and Religious Contribution to the Oxford Movement.* 1959. Centrale Drukkerj N. V., Nijmegen, Holland. Pp. 192. 20s.

John C. Bennet: *Christian and the State.* Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1960. Pp. 302. $4.50.

Joost de Blank: *A Working Faith. Sermons for the Man in the Street.* Lutterworth Press. Pp. 108. 7s. 6d.

G. C. Berkhouwer: *The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth.* Paperback Edition. Wm. B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Michigan. Pp. 414. $2.45.

G. W. Bromiley: *Christian Ministry.* Wm. B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Michigan. Pp. 119. $1.50.

F. F. Bruce: *The Apostolic Defence of the Gospel.* The Inter-Varsity Fellowship. Pp. 95. 3s. 6d.

John Calvin: *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* (translated into Japanese by Japan Calvin Translation Society). Shinkyo Shuppansha (Protestant Pub. Co.), Tokyo, Japan. (The first of 12 volumes of Calvin's NT Commentaries.)

H. M. Carson: *The Epistles of Paul to the Colossians and Philemon. An Introduction and Commentary.* (Tyndale NT Commentaries, edited by R. V. G. Tasker.) Tyndale Press. 1960. Pp. 112. 7s. 6d.

Oscar Cullmann: *Catholics and Protestants. A Plea for Christian Solidarity.* Lutterworth Press. Pp. 62. 4s. 6d.

J. G. Davies: *The Making of the Church.* Skeffington and Son. Pp. 208. 21s.

Bernard Erling: *Nature and History. A Study in Theological Methodology with special Attention to the Method of Motif Research. Studia Theologica Lundensia,* 19. C. W. K. Gleerup, Lund. 1960. Pp. 286. Sw.Kr. 20.

Austin Farrer: *Said or Sung, An arrangement of homily and verse.* The Faith Press. Pp. 190. 16s.

R. M. Grant: *Gnosticism and Early Christianity*—Columbia U., Oxford P. 31s. 6d.

Edward Rochie Hardy: *Faithful Witness.* (World Christian Books No. 31.) Lutterworth Press. Pp. 80. 2s. 6d.

Paul M. Harrison: *Authority and Power in the Free Church Tradition.* Princeton U.P. 40s.

Gordon Huelin: *Saint Willibord and his Society.* The Faith Press. Pp. 80. 5s.

H. C. Kee and F. W. Young: *The Living World of the New Testament.* Darton, Longman and Tod Ltd. Pp. 492. 25s.

Lehre und Forschung an der Universität Basel zur Zeit der Feier ihres fünfhundertjährigen Bestehens, dargestellt von Dozenten der Universität Basel. Birkhaüser Verlag, Basel. 1960. Pp. 365.

Henri de Lubac: *The Discovery of God* (tr. by Alexander Dru). Darton, Longman and Tod Ltd. Pp. 212. 18s.

Walter Lüthi: *St. John's Gospel. An Exposition* (tr. by K. Schoenenberger). Oliver and Boyd. Pp. 348. 25s.

Paul L. Maier: *Caspar Schwenckfeld on the Person and Work of Christ.* Van Gorcum-Assen, Holland. 1959. Pp. 115. H.ff. 10.50.

Donald McGavran: *How our Churches Grow. The New Frontier of Mission.* The World Mission Press. Pp. 186. 12s. 6d.

Giovanni Miegge: *Gospel and Myth in the Thought of Rudolf Bultmann.* Lutterworth Press. 1960. Pp. 152. 25s.

J. A. Motyer: *The Revelation of the Divine Name.* (Tyndale Monographs). The Tyndale Press. Pp. 31. 1s. 6d.

Stephen Neill: *Christian Holiness.* Lutterworth Press. London. Pp. 134. 15s.

Wolfgang Philipp: *Das Werden der Aufklärung in theologiegeschichtlicher Sicht.* (Forschungen zur Systematischen Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, Band 3.) Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, Goettingen.

Josef Pieper: *Prudence. The First Cardinal Virtue.* Faber and Faber. Pp. 79. 12s. 6d.

Gerhard von Rad: *Moses.* (World Christian Books No. 32.) Lutterworth Press, Pp. 80. 2s. 6d.

Hugo Rahner: *St. Ignatius Loyola: Letters to Women.* Herder, Freiburg and Nelson. Edinburgh. 1960. Pp. 565. 63s.

A. E. J. Rawlinson: *The Anglican Communion in Christendom.* S.P.C.K. Pp. 134. 6s. 6d.

D. Ritschl: *Christ our Life. The Protestant Church at Worship and Work.* Oliver and Boyd. Pp. 114. 12s. 6d.

D. S. Russell: *Between the Testaments.* S.C.M. Press. 12s. 6d.

Vardapet Karekin Sarkissian: *Armenian Christian Literature. A Brief Introduction.* The Faith Press. 1960. Pp. 48. 6s.

Massey H. Shepherd: *The Paschal Liturgy and the Apocalypse.* (Ecumenical Studies in Worship No. 6.) Lutterworth Press. Pp. 99. 7s. 6d.

James D. Smart: *The Rebirth of Ministry. A Study of the Biblical Character of the Church's Ministry.* The Westminster Press, Westminster Building, Philadelphia Pa. Pp. 192. $3.50.

Sources of Christian Theology. Vol. II. Sacraments and Forgiveness. The History and Doctrinal Development of Penance, Extreme Unction, and Indulgences. Edited with Commentary by Paul F. Palmer. The Newman Press, Westminster; Darton, Longman and Tod, Pp. 410. 50s.

R. V. G. Tasker: *The Gospel according to St. John. An Introduction and Commentary.* (Tyndale NT Commentries.) Tyndale Press. 1960. Pp. 235. 9s. 6d.

J. A. Thompson: *Archaeology and the New Testament.* (A Pathway Book.) Wm. B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids. $1.50.

J. G. S. S. Thomson: *The Word of the Lord in Jeremiah.* (Tyndale Monographs.) The Tyndale Press. Pp. 20.

J. W. C. Wand: *The Church Today. A Brief Description of the Christian Church in its External Variety and its Inner Unity.* (A Pelican Book.) Penguin Books. Pp. 192. 3s. 6d.

J D. W. Watts: *Lists of Words occurring frequently in the Hebrew Bible. Hebrew and English.* Wm. Eerdmans. Pp. 31. 75 cents.

R. E. O. White: *The Biblical Doctrine of Initiation.* Hodder and Stoughton. Pp. 392. 30s.

W. A. Whitehouse: *Order, Goodness, Glory.* Oxford U.P. 9s. 6d.

R. R. Williams: *Reading Through Hebrews. Six Expository Lectures.* A. and R. Mowbray and Co. Ltd. Pp. 76. 5s.

Gustaf Wingren: *Schöpfung und Gesetz.* Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Göttingen. Pp. 198. DM. 14.80.

Alban Winter: *The Catholic Epistles. A Devotional Commentary on the Epistles of SS. James, Peter and John.* The Faith Press. Pp. 144. 7s. 6d.

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JUSTIFICATION

ITS RADICAL NATURE AND PLACE IN REFORMED DOCTRINE AND LIFE[1]

by The Rev. Professor T. F. TORRANCE

I

The Teaching of John Knox

In his debate with the Jesuit, James Tyrie, John Knox claimed that the controversy of the Reformers with the Roman Church was the same as that of St. Paul with the Judaisers of Galatia, in which the Gospel of Grace was at stake, 'for it concerneth the chief head of justification', as Knox expressed it.[2] On the other hand, when we examine the writings of Knox we do not find that 'justification', as a term at any rate, plays a prominent part, while the expression 'justification by faith' is hardly ever found—for when he did speak of justification he preferred to be more concrete and to use an expression like 'justification through the blood of Christ'.

This calls for two observations. (1) The whole question of the Reformation is at stake in the doctrine of justification. (2) Justification is not a principle in itself: it directs us at once to Jesus Christ and His mighty acts.

When we turn to the *Scots Confession* of 1560, and ask what place justification occupies in it, we find ample confirmation for the two observations we have just made. There are, in fact, three important facts about justification in the Confession that we must note.

(1) There is no separate article on justification. It has no place of its own; rather does justification belong to the inner texture of the Gospel and becomes evident as its cutting edge. That is to say, justification makes decisively clear the very essence of the Gospel of salvation by Grace.

(2) What is absolutely central is Jesus Christ. Man's salvation is exclusively the work of God in Christ, God in union

[1] Presidential address delivered to the *Scottish Church Theology Society*, 18th January, 1960.

[2] *The Works of John Knox* (edit. by Laing), vol. VI, p. 499.

with Man, and therefore Man in union with God. It is an outstanding characteristic of all the documents of the Scottish Reformation that a place of centrality is given to the union of God and Man in Christ, and therefore of our 'blessed conjunction' or 'society' or 'fraternity' with Christ. That union with Christ lies at the heart of our righteousness in Him, for it is through that union that we actually participate in His holy life. Knox laid immense stress upon the saving humanity of Christ, that is, upon His positive obedience and filial life in our flesh. Consider, for example, this sentence that comes from the *Form of Confession* in the *Book of Common Order*: 'We mast alwais have our refuge to the free justice which procedeth of the obedience which Jesus Christe hath prayed for us.'[1] What Knox refers to there is the fact that the prayer of Jesus was part of His atoning obedience and oblation to God—it was the worship of God the Father with His Life. In that Life of the worshipping and obedient Son we are made to share and are well-pleasing to the Father as through that participation we are clothed with the Name and Holy Life of Christ. In His unity with man the Son of God lived out a perfect Life on earth in obedience, love and worship, and as such died and rose again. Therefore it is in and through our union with Him, that all that is His becomes ours. It is only as such, that is in the Name of Christ, that we appear before God, and as such that He regards us—in Christ.

(3) The accent lies very strongly here on the positive side of salvation. Thus justification is expressly linked with the resurrection of Christ,[2] to which a whole chapter is given in the Confession of 1560, while a further chapter is devoted to the Ascension of Christ.[3] Now that is one of the great characteristics of Knoxian theology—Ressurrection and Ascension are part of the Atonement—indeed, 'the Resurrection' is often called 'the chief article of our faith'. What is the significance of this emphasis? In the Resurrection and Ascension we have the affirmation of man by God, and his exaltation to be a partaker of a new humanity, a new righteousness, and a new freedom as a child of God, as a brother of Christ, as a joint-heir with

[1] *Works*, VI, p. 364.
[2] Romans 4.35—a favourite verse with Knox, as with Calvin.
[3] *Scots Confession*, Articles X and XI

Him, as one who together with Him has the same Father. Justification is not only the forgiveness of sins, but the bestowal of a positive righteousness that derives from beyond us, and which we have through union with Christ. Justification is not the beginning of a new self-righteousness, but the perpetual end of it, for it is a perpetual living in Christ, from a centre and source beyond us. To be justified is to be lifted up above and beyond ourselves to live out of the risen and ascended Christ, and not out of ourselves.

Justification is interwoven with Incarnation—the union of God and Man in Christ, and with the fulfilment of that union in Reconciliation and Mediation between God and man which was wrought out in the Life, Death, Resurrection and Ascension of Christ—although the final execution of it so far as we are concerned awaits the coming again of Jesus Christ. Justification is rooted in the Incarnation and therefore it reaches out to the final Advent of Jesus as the Incarnate Son—it is both christological and eschatological. In none of the Reformers was the stress upon incarnational union so strong as in Knox; and in none of them was the place given to the *Parousia* so powerful; while it is Knox's highly distinctive doctrine of the Ascension that links those two together, or rather reveals the relation of the Incarnation to the *Parousia*. It is in the Ascension that we have *the fruit* of the Incarnation (including the Death and Resurrection) of Christ, and it is in the *Parousia* that we have the full *fruit* of the Ascension.

Now the reality of all this is what Knox called *Veritie*, that is, the truth and reality of our justification and renewal in Jesus Christ. But the *Veritie* is in Christ and *is* Christ, and it is in us through the operation of the Spirit, and through faith. The *Veritie* of God is in us only as by faith we seek it, not in ourselves, but in Christ alone, for it is through the Spirit that we partake of the blessed conjunction between Christ and ourselves and are presented before the Father in the Body of the Son as those who share in His Life and Righteousness, and are one with Him.

If it is through the Spirit that this Verity is in us, it is through the two Sacraments as instruments of the Holy Spirit's operation that we are *exercised*, as Knox expressed it, in that Verity or blessed conjunction, unity, society, or fraternity with Christ.

In Baptism we are ingrafted into Christ to be made partakers of His justice by which our sins are covered and remitted, and in the Supper we are continually nourished through that union with Christ.[1] Both Sacraments tell us that we live not out of ourselves, but we find our life and righteousness outside of ourselves, in Christ alone, through union and communion with Him. Therefore, we are required, as Knox and his colleagues put it in the *Confession*, 'to spoil ourselves of all honour of our own creation and redemption and also of our regeneration and sanctification'.[2] That is the radical nature, and the cutting edge of Justification.

To bring out the full significance of that a more systematic exposition is necessary.

II

The Nature of Justification

The Greek word δικαιοῦν, like the Scots word *to justify*, may mean to condemn as well as to vindicate. The basic meaning, which we find in biblical Greek, is *to put in the right, to put in the truth*. Thus, if a man is guilty he is put in the right by being condemned, for that is the truth of the matter; if he is innocent he is put in the right by being declared guiltless and set free. Justification always involves a fulfilling of the righteousness, or the enacting of the truth.

The Gospel teaches 'the justification of the ungodly', and the astounding thing about it is that means such a putting of the ungodly man in the right that through fulfilment of his condemnation he is justified, justified in both senses: judged and acquitted, condemned and vindicated, exposed as guilty and made righteous—but that is truth, ἀληθεία, concrete reality, only in Jesus Christ.

Let us consider what that means, by thinking of it in terms of *objective justification* and *subjective justification*.

A. *Objective justification* takes place in Christ, before the Father. The *Scots Confession* expounds it in this way. There was 'enmity betwixt the justice of God and our sins',[3] and therefore the Son

[1] *Scots Confession*, 1560, Art. XXI.
[2] Art. XII.
[3] *Scots Confession*, Art. VIII.

of God descended to take to Himself a body of our body, flesh of our flesh, and bone of our bones, and so to become *Mediator* between God and man. Three conceptions are involved here which we may allow three words of the *Confession* in its Latin edition to express. (*a*) *Frater*. The Son of the Father has made Himself our Brother, for through His incarnational union with us, He has established our union with Him. By making Himself our Brother, He has made us brothers of His and therefore sons of the Father. Through this incarnational fraternity, that which was lost in Adam is restored.[1] (*b*) *Mediator* or *Interpres*, Through His Sonship, that is, through His obedient Life in filial relation toward the Father, and through His brotherhood with us in our estrangement, Christ is the active Agent who reveals God to us and reconciles us to God—and that He does through the whole of His Life lived out in our flesh and bone in which He brought us back to union with God. The positive emphasis here is upon the obedience of the Beloved Son.[2] (*c*) *Pacificator*. As our Mediator or Redeemer it behoved Jesus Christ to be very God and very Man 'because He was to underlie the punishment due for our transgressions, and to present Himself in the presence of His Father's Judgment, as in our persone, to suffer for our transgression and inobedience, be death to overcome him that was the author of death.'[3]

All this could only be done in the hypostatic union, 'the wondrous conjunction betwixt Godhead and Manhood',[4] and out of it issues our justification in resurrection.[5]

This is the doctrine which Reformed theology has called the *Active* and *Passive Obedience* of Christ, and His incarnational *Assumption* and *Sanctification* of our human nature.

(1) By *active obedience* of Christ is meant the positive fulfilment in the whole Life of Jesus of His Sonship. From the very beginning to the very end He maintained a perfect filial relation to the Father in which He yielded to Him a life of utter love and faithfulness, or praise and thanksgiving and confidence and trust, and in which He perfectly fulfilled God's Holy Will and received and laid hold of the Love of the Father. This active obedience was therefore His own loving self-offering to the

[1] ibid. [2] Art. VIII and X. [3] Art. IX.
[4] Art. VII and VIII. [5] Art. X.

Father in our name and on our behalf and also His own faithful appropriation of the Father's Word and Will in our name and on our behalf.

(2) By *passive obedience* is meant the submission of Jesus Christ to the judgment of the Father upon our sin which He assumed in our humanity when He was 'made under the Law' in order to bear it in our name and on our behalf. This is the passion He endured in the expiation of our sins, but it is also His willing acceptance of the divine verdict upon our humanity. The passive obedience is manifested above all in the obedience of Jesus unto the death of the Cross, but that was a passion that began with His very birth, for His whole life, as Calvin says, was in a real sense a bearing of the Cross, but it was in the Cross itself that it had its *telos* or consummation.

This distinction between the active and passive obedience of Christ has been emphasised in Reformed theology not in order to divide or separate them but in order to insist that the whole course of Christ's active obedience is absolutely integral to His work of reconciliation, and that atonement cannot be limited to His passive obedience, that is to His passive submission to the penalty for our sin inflicted upon Christ in His death. As Calvin put it, immediately He put on the person of the servant He began to pay the price of liberation for our salvation.[1] How could it be otherwise when in the Incarnation there took place a union of God the Judge and the man judged in one Person, so that all through His life, but especially in His death, Jesus bore in Himself the infliction and judgment of God upon our sinful humanity, and wrought out in His life and His death expiation and amendment for our sin?

The active and passive obedience of Christ thus do not differ in regard to time, for both extend to the very beginning of the Incarnation, to the birth of Jesus, and both reach out to its fulfilment in His death and resurrection. Nor do they differ in regard to their Subject, for they are both manifestations of the one obedience of the Son of God in our humanity. They are set in mutual unity in the whole life of Christ. Since this is so we must speak of the active obedience as *actio passiva* and the passive obedience as *passio activa*. This mutuality of Christ's active and passive obedience is important, for it means that in

[1] *Institute* 2.16.5.

our justification we have imputed to us not only the passive righteousness of Christ in which He satisfied for our sins in suffering the judgment of God in His death on the Cross, but the active righteousness of Christ in which He positively fulfilled the Father's holy Will in an obedient Life. In other words, justification means not simply the non-imputation of our sins through the pardon of Christ, but positive sharing in His divine-human righteousness. We are saved, therefore, not only by the death of Christ which He suffered for our sakes, but by His Life which He lived in our flesh for our sakes and which God raised from the dead that we may share in it through the power of the Spirit. It is in that light, of His atoning and justifying Life, that we are to understand the Incarnation of the Son in the whole course of His obedience from His Birth to His Resurrection.

(3) By the *sanctification of our human nature* we refer to what was wrought by the Son, not only in His active and passive obedience, but through the *union* He established in His birth, life, death, and resurrection between our fallen human nature and His divine nature. In this union He both assumed our fallen human nature, taking it from the Virgin Mary, and sanctified it in the very act of assumption, and all through the holy Life He lived in it from the beginning to the end. Thus our redemption begins from His very Birth, so that we must regard the Incarnation, even in its narrower sense, as redeeming event, reaching out to its full *telos* in the death and resurrection. In His holy assumption of our unholy humanity, His purity wipes away our impurity, His holiness covers our corruption, His nature heals our nature.[1]

If we are to think of the active and passive obedience of Christ as dealing with our actual sin and its penalty, we are to think of the incarnational union of the Holy Son with our unholy nature as dealing with our original sin, or as sanctifying our human nature, through bringing it into a healing and sanctifying union with His own holy nature. That applies, as Calvin insisted in a famous section of his *Institute*, to the whole life of Jesus, His conception, birth, childhood, youth, manhood, for by living His holy Life through the whole course of our

[1] See Robert Bruce, *Sermons Preached in the Kirk of Edinburgh* (edit. by Cunningham), p. 268f.

life He has sanctified our conception, birth, childhood, youth, manhood, and death, in Himself.[1]

This is supremely important, for it is only through this union of the human nature with His divine nature that Jesus Christ gives us not only the negative righteousness of the remission of sins but makes us share in the positive righteousness of His obedient and loving Life lived in perfect filial relation to the Father from the cradle to the grave. If we neglect this essential element in the obedience of the Son, then not only do the active and the passive obedience of Christ fall apart in our understanding and doctrine, but we are unable to apprehend justification as anything more than a merely forensic non-imputation of sin. Moreover, if we neglect this essential element we are unable to see the Humanity of Jesus Christ in its saving significance, that is, to give the whole life of the historical Jesus its rightful place in the doctrine of the atonement. It is necessary for us, then, to give the fullest consideration to the place of the union of human and divine natures in the being and Life of the incarnate Son, for it is that saving and sanctifying union in which we are given to share that belongs to the very substance of our faith and life in Christ. In other words, what we are concerned with is the *filial relation* which the Son of God lived out in our humanity in perfect holiness and love, achieving that in Himself in assuming our human nature into oneness with Himself, and on that ground giving us to share in it, providing us with a fulness in His own obedient Sonship from which we may all receive.

B. *Subjective Justification*

It is illuminating to recognise that subjective Justification, as well as objective Justification, has already taken place in Jesus Christ. Not only was the great divine act of righteousness fulfilled in the flesh of Jesus, in His Life and Death, but throughout His Life and Death Jesus stood in our place as our Substitute and Representative who appropriated the divine Act of saving Righteousness for us. He responded to it, yielded to it, accepted it and actively made it His own, for what He was and did in His human nature was not for His own sake but for our sakes. That is true of all that He did. He was the

[1] *Institute* 2.16.19.

Word of God brought to bear upon man, but He was also man hearing that Word, answering it, trusting it, living by it—by faith. He was the great Believer—vicariously believing in our place and in our name.[1] He was not only the Will of God enacted in our flesh, but He was the will of man united to that divine Will. In becoming one with us He laid hold upon our wayward human will, made it His very own, and bent it back into obedience to, and in oneness with, the holy Will of God. Likewise in Justification, Jesus Christ was not only the embodiment of God's justifying act but the embodiment of our human appropriation of it. In that unity of the divine and the human, Justification was fulfilled in Christ from both sides, from the side of the justifying God and from the side of justified man—'He was justified in the Spirit', as St. Paul put it.[2] Justification as objective act of the redeeming God and Justification as subjective actualisation of it in our estranged human existence have once and for all taken place—in Jesus.

The New Testament employs other language to speak of this —ἁγιάζειν, to sanctify, and τελειοῦν, to consecrate, especially in their application to Christ. Thus in the Fourth Gospel, in His great high-priestly prayer, Jesus spoke of sanctifying Himself that we also may be sanctified in Him, and prayed that we may be consecrated in one with Him as He and the Father are one. Similarly the Epistle to the Hebrews spoke of Christ as our High-Priest who has consecrated Himself for our sakes, and pointed out that He who sanctifies and those who are sanctified are all one. Once and for all we have been sanctified and consecrated in Christ's vicarious work.

That aspect of justification tended to drop out of sight when Protestant scholastic theology began to operate with an *ordo salutis* in which it assigned justification and sanctification to successive and different stages in a process of salvation. In the New Testament itself, however, sanctification or consecration in Christ (for the two words express the same thing) is spoken of in the perfect tense. Christ has already consecrated or sanctified Himself for our sakes, so that we are already consecrated or sanctified in Him—therefore santification or consecration is

[1] This is the significance of the expression 'the merits of Christ' employed in our Reformed Confessions and Catechisms. See *The School of Faith*, p. lxxxiiif.

[2] 1 Timothy 3.16.

imputed to us by His free Grace just like justification. But it would be a mistake to think of these as two different things, for in the Johannine literature and in the Epistle to the Hebrews the words 'sanctification' and 'consecration' correspond closely to the Pauline 'justification'—they have their special nuance, without doubt, for they are more closely associated than 'justification' with the priestly work of Christ, but it is the same reality, the same verity, to use Knox's term, which they describe.

This teaching is found deeply embedded in the theology of John Calvin and it is an immense pity that later 'Calvinism' overlaid and obscured it, although it is once more being brought to light and appropriated in our Reformed doctrine.[1] Our concern here is with *subjective justification*, that aspect of it in which the mighty act of God's righteousness and holiness is appropriated and translated into human life—and that is precisely what Calvin spoke of as the consecrated and sanctified flesh or Life of Jesus in which we are given to share. Let us take as a text for our discussion his answer in the *Geneva Catechism* to question 342. 'Since the whole affiance of our salvation rests in the obedience which He has rendered to God, His Father, in order that it may be imputed to us as if it were ours, we must possess Him: for His blessings are not ours unless He gives Himself to us first.' The same essential point is made by Knox in the *Book of Common Order* in which he says that justification, regeneration, sanctification flow out of *adoption*.

We may single out of this two points immediately relevant for our concern at the moment. (1) It is only through union with Christ that we partake of the blessings of Christ, that is through union with Him in His holy and obedient life. Through being united to Him we share in His judgment and His exaltation, in His passive and active obedience, in His Death and also in His Resurrection and Ascension—but first of all it is necessary that we be united to Him, that is, have part in the union which He wrought out between us in His Incarnation and in the whole course of His Life. Unfortunately this was reversed in the later teaching of the Church of Scotland, as found in the Westminster Standards—for they put justification

[1] Cf. R. S. Wallace, *Calvin's Doctrine of the Christian Life*, in which Dr Wallace shows that for Calvin Christ's self-consecration on our behalf governs the whole of the Christian life.

first, and then spoke of union with Christ and sanctification as following upon the judicial act that took place in justification by faith.[1]

(2) But there is a second point we have to note in Calvin's statement, the meaning of 'affiance'. As Calvin used it this term had a convenanted significance, for it referred to the 'fiance' or trust which we have within the covenant mercies of God. A great deal of harm has been occasioned through a sharp distinction between *fides quae creditur* and *fides qua creditur*, or between *credere* and *confidere*, belief and trust. Once this distinction is drawn, faith is separated off from its objective ground and is understood as 'trust', *fiducia*—then justification by faith means justification through our trust in God. Now of course there is a truth here which must not be neglected. The Latin term for trust, *fiducia*, which Calvin often translated *fiance*, was a legal term taken from conveyancing, and referred to the conveying of a property from one person to another without any documented receipt; it is an act of trust that relies solely upon the word of another without any tangible pledge of his deed. As Calvin used the word *affiance*, however, the trust or faith of the believer was regarded as grounded and pledged in the faithfulness of Christ, not only in His spoken promises but in His flesh. He has already received from God all His blessings and has sealed that reception of it for us in His own life and death. Faith is thus a polar concept that reposes upon and derives from the prior faithfulness of God which has been translated permanently into our actual human existence in Jesus Christ. We do not rely, then, upon our act of faith, but upon the faith of Christ which undergirds and upholds our faith. But His faith is not in word only; it has been translated into His life and saving action and set forth in the Covenant of His Body and Blood. The text which we have taken from Calvin comes from his account of the Lord's Supper, for it is in our participation in the Supper and our union with Christ which it gives us that we discern what *affiance*, faith depending upon the faithfulness of Christ, really means.

We may summarise this by saying that Jesus Christ was not only the fulfilment and embodiment of God's righteous and holy Act or δικαίωμα, but also the embodiment of our act of

[1] See *The School of Faith*, cvif.

faith and trust and obedience toward God. He stood in our place, taking our cause upon Him, also as Believer, as the Obedient One who was Himself justified before God as His beloved Son in whom He was well pleased. He offered to God a perfect confidence and trust, a perfect faith and response which we are unable to offer, and He appropriated all God's blessings which we are unable to appropriate. Through union with Him we share in His faith, in His obedience, in His trust and His appropriation of the Father's blessing; we share in His justification before God. Therefore when we are justified by faith, this does not mean that it is *our* faith that justifies us, far from it—it is the faith of Christ alone that justifies us, but we in faith flee from our own acts even of repentance, confession, trust and response, and take refuge in the obedience and faithfulness of Christ—'Lord I believe, help thou mine unbelief.' That is what it means to be justified by faith.

We may express it in still another way. Justification has been fulfilled subjectively as well as objectively in Jesus Christ, but that objective and subjective justification is objective to us. It is freely imputed to us by Grace objectively and we through the Spirit share in it subjectively as we are united to Christ. His subjective justification becomes ours, and it is subjective in us as well as in Him, but only subjective in us because it has been made subjectively real in our own human nature, in our own human flesh in Jesus, our Brother, and our Mediator.

When we look at it like this, we understand why John Knox hesitated to use the expression 'justification by faith' and preferred instead concrete expressions which made it clear that we are justified only in Christ, by what He has done alone, and not by any act of ours, even if that act be an act of believing. We believe in Christ in such a way that we flee from ourselves and take refuge in Him alone—and therefore we can hardly speak about 'justifying faith' without transferring the emphasis away from Christ and His faithful act to ourselves and our act of trust or believing. At this point Calvin and Knox stood in contrast to Luther who approached the whole question from a point that tended to be anthropocentric: 'How can I get a gracious God?' Luther made it indubitably clear that justification does not derive from the act of the self, but from a righteousness outside of us in Christ, from an *aliena justitia*, as

he called it. But his basic question demanded an answer to the self, and inevitably gave the whole question of assurance undue prominence. With Calvin and Knox it was different—assurance had little place, because it was not needed. The very act of faith was pivoted upon Christ and His faith, not upon my faith or my need for this or that answer, and hence the assurance was unshakable, because it was grounded in the solid faithfulness of Christ. It was only later in Scottish theology when the anthropocentric questions emerged, questions of conscience and soul-searching, when the eyes of the believer were turned inward upon his own heart rather than outward upon his Lord and Saviour, that the demand for assurance became clamant. Whenever there is talk of 'justifying faith' then uncertainty creeps in, for all our acts, even of repentance and faith are unworthy before God. If it is upon our repentance and our faith that we have ultimately to rely, who can be saved, not to speak of being sure of his salvation? It is against this false notion of justification and this false notion of faith that Fraser of Brea directed his profound writings, for what disturbed him more than anything else was the new legalism and the new self-righteousness that had crept into the Reformed faith under cover of 'justifying faith'.[1] If we are to use the expression 'justification by faith alone', and there is no reason why we should not, then let it be crystal clear that 'by faith alone' is meant 'by the Grace of Christ alone', that faith is but an empty vessel to be filled by the Covenant Mercies and faithfulness of God in Christ.

III

The Radical Consequences of Justification

Justification means Justification by Christ alone—that is the reference of the expressions *sola fide*, *sola gratia*, *sola scriptura*, used in Reformed theology. Justification means that we look exclusively to Christ, and therefore that we look away from ourselves altogether in order to live out of Him alone. That radical nature of justification is expressed and its radical consequences drawn by the *Scots Confession* in the words we cited earlier: 'we willingly spoil ourselves of all honour and

[1] James Fraser of Brea, *A Treatise on Justifying Faith*, and *Meditations on Several Subjects in Divinity, Particularly Trusting upon God*, etc.

glory of our own salvation and redemption, as we also do of our regeneration and sanctification.'

This is something that very badly needs to be reiterated today within the Churches of the Reformation. Justification by Christ alone means the rejection of *all* forms of self-justification, and all forms of justification by anything or out of any source other than Jesus Christ. Let us consider what this means in several areas of doctrine and life.

(*a*) At the Reformation Justification by the Grace of Christ alone was seen to set aside all *natural goodness*, and all works–righteousness; but this applies to all goodness, Christian goodness as well, that is, to 'sanctification' as it came to be called. This is powerfully driven home by the *Scots Confession* in several articles, such as the twelfth and the fifteenth. All that we do is unworthy so that we must fall down before you and unfeignedly confess that we are unprofitable servants—and it is precisely Justification by the free Grace of Christ alone that shows us that all that we are and have done even as believers is called in question. Justification by Grace alone remains the sole ground of the Christian life; we never advance beyond it, as if justification were only the beginning of a new self-righteousness, the beginning of a life of sanctification which is what we do in response to justification. Of course we are summoned to live out day by day what we already are in Christ through His self-consecration or sanctification, but sanctification is not what we do in addition to what God has done in justification. And yet that is the tendency of the *Westminster Catechisms*, where we have a return to the Roman notion of infused sanctification that has to be worked out through strict obedience to legal precepts—hence the exposition of the Ten Commandments takes up the greater part of the Catechisms. But the *Scots Confession* laid the axe to the root of any such movement when it insisted that we have to spoil ourselves even of our own regeneration and sanctification as well as justification. What it 'axed' so radically was the notion of 'corredemption' which in our day has again become so rampant, not only in the Roman Church, but in Liberal and Evangelical Protestantism, e.g. the emphasis upon existential decision as the means whereby we 'make real' for ourselves the *kerygma* of the New Testa-

ment, which means that in the last resort our salvation depends upon our own personal or existential decision. That is the exact antithesis of the Reformed doctrine of election, which rests salvation upon the prior and objective decision of God in Christ. It is Justification by Grace alone that guards the Gospel from corruption by 'Evangelicals', 'Liberals' and Romans alike.

(*b*) Justification by the Grace of Christ alone calls in question not only all natural goodness but all *natural knowledge*. Natural knowledge is as much the work of the flesh as natural goodness; it is a work of the natural man. It is at this point that Karl Barth has made such an immense contribution to the Reformation. We cannot separate knowing and being for they belong to the same man, and it is the whole man, with his knowing and his acting, with the whole of his being, who is called in question by Justification. Justification puts us in the right and truth of God and therefore tells us that we are in untruth. Now, let it be clear that Justification by Grace alone does not mean that there is no natural goodness in man, but that man with his natural goodness is called in question. Jesus Christ died for the whole man (with his good and his evil) not for part of him, the evil part, but for the whole man. He died for all men, the good and the bad, and all alike come under the total judgment of His Death and Resurrection; all alike have to be born again in Him, and made new creatures. That is the radical nature of the Gospel, which becomes so clear to us when we communicate at the Holy Table in the Body and Blood of our Lord, for there we feel ashamed for our *whole being*, for our good as well as for our evil. But the same applies to our natural knowledge. Justification by the Grace of Christ alone, does not mean that there is no natural knowledge—what natural man is there who does not know something of God even if he holds it down in unrighteousness or turns the truth into a lie?[1] But it does mean that the whole of that natural knowledge is called in question by Christ who when He comes to us says: 'If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, take up his cross and follow me.' The whole man with his natural knowledge is there questioned down to the root of his being, for man is summoned to look away from all that he is

[1] Rom. 1.18, 25.

and knows or thinks he knows to Christ who is the Way the Truth and the Life; no one goes to the Father but by Him. The theology of Barth can be described, then, as the application of Justification to the whole realm of man's life, to the realm of his knowing as well as the realm of his doing. In that he has sought to follow through the radical consequences of the Reformation from which our forefathers resiled when they took refuge again, like the Romans, in the works of the natural man, for justification.

But if we are to take the *Scots Confession* seriously then we have to apply this not only to natural knowledge but to *all* Christian knowledge; we have to learn to spoil ourselves of our own vaunted knowledge, we have to let our own theology be called into radical question, by Christ. If we translate the word 'justification' by the word 'verification' we can see the startling relevance of this to modern theological and philosophical discussions. Justification by Grace alone tells us that verification of our faith or knowledge on any other ground, or out of any other source, that Jesus Christ, is to be set aside. Justification has an *epistemological* as well as an ethical reference—epistemologically it insists that the only legitimate demonstration of Christian truth is that which is in accordance with its nature, which is Grace, and that to seek justification of it on any other ground is not only fundamentally false in itself but to falsify the Gospel at its very basis. But apart from the contemporary debate on 'verification' Justification means that at every point in our theological inquiry we have to let our knowledge, our theology, our formulations, our statements, be called into question by the very Christ toward which they point, for He alone is the Truth. Justification means that our theological statements are of such a kind that they do not claim to have truth in themselves for by their very nature they point away from themselves to Christ as the one Truth of God. Therefore whenever we claim that our theological statements or our formulations have their truth in themselves we are turning back into the way of self-justification. Out of sheer respect for the majesty of the Truth as it is revealed in the Holy Scriptures, we have to do our utmost to speak correctly and exactly about it—that is the meaning of orthodoxy and the way of humility—but when we have done all this, we have still to

confess that we are unfaithful servants, that all our efforts fall far short of the truth. Far from seeking justification on the ground of our 'orthodoxy' we can only serve the Truth faithfully if we point away from ourselves and our statements to Christ Himself, and direct all eyes to Him alone. He who boasts of orthodoxy thus sins against Justification by Christ alone, for he justifies himself by appeal to his own beliefs or his own formulations of belief and thereby does despite to the Truth and Grace of Christ. Once a Church begins to boast of its 'orthodoxy' it begins to fall from Grace.

(*c*) Justification by the Grace of Christ alone calls in question all *tradition*. The radical consequence of Justification was keenly felt in this direction at the Reformation. Concentration upon the Word of God, the self-utterance of the Truth, and the acknowledgment of its primacy, cut the strings of prejudice and prejudgment and made clear the path of faith and obedience. Justification here meant that faith is determined by the objective Word of God as its ultimate authority, and so it was freed from the shackles of every lesser authority, for devotion to the Truth of the Word (the whole Truth and nothing but the Truth) inculcated a readiness to rethink all preconceptions and to put all traditional ideas to the test face to face with the Word. In other words, sheer attachment to the Word of God as the real object of knowledge meant detachment from all other sources and norms of knowledge, and the demand that all traditional ideas and notions had to be tested at the bar of the Word. That did not mean that tradition was to be despised, but that it was to be subjected to the criticism of the Word and the Spirit, and corrected through obedient conformity to Jesus Christ. The Reformation stood, therefore, for the supremacy of the Word over all tradition, and for theological activity as the repentant rethinking of all tradition face to face with the Revelation of God in Jesus Christ.

But that applies no less to the Reformed and Evangelical tradition; to our Presbyterian tradition as well as to the Roman tradition. When we examine our own position today, it is astonishing to find how close we have come to the Roman view even in the Church of Scotland. How frequently, for example, we find that appeal is made to 'Christian instinct' or to 'the mind of the Church' over against the plain utterances of Holy

Scripture, and often just at those places were the Word of God offends our will, opposes our habits, or cuts against the grain of our desire! And how massive is the effect of our several traditions upon the interpretations of the Bible! How easy it is to allow the Presbyterian tradition to determine our reading of the New Testament especially when it is a question of justifying our tradition before the critique of others! There can be no doubt that every one of the great Churches of the Reformation, the Lutheran, the Anglican, and the Reformed, has developed its own masterful tradition, and that that tradition today exercises massive influence not only over its way of interpreting the Bible and formulating its doctrine but over the whole shape and direction of its life. Those who shut their eyes to this fact are precisely those who are most enslaved to the dominant power of tradition just because it has become an unconscious canon and norm of their thinking. It is high time we asked again whether the Word of God really does have free course amongst us and whether it is not after all bound and fettered by the traditions of men. The tragedy, apparently, is that the very structures of our Churches represent the fossilisation of traditions that have grown up by practice and procedure, have become so hardened in self-justification that even the Word of God can hardly crack them open. There is scarcely a Church that claims to be *ecclesia reformata* that can truthfully claim to be *semper reformanda*.

(*d*) Justification by Christ alone calls in question all *systems* and *orders*, and calls them in question because Jesus Christ alone is central and supreme in the one Church of God. In any true theological system, Justification is by reference to Christ alone, for conformity to Christ as the Truth of God for us is the one ultimate principle of unity. Likewise Justification in ecclesiastical order or polity ought to be through appeal to Christ alone. Our quarrel with the Church of Rome in doctrinal matters concerns the centrality of Jesus Christ, the primacy and supremacy of Christology which is so obscured and compromised by Roman doctrines of merit and tradition, and above all by Mariology. In our debate with the Church of England over questions of order, we are also concerned with the centrality of Christ, and the primacy of Christology—and therefore the doctrine of the Church as the Body of *Christ* is in

the forefront. It is Justification by Christ alone that makes it so, for He alone is the ground and Head of the Church, and in Him alone is the Church's unity constituted and its order maintained. But for that very reason Justification by Christ alone disallows any appeal from one Church to another for recognition of its orders, as it also rebukes the self-justification of a Church in calling in question the orders of another Church. Justification by Christ alone means that we renounce the way of the flesh in seeking honour from men, or justification from one another; and therefore Justification by Christ alone means that in any movement for reconciliation between Churches, the question of the recognition of orders cannot have priority without radical betrayal of the Reformation, nay, without radical betrayal of Christ for He is thereby ousted from His place of centrality.

It becomes more and more clear that in the ecumenical movement it is the doctrine of Justification by Christ alone that is at stake, and that it can just as easily be sinned against by those who shout loudest that they are upholding the Reformation tradition as by those who make no such boast. He is truest to the Reformation tradition who is always ready to subject it to the ruthless questioning of the Word of God.

(*e*) Nowhere does Justification by Christ alone have more radical consequences than in regard to the pastoral ministry. Justification by Christ is grounded upon His mighty Act in which He took our place, substituting Himself for us under the divine judgment, and substituting Himself for us in the obedient response He rendered to God in worship and thanksgiving and praise. In Himself He has opened up a way to the Father, so that we may approach God solely through Him and on the ground of what He has done and is—therefore we pray in His Name, and whatever we do, we do in His Name before God. Thus the whole of our worship and ministry reposes upon the substitutionary work of Christ. Now the radical nature of that is apparent from the fact that through substituting Himself in our place there takes place a displacement of our humanity by the humanity of Christ—that is why Jesus insists that we can only follow Him by denying ourselves, by letting Him displace us from a place of centrality, and by letting Him take our place.

At the Reformation this doctrine had immediate effect in the overthrow of Roman sacerdotalism—Jesus Christ is our sole Priest. He is the one and only Man who can mediate between us and God, so that we approach God solely through the mediation of the Humanity of Jesus, through His incarnate Priesthood. When the Humanity of Christ is depreciated or whenever it is obscured by the sheer majesty of His Deity then the need for some other human mediation creeps in—hence in the Dark and Middle Ages arose the need for a human priesthood to mediate between sinful humanity and the exalted Christ, the majestic Judge and King. There was of course no denial of the Deity of Christ by the Reformers—on the contrary they restored the purity of faith in Christ as God through overthrowing the accretions that compromised it; but they also restored the place occupied in the New Testament and the Early Church by the Humanity of Christ, as He who took our human nature in order to be our Priest, as He who takes our side and is our Advocate before the judgment of God, and who once and for all has wrought out atonement for us in His sacrifice on the Cross, and therefore as He who eternally stands in for us as our heavenly Mediator and High-Priest.

The Church on earth lives and acts only as it is directed by its heavenly Lord, and only in such a way that His Ministry is reflected in the midst of its ministry and worship. Therefore from first to last the worship and ministry of the Church on earth must be governed by the fact that Christ substitutes Himself in our place, and that our humanity with its own acts of worship, is displaced by His, so that we appear before God not in our own name, not in our own significance, not in virtue of our own acts of confession, contrition, worship, and thanksgiving, but solely in the name of Christ and solely in virtue of what He has done in our name and on our behalf, and in our stead. Justification by Christ alone means that from first to last in the worship of God and in the ministry of the Gospel Christ Himself is central, and that we draw near in worship and service only through letting Him take our place. He only is Priest. He only represents humanity. He only has an offering with which to appear before God and with which God is well-pleased. He only presents our prayers before God, and He only is our praise and thanksgiving and worship as we

appear before the face of the Father. Nothing in our hands we bring—simply to His Cross we cling.

But what has happened in Protestant worship and ministry? Is it not too often the case that the whole life and worship of the congregation revolves round the personality of the minister? He is the one who is in the centre; he offers the prayers of the congregation; he it is who mediates 'truth' through his personality, and he it is who mediates between the people and God through conducting the worship entirely on his own. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the case of the popular minister where everything centres on him, and the whole life of the congregation is built round him. What is that but *Protestant sacerdotalism*, sacerdotalism which involves the displacement of the Humanity of Christ by the humanity of the minister, and the obscuring of the Person of Christ by the personality of the minister? How extraordinary that Protestantism should thus develop a new sacerdotalism, to be sure a psychological rather than a sacramental sacerdotalism, but a sacerdotalism nonetheless, in which it is the personality of the minister which both mediates the Word of God to man and mediates the worship of man to God! Protestant Churches are full of these 'psychological priests' and more and more they evolve a psychological cult and develop a form of psychological counselling which displaces the truly pastoral ministry of Christ. How frequently, for example, the minister's prayers are so crammed with his own personality (with all its boring idiosyncracies!) that the worshipper cannot get past him in order to worship God in the name of Christ—but is forced to worship God in the name of the minister! How frequently the sermon is not an exposition of the Word of God but an exposition of the minister's own views on this or that subject! And how frequently the whole life of the congregation is so built up on the personality of the minister that when he goes the congregation all but collapses or dwindles away!

There can be no doubt that the whole concept of the ministry and of worship in our Reformed Churches needs to be brought back to the criticism of the Word of God in order that we may learn again the meaning of Justification by Christ alone in the midst of the Church's life and work. Jesus Christ must be given His rightful place by being set right in the centre, as Head Lord

of the Church as its sole Prophet and Priest and King, and that means in the midst of our preaching, in the basic notion of the ministerial office, in the fundamental mode of worship, and in the whole life of the congregation as the Body of *Christ alone*.

THE INTEGRITY OF FAITH

AN INQUIRY INTO THE MEANING OF LAW IN THE THOUGHT OF JOHN CALVIN

by The Rev. Professor ROBERT A. GESSERT

Introduction

Though at first it seems quite simple and straightforward and though he devotes hundreds of pages to its exposition, Calvin's idea of law is subtle and elusive. He, like Luther, stresses the Protestant principle of justification by grace alone, but not a few interpreters have seen him as the severest of legalists who finally relegates grace to the position of being merely a means to works righteousness. It is undoubtedly pretentious to try to put law in its 'true' meaning and context in Calvin's schema. This paper must therefore be regarded as simply an exploratory effort in that direction.

Since Calvin was himself a competent student of the secular law, a fruitful method for investigating this problem would be to inquire into the character of the legal studies that formed such an important part of his background. How did he regard the Roman Law which had been shaping European civilisation for several centuries? To what extent was he influenced by Greek versions of the Natural Law which had been so important to Thomas Aquinas? In the English language we make the word 'law' (like 'love') carry, somewhat promiscuously, nuances of meaning that the more analytical languages of Latin and Greek distinguish. The tools of Philology and History may be necessary for a definitive examination of Calvin's concept of law. He wrote primarily in Latin and used *lex* most frequently—but how is this related to *jus* or to *ratio*, so significant for Stoic conceptions of Divine and Natural Law? What bearing did the Greek terms *nomos* and *telos* and *logos*—all highly influential for Aquinas—have on his understanding of the character of law?

We could also fruitfully focus our entire attention on Calvin's own definitions and elucidation of the nature and content of law. While a preliminary part of my inquiry is necessarily

occupied with this material, it is my opinion that we may get closer to Calvin's meaning by trying to see his formal and direct treatment of the subject in the context of his total thought. The bulk of this interpretation is therefore concerned with the relation of law to other key insights and concepts in Calvin's works. I will try to show the relation of law to his doctrine of God, his view of man, and his understanding of the Gospel.

The Law as Law

> What I have said will become plain if we attend, as we ought to two things connected with all laws—viz. the enactment of the law, and the equity on which the enactment is founded and rests. . . . Now, as it is evident that the law of God which we call moral, is nothing else than the testimony of the natural law, and of that conscience which God has engraven on the minds of men, the whole of this equity of which we now speak is prescribed in it. Hence it alone ought to be the aim, the rule, and the end of all laws.[1]

When Calvin defines his terms he does so in the context of using them for the illumination of some aspect of life under God. He is not primarily concerned with the refinement of conceptualisation, so it is dangerous for us to take one of many possible statements as *the* definition of law. In trying to build up an understanding of the meanings implied in all his uses, the most obvious thing we note is that law is a *rule* of conduct. It is *lex*, that is, a directive and an imperative. But it is founded on rightness (*aequitas*) and righteousness (*jus*). One does not have to read far in Calvin, however, to discover that it is finally *legislator* (Lawgiver) that gives law its character as law.[2] In his discussions of law, Thomas Aquinas found it necessary to distinguish four kinds of law in addition to positive or civil law: Eternal Law which is in the mind of God, Divine Law which God reveals to man, Natural Law which is the image of the Eternal Law as it is knowable to man naturally, and Human Law (*jus gentium*) which sometimes seems to mean the Common Law or the Law of Nations and sometimes seems to mean the elaboration of the Natural Law.[3] Calvin occasionally—for specific purposes as in his treatment of civil government—implies some of these distinctions, but his preoccupation

[1] *Institutes* (Beveridge translation), Book IV, chap. xx, sect. 16.
[2] *ibid.*, Book II, chap. viii, sect. 6.
[3] cf. *Summa Theologica*, I-II, Q 90-96.

is with the Divine Law, enacted and revealed by God. All other law must be seen in the light of this which alone can be known by man with reliability and 'benefit' and in which the true Law-giver is known:

> . . . as a necessary remedy, both for our dulness and our contumacy, the Lord has given us his written Law, which, by its sure attestations, removes the obscurity of the law of nature, and also, by shaking off our lethargy, makes a more lively and permanent impression on our minds.[1]

The focus on written Law does not remove all richness, flexibility, or generality from the concept. The Mosaic Law is written Law, but as such it belongs particularly to and characterises the First Dispensation. The Moral, Ceremonial and Judicial components of the Exodus Code are the basic types within it. The Ceremonial, pertaining to piety in a particular way, was superseded in the Atonement of Christ. The Judicial, concerned with administration according to charity, rightly varies from time to time and from place to place in its specifications. The Moral Law, which is the heart of the Mosaic Law and the Divine Law, alone applies universally and without essential variation. Though the Moral Law is written in the Decalogue, it is not identical with its words. On the one hand, the Ten Commandments can be summarised without loss in the Double Love Commandment. On the other hand, each Commandment requires interpretation according to hermeneutical principles and with the guidance of the Holy Spirit.

The Law behind all law has certain general features, for Calvin, which he lays before us in the preface to his exposition of the Decalogue.[2] First, the fact that the Lawgiver gives Law its character tells us that the 'law is spiritual'. The words of the Decalogue deal largely with external behaviour, but their real target is internal—purity of heart. And the spirit of the law is both more important and more exacting than the letter. Secondly since the Law is spiritual and written, attention must be paid to what the words imply but cannot contain. This is accomplished by (*a*) seeking to determine the end or purpose (*rationem, ceu finem*) of each specific Commandment, and (*b*)

[1] *Institutes,* Book II, chap. viii, sect. 1.

[2] See especially *Commentary on Romans* and *Harmony of the Pentateuch* as well as Book II, chap. vii, of *Institutes.*

noting that the expressions are generally elliptical, that is, a prohibition is stated but the opposite is also required. Thirdly, the division of the Decalogue into two Tables shows the complete interdependence of piety toward God and justice and charity toward men—the latter is the necessary expression of the former, and the former is the necessary foundation of the latter and the final cause of both Tables.

Even in so brief a summary treatment of the character of law as Law, mention must be made of the well-known functions of the Law so frequently alluded to by Calvin. The first function or 'office' of the Law is to convict and condemn man, rendering him inexcusable and desperate with respect to his own resources for righteousness and salvation. Through this office, the Law may lead to Christ. The second function of the Law is to restrain by threats of punishment those who 'have no regard for rectitude and justice'. This is especially necessary 'for the good of society'. In both of these first two functions the Law touches all men in some measure. But the highest office is that which the Law performs only with respect to God's Elect, those who have been justified by grace. For them, even though the Law is 'engraven on their hearts by the finger of God', the external and written Law is still 'the best instrument for enabling them daily to learn with greater truth and certainty what the will of the Lord is which they aspire to follow, and to confirm them in this knowledge'.[1]

In his stress upon the Lawgiver, the didactic role of the Law, and the character of Law as a relation between God and man, Calvin shows that, in spite of his Greek and Roman humanism, his real mentors in the conceptualisation of law are the Hebrew Prophets. None of the Greek words—*telos*, *nomos*, *logos*—nor any of the Latin words—*lex*, *jus*, *aequitas*, *ratio*—expresses the full, vibrant meaning of law in Calvin's thought so well as *Torah*. To be sure, Calvin parts ways with Jewish interpreters of the Law in finding condemnation in it apart from the grace of Christ, but hardly in any other essential respect[2];

[1] All quotes in this paragraph are from Book II, chap. vii, of *Institutes*.

[2] Stoicism as well as Hebraicism emphasises the Will of God which gives Law its force and righteousness. Stoicism also has a doctrine of Providence which it takes as seriously as Calvin. However, Stoicism's pantheism and resignation and Hebraicism's emphasis upon revealed Law and affirmation in obedience show Calvin's affinities with the Jews rather than the Stoics. See also *infra*.

There are not various rules of life, but one perpetual and inflexible rule; and, therefore, when David describes the righteous as spending their whole lives in meditating on the Law (Psalm 1.2), we must not confine to a single age, an employment which is most appropriate to all ages, even to the end of the world.[1]

The Law and God

The Lord, in delivering a perfect rule of righteousness, has reduced it in all its parts to His mere will, and in this way has shown that there is nothing more acceptable to Him than obedience.[2]

Emil Brunner, in *The Divine Imperative*, argues that the law is an edict issued by God because of the fallen condition of man and is, therefore, only an 'indirect' expression of His will in relation to man.[3] Calvin stands in striking opposition to Brunner on this point. In many places, particularly when speaking of man's need for the revelation of Scripture,[4] Calvin tends to identify Law with the word of God. The Law is the direct and accurate expression of God's character, especially as Creator and Father. And there can be no doubt that the Redeemer and Creator are one in essence and that the two testaments are not to be torn asunder, the Anabaptists notwithstanding.

Since it may be said of God, that 'in the enumeration of His perfections, He is described not as He is in Himself, but in relation to us, in order that our acknowledgment of Him may be a more vivid actual impression than empty speculation,'[5]—the Law as word can be seen to lie at the basis of all our existential knowledge of God. A prominent Jewish Rabbi once remarked that Judaism did not have until the nineteenth century—and still does not 'properly' have—'theologians as such'. All that Judaism can or should have are interpreters of Torah, for the being and nature of God are not objects of human inquiry; man's ultimate concern consists in his *relation* to God and that relation *is* Torah. For Calvin, also, the Law has this

[1] *Institutes*, Book II, chap. vii, sect. 13.
[2] ibid., Book II, chap. viii, sect. 5.
[3] cf. *The Divine Imperative*, p. 142, where Brunner writes: 'It is true that the *Lex* itself *is not what God wills*, but it is absolutely controlled by the Divine Command. In spite of the element of compulsion which it contains, the *Lex* forms part of the way in which God, at present, preserves life *in the created order tainted by sin*; it is His way of giving us life, and especially life with one another.' Italics mine. See also *infra* 'The Law and Man'.
[4] cf. *Institutes*, Book I, chap. vi.
[5] ibid., Book I, chap. x, sect. 2.

sense of relation and this dimension of depth. There is no aspect of the knowable word of God or of His relation to man which lies outside the Law.[1] It is not the *Law* which is contingent upon the fallen condition of man as in Brunner's view, it is merely the Law's *functions with respect to fallen man* that are contingent in Calvin's view. Contingently the Law expresses an actual and necessary relation of God to man. Eternally, through the work of Christ, the Law expresses a potential and desired relation of God to man.

This basic point can be elaborated more analytically in reference to four principles implied in Calvin's understanding of the relation of God to man. The idea of Law bears directly on each of these. First, the principle of *intention*. The *voluntas Dei* (will of God) issues in the *verbum Dei* (Word of God); the *Legislator* stands behind the *lex*. It is important to note here that none of the Greek terms associated with law carries the same connotation of will as *lex*. In biblical thought and in Roman Stoicism law exists as God's prerogative. In much Greek religion and art if not philosophy, the gods are themselves subject to law (as *logos*) which has a reality superior to any will.

Second, the principle of *sovereignty*. Again, a reference to Stoicism will be helpful. For the Roman Stoics, Natural Law was synonymous with Divine Reason. But this Reason was viewed as dynamic, not static; it was not regarded merely as a structure or form inhering in the universe, but rather as the active and shaping principle that directly determined the course of all history. Divine Reason is Providence as well as will and form. Calvin objects strenuously to the tendency of the Romans to identify Divine Reason with God Himself, condemning 'that jejune speculation, of a universal mind animating and envigorating the world'.[2] But it is the pantheism —the failure to acknowledge the Lawgiver apart from and behind the Law—not the principle of active sovereignty in the Law that he rejects. God rules through His Law—in the regularities of nature and in the direction and purpose of history. In the universe, the 'Dumb Magistrate' is supreme.

[1] See commentary on Acts 7.38 in *Calvin's Commentaries* (Haroutunian's translation), p. 103.

[2] *Institutes*, Book I, chap. v, sect. 5.

With respect to it, even Church and State are subjects or, at best, ministers of it.

Third, the principle of *righteousness*. The Law breathes the spirit of God's righteousness. Through it, He has laid down and defined what is right and what is wrong. The threats and promises contained in the Law make this manifestly clear, but it is implied in every syllable of the Law. A 'rule of perfect righteousness' is revealed to man, but, more importantly, the righteousness of God's relation to man is put with ultimate seriousness and man is rendered totally inexcusable. That God never lays aside this righteousness is perfectly shown precisely in the work of Christ and in the Atonement as fulfilment of the law. Indeed, to regard the Atonement as abrogating God's Law would make the work of Christ superfluous; if God's righteousness can be set aside, Christ is unnecessary to man's salvation.

The fourth principle implied in the Law is the principle of *revelation*. In one sense Calvin sees progress in revelation. Special revelation is needed because fallen man is blind to the 'bright manifestations' of God in his universe, the order of nature and the original image of God in man.[1] Special revelation develops in the First Dispensation: the Patriarchs, the Law and the Prophets.[2] And one could call this a 'Dispensation of Law' since the Patriarchs are preparatory to the Law and the Prophets are interpreters of the Law. A more decisive step (one might almost say 'leap') in the advance of revelation marks the Second Dispensation, the 'Dispensation of Grace'. But deeper than this change and accumulation lies a permanent and complete unity: Christ is present already in the period of the Patriarchs, and the Law receives its only true interpretation and fulfilment in Christ.[3]

It will not now be difficult to ascertain the general end contemplated by the whole Law—viz. the fulfilment of righteousness, that man may form his life on the model of the divine purity. For therein God has so delineated His own character, that any one exhibiting in action what is commanded, would in some measure exhibit a living image of God.[4]

[1] cf. ibid., Book I, chap. iv, v.
[2] ibid., Book I, chap. vi, sect. 2.
[3] See *infra*, 'The Law and the Gospel'.
[4] *Institutes*, Book II, chap. viii, sect. 51.

The Law and Man

For though the law has other uses besides . . . the general meaning is, that it is the proper school for training the children of God; the invitation given to all nations, to behold Him in the heavens and earth, proving of no avail.[1]

Emil Brunner's *The Divine Imperative* provides an excellent point of departure for this discussion also. As the law for Brunner expresses the will of God only indirectly, so man's experience of the law is ambiguous, indeed, paradoxical. Since Christian ethics deals with the inner heart of man and not merely with external actions, if man is truly to do the good in a Christian sense, so argues Brunner, he must do it *willingly*. To 'do the good' can have no other meaning than to *will* the good as well as to conform to some rule in external action. That is, the good in order truly to be done has to be done spontaneously without any sense of demand. The awareness of a conflict between what the 'right' or the 'law' requires and what one spontaneously wants to do is the essential characteristic of all law. It is also the demonstration that the right is almost impossible to do. If one were truly good and actually did the good, the sense of 'ought' would disappear completely for him:

Duty and genuine goodness are mutually exclusive. Obedience due to a sense of unwilling constraint is bondage, and indeed the bondage of sin. If I feel I '*ought*' to do right, it is a sign that I cannot do it. If I could really do it, there would be no question of 'ought' about it at all.[2]

It will serve us well to consider Brunner's argument carefully since it bears a resemblance to Calvin's position, but finally departs quite radically from the latter.[3] Brunner, like Calvin, sees nothing less than purity of heart as the true Christian righteousness. For both men this is possible only through the operation of the grace of God in Christ. Furthermore, the

[1] ibid., Book I, chap. vi, sect. 4. [2] *The Divine Imperative*, p. 74.

[3] I do not pretend to do justice to Brunner's rich and complex treatment of Law which shows great sympathies toward Calvin. In the *uses* of the Law Brunner sees Calvin to be a necessary corrective to Luther; in the *nature* of Law he sees Luther to be the necessary corrective to Calvin. It is the implications of the latter which I am concerned to call attention to. For another important treatment (in some ways similar to Brunner's) of the final *opposition* of Law and grace, see Reinhold Niebuhr's 'Love and Law in Protestantism and Catholicism' in *Christian Realism and Political Problems*. It is obvious that Niebuhr's affinities are also with Luther, so much so that he tends to distort Calvin's and Catholicism's views of the nature of law.

Law can be experienced without grace and grace in some sense supersedes the Law in the thought of both. The radical difference between the two men emerges at two points. First, as I have noted above, Brunner in opposition to Calvin holds law to be necessary only because of the Fall. Insofar as law is relevant to the justified man, it is so because he is a justified *sinner*. Christ, for Brunner, supersedes the Law both in expressing the true will of God and in making genuine goodness possible, which the law under any circumstances cannot do. The Law has to be set aside in order that righteousness might become possible for man. The most dangerous heresy in Brunner's view is 'legalism'. Calvin, fearing antinomianism and Christological heresies, insists that Christ did not set aside the law, but fulfilled it: 'I came not to destroy the law but to fulfil the law' (Mat. 5.17).

The second point of difference and the one that bears more directly on the question of 'law and man' is their antithetical treatments of the experience of the 'ought'. The critical philosophy and 'Pelagianism' of Kant[1] as well as biblical insight have influenced Brunner's version of 'bondage of will'. Kant 'discovers' moral freedom in the experience of the imperative: 'thou shalt' means 'thou canst'. Brunner basically agrees but adds what Kant omitted: that bondage is *also* discovered in the same imperative.

> This is the paradox: that the sense of 'ought', through which alone I learn at all what freedom is in this sense of 'ought', unveils to me my formal freedom—announces to me that I am in bondage to sin.[2]

We would be misled to think that this is also Calvin's notion of bondage of the will. Calvin comes at the problem 'empirically' and biblically rather than 'critically' and biblically, and his attention is focussed on freedom directly, not on the sense of 'ought'. Calvin observes what men spontaneously, willingly, 'freely' do and discovers that the overwhelming evidence is that it is evil. He also discovers that men must be compelled, commanded or otherwise made to do good against

[1] Brunner, in a note on the passage cited, quotes Kant's famous dictum, 'For, so long as the Moral Law commands "Thou *shalt* become a better man", the conclusion is inevitable "that thou canst".' (*Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*, p. 60.)

[2] Brunner, op. cit., p. 74.

their wills—but without turning his attention away from the experience of freedom toward an abstract, critical examination of 'ought'. This may seem over-subtle but it is very important, for Calvin's thought would run, contrary to Brunner's, 'If I feel I want to do it, it is a sign that it is evil.' The sense of bondage emerges in Calvin's thought—as even more explicitly in Jonathan Edwards' thought[1]—from the *content* of spontaneity and 'wants' rather than from the *form* of 'ought'. That is, the paradox is this: that in our free willingness toward evil, we discover our bondage to self and sin.[2] The Moral Law shows us this paradox, but it is not itself the source of the paradox. The paradox lies in fallen human nature, not in a law that applies only to the Fall.[3]

Brunner's analysis excludes grace from the experience of 'ought'. Only law can work through this experience. By regarding the operation of grace as essentially spontaneous, Brunner tends either toward a Spiritism that places God substantially within redeemed men or toward an Aristotelianism that no longer sees God's work as active. God either works totally within man or He merely attracts man to Himself in His passive perfection. Brunner tries to guard against these tendencies within his thought by insisting that man remains a sinner though saved by grace. The law or imperative is necessary to guide the believer because of his remaining unbelief. The God behind this law, in spite of this effort, is a God

[1] cf. 'Freedom of the Will', 'Religious Affections', and 'Doctrine of Original Sin'.

[2] Calvin's successors on this point are Nietzsche and Sartre rather than Kant and Brunner. Focussing, like Calvin, on the meaning of freedom, existentialism tends to suggest that the true meaning of freedom's actualisation is that man almost necessarily has to be judged wrong by every moral standard. If the actualisation of freedom conforms in any respect to an external standard, freedom has been limited if not lost. In the context of the Christian faith it is not difficult to move from this existentialist insight to the notion of bondage to sin and self. See also Martin Buber's interpretation of 'the meaning of that paradoxical myth of the two spirits', in which the 'wicked' spirit 'has to choose between the two affirmations: affirmation of himself and affirmation of the order, which has established and eternally establishes good and evil, the first as the affirmed and the second as the denied. If he affirms the order he must himself become "good", and that means he must deny and overcome his present state of being. If he affirms himself he must deny and reverse the order. . . .' The 'choice of himself' is, of course, 'the lie against being' for Buber. *Good and Evil*, 'Images of Good and Evil', Part III, iv, 'The Second Stage'.

[3] The interpretation of Calvin presented in this paragraph has been drawn from many places. The *Commentary on Romans*, however, has been most illuminating to me. See especially the expositions of Romans 6 and 7 and even more particularly 7.14, 16, 22, 23.

who cannot confront man insofar as he is a genuine believer. The 'personality' of God and man's encounter with God become contingent realities along with the law, relevant only for man's fallen state. When Torah disappears, the Eternal Thou is eclipsed.[1] In Calvin's thought, God and man meet in Christ without loss to the essence of either because Christ is the fulfilment of the Law and because the Law is in Him.

The four principles of intention, sovereignty, righteousness, and revelation discussed in the previous section have implications for the life of man that can be only briefly suggested here. All four principles apply for all men, both fallen and redeemed. Calvin's doctrine of double predestination is the troublesome but clear statement of the divine side of intention in the divine-human encounter. Loving obedience on the one hand and rebellion and dreadful obedience on the other hand are the possibilities for human will in relation to God.

Law in relation to man signifies governance in several respects. God's reign through law over fallen man is like the reign of a strong monarch over a traitorous people; every law seems to be a sedition law. His reign in His Elect is like a loyal constitutional republic. It is worth noting here, also, that it is primarily the principle of sovereignty that allows Calvin to use the term law when speaking of other things than the revealed Divine Law. Positive or civil law still partakes of the nature of *law*, for Calvin, even when it does not clearly express good intention or righteousness because it always explicitly expresses governance—God's mysterious governance as well as man's. Moreover, Calvin refuses to dispense with the idea of natural law even though we may derive no real benefit from it without the revealed Law and grace.[2] Belief in the existence of a not-naturally-knowable natural law is meaningful for Calvin because the idea points to God's universal sovereignty. His use of the term when developing or

[1] R. Niebuhr reflects the same ambiguous tendencies as Brunner. Perhaps these dangers are inherent in Lutheranism and neo-Lutheranism. The allusion here to Buber is quite intentional. Calvin and Buber share an existentialist and non-legalistic appropriation of the Old Testament.

[2] cf. *Institutes*, Book I, chap. v, sect. 11. Even in commenting on Romans 7.22-23, Calvin asserts of the 'law of the mind' which Paul refers to, that it 'undoubtedly means a principle rightly formed' and therefore 'it is evident that this passage is very absurdly applied to man not yet regenerated; for such, as Paul teaches us, are destitute of mind, inasmuch as their soul has become differentiated from reason' (*Commentary on Romans*).

arguing the content of Law seems primarily rhetorical. Another use of the term 'law' which seems rather metaphorical occurs in Pauline phrases such as 'law of my members' and 'law of sin'. The use is metaphorical because the 'reign' of the flesh is connoted but hardly the 'reign of God'.

Finally, though there is no righteousness in man, in Calvin's view, apart from grace, there just as surely is no righteousness apart from obedience to the Law. Righteousness in man is the fruit of the unity between Law and grace: both are necessary, neither is sufficient alone—Law may 'appear' without grace but as such it is an instrument of death; grace never appears without Law. The quotation marks around 'appear' in the last sentence are quite important, for the Law in any of its functions and in all of its severity can be known for what it really is only in Christ—both because Christ is the fulfilment of the Law and because man could not stand the dreadful knowledge of the Law apart from God's grace and mercy in Christ. The discussion of man's relation to the Law implies throughout the relation of law and grace.

The Law and the Gospel

> The letter therefore is dead [see 2 Cor. 3.6], and the law of the Lord kills its readers when it is dissevered from the grace of Christ, and only sounds in the ear without touching the heart. But if it is effectively impressed on the heart by the Spirit; if it exhibits Christ, it is the word of life converting the soul, and making wise the simple.[1]

I have already indicated the three major reasons that Calvin adamantly asserts that Christ completes and fulfils the Law without abrogating it: (1) The Law is not destroyed in the work of Christ because it is a direct expression of God's eternal will and righteousness. (2) The Law is not set aside—otherwise Christ's sacrifice would be incidental rather than necessary for our salvation, we would be saved by a change in God's mind rather than by the death of His Son. (3) The Law and its imperative is heard more clearly by him who has heard the Gospel and its indicative—indeed, one truly hears the Law only if he hears the Gospel and one truly hears the Gospel only if he hears the Law also.

The realities behind the Decalogue and the Gospel have been

[1] *Institutes*, Book I, chap. ix, sect. 3.

contrasted as frequently as love and justice. They have been regarded as mutually exclusive poles or as the antitheses of one another. Perhaps 'dialectical theology' has been overdone. Or perhaps it would be both more sympathetic and more accurate to say, in Tillichian fashion, that the Law and the Gospel seem diametrically opposed to one another because we apprehend them under the distortions of existence. Calvin, however, sees with eyes enlightened by the fact of Redemption. For him it will no longer do to assert for our ultimate preoccupation if not concern what is merely contingently true under the corruption of the Fall. He reads the real meaning of the Creation and of the Fall and of the Crucifixion from the point of view of the Resurrection. Under this view the Dispensations of Law and Gospel reveal One God with one intention, one righteousness, and one sovereignty over man. Under this view the Law behind the Decalogue and the Grace behind the Gospel are not separate realities opposed to one another as if God's right hand did not know what His left hand was doing. They are not even two realities in dialectical relation to one another, the right hand pushing from one side and the left hand pushing from the other so that man in between will not slip when he is lifted. Law and grace are two aspects of a single reality, the reality of God's existential relation to man.

How can Law and grace be two aspects of a single reality? Is it not true that even for Calvin some appearance of Law can exist without grace, though grace not at all without Law? Two metaphors and an analogy may help us.

Grace can be compared to a fluid and Law to the vessel that contains it. Without the glass, the water cannot be conveyed to the lips. Indeed, the water must find some vessel to contain it or cease to be water that is accessible to us at all. Without the water, the empty glass, though it exist, will quench no thirst. That which alone can refresh us is a unity, a glass-of-water.

The second metaphor: Grace is enthroned, by God's free action in the heart of man, there to reign in a tiny kingdom of subjects known as needs and wants. How shall it reign there? Shall the sovereign Grace magically transfer His mind into His subjects in secret? Or shall the Sovereign make His laws known by enacting and enforcing them? The reign of grace

in man's heart is not some kind of mystical statism, nor is it a house divided against itself. The Sovereign rules by constitutional government. Grace's sovereignty is lawful, otherwise both God and man are disgraced—man in the loss of his humanity, God in the loss of His personality.

The analogy may place us on more substantial ground. Paul Tillich has done a great service in illuminating some of the mysteries in the relation of love and justice.[1] Justice is the concept which calls attention to the structure of relatedness. Love is the concept that alludes to the substance or content of the same reality. Both deal with relatedness in any manifestation. There is no relation without both form and content —however good or however bad—which is not subject to the analysis and critique of both concepts. Justice and love refer to human-to-human relations and analogically to the divine-to-human relation. For Calvin, the given, most significant, existential reality is the divine-to-human relation. The proper terms which point to the form and content of *this* relation are Law and grace. Both aspects are present in any manifestation of the relation; both are perfectly present in the Resurrection. Law is the structure of the divine-to-human relatedness, and grace is the substance which not only fills the structure but makes it truly possible. For Calvin, Law in its richest meaning is synonymous with the word of God, and grace with the Spirit. Their objective unity is found in Christ, the Mediator; in faith the subjective unity becomes our 'purity of heart';

> For the Lord has so knit together the certainty of His word and His Spirit, that our minds are duly imbued with reverence for the word when the Spirit shining upon it enables us there to behold the face of God; and on the other hand, we embrace the Spirit with no danger of delusion when we recognise Him in His image, that is, His Word.[2]

Postscript

> Hence it appears that the grace of God (as this name is used when regeneration is spoken of) is the rule of the Spirit, in directing and governing the human will.[3]

Much of contemporary Protestant ethical thought has been preoccupied with the Fall of man and has seen, at best, a

[1] cf. *Love, Power and Justice.*
[2] *Institutes*, Book I, chap. ix, sect. 3.
[3] ibid., Book II, chap. v, sect. 15.

dialectical relation between the consequences of the Fall and the consequences of Redemption for the regulation of human conduct.[1] Furthermore, the dialectical principle has been too readily embraced in discussions of eternity and history, grace and law, love and justice, the indicative and the imperative. One of the great attractions of Calvin's thought is the 'new light' he continues to shed on these 'distorted polarities'. His perspective is the framework of Redemption, which rather than dissolving the concern for ethical principle, guides us in the search for obedient response.

Living on this side of Higher Criticism, we may not be able to take the written Law in so precise a manner as Calvin did. But he himself looked steadily beyond the literal statement to the Law which is Law simply because it is God's will and word. Just because of our difficulties with Higher Criticism and biblical law, or because of our difficulties with Kant, Marx and Freud and our versions of natural law, we cannot as students of Christian ethics nor as living human beings abandon the search for Law and obedience to it, falsely comforting ourselves with the notion that the Law was abrogated for us by history if not by Christ. As Kierkegaard saw with Calvin, the struggle of the soul, the imperative to become a Christian, the ultimate and consuming search for integrity or singlemindedness—do not end with the first coming of Christ into human life; they begin there. Faith 'is a firm and sure knowledge of the divine favour toward us, founded on the truth of a free promise in Christ, and revealed to our minds, and sealed on our hearts, by the Holy Spirit'.[2] For this reason, 'faith is properly that by which we obey the gospel'.[3]

[1] Paul Lehmann ('The Foundation and Pattern of Christian Behaviour' in *Christian Faith and Social Action*), T. F. Torrance (*Calvin's Doctrine of Man*, and *Kingdom and Church*), Dietrich Bonhoeffer (*Ethics*), and Paul Tillich (*Love, Power and Justice*, and *Systematic Theology*, vol. ii), have all made significant efforts at breaking out of this pattern.

[2] *Institutes*, Book III, chap. ii, sect. 7.

[3] *Commentary on Romans*, Romans 1.5.

THE JUSTIFICATION OF A SINNER BEFORE GOD

AS TAUGHT IN LATER LUTHERAN ORTHODOXY

by The Rev. Proffesor R. PREUS

During the history of the Lutheran Church the doctrine of justification has been spoken of commonly and rather loosely as the *articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae*. This was certainly the conviction of Luther, as many of his statements testify. The purpose of this study is to examine the teaching of John Andrew Quenstedt, the most prominent and able representative of the later seventeenth-century Lutheran orthodoxy, on this doctrine and to learn how closely the dogmatics of his time approximates the emphasis and terminology of Luther. Quenstedt is the 'book-keeper'—one might say the Aquinas—of Lutheran scholasticism, and he quite accurately sums up the theology of the entire century. It might be said by way of introduction that modern Lutheranism owes much to the dogmaticians of the age of orthodoxy for the manner in which it deals with this doctrine; and for this reason I feel justified in presenting an article of this nature.[1] I propose merely to summarise Quenstedt's treatment of the doctrine of justification, and to offer comments when I deem them necessary.[2] I believe that the reader will find that Quenstedt's presentation is quite well balanced and that it gives the impression of being consistently drawn from Scripture. At least it is obvious that this is Quenstedt's persuasion as he develops the doctrine.

At the outset of his discussion Quenstedt wishes to show his dependence upon Luther by insisting that justification must be considered the central doctrine of theology. He says that the doctrine of the justification of a sinner before God 'is the citadel of the whole Christian religion; the nexus by which all members of the body of Christian doctrine are joined together; and should this doctrine be violated, all the remaining articles will be abandoned and overthrown'. Then in characteristic

[1] cf. Koeberle, *The Quest for Holiness*, N.Y., 1936; F. Pieper, *Christian Dogmatics*, St. Louis, 1951; Elert, *Der Christliche Glaube*, Hamburg, 1956, pp. 470ff; et al.

[2] All references and quotations from Quenstedt's *Theologia Didactico-Polemica sive Systema Theologicum*, de justificatione, sect. 1, unless otherwise stated.

fashion he listens to some of the fine statements of Luther and others on the importance of this article. Luther in his comments on Gen. 21 says (Erl. ed. Lat., 10.137): 'This is the highest article of our faith, and if one should abandon it as the Jews do or pervert it like the Papists, the Church cannot stand nor can God maintain His glory which consists in this, that He might be merciful and that He desires to pardon sins for His Son's sake and to save.'[1] Quenstedt also quotes the classic statement from Chemnitz (*Loci Theologici*, 1653 ed., II, 200): 'This article is in a sense a stronghold and the high fortress of all the doctrine and of the entire Christian religion; if it is obscured or adulterated or set aside, the purity of doctrine in other articles of faith cannot possibly be maintained. But if this article is kept pure, all idolatry, superstitions, and whatever corruptions there are in the other articles of faith tumble down from their own weight.' The final introductory quotation of Quenstedt's is from B. Meisner (*'Ανθρωπολόγιας Sacrae . . .*, 3rd ed., Wittebergae, 1663, Decas. III, Disp. XXIV, p. 139): 'This article is the central point of theology according to which all other articles of faith are adjusted; it is the sacred ocean into which all other doctrines flow, it is the treasure chest of our faith which keeps safe and unharmed all the other doctrines.' Quenstedt probably takes these quotations from Gerhard and Meisner who both offer even more statements of Luther on the importance of this doctrine. Both Meisner and Gerhard quote, for instance, the well-known statement of Luther (op. cit., 21.3): 'In my heart one article alone rules supreme, that of faith in Christ, by whom, through whom and in whom all my theological thinking flows back and forth day and night. And still I find that I have grasped this so high and broad and deep a wisdom only in a weak and poor and fragmentary manner.' When K. Barth[2] points out that no one ever followed Luther's emphasis to the point of actually planning and organising an evangelical dogmatics around the article of justification he is correct, and his words also apply to Quenstedt. But this does not imply any lessening of emphasis on the centrality of this doctrine.[3] The fact is that no doctrine was made a unifying

[1] Quenstedt also cites similar statements of Luther. Erl. ed. Lat., 21.12, 20.

[2] *Church Dogmatics*, IV, 1, p. 522.

[3] Chemnitz in his *Loci Theologici* devotes no less than 100 folio pages to the doctrine of justification and often calls this the central teaching of Christian

principle in the dogmatics of the orthodox Lutheran theologians; to attempt such a thing never occurred to them. It is unfortunate, as Barth points out, that the later orthodox Lutherans called the doctrine of justification by faith alone a secondary fundamental doctrine.[1] However, Hollaz meant only to stress the fact that one could be saved without knowing explicitly the doctrine of justification by faith alone in its proper formulation; and this would obtain in the case of many simple Christians who could not adequately express their faith in this manner. But that faith saves Hollaz calls a fundamental article (*articulus fidei constituens*). And the doctrine that Christ is Mediator, the doctrine of the atonement, the doctrine of the justifying grace of God—these also are called *articuli fidei constituentes*. But it can only lead to confusion when Hollaz makes justification a fundamental article and justification by faith alone a secondary fundamental article. These two ideas cannot be separated.

Barth says that the *articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae* is not the doctrine of justification as such, but its basis and culmination. In saying this he is not going beyond Luther and the later dogmaticians. Luther often speaks merely of the article of Christ as the teaching upon which everything else hangs, and he means by this the teaching concerning the work of Christ.[2] The dogmaticians too when they speak of justification as the article upon which all theology depends are thinking of justification in the wider sense, for in every discussion of the doctrine they include a thorough treatment of its basis (Christ's work) and its aim and effects (*unio mystica*, sonship, peace of conscience, sanctification and eternal life).

Proceeding to the actual presentation of the doctrine Quenstedt begins with a simple word study of the pertinent verbs and their cognates. The words 'to justify' (δικαιοῦν, הִצְדִּיק) in Scripture never signify a justification through infusion of new qualities, but they are used to denote an action whereby God justifies the impious before His bar, in a forensic sense. In

theology. Gerhard too is very thorough in his treatment of the doctrine and in his discussion on justification (*Loci Theologici*, Tom. VII) he includes his presentation of the work of Christ.

[1] Baier, *Compendium Theologiae Positivae*, prol. I, 33. Hollaz, *Examen Theologicum Acroamaticum*, prol. quaes. 19-24.

[2] cf. Erl. Aufl., 50.26-29; 48.18, 40:324ff.

Scripture the term often means (*a*) a recognition of divine righteousness (*justitiae divinae agnitio*), Ps. 51.4; Luke 7.29. Again it can mean (*b*) that a person is seen to be just by his works (Jas. 2.12). In this case there is no reference to the righteousness which is imputed to faith, but to the fact that a man's faith through which he becomes righteous is shown by his works. The term means (*c*) a devoting of oneself to the study of righteousness, Dan. 12.3. It denotes (*d*) a continuation in righteousness, Rev. 22.11: 'And he that is righteous, let him be righteous still.' This verse either implies an *actus continuatio* in which case we should try diligently to retain the righteousness of faith which we have, or it implies an *actus reiteratio* according to which he who falls into sin should through repentance return to God and be justified again. The word denotes (*e*) a sinfulness which is called by the name of righteousness when compared to worse sin, Ezek. 16-51, Jer. 3.11. The term points sometimes merely to (*f*) the attempt to arrogate to oneself the title of righteous, Luke 10.29, 16.15. It may denote (*g*) a censure or reprehending (*traductio et reprehensio*), Matt. 11.19. This at least represents the opinion of Luther, Brenz, Chemnitz, Hunnius, Osiander, Gerhard and others on this passage. The word may denote (*h*) a liberation from sin, Rom. 6.7, 18, 22. The term points (*i*) to the administrating of justice between contending parties, 2 Sam. 15.4. The word refers finally to (*j*) a forensic act of a judge and of justice (*actus judicialis*), by which a person is judicially declared righteous, Deut. 25.1, Prov. 17.5, Matt. 12.37. 'And in those passages where the justification of a sinner before God is spoken of the word "to justify" is always used in the forensic sense.' This becomes clear when we notice the contrast to this justification, viz. judgment which even Bellarmine grants must be considered a forensic act of God. Christ and the apostles employ the two terms as opposites consistently (John 3.18, 5.24; Rom. 5.19; Acts 10.43). 'We conclude then that the word "to justify" never means in Scripture to pour the quality of righteousness into somebody, but in this connexion it denotes nothing else than to establish righteousness forensically, or to make righteous by an act which is entirely outside man.'

The subject (*subjectum*) of justification, considered as the *terminus a quo*, is sinful man (cf. Rom. 3.23). With these words

of the apostle the indisposition of man towards his own justification is graphically described, and that *intensively* by virtue of the extreme misery of man and the total corruption of his faculties, and also *extensively* since all men are subject to the curse of the Law. The apostle describes the *subjectum justificandum* (1) by his common state of corruption in that all have sinned, and (2) by his lacking of glory which he possessed in his original state of integrity and righteousness. However, it cannot be said that man is justified in so far as he is a sinner (*quatenus in statu peccati est*) and is deprived of the glory of God, but sinful man (*homo peccator*) is justified in so far as he is born again and believes. Therefore we say that the *subjectum justificandum*, when justification is considered as a present state (*ratione actus and status praesentis*), is the believer (*homo credens*), for only the believer in Christ is actually (*actu*) justified. Thus Paul says in Rom. 3.22: 'The righteousness of God which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe.' In this passage 'the righteousness of God' is not to be understood as the righteousness which is in God essentially, but it is the righteousness which is from God, which comes to believers, i.e. it is imputed to believers. It is the same righteousness which the apostle speaks of later in Rom. 4.3ff where the perfect obedience of Christ which comes about by His obeying the Law and His suffering comes 'unto all and upon all them that believe'. The pleonasm in this verse emphasises that the righteousness (or obedience of Christ) is always apprehended by those who believe and only by those who believe, cf. Rom. 4.5. In this latter verse Quenstedt points out that ' "the ungodly" are not to be taken as those ungodly who without repentance persist in their ungodliness, but as the ungodly who recognise their ungodliness, desire to be freed from it, and flee with true faith to Christ and His throne of grace'.

The efficient cause of justification is the entire Trinity; for justification is an *opus ad extra* of God. The work of justification is attributed to God the Father in John 3.16-17 and Rom. 8.33. In the last passages the Father is referred to, for it is He who delivered up His Son (v. 32). The work of justification is attributed to the Son in Isa. 53.11: 'By his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many,' i.e. through faith. Keeping in mind this passage Quenstedt remarks that Christ may be con-

sidered the cause of our justification because of His active and passive obedience, for this work of Christ was performed in order to make satisfaction for our unrighteousness and bring righteousness to us again. Thus Christ is called 'the Lord our righteousness', Jer. 23.6. Justification is attributed to the Holy Spirit in 1 Cor. 6.11 where we are told that we 'are justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God'. And so Quenstedt concludes, 'The work of justification pertains indivisibly to all three Persons, although you notice the mode of operation of each one in the carrying out of this mystery.'

That which moves God to justify us (*causa impulsiva interna*) is His own free grace. But before discussing this Quenstedt refers us to his consideration of the purpose of the vicarious atonement. On the part of God the purpose of the atonement is twofold: (1) to satisfy divine justice, for God will not remit sins without satisfaction; (2) to show His mercy which is manifested most clearly in this, that God gave His Son over to the most shameful death for our sake and accepted His satisfaction for us, and in this, that the Son willingly took our sins and made atonement for them by His death (II, III, II, thesis 41). This second fact is brought out most clearly in such passages as Rom. 5.8, John 3.16, John 15.13 and Eph. 5.25. Commenting on 1 John 3.16 Quenstedt says:

> This is the love of God: rather than banish men eternally from heaven He removed Himself from heaven, clothed Himself with flesh, became the Creature of a creature, inclosed Himself in the womb of the virgin, was wrapped in rags, laid in hay and housed in a barn. Nor does His love stop here; but after a life spent in poverty and adversities this love drives Christ to the ground on Olivet, binds Him in chains, delivers Him to jailors, cuts Him with the lash, crowns Him with thorns, fastens Him with nails to the Cross, and gives Him to drink the cup of bitterness. And finally this love compels Him to die, to die for adversaries and enemies (Rom. 5.6). Continuously and in these sundry ways Christ, who thirsts so greatly for our salvation, declares His love and mercy towards the human race.

That grace as the cause within God which moves Him to justify us by noting that this gracious disposition of God is expressed in two ways in Scripture. (1) κατ' ἄρσιν by removing any false impression that in us there is some cause of justification. This truth is brought out in all those passages which speak of God justifying us freely (δωρεάν, *gratis*), Rom. 3.24. This passage indicates that no power and ability to be justified

resides in us, nor do we contribute any work or merit toward this end. That the term conveys this meaning (Luther: *Ohne Verdienst*) is shown also from John 15.25, 'They hated me with a cause' (Luther: *Ohne Ursach*, cf. 1 Sam. 19.5; Ps. 35.19, 69.4 where the Heb. חִנָּם, *gratis*, is used). (2) Scripture expresses God's loving disposition towards us κατὰ θέσιν, by explicitly using the word 'grace' to denote not some gift dwelling in us, or some quality infused into us, but the gracious favour of God which is received by believers. In the preceding verses the word 'grace' not only excludes all righteousness of the Law and shows that the righteousness spoken of comes without the Law, but the context implies the idea conveyed by the δωρεάν, viz. that this grace is simply gratuitous.

Our justification is gratuitous therefore in this sense, that God judges us by His mercy and not by His justice. It is gratuitous because God bestows this benefit on us although we are unworthy and far from meriting it and because He bestows it without any intervention of works on our part; and this is in keeping with the clear opposition between grace and works which always obtains, according to the apostle, Rom. 11.6: 'If by grace, then it is no more of works,' Eph. 2.8, 9: 'It is the gift of God: not of works, lest any man should boast.' Hence this grace is also called χρηστότης, φιλανθρωπία, kindness and love, Tit. 3.4-6: kindness by reason of the advantage which it offers us; φιλανθρωπία in reference to object of this grace, namely, men; mercy by reason of our misery by which our Lord allowed Himself to be moved, Gen. 8.21.

The external meritorious cause of our justification is the all-sufficient merit of the obedience of our Mediator. For we are justified 'through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus: whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in His blood.' The διά here is to be taken in the sense of *propter* (διὰ τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως) as it is interpreted in other passages. In this verse the meritorious cause of our justification is the ἀπολύτρωσις, the redemption which is the very basis of our justification before God, for this redemption is mediated through the precious blood of Jesus Christ. This same redemption God sets forth as a propitiation for us, and that not merely in the sense of freeing us, but of making satisfaction for us.

Propitiation may also be called the meriting cause (*causa promerens*) of our justification, for the apostle says that God has set forth Christ as a propitiation to be accepted through faith in His blood. The term ἱλαστήριον which Luther translates

'*Gnadenstuhl*' means an expiation, a compensation for the guilt of sin, an idea which is expressed in Heb. 11.17. The verb ἱλάσκειν may also mean to placate or pacify, and this is the meaning the ἱλασμός takes on in 1 John 2.2, 4.10.

Thus God justifies us freely and without any merit on our part and regards only the merit of Christ which is an ἀπολύτρωσις ἱλαστική, ἱλασμός, a bloody and appeasing sacrifice, a redemption and atonement. And so Christ is called in the above passages a ἱλαστήριον because He performed a ἱλασμός, a redemptive expiation and atonement through His blood for us, and by means of this placated God who was angry with sinners.

The *causa media* of justification is from God's side the Word and Sacraments through which the righteousness of Christ is offered to faith. The Word and Sacraments offer and bring the righteousness of Christ and the forgiveness of sins, Luke 24.47. The Word and Sacraments also bring sinners to faith in Christ and His righteousness and keep them and strengthen them in that faith. The *causa media* on the part of man is the so-called *organon* ληπτικόν, the faith which receives these benefits. Again we must listen to Rom. 3.22 which tells us that this righteousness of God is 'by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe'. Compare also v. 25 where we are told that the benefits are received 'through faith in his blood'. The object of faith here is the blood which must be understood synecdochically for the entire cruel suffering of Christ through His whole life. The διά points out the *causa organica* through which the atoning and propitiatory blood of Christ becomes ours. Thus it is the same thing to say that we are justified, that we receive grace, that we live in Christ, for it is all through faith (πίστει, Acts 26.18; ἐκ πίστεως, Gal. 3.7, 8, 9, 11, 12; διὰ τῆς πίστεως, Rom. 3.30, 31; μετὰ πίστεως, 1 Tim. 1.14; ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει, Phil. 3.9; ἐν πίστει, 1 Tim. 3.13; κατὰ πίστιν, Heb. 11.13).

On our part it is this faith alone which justifies us and effects (*influit*) our justification. Whatever merely embraces and apprehends to itself the promises of grace, the forgiveness of sins and the merit of Christ does so without any admixture of works. And only that on the part of man which enters into the picture when we consider God justifying him can be said to justify. Thus we are said to be justified by faith exclusively without the deeds of the Law, Rom. 3.28. Eph. 2.8, 9. True, faith is never alone, never all by itself and isolated from good works, and yet faith alone apprehends the merit of Christ, and we are justified by means of faith alone.

Faith is to be considered an organic cause of justification not in so far as it is our act or our acceptance of God's grace (*in se et in sua natura*), but by virtue of the object which it apprehends. Here Quenstedt troubles himself to distinguish between the *causalitas* of faith in the matter of justification and the *ratio causandi* in this matter. The causality of faith in justification consists in this, that faith receives and accepts the grace of God (*λαμβάνειν*, John 1.12, Rom. 5.17, Gal. 3.14; *καταλαμβάνειν*, John 1.5; *παραλαμβάνειν*, John 1.11; *δέχεσθαι*, Luke 8.13, Acts 8.14; *ἀποδέχεσθαι*, Acts 2.41, 1 Tim. 1.15). The reason for this causality of faith in justification does not consist in this, that faith is an acceptance and reception (*quatenus est apprehensio*), for a person can apprehend to himself imaginary things or human righteousness; rather it consists in this, the object which faith apprehends, viz. the merit of Christ. And of this St. Paul speaks in Rom. 3.25 where he says that 'the whole justifying power of faith depends on the thing apprehended, on the bloody merit of Christ which is the proper object of justifying faith'. Quenstedt goes on to illustrate with the following interesting analogy:

> When the hand of a starving man seizes bread which is offered to it, it is not this taking of the bread which satisfies the man, for he could seize a piece of mud or a stone or something else which could not satisfy him, but his being satisfied depends on the object which he takes to himself and depends on his eating it, i.e. it depends on the bread. When the lips of a thirsty man drink water which has been drawn with a bucket from some well, it is not the drinking as such that quenches his thirst, for you can also draw sand or blood with a bucket. No, if his thirst is to be satisfied, the drink which he consumes must have the power to quench thirst. Thus he who hungers and thirsts after righteousness receives it through faith, as the begging hand which receives the bread coming down from heaven (John 6.50-51) and as the vessel of the thirsting soul draws the water springing up into everlasting life (John 4.14); but it is not this receiving and drinking as such which drives away the spiritual hunger and quenches the thirst. Man does not possess anything of such a nature as can accomplish this, e.g. his own merits, his own pretended autonomy, satisfactions which are the inventions of the Synagogue of Rome. No, the whole strength of man's receiving depends on the thing received through faith, the redemption and the blood of Jesus Christ.[1]

The form of justification consists in the fact of certain changes which take place in man. This is not to be understood

[1] cf. *Formula of Concord*, Thor. decl. III, 13ff.

as though sin were driven out of man completely and righteousness infused or as though one is changed from being inherently unrighteous to being inherently righteous. For want of a better term Quenstedt calls this change a moral change which means that man becomes righteous by a forensic and external action, and this action is not performed in man but in respect to man and outside man (*circa et extra hominem*), and so it is extrinsic and at the same time real and true.

The nature of justification (*forma in specie*) is twofold: (A) It is the forgiveness of sins and the non-imputation of our own righteousness; (B) It is the imputation of the obedience of Christ.[1]

(A) Quenstedt discusses three passages at great length in showing that justification is the remission of sins, or the same thing, the non-imputation of guilt. His first exegesis revolves around Ps. 32.1-2 and Rom. 4.7-8. Here it is his interest to demonstrate that the whole gamut of man's sin and rebellion against God is summed up in the three nouns פֶּשַׁע (*Praevaricatio, quae est gravior a Domino supremo defectio, eaque malitiosa, pertinax, horrenda*), חַטָּאָה which is from חָטָא which means to wander or err, and עָוֹן (*perversitas, iniquitas*), even as the entire story of God's work of redemption and justification are summed up in the three verbs נָשָׂא (*elevavit, condonavit, vel reatum aut poenam ab altero delinquente abstulit, removit*, Num. 14.19), כָּסָה (*tegit, operitur*), and חָשַׁב (*cogitavit, cogitando reputavit, quandoque cum* ל *constructum, significat, aliquid alteri imputavit, aut cogitando annumeravit* [*Germanice* zurechnen]). Commenting on 2 Cor. 5.19 Quenstedt says that the non-imputation of sins means that God chooses not to punish sins. The basis for this non-imputation is not in the subject, man, for if God had regard only to sinful man He must punish sin. 'The basis is in Christ who made atonement for this sin which is in man and which is not imputed.'

(B) Positively the nature of justification consists in the imputation of Christ's obedience. The first Bible verse for consideration is Rom. 4.5. Three questions may be asked in reference to this passage: (1) What does it mean to impute? (2) To whom is the imputation made? (3) What is imputed?

[1] This agrees with the *Formula of Concordia*, Art. III.

In answer to the first query Quenstedt replies that the word 'to impute' can often be taken in a physical sense as meaning to infuse as when a branch is grafted on to a plant. However, the word is also used as an acceptation, e.g. victory is imputed to Caesar although he is absent. According to the first meaning to impute sin to someone would mean to instil or infuse iniquity into him, which is an unorthodox way to speak. According to the second meaning there may be an imputation of either evil or good. For instance, Scripture says that sin is imputed to the workers of iniquity, Lev. 17.16. Sometimes sin is imputed to a person undeservedly as when adultery was imputed to Susanna. And again sin is imputed *ex gratia* as when our sins were imputed to Christ in His atoning for our sins. Righteousness may also be imputed as well as sin, and that (*a*) *jure et secundum debitum* when the basis of the imputation is in the subject (Rom. 4.4), or (*b*) *injuria* as when a stupid person is reputed to be wise just because he is silent (Prov. 17.27), or (*c*) *ex gratia* when the guilty is absolved because of the merit of another. This last usage is that of Scripture when speaking of our justification. In answer to the second question we need merely repeat the words of the apostle, 'To him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly.' The person who does not work is simply the one who does not depend on his works for justification, not one who lacks good works, for works always proceed from faith. The believer, then, is the one to whom this imputation is made, the believer who does not trust in himself. But what does he trust in? In Him 'that justifieth the ungodly', viz. God, 'who promises in the Word of the Gospel that He wishes to be gracious for the sake of Christ's merit and justify the ungodly out of grace, that is, forgive him all his sins and pronounce him righteous, that he may believe and not spurn the grace offered in the promised Word, but seize it and hold on to it with faith'. The ἐπὶ τόν expresses a trust in the mercy of God, a trust which rests firmly in God. The 'ungodly' is not one who was formerly ungodly, but one who is ungodly even now and merits eternal judgment but for this, that God by grace for Christ's sake forgives all his sins, since Christ bore his ungodliness and the sins of the whole world. In answer to the third question, it is righteousness which is imputed, the righteousness of Christ. And this agrees perfectly well with what Paul says here, viz.

that 'his faith is counted for righteousness'. Quenstedt says, 'The imputation of the righteousness of Christ and the imputation of faith for righteousness is one and the same. For faith does not justify because of its own character, but because of the value of its object.'

Speaking on Rom. 5.19 Quenstedt notes three things. (1) As to the cause of the condemnation and the salvation spoken of here, the cause of the former is the disobedience of Adam, the cause of the latter is the obedience of Christ. (2) As to the effects of Adam's disobedience and Christ's obedience, the effect of the former is that all men were made sinners, the effect of the latter is that all men are made (*constituuntur*) righteous. (3) As to the dominion which the actions of both these men exert (*utriusque subjecta*), the disobedience of Adam passed upon (*transiit*) all men, the obedience of Christ was performed (*praestita est*) on behalf of all men. Quenstedt warns that we must not press the parallel beyond this point, for then it might be inferred that the righteousness of Christ was passed on to all men without any consideration of their faith or unbelief, just as the sin of Adam is propagated through natural generation. Gerhard[1] uses slightly different language here. He says that just as the offence of Adam brought sin upon all so that all are justly condemned by God unless reconciliation is made, so by the merit of Christ righteousness and salvation were brought to (*propagatur*) all in order that all might be justified by faith. Both the condemnation and the justification were forensic. Later in a footnote, however, Gerhard states exactly what Quenstedt said above.

Quenstedt next offers a very long exegesis of 2 Cor. 5.21 to which I offer only a few brief allusions. He says that this verse leads us to speak either in reference to the person to whom imputation is made or to the thing which is imputed. Here is what he says:

> When we say that our sin is imputed to Christ and Christ's righteousness is imputed to us, then we mean that our sin which is in us and not in Christ is transferred to Christ according to God's decree and determination, that is, it is reckoned as though it were in Christ; on the other hand, the righteousness of Christ which is in Christ and not in us is transferred to us according to God's decree and determination, that is, it is reckoned as though it were in us.

[1] *Loci Theologici*, Cotta ed., Tuebingen, 1762, VII, 11.

The non-imputation of sin—and this is precisely the forgiveness of sin—is inseparably joined with the imputation of Christ's righteousness.

From the above delineation of Quenstedt's doctrine of justification it seems quite clear that Lutheran orthodoxy made the concerted effort to remain faithful to the teachings of Scripture on the one hand and of Luther and the Lutheran Confessions on the other hand. The question may be asked: just how close were the theologians of Quenstedt's day to the doctrine of Luther? There is no doubt that their terminology differs from Luther's to a marked degree, especially after the *Formula of Concord*. Luther, in speaking of the foreign righteousness which becomes ours through faith, does not shrink from calling it a *justitia extra infusa*,[1] even though he insists that it is a *justitia aliena*. *Gratia infusa* is a term commonly employed by Luther, even in his later writings. He says that when God justifies 'He drives sin out of the heart and drives in grace'.[2] He speaks of the righteousness of God according to the usage of Scripture meaning 'the grace and mercy of Christ poured into us through Christ'.[3] He has of course purged such concepts of their mechanical, Romish meaning, as may be seen from the context of such statements; but the fact remains that after the *Formula of Concord* Lutheran theologians could and did not speak in such a free manner. They repudiate the term 'infused righteousness', and insist that the word 'justify' in Scripture never denotes a justification by the infusion of new qualities into a person (*per infusionem novarum qualitatum*).[4] This does not imply that they are abandoning anything that was taught by Luther; but after Trent and the appearance of Osiander in their own ranks they have concluded that it is simply not possible to baptise some of the questionable Roman terminology still employed by Luther. In their day the *gratia infusa* was irrevocably associated with the synergism of the Roman doctrine of justification.[5] The later dogmaticians do not even like to speak of justification as being an act whereby God makes an unrighteous man righteous, although Luther and the Lutheran

[1] *Sermo de duplici iustitia*, 1519. WA 2.245-6.
[2] Erl. Aufl., 14.204. 1 Advent, 1522.
[3] Erl. Aufl., 10.18ff. Sermon on Matt. 9.1-9.
[4] cf. *supra*. Also Gerhard, op. cit., VII.8.13.
[5] Council of Trent, Sess. 6, Ch. 7 and can. 11.

confessions freely speak that way. For this was the terminology of Rome and implied that justification was a process like sanctification. Bellarmine, for instance, had said,[1]

> Ordinarily a person is said to be warmed not only when from being cold he is made warm, but when from being warm he is made warmer. Thus too one is said to be justified not only when from being unrighteous he is made righteous, but when from being righteous he is made more righteous.

The Lutheran theologians were even hesitant about speaking of justification as a change (*mutatio*), for Roman theology used this terminology often to mean a change which was like a sick person being made well. The Lutherans were wont to abandon any terminology which would imply that justification was a process.

The question in all this is simply whether the later dogmaticians departed in any way from Luther's teaching on justification, or whether they are only defining and refining terms. The accusation has often been made that Lutheran orthodoxy taught an unreal justification with its doctrine of imputed righteousness. Perrone says,[2]

> According to the doctrine of the Protestants it does not happen in justification that sins are really remitted at all, but are merely concealed according to an extrinsic imputation of the righteousness of God or Christ, and thus by the power of this justification there begins to take place in us a certain inner renewal by which man becomes inwardly and formally righteous from sin.

This is a caricature, not only of the doctrine of Luther, but of the later orthodox Lutherans as well. Quenstedt, following Chemnitz, insists that the imputation has an absolutely firm foundation which is not in man who is justified, but in Christ and His work. It is very important for our present discussion that Quenstedt's point of view be made clear on this matter. When we know precisely what he understood by the imputation in justification, we quickly learn that he has not departed from Luther's doctrine of justification on any important point, and we learn that any accusation that the old orthodox teaching made justification merely a legal fiction is unfounded. Therefore I quote Quenstedt at length.

[1] *Disputationes*, Tom. 4, de justificatione, I, III.
[2] *Praelectiones Theologicae*, ed. 27, Ratisbonae, 1856, II, 229.

The imputation consists in a real reckoning. According to the judgment of God the sinful man who believes in Christ is absolved of sins and the righteousness of Christ is truly reckoned to him. Now granted that the reckoning does not work the result that the righteousness of Christ inheres inherently in the believer; the imputation, nevertheless, is not thereby fictitious and imaginary, a mere opinion of a just person, without any actual effect, as the papists maliciously report us as teaching. No, this λογισμός or imputation is earnest and real. It has its gracious foundation in Christ and its termination in us (*ad nos*). It consists in a gracious determination of God and in a real conferring and transferring of Christ's righteousness to the believer. And so when one believes, he is by this reckoning made and accounted righteous in the judgment of God's mind. And this is a most real judgment of God which from the throne of His grace extends over the sinner who from the Gospel believes in Christ. . . . Those to whom the righteousness of Christ is imputed are truly righteous, although not inherently or by inherence, but imputatively and through an extrinsic designation that they are such, for also from that which is extrinsic a true designation can take place. Therefore it is a vain question, whether we are really righteous by that imputation, or whether we are only regarded as righteous. For God's judgment is according to truth. Wherefore he who is regarded by God as righteous is truly righteous.

This statement of Quenstedt's which is quite typical of all the later dogmaticians[1] places him squarely in the camp of Luther with his emphasis upon the greatness and the reality of God's imputation. It is reminiscent of Luther's words,[2]

This imputation is not a thing of no consequence, but is greater than the whole world, yea, than all the holy angels. Reason cannot see all this, for reason disregards the Word of God; but we (I say) thank God that we have such a Saviour who is able to pass us by and reckon our sin as nothing.

Hence the concern of many modern theologians[3] that the forensic justification be not a fiction is fully met not only by Luther but also by the later dogmaticians. Adolf Hoenecke has summarised their position well,[4]

The position of the dogmaticians is clear. They wish to show that according to Scripture there is a middle ground between the physical infusion of indwelling righteousness and an empty, ineffective, declarative reckoning (as the papists groundlessly charge against the Lutheran teaching). The middle ground is a formal reckoning (*appropriata imputatio*). This

[1] cf. Baier, *Compendium*, de justificatione, par. 3. Dannhauer, *Hodosophia*, ed. 1713, p. 461.

[2] *Die Disputation de iustificatione* (1536). WA 39.97-98.

[3] cf. Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, IV, 1.95; Berkouwer, *Faith and Justification*, 87; Bultmann, *Theology of the NT*, I, 276.

[4] *Ev.-Luth. Dogmatik*, Milwaukee, 1912, III, 345.

reckoning would be empty if it took place only up in heaven in the tribunal of God and were manipulated, as it were, behind the back of the sinner. But the sinner is himself active in this matter of reckoning through the Holy Spirit working in him through the Word; he receives God's imputed verdict concerning him, a verdict in which the Holy Spirit attributes the whole transaction as applying to him. And so the sinner emerges from this transaction as one who has righteousness, not a righteousness achieved by his works, not a righteousness infused into him, but a righteousness spoken over him according to God's unfailing verdict.

Thus with the forensic justification, with the *justitia aliena*, with the strong emphasis on the validity and reality of the imputation we have the basic elements of Lutheran orthodoxy's doctrine of justification. And if the terminology has changed the main strands and emphasis of the Reformation teaching remains intact.

THE CREEDS OF A.D. 325
ANTIOCH, CAESAREA, NICAEA

by The Rev. Dr T. EVAN POLLARD

The Letter of the Synod of Antioch contained in a Syriac MS. of the eighth or ninth century (*Codex Parisinus Syriacus* 62), to which Edward Schwartz first drew attention in 1905,[1] has thrown light on the period immediately preceding the Council of Nicaea and on the proceedings of the Council itself. After much initial controversy, mainly between Schwartz and von Harnack, this document is now generally accepted as authentic.[2] The Synod of Antioch, of which nothing was hitherto known, appears to have assembled in order to settle the difficulties which had arisen in the Church at Antioch after the death of Bishop Philogonius (*ca.* A.D. 322), one of three Bishops whom Arius described as 'unlearned heretics'[3]; Eustathius, Bishop of Beroea, was appointed to fill the vacancy. The Synod was attended by at least fifty-nine bishops from Syria and Palestine, forty-nine of whom also attended the Council of Nicaea a few months later.

If Opitz' emendation of the text is correct, the first signatory of the Letter was Hosius of Cordova, *confidant* and ecclesiastical adviser to the Emperor Constantine, who had been the Emperor's special envoy to Alexandria in an attempt to mediate between Alexander and Arius. After settling the problem of the episcopal succession in Antioch, the Synod proceeded to discuss the situation which had arisen over the teachings of Arius, not with any intention of adjudicating between the Alexandrian Bishop and his presbyter, but rather of dealing with the repercussions which the controversy was having in their own sphere of jurisdiction.[4] A statement of faith was drawn up, and all the bishops present, with the exception of

[1] *Nachrichten von der Kgl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, 1905.

[2] For a survey of the controversy between Schwartz and von Harnack *vide* F. L. Cross, 'The Council of Antioch in A.D. 325' in *Church Quarterly Review*, Vol. CXXVIII (1939), 49ff.

[3] H.-G. Opitz, *Urkunden zur Geschichte des arianischen Streites* 318-28, *Urk.* 1.

[4] Is it possible that, in giving its firm decision against Arianism, the Synod sought to forestall any possibility of an adverse decision by the imperially sponsored Council at Nicaea?

Theodotus of Laodicea, Narcissus of Neronias and Eusebius of Caesarea, subscribed to it. In the debate on this statement of faith, these three sympathisers with Arius 'quite plainly introduced arguments opposed to what had been set forth, as if they had forgotten the Holy Scriptures and the Apostolic teachings, and tried to escape notice in many ways and to conceal their deceit by using specious arguments'.[1] Their sympathy with Arianism became apparent to all, and, as a result, they were 'provisionally excommunicated'; 'because of the great brotherly love of the Synod, we have given them an opportunity for repentance and true examination at the great and sacred Synod at Ancyra'.[2]

In the light of this Letter, the position of Eusebius of Caesarea at Nicaea becomes clear. He did not go to the Council as one of the leading bishops of the Church, but as one whose orthodoxy was under suspicion, and who had to vindicate himself and remove the stigma which the Synod of Antioch had placed on his name. His introduction of the Creed of Caesarea into the debate at the Council was not an attempt to break the deadlock between Arius and Alexander, but rather at attempt to prove his own orthodoxy. The letter which he wrote to his congregation after the Council emphasises continually how anxious Eusebius had been to make his orthodoxy plain; he introduced the Creed of his Church with repeated emphasis on the antiquity of his belief:

> As we have received from the Bishops who preceded us, and in our first cathechisings, and when we received the Holy Laver, and as we have learned from the divine Scriptures, and as we believed and taught in the priesthood and in the episcopate itself, so believing also at the present time, we report to your our faith. . . .[3]

He emphasises that 'it was declared to be good and unexceptionable',[4] and that 'no room for contradiction appeared, but our most pious Emperor, before anyone else, testified that it comprised most orthodox statements . . . and that such were

[1] Opitz, *Urk.* 18 (40, 6-10); the translation is made from Schwartz' Greek translation published by Opitz. I am grateful to Professor David Hubbard, of Westmont College, California, and Professor Robert B. Laurin, of California Baptist Theological Seminary for assistance with the Syriac text.

[2] Opitz, *Urk.* 18 (40, 16f); *Cod. Par. Syr.* 62 also contains a letter of the Emperor announcing the change of the *venue* of the Council from Ancyra to Nicaea; *vide Urk.* 20.

[3] *Urk.* 22 (42, 5-8). [4] ibid. (43, 4).

his own opinions, and he advised all present to agree to it . . . with the insertion of the single word ὁμοούσιον'.[1] When the Council produced its Creed, Eusebius hesitated for a day before signing it, ostensibly because he had some doubts about some of the terms which were used; he tells us that he signed eventually because of assurances which he received from the Emperor that these questionable terms did not mean what Eusebius thought they meant, and his explanations of these terms reveals his 'theological incapacity and disingenuousness'.[2]

It is not my concern to investigate the relationship between Eusebius' Caesarean Creed and the Creed which the Nicene Council promulgated. The question has been discussed at length by Canon J. N. D. Kelly,[3] who has shown that the traditional view that the Nicene Creed was based on the Caesarean Creed[4] is untenable. Dr Kelly says, 'The truth of the matter is, as anyone can discover for himself who cares to make an exhaustive comparison, that *CAES* and *N* differ far more radically than Hort and his followers, even in their most liberal moments, were prepared to concede.'[5] After a careful analysis of the letter of Eusebius, he concludes: 'The real ground of his disappointment was the theological tone of the new Creed, as he showed by the way he scrutinised every specifically theological clause in the formula itself and its anathemas. . . . They (*sc.* the committee) had introduced, not so much a new creed, as what looked dangerously like a new theology, which Eusebius was only able to accept . . . after he had tested every article of it.'[6]

Dr Kelly's conclusions are important because of the emphasis he places, not on the verbal differences, but on the theological differences between *CAES* and *N*. He pays little attention, however, to the theology which is implicit in the Creed of the Synod of Antioch (*ANT*). A comparison of the theological emphases of *CAES*, *ANT* and *N* throws further light on the controversy, in which the three great theological traditions of

[1] *Urk.* 22 (43, 26-44, 4).
[2] T. Zahn, *Marcellus von Ancyra*, 18, quoted by A. E. Burn, *The Council of Nicaea*, 42.
[3] *Early Christian Creeds*, 205-62.
[4] cf. F. J. A. Hort, *Two Dissertations*, 54-72; A. E. Burn, *Introduction to the Creeds*, 76ff, and *The Council of Nicaea*, 20off; A. von Harnack, in Hauck's *Realencyclopaedie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche*, Vol. XI, 15ff.
[5] op. cit., 218. [6] ibid., 225.

the early Church, Antiochene, Alexandrian and Western (with which the neo-Alexandrian theology of Alexander and Athanasius had a great affinity), came into conflict.

I

The Creed of the Synod of Antioch (*early* A.D. 325)

The credal statement contained in the Synodal Letter[1] is exceedingly involved and cumbersome[2] because of the inclusion in it of passages of anti-Arian polemic as well as orthodox explanations of some of the phrases. If these insertions are removed, a concise creed is left which follows the regular pattern of the other early tripartite creeds. The Christological clause of the basic creed of the Synod reads as follows:

> in one Lord Jesus Christ,
> the only-begotten Son . . .
> the divine Logos,
> true Light,
> Righteousness,
> Jesus Christ, Lord and Saviour of all . . .
> (who) having been born in flesh from Mary the Mother of God,
> and made incarnate,
> having suffered and died,
> rose again from the dead,
> and was taken up into heaven,
> and sits on the right hand of the Majesty most high,
> and will come to judge the living and the dead.

The first and longest anti-Arian insertion follows the words *The only-begotten Son*, and consists of a criticism of the Arian interpretation of this phrase, together with a statement of what the Antiochene Fathers understood by it. The insertion reads:

> (Only-begotten Son) begotten not from what is not but from the Father, not as made but as properly an offspring, but begotten in an ineffable, indescribable manner, because only the Father who begot and the Son who was begotten know (for 'no one knows the Father but the Son, nor the Son but the Father', Matt. 11.27), who exists everlastingly and did not at one time not exist. For we have learned from the Holy Scriptures that He alone is the express image, not, plainly, as if He might have remained unbegotten from the Father, nor by adoption (for it is impious and blasphemous to say this); but the Scriptures describe Him as validly and truly

[1] Quotations of the credal statement follow the translation given by J. N. D. Kelly, op. cit., 209f.

[2] Kelly calls it 'this tortuous compilation', op. cit., 210.

begotten as Son, so that we believe Him to be immutable and unchangeable, and that He was not begotten and did not come to be by volition or by adoption, so as to appear to be from that which is not, but as it befits Him to be begotten; not (a thing which it is unlawful to think) according to likeness or nature or commixture with any of the things which came to be through Him, but in a way which passes all understanding or conception or reasoning we confess Him to have been begotten of the unbegotten Father. . . .

It is clear from this that the Antiochene Fathers grasped the full import of the Arian teaching and proceeded to attack it at its central point, the interpretation of the word μονογενής, which is applied to Jesus Christ in Scripture only by the Fourth Evangelist (John 1.14, 18; 3.16, 18; 1 John 4.9).[1]

The second anti-Arian insertion occurs after the words *Lord and Saviour of all*:

For He is the express image of the very substance of His Father, and not of His will or of anything else. This Son, the divine Logos . . .

The main points of the anti-Arian polemic of the credal statement itself are taken up again in the anathemas attached to the end of the Creed:

We anathematise those who say or think or preach that the Son of God is a creature or has come into being or has been made and is not truly begotten, or that there was when He was not. For we believe that He was and is and that He is light. Furthermore we anathematise those who suppose that He is immutable by His own act of will, just as those who derive His birth from that which is not, and deny that He is immutable in the way the Father is. For just as our Saviour is the image of the Father in all things, so in this respect particularly He has been proclaimed the Father's image.

Dr Kelly[2] has pointed out the close relationship which is evident between this Antiochene creed and the creed which Arius submitted to Bishop Alexander,[3] while he expresses his agreement with Schwartz' statement that it is 'im Wesentlichen eine Paraphrase von Alexanders Tomos'[4] to Alexander of Thessalonica.[5] Whether there is any actual dependence of the Synodal Letter on these two documents it is impossible to tell, but it is certain that the Antiochenes were well-informed (by Hosius?) on the nature of the Arian doctrine and most definite in their opposition to it. The polemic of the anti-Arian insertions

[1] Elsewhere in the NT (Luke 7.12, 8.42, 9.38 and Heb. 11.27) it refers to *only* sons or daughters. [2] op. cit., 210. [3] Opitz, *Urk.* 6.
[4] Kelly, op. cit., 210, note 2, quoting Schwartz, *Zur Geschichte des Athanasius* VI, in *N.G.G.* (1905), 288. [5] Opitz, *Urk.* 14.

and anathemas is directed at the Arian doctrine of the generation of the Son from nothing and at the teachings which the Arians derived from their presupposition that if the Son is distinct from the Father He must be other than God. The main Arian propositions are denied and the orthodox doctrine set forth in counter-propositions, as can be seen from the following analysis:

ARIAN PROPOSITIONS	ORTHODOX COUNTER-PROPOSITIONS
1. The Son is begotten from what is not (*ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος*).	The Son is begotten from the Father (*ἐκ τοῦ πατρός*).
2. He is a thing made (*ποιητός*).	He is genuinely an offspring (*γέννημα κυρίως*).
3. There was when He was not (*ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν*).	He was everlastingly (*ἀεὶ ὄντα*).
4. He is not God's proper Logos.	This Son is the Divine Logos (*οὗτος δ' ὁ υἱὸς θεὸς λόγος*).
5. He was begotten by the will of the Father and by adoption from what is not.	He was begotten from the unbegotten Father in a way which passes all understanding, ineffably and indescribably.
6. He is the image of the will of the Father.	He is the express image of His Father's very substance, validly and truly begotten as Son.
7. He is mutable and changeable. (*τρεπτὸς καὶ ἀλλοιωτός*).	He is immutable and unchangeable. (*ἄτρεπτος καὶ ἀναλλοίωτος*).

In the basic creed itself, the primary characterisation of *one Lord Jesus Christ* is *only-begotten Son*, and it is to this phrase that the Antiochenes attach their first anti-Arian insertion; they thus recognised that the crux of the controversy lies in the word *μονογενής*. In the initial stages of the controversy Alexander of Alexandria interpreted this adjective in its proper sense of 'unique' or 'only one of its kind'[1]; the Arians, on the contrary, interpreted it as though it were the equivalent of *μονογέννητος*, and it must be remembered that they drew no distinction between *γεννητός* and *γενητός*.[2] For them there was no difference between saying that the Son was begotten and saying that He was created or originated. They thought that

[1] cf. D. Moody, 'God's Only Son: The Translation of John 3.16 in the R.S.V.' in *The Journal of Biblical Literature*, Vol. LXXII (1953), 213ff; P. Winter, '*Μονογενὴς παρὰ πατρός*' in *Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte*, Vol. V (1953), 335ff; C. H. Turner, '*ὁ υἱός μου ὁ ἀγαπητός*' in *The Journal of Theological Studies*, Vol. XXVII (1926), 113ff.

[2] cf. G. L. Prestige, "*Αγέν*[*ν*]*ητος* and *γεν*[*ν*]*ητός* and Kindred Words in Eusebius and the Early Arians' in *The Journal of Theological Studies*, Vol. XXIV (1923), 486ff.

the Son was *only-begotten* because He alone was created by God Himself; all other begotten or created beings were made through the Son as through an instrument. The Antiochenes agreed with Alexander and asserted the absolute uniqueness and ineffability of the Son's generation from the Father. They interpreted the Person of Christ in the light of His being *ὁ μονογενὴς υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ*, the *only*, the *unique* Son of God, and they interpreted His generation in the light of the uniqueness of His relationship with the Father. For the Antiochenes, as for the Fourth Evangelist, Christ *is* the Son of God, while we may *become* the children of God. Christ's Sonship is unique, and because His relationship with the Father is unique, the manner of His generation is unique and there are no human terms which are adequate to express the manner of His generation from the Father, which is ineffable and indescribable, beyond all human reasoning or conception or understanding.

The ineffability of His generation from the Father, however, does not prevent the Antiochenes from making certain statements about it. If Christ is the Son, then He must be an offspring (*γέννημα*), and if He is an offspring He cannot be a creature (*κτίσμα*), a thing made (*ποιητός*) or originate (*γενητός*). If He is genuinely and truly Son of God, and if God is truly His Father, then the idea that He is a creature, a thing made or originate, is excluded.

Furthermore it must be noticed that the regulative concept of *ANT* is that of Sonship; *υἱὸν μονογενῆ* introduces the Christological clause, while *θεὸν λόγον* appears as only one of a string of titles given to the Son: 'divine Logos, true Light, Righteousness, Jesus Christ, Lord and Saviour of all'. The Antiochene Bishops have put the title *Logos* in its proper perspective, and, what is just as important, in opposition to the Arian distinction between *Logos* and *Son*,[1] they bluntly identify the two: *οὗτος δ'ὁ υἱὸς θεὸς λόγος*. They are emphatic that the Logos, who is the Son of God, 'was, and is, and is Light', that 'He exists everlastingly and did not at one time not exist', and that 'this Son, the divine Logos, having been born of Mary the Mother of God, and made incarnate, suffered and died . . . '.

[1] cf. my articles, 'Logos and Son in Origen, Arius and Athanasius' in *Studia Patristica*, Vol. II, 282ff, and 'The Origins of Arianism' in *The Journal of Theological Studies*, N.S. Vol. IX (1958), 103ff.

ANT emphasises too that the Son is from the Father (ἐκ τοῦ πατρός), in opposition to the Arian assertion that He is 'from nothing' (ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, or ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων). While it does not attempt to make the meaning of ἐκ τοῦ πατρός more specific, as the Nicene Council was to do a few months later in the phrase ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός, the second anti-Arian insertion in *ANT* makes the meaning of the phrase quite clear. It asserts that the Son 'is the express image, not of the will or of anything else, but of the Father's very substance' (εἰκὼν . . . αὐτῆς τῆς πατρικῆς ὑποστάσεως), which is a clear reference to Heb. 1.3, χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ.

The image-concept plays a leading role in the Arian controversy and in the Marcellan controversy. Here it is interesting to notice that *ANT* conflates Col. 1.15 with Heb. 1.3, replacing the word χαρακτήρ of Heb. 1.3 with εἰκών from Col. 1.15. It may be thought that this conflation has no doctrinal significance, but it is clear that the conflation is intentional, for instead of using *salmā'* by which the Syriac Version translates χαρακτήρ (Heb. 1.3), it has *yuwknā'*, a transliteration of the Greek εἰκών (Col. 1.15). The fact of this transliteration suggests that some special meaning is intended by the phrase. In Col. 1.15 the Son is asserted to be 'the image of the invisible God', the one, that is, through whom the invisible God becomes visible. Like John 14.9, 'He who has seen me has seen the Father', this phrase has a revelational significance, emphasising the reality and authenticity of the revelation of God which is given in and through Jesus Christ the Son. Similarly, the opening words of the Epistle to the Hebrews are concerned with the reality and authenticity of the revelation of the Father in and through the Son, and Heb. 1.3 in particular emphasises that the Son, who is the agent of the Father in creation, by whom the Father made the worlds (Heb. 1.2), 'reflects the glory of God and bears the very stamp of His nature'; that is, the Son reveals to men the glory of God, which is God Himself, and He is the outward expression of the nature of the Godhead. By conflating Col. 1.15 and Heb. 1.3 *ANT* increases or strengthens the revelational emphasis which is found in each, and the revelation in and through the Son is asserted to be a revelation not of the will or of anything else, but of the Father's very nature or substance. Thus the

Antiochene Fathers would have had no hesitation in accepting the Nicene phrase ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός, or in agreeing wholeheartedly with the word ὁμοούσιον. They interpret the image-concept in the light of the Son-concept—the Son 'is the image of the Father, validly and truly begotten as Son'. The phrase ἐκ τοῦ πατρός refers to the generation of the Son from the Father's substance (ὑπόστασις) of which He is the εἰκών. It is by implication rather than by specific statement that *ANT* gives precision to the meaning of ὁμοούσιον.

After studying *ANT* with its anti-Arian insertions, one wonders how far it was influenced by Eustathius, the leading Antiochene theologian of the time, who was present at the Synod and elected by it to fill the vacant see of Antioch. Eustathius was later to become one of the most forthright opponents of Arianism and the first victim of the Arian purge which followed the Arians' return to favour with the Emperor in A.D. 329. In *ANT* the regulative Christological concept is 'the only Son'; the Antiochenes have broken away from the old Word-Christology which had landed Paul of Samosata in trouble seventy years before, but they have retained the revelational emphasis which had been traditional in the Antiochene tradition from the days of Ignatius, Theophilus and Irenaeus.

It is clear that when the Council of Nicaea met a few months later Alexander of Alexandria must have received strong and valuable support from the Antiochene Bishops who had already declared unequivocally their opposition to the teachings of Arius at their own local Synod.

II

The Creed of Caesarea presented at the Council of Nicaea by Eusebius of Caesarea

There can be no doubt that the Antiochene Creed must have been very disturbing to Eusebius of Caesarea. Its emphasis on the unity of the Father and the Son and on the eternity of the generation of the Son (ἀεὶ ὄντα) was contrary to his own emphasis on the inferiority and posteriority of the Son to the Father.[1] Early in the controversy, writing to Euphration of

[1] Before the Arian controversy broke out Eusebius asserted that the Logos-Son

Balanea, Eusebius set forth the distinction between Father and Son by means of exegesis of one of his favourite texts, 'the only true God' (John 17.3):

> He [the Son] teaches that He [the Father] is the only true [God] in the place where He says, 'that they may know thee, the only true God', with the vitally necessary addition of the word 'true', since the Son also is God Himself (αὐτὸς θεός) but not the 'true God' (ἀληθινὸς θεός). For there is only one true God, because He has no one prior to Him. If the Son Himself also is true, He would be God as the image of the true God, for 'the Logos was God' (John 1.1c), but not as being the only true God.[1]

The marked tendency towards ditheism which is characteristic of Eusebius' ante-Nicene theology comes out more strongly still in a statement which Narcissus of Neronias makes in his letter to Chrestus, Euphronius and Eusebius (of Nicomedia?), which almost certainly refers to the debate at the Synod of Antioch. Narcissus says that Hosius asked him if, like Eusebius of Palestine, he would say that there are 'two essences' (δύο οὐσίαι).[2] Holding as he did that there is a radical distinction between the Father and the Son within the hierarchy of the Godhead, Eusebius could not accept the Antiochene formula with its strong emphasis on the eternity of the Son and the unity of the Son with the Father. In his mind such teaching was heretical. Therefore he was prepared to await the forthcoming Council at Nicaea where he felt that he would receive a more sympathetic hearing than was possible from a strongly anti-Origenist Synod.

The difference in theological outlook between the Antiochenes and Eusebius becomes plain when we study carefully the Caesarean Creed which Eusebius presented to the Council of Nicaea as evidence of his orthodoxy. The Christological clause of *CAES* reads:

is 'some second being' beside God (*Dem. Ev.*, i, 5, 10d; cf. also iv, 6, 154d; v, 3, 220a; v, 30, 255b; *Hist. Eccl.*, i, 2, 5), who 'stands midway between the unoriginate God and the things originated after Him' (*Dem. Ev.*, iv, 10, 164d). Eusebius does strive to ascribe some kind of eternity to the Logos-Son, but he is willing to go no farther than saying that the Son was begotten 'before all ages' (*Dem. Ev.*, v. 1, 215b, *et al.*). As Hendrik Berkhof remarks, 'The eternity of the Son does not mean a co-eternity with the Father. . . . The Father has eternity in the proper sense; the Son, as begotten, has it in a derivative sense' (*Die Theologie des Eusebius von Caesarea*, Amsterdam, 1939, 75ff).

[1] Opitz, *Urk.* 3 (5, 5-10).

[2] Opitz, *Urk.* 19.

And in one Lord Jesus Christ,
the Logos of God,
God from God,
Light from Light,
Life from Life,
Only-begotten Son,
First-born of all creation,
begotten from the Father before all ages,
through whom all things came to be,
who, for our salvation, was incarnate and dwelt among men,
and suffered, and rose again the third day,
and will come again in glory,
to judge the living and the dead.[1]

When this creed is compared with *ANT*, the difference of theological emphasis is immediately apparent. In *ANT* the primary characterisation of *one Lord Jesus Christ* is *only-begotten Son*, while in *CAES* it is *the Logos of God*. This difference cannot be accidental. The emphasis in Antiochene theology, in so far as we know it, was biblical and unphilosophical, whereas Caesarean theology, at least since the long period during which Origen had taught in Caesarea, had continued to emphasise a philosophical and cosmological doctrine. This cosmological interest makes itself evident in the Creed by the primary characterisation of Jesus Christ, not as the Son of God, but as *the Logos of God*. The regulative concept of *CAES* is not *Son* but *Logos*.

The cosmological emphasis is continued in the phrases which follow immediately: *God from God*, *Light from Light*, *Life from Life*. These phrases had become part of the common stock of metaphors used to describe the relation of the Logos to God. Their roots go back to the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel; they flower in the early Logos-theology of Justin Martyr and in the apologetic side of Tertullian's thought; they reach full fruition in the Alexandrian tradition of Clement, Origen and Dionysius. In the Nicene Creed, as we shall see, they are severed from their roots in Logos-theology and grafted on to the Son-concept. Here, however, in *CAES* they remain within the framework of a Logos-theology with its cosmological emphasis.

It is only after this emphasis on Jesus Christ as *the Logos of God* that the title *Son* is introduced: *only-begotten Son*. Even in

[1] Opitz, *Urk.* 22 (43, 10ff).

this title the cosmological emphasis is retained, however, for it is coupled with another title: *First-born of all Creation*, derived from Col. 1.15. *ANT* also quoted Col. 1.15, but it focused attention on the first part of the verse, 'image of the invisible God' which refers to the revelational significance of Jesus Christ. The second part of the verse, removed from its context, has a cosmological significance[1]; it is as *First-born of all Creation* that Jesus Christ is *only-begotten Son*. The addition of the former to the latter reduces the generic uniqueness implied by the adjective μονογενής to a mere priority in time and status of the Logos-Son to the rest of creation. The interpretation of these two terms in relation to each other became a burning question in the refutation of the Arians by Athanasius and in the controversy concerning the theology of Marcellus of Ancyra.[2]

That *CAES* does not move out of the realm of cosmology when it introduces the title *only-begotten Son* is indicated by the phrases that follow: *begotten from the Father before all ages, through whom all things came into being*. The addition of these words to *First-born of all Creation* shows that the emphasis is on the temporal priority of the Logos-Son to the rest of creation and on His role as cosmological intermediary in the activity of

[1] I would not deny that St. Paul intends this phrase in a cosmological sense, but the overall context is soteriological. As Dr Stig Hanson remarks, discussing the whole passage from Colossians (*The Unity of the Church in the NT*, 109ff), 'Creation and reconciliation have a close interrelation. . . . Christ is the centre of creation as well as reconciliation. There is a parallelism between these two acts, and, as the mediator of them, Christ has in both cases the same title: πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως (verse 15) and πρωτότοκος ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν (verse 18).' Discussing the former title, he says, 'It is not primarily a question of priority or sovereignty in relation to the world . . . but of representation.' For Paul, that is, Christ is the head of all creation, just as He is the head of the new creation, the Church. Paul argues, and so does John, from *Heilsgeschichte* to cosmology, and not vice versa, and cosmology is but the framework of *Heilsgeschichte*, and not the clue to it. The argument of Col. 1.13ff is from the known fact of reconciliation through Christ in history to the thought that He must have been the mediator of creation at the beginning of history.

[2] The Arians coupled together the two titles ὁ μονογενής and ὁ πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως. Athanasius (*Or. c. Ar.*, ii, 62; *PG*, xxvi, 277) says, 'The term μονογενής is used where there are no brethren, and πρωτότοκος because there are brethren. . . . If then He is μονογενής, as indeed He is, πρωτότοκος needs some explanation; if, on the other hand, He is really πρωτότοκος, then He is not μονογενής. For the same cannot be both μονογενής and πρωτότοκος except in different relations.' Marcellus (Fr. 3 in Klostermann's collection at the end of *Eusebius Werke*, iv, *GCS*) says, 'There is a great contradiction in these titles, as even the most stupid may easily see. For it is clear that ὁ μονογενής, if He is really μονογενής, cannot be πρωτότοκος as well, and ὁ πρωτότοκος, if He is really πρωτότοκος, cannot also be μονογενής.'

creation. The first of these phrases does not necessarily mean that the Logos-Son was eternally generated from the Father. The Arians could assert that the Son was begotten from the Father before all ages,[1] without denying their proposition that 'there was once when He was not'. Eusebius, as we have seen, understood it to mean that the Son was not co-eternal with the Father; he assigned to the Son 'semi-eternity' as befitted His 'semi-divine being'.[2] *ANT*, on the other hand, asserts unequivocally that the Son is eternal (*τὸν ἀεὶ ὄντα καὶ οὐ πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα*). *Begotten before all ages*, however, being Scriptural, was used universally before the Council of Nicaea, and was considered to be quite orthodox[3]; the Council of Nicaea was forced to avoid the phrase because of the fact that the Arians, placing their own interpretation on it, could accept it in a sense which was unorthodox.

The remaining section of the Christological clause of *CAES* deals with the Incarnation. While it is orthodox in tone, it is inadequate in the face of the challenge which Arianism was making to the Christology of the Church. There is no mention of the Virgin Birth, a doctrine which safeguarded both the real manhood and the real Godhead of the Saviour. While *CAES* says that the Logos-Son became flesh (*σαρκωθέντα*; cf. John 1.14: *ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο*), it does not say that He *became man*, but only that He *dwelt among men* (*ἐν ἀνθρώποις πολιτευσάμενον*). It is interesting that Eusebius who was to object to the explicitly anti-Arian phrases of the Nicene Creed on the grounds that they were unscriptural, should propose an unscriptural word like *πολιτεύομαι*, which is never used with Christ as subject in the New Testament. The terms which he uses in his creed to describe the Incarnation, *σαρκωθέντα καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις πολιτευσάμενον*, do nothing to safeguard the Church's faith in the reality and completeness of the manhood which the Son of God assumed; it does justice only to the old Logos-Sarx Christology of the Apologetic tradition. The Council was to make the completeness of the manhood of the Saviour more explicit by incorporating into its creed the word *ἐνανθρωπήσαντα*.

[1] cf. the discussion of Prov. 8.22ff in the light of Col. 1.13ff and Gen. 1.1 in W. D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism*, 150ff.

[2] Berkhof, op. cit., 75.

[3] Alexander himself used the phrase, *Urk.* 14 (27, 20).

The theology implicit in *CAES*, then, presupposes a cosmological interpretation of the fact of Christ. The regulative concept of its Christological clause is *the Logos of God*, and the concept of Sonship enters only as one among many of the titles of the Logos. There is no evidence that can be adduced to prove that the teaching of Origen had any direct influence on its formulation, but it is significant that such a creed as *CAES* should belong to a Church in which Origen had laboured for so long and whose Bishop at the time of the Nicene Council was Eusebius, the last representative of the old Origenist tradition.

Eusebius produced this creed as proof of his orthodoxy. It is open to orthodox interpretation and there is nothing explicitly Arian in it. The Bishops assembled at Nicaea accepted it as orthodox and removed the ban of excommunication which the local Synod of Antioch had imposed. Recognising, however, that such a creed as *CAES* was inadequate to exclude Arianism, the Council proceeded to produce a creed which would remove once and for all any loopholes by which the Arians might escape to continue preaching their heresy in the name of the Church. The creed which the Council produced was just as disconcerting to Eusebius as that which he had refused to sign at Antioch, and it was only after much hesitation that he agreed to sign the Nicene formula.

III

The Creed of the Council of Nicaea

The order in which events at the Council took place is uncertain, but Athanasius has recorded sufficient to enable us to catch a glimpse of the kind of argument that took place.[1] He describes how the orthodox Bishops sought to express their faith in the real divinity of the Son in Scriptural terms. Every phrase that was suggested, however, the Arians managed to twist to support their own position. The phrase ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ was suggested, but they immediately said, 'We also are ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, for it is written "There is one God, ἐξ οὗ are all things" (1 Cor. 8.6), and "All things are ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ" (2 Cor. 5.17)'.[2] When the Bishops said that the Son must be described

[1] *De Decretis*, 19. [2] idem.

as 'the true power and image of the Father, exactly like the Father in all things', the Arians were seen to whisper and wink at each other, saying that the words 'like' and 'always' and 'power' are 'common to us and the Son' and that they had no difficulty in accepting these words. They proceeded to quote Scripture to show that these words could be interpreted to imply that the Son belonged to the sphere of the creatures and not to the sphere of the divine.[1] The ingenuity of the Arians in finding loop-holes through which to escape from the net in which the Bishops were seeking to catch them forced the Council, says Athanasius, to look beyond the actual language of Scripture for terms which would exclude Arianism, and it was agreed that the term *ὁμοούσιον* alone was adequate. It seems probable that this term was proposed by the Emperor himself at the suggestion of Hosius, for the Latin equivalent of *ὁμοούσιος*, *consubstantialis*, was well established in Western Trinitarian theology.[2]

Having shown that the traditional view that Eusebius' creed was used as a working basis for the creed of the Council is untenable, Canon Kelly sets forth the view first proposed by Hans Lietzmann that 'the creed underlying *N* . . . must have been one belonging to the Jerusalem family. . . . It is . . . possible on this view to account for any resemblance which *N* may be thought to have to *CAES*, for *CAES* too is presumably a creed of the same Syro-Palestinian family. *N* and *CAES* are therefore related, not, however, as offspring to parent, but as two denizens of one and the same ecclesiastical region. There is nothing improbable in the committee's having recourse to a Palestinian formulary as a working draft.'[3] Canon Kelly appears to be too cautious; if the committee were seeking a creed to use as a basis for its formulary, the creed of Jerusalem would commend itself as most suitable, since it was the Creed of the oldest Church in Christendom. We know from Canon VII of the Council that the question of the status and precedence of the Bishop of Jerusalem was before the Council, which decided that 'since custom and ancient tradi-

[1] *De Decretis*, 20.

[2] Athanasius (*Hist. Ar.*, 42; *PG*, xxv, 744) says that it was Hosius who put forth the Nicene faith; Eusebius says that it was the Emperor who suggested the inclusion of the word *ὁμοούσιον*. (*Urk.* 22.)

[3] op. cit., 227f.

tion prevail' the Bishop of Jerusalem should have 'the honour due to him in consequence of, or in accordance with, such tradition, reserving however to the metropolis (Caesarea) its proper dignity'.[1] No Church had better claim to have its creed used as the basis for the Creed of the Council of Nicaea.[2]

The Christological clause of the Creed set forth by the Council reads as follows[3]:

> And in one Lord Jesus Christ,
> the Son of God,
> begotten from the Father uniquely,
> that is, from the substance of the Father,
> God from God,
> Light from Light,
> true God from true God,
> begotten, not made,
> consubstantial with the Father,
> through whom all things were made,
> both things in heaven and those in earth,
> who for us men and our salvation came down
> and was incarnate, and became man;
> he suffered and rose on the third day,
> ascended into heaven,
> and is coming to judge living and dead.

Eusebius and others objected to the anti-Arian phrases—*that is, of the substance of the Father*, and *consubstantial with the Father*—on the grounds that they were not Scriptural, while the orthodox claimed that even if they are not Scriptural they at least embody the teaching of Scripture. Nevertheless, Eusebius' letter to his Congregation makes it clear that his main objection was not the unscriptural language but the theology of the Creed which appeared to him to be a dangerous innovation. When *N* is studied clause by clause and compared with *ANT* and *CAES* the peculiar theological emphasis of *N* becomes clear.

[1] W. Bright, *Canons of the First Four General Councils*, 2nd ed., 27.

[2] When the Bishops at Chalcedon (A.D. 451) asked for the Nicene Creed to be read, the Metropolitan of Bithynia, in whose province Nicaea was situated, was called to read it. Kelly (op. cit., 215) says, 'The choice of this dignitary was dictated, we can be sure, by the desire to have the Creed recited in the authentic, original text.' Similarly it seems most probable that the desire to base its formula on the most authentic Creed would dictate the choice, by the Nicene Bishops, of the Creed of the oldest Church in Christendom. *Vide* the excellent section in W. Telfer, *Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa* (Library of Christian Classics, Vol. IV), 54ff.

[3] For the most part the translation follows that by E. R. Hardy, *Christology of the Later Fathers* (L.C.C., Vol. III), 338. By some curious error Hardy's translation omits the phrase THE SON OF GOD.

1. The three creeds agree in making the subject of the Christological clause *one Lord Jesus Christ.* They differ immediately on the primary characterisation of this subject:

ANT: υἱὸν μονογενῆ *only-begotten Son*
CAES: τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγον *the Logos of God*
N: τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ *the Son of God*

N does not mention the title *Logos*, which, while Scriptural, is never used by Jesus of Himself. *The Son of God* is the distinctive title which Jesus claims for Himself, particularly in the Fourth Gospel. *N* even avoids introducing the adjective μονογενής into the primary characterisation of *one Lord Jesus Christ.*

2. *N* proceeds to define more closely what it means by the title *the Son of God*, adding the words *begotten from the Father uniquely, that is, from the substance of the Father.* The words *begotten from the Father* are common to all three creeds. In *ANT* they appear at the beginning of the first anti-Arian insertion: *begotten* not from that which is not but *from the Father*[1]; *CAES* modifies the phrase with *before all ages*, which excluded neither Arianism nor the near-Arianism of Eusebius. *N* modifies the phrase by adding *uniquely* (μονογενῆ). It is impossible to escape the impression that the separation of μονογενῆ from υἱόν has a specific significance in *N*, particularly since μονογενῆ appears in the middle of the section which declares the begotten-ness of the Son. At first sight it seems that μονογενῆ in this setting must mean 'only-*begotten*', but had *N* wished to say that the Son was 'only-*begotten* from the Father' it could have said more simply μονογενῆ ἐκ τοῦ πατρός. By placing μονογενῆ after *begotten from the Father* and following it immediately with the explanation *that is, from the essence of the Father*, it is evident that the Bishops were seeking to emphasise that the uniqueness of the Son lies in the uniqueness of His relation to the Father, not as the only-*begotten* Son, but as the Son who is alone *from the essence of the Father.* None of the orthodox Bishops would have been willing to assert that Jesus Christ is the only-*begotten* Son, for they were at pains to emphasise that through faith in Jesus Christ men can and do become children of God; John 1.12-13

[1] It is possible that the basic creed of Antioch contained the words BEGOTTEN FROM THE FATHER, and the words 'not from that which is not but' were inserted into the phrase to exclude the Arian doctrine of the Son's *creatio ex nihilo.*

teaches that those who believe in Christ receive power to become the children of God and 'have been begotten from God' (ἐκ θεοῦ ἐγεννήθησαν). Alexander of Alexandria had already emphasised that the uniqueness of Jesus Christ consists not in His being only-*begotten*, but in the fact that He is alone Son of God by nature (φύσει), while through faith in Him men become God's children by adoption (θέσει). The uniqueness of Jesus Christ consists, not in His being only-*begotten* from God, but in His being *begotten from the essence of God*.

It has already been shown how the Antiochene Bishops would have had no hesitation in accepting this expression which makes explicit what is implicit in their creed; they too emphasised the generic difference between Christ's Sonship and ours, but sought to express the unity of the Father and the Son in the biblical terms *image of the Father's very substance*. There is nothing in *CAES* corresponding to this emphasis on the generic uniqueness of Christ's Sonship, nothing which could exclude the Arian assimilation of His Sonship to ours.

3. *God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God.* The first two phrases also appear in *CAES*, but there they are set in the framework of a Logos-theology, attached directly to the title *the Logos of God*. In *N* they are set in the framework of the doctrine of the *Son* and emphasise that He who is *begotten from the essence of the Father* is indeed God, as *God from God*, indeed Light, as *Light from Light*, indeed True God, as *True God from True God*. In the Logos-theology the first two phrases implied a subordinationist view of the relation of the Logos (Son) to God (the Father); in order to remove from them this idea of inferiority of the Son to the Father, *N* adds the further clause *True God from True God*. At the beginning of the controversy Eusebius had interpreted John 17.3 as meaning that the Father alone is 'the true God' and that Jesus Christ, while being θεός (God-without-the-article) is not 'the true God'.[1] In his letter to his Congregation Eusebius avoids any reference to this direct contradiction of a view which he continued to maintain until the end of his life. In *De Ecclesiastica Theologia*, Eusebius asserts that the Father is 'the *only* true God', while the Son may be called 'true God' but not '*only* true God'![2]

4. *Begotten, not made.* Having distinguished Christ's Sonship

[1] *vide supra*, p. 000, n. 0. [2] ii, 23, 1 (*GCS*, iv, 133, 18).

from ours by asserting that His uniqueness consists in His being *begotten from the essence of the Father*, *N* goes on to distinguish Him from the creatures, in opposition to the Arian doctrine that the Son is a creature (κτίσμα) made from nothing (ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων). The Son is *begotten* from the essence of the Father, *not made* from nothing. The recourse which the Arians took to vague distinctions such as 'perfect creature, but not as one of the creatures'[1] could not satisfy the Council. Jesus Christ is not a creature; He is *the Son of God*.

5. *Consubstantial with the Father.* Here, in three words—ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρί—*N* makes the assertion of the reality of the Son's essential unity with the Father completely unmistakable, and introduces the word which divided the Church for the next fifty years. *N* asserts not only that the Son is *from the essence of the Father*, but also that His essence is the same as the essence of the Father. Thus it sets forth in three words the same doctrine as that which *ANT* struggled to express in many words; according to *ANT* the Son is 'begotten . . . from the Father, not as made but as properly an offspring, but begotten in an ineffable, indescribable manner . . . validly and truly begotten as Son . . . begotten of the unbegotten Father . . . the express image . . . of His Father's very substance'. If we remember that at this time no distinction had been drawn between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, it becomes evident that *ANT*'s phrase 'express image of His Father's very substance' (ὑποστάσεως) is very close to *N*'s 'consubstantial with the Father'. On the other hand, *CAES* leaves the question of the οὐσία of the Son undefined and indefinite; Eusebius, however, followed his recital of *CAES* with the words: 'believing each of these (*sc.* Father, Logos and Holy Spirit) to be and to exist, the Father truly Father, and the Son truly Son, and the Holy Spirit truly Holy Spirit'.[2] *N* is anxious to emphasise the essential one-ness of the Father and the Son, while Eusebius and *CAES* seek to emphasise the distinction of the Son from the Father.

The Letter of Narcissus of Neronias,[3] already referred to, relates how Narcissus was asked by Hosius, apparently at the Synod of Antioch,[4] whether he, like Eusebius, taught that there are

[1] Opitz, *Urk.* 6 (12, 9-10). [2] ibid., 22 (43, 15-17). [3] ibid., 19.
[4] The suggestion that the Synod of Antioch was the place where this incident took place is made with forcefulness by Opitz, 'Euseb von Caesarea als Theologe', in *Z.N.T.W.*, xxxiv (1935). cf. also Berkhof, op. cit., 176.

'two essences' (δύο οὐσίαι), to which Narcissus replied that according to the Scriptures there are 'three essences (τρεῖς οὐσίαι). For Eusebius the 'two essences' are the Father and the Son; he appears to have thought of the Holy Spirit as the first creature created through the Logos[1]; the Logos-Son is a second independent divine being beside 'the only true God', a second οὐσία distinct from and inferior to the first divine οὐσία. In his letter to his Congregation 'Eusebius does not commit himself to any positive in which the formula "of the essence" is to be understood, but only says what it does not mean'.[2] He writes:

> We thought good to assent to the sense of such religious doctrine, teaching as it did that the Son was from the Father, not however as part of His essence. On this account we assented to the sense ourselves, without declining even the term ὁμοούσιον, peace being the object which we set before us, and steadfastness in the orthodox view.[3]

A. E. Burn says that the Emperor 'was more concerned to promote peace than to discover truth',[4] and the same judgment must be passed on Eusebius, who was not concerned to discover what was the truth which the word ὁμοούσιον guaranteed; but, being assured that it did not mean that the οὐσία of God was shared or portioned out between the Father and the Son, and being aware that the majority of the Council, along with the Emperor, favoured the term, he signed the statement for the sake of the peace of the Church.

If Eusebius could give no precise meaning to the term ὁμοούσιον, Marcellus of Ancyra, who, in the fragments preserved from his *Syntagma* against the Arians, does not use the term, uses an even stronger phrase, εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτός, which emphasises the identity of the οὐσία of the Son with that of the Father, while Athanasius interpreted it in the sense of ταὐτότης πρὸς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα,[5] giving it the sense of ταὐτούσιος. Both the Antiochene and Alexandrian defenders of the Nicene

[1] Eusebius scarcely mentions the Holy Spirit in his writings. In *Dem. Ev.*, and the Syriac *Theophaneia* the Holy Spirit is ignored, while in *De Ecc. Theol.*, in a section entitled 'How the Church of God believes', he sets forth a strange 'Trinity': 'Therefore for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things . . . and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, who pre-exists only-begotten Son of God, and, thirdly, the Son of Man according to the flesh, which the Son of God assumed on our behalf' (i, 6; *GCS*, iv, 65, 3ff). Cf. Berkhof, op. cit., 86ff.

[2] Robertson, *Athanasius* (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, vol. iv), 75, note 5.

[3] *Urk.* 22 (45, 10-14).

[4] *The Council of Nicaea*, 54.

[5] *De Decretis*, 23; 24; etc.

faith agreed with the teaching, well established in the Western Church, that it is the same divine οὐσία (*substantia*) which is present in the Father and the Son.

The assertion that the Son is ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρί sums up the absolute uniqueness of the Son's relationship with the Father which the previous phrases of the Creed emphasised by distinguishing between His Sonship and ours, and between His origination and that of the creatures.

Having concentrated its attention on safeguarding the divinity of the *one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God*, and the uniqueness of His relation to the Father, *N* turns its attention briefly to cosmology.

6. *Through whom all things were made, both things in Heaven and things in Earth.* This Son, Jesus Christ, who is *consubstantial with the Father*, is declared to be the mediator of the divine activity of creation; He is such, not because He is a demigod, created by God for the purpose of creating the Cosmos, but because He is *the Son of God*. These words are a conflation of John 1.3 and Col. 1.16, both of which are 'cosmological' texts[1]; but the setting in which *N* places this conflation makes cosmology subordinate to theology and soteriology, and the Son's mediatorial work in creation a corollary of His Sonship and mediatorial work in salvation.

7. *Who for us men and our salvation came down and was incarnate, and became man.* The motive for the Incarnation is asserted to be soteriological, and once again the divine origin and pre-existence of the Son is emphasised in the words *came down*, which have nothing corresponding with them in either *ANT* or *CAES*.

Like *ANT* and *CAES*, *N* says that the Son *was Incarnate*, but, in order to emphasise the reality of this Incarnation and the fulness of the manhood which the Son of God assumed, *N* adds the word ἐνανθρωπήσαντα, *became man*. The Christology which *N* sets forth is a *God-Man* Christology; the truncation of the humanity, which is implict of the *Logos-Sarx* Christology of the old Alexandrian tradition and of Eusebius, its Nicene representative, and the truncation of the divinity, which is implicit

[1] In an article, 'Cosmology and the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel', in *Vigiliae Christianae*, Vol. XII (1958), 147-53, I have argued that John 1.3 is not 'cosmological', its true meaning being 'All God's activity *ad extra* takes place through the Logos'.

in the *Word-Man* Christology of the Antiochene tradition, are both avoided by the addition of these words, *became man.*

IV

Summary and Conclusions

1. The Creed of the Synod of Antioch makes the Son-concept regulative, emphasising, in opposition to the Arian distinction between the Logos and the Son, their identity, and safeguarding the authenticity of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ by affirming the uniqueness of His relation to God the Father. The divine Logos, whom it identifies with the Son of God, is not the metaphysical Logos of the old Alexandrian tradition, but the creative and revealing Word of God attested in Old Testament thought. *ANT* enshrines the Antiochene tradition as it was in process of modification in the early decades of the fourth century in the light of the new emphasis on the Father-Son relationship rather than the old emphasis on the God-Word relationship.

2. *CAES* makes the metaphysical concept of the Logos regulative, laying the emphasis on the cosmological role of the Logos as an intermediary and intermediate being between the transcendent God and the realm of the creatures. It interprets the concept of Sonship in terms of the Logos which it interprets in the light of the current Middle-Platonist cosmology which exercised such a strong influence on Origen.[1] The Caesarean Creed bears the marks of Origen's influence, particularly of the subordinationist side of his theology. It emphasises the distinction between the Father and the Son, but contains nothing which testifies to their one-ness with each other, while the terms which it uses to describe the Incarnation, by their very vagueness, are inadequate to the task of bearing witness to the Incarnation as a real Incarnation of God in man. *CAES* preserves all the faults of the old Logos-theology.

3. *N* makes the Son-concept regulative, ignoring entirely the Logos-concept, and emphasising the uniqueness of the Son's begetting from the Father by asserting the essential one-ness of the Father and the Son, and thereby safeguarding

[1] cf. my article in *Studia Patristica*, Vol. II; J. Daniélou, *Origène*, 85ff; E. von Ivanka, *Hellenisches und christliches im frühbyzantinischen Geistesleben*, Chapter 1.

the central truth of the Christian Gospel that in Jesus Christ *God Himself* has acted for us men and our salvation. In *N* is enshrined the deepest insight of the common faith of the Church which had found its expression in the writings of Tertullian and Novatian in the West, and in the ante-Nicene writings of Athanasius.

4. If *ANT* emphasises the reality of the revelation of the Father through the Son, and *CAES* emphasises the cosmological mediation of the Logos, *N* aims at safeguarding the saving facts of the Faith, against those who would make of Jesus Christ the Saviour a second and inferior God, and thus change Christianity into ditheism or polytheism. *N* preserves the two great paradoxes which are central in the New Testament witness to Christ, the *distinction-within-unity* which characterises the relationship between Father and Son,[1] and the God-Man relationship within the person of Christ. *N* preserves these paradoxes because it knows that they are necessary implications of the Church's faith in Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord. It was the soteriological motive that moved Athanasius to fight for nearly half a century in defence of the Nicene faith and of the truth embodied in the phrase *ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρί*.

5. It is not difficult to understand why Athanasius and his Bishop, Alexander, representatives of the Alexandrian reaction against Origenism in favour of a biblical theology, came into alliance with the representatives of the two streams of tradition which arose in Syria/Asia Minor, the one flowing through Western theology, and the other continuing in Asia Minor and Antioch. It is easy to understand, too, why these three groups should be opposed to the Christianised Middle-Platonist cosmology of Eusebius of Caesarea and the stark rationalism of the Arians which threatened to destroy the reality of the revelation of God in Christ and to deny the efficacy of His saving work.

[1] cf. my article, 'The Exegesis of John X.30 in the Early Trinitarian Controversies', in *New Testament Studies*, Vol. III (1957), 334ff.

BOOK REVIEWS

The School of Faith. By T. F. Torrance. James Clarke, London, 1959. Pp. cxxvi + 298. 18s. 6d.

Men in the Church are very much concerned in this age about the problem of communication, the making clear of the Truth in Christ to their contemporaries. There is, however, a second and no less pressing problem—how to make the Truth clear to the next generation within the Church. Our Fathers were often very successful at this. While they did not possess our knowledge of child psychology, their genuine concern and their sanctified common sense did enable them to hand on the faith effectively. They did this through a variety of Catechisms. The number of these official Catechisms, even within the history of the Church of Scotland, is probably a surprise to most of us. Four major Catechisms were used from the Reformation age on—Calvin's Geneva Catechism, the Heidelberg or Palatine Catechism, John Craig's very influential Catechism (with its hundreds of short questions and answers) and the Larger Catechism of the Westminster Divines. But our Fathers not only provided manuals of instruction to be used by the ministry. They had sufficient understanding of the needs of young people to produce shorter and simpler Catechisms—all the others shorter and simpler than the one with which we are familiar—the Shorter Catechism itself. To read again these Catechisms is a heartening experience, with their obvious enthusiasm for the newly discovered sense of the grace of God. And to read Calvin's or the Heidelberg or John Craig's is at many points to echo the words of Horatius Bonar that 'it may be questioned whether the Church gained anything by the exchange of the Reformation Standards for those of the seventeenth century'.

In *The School of Faith* Professor T. F. Torrance has done us a real and twofold service. He has reproduced for us in a modern and attractive form all the principal Catechisms used by the Church of Scotland since the Reformation, and he has written a 126-page introduction to them through which he makes us the keener to read the Catechisms. Here he discusses the theology which they state, or imply, and gives us a statement of his own theological position in a powerful and systematic way for which many of his readers will be grateful.

Out of a great deal of important material two matters are singled out here for special notice.

(1) Much modern educational theory assumes that man is essentially good by nature and that education consists in 'drawing out'

innate wisdom. Such a view fails to recognise two aspects of the Christian Revelation—that in true religious knowledge the Truth meets us in the Person of the Incarnate Word and no less that there is a resistance in the human heart to this Truth, which has to be overcome by obedience and self-surrender. The Catechisms sought to put right questions and especially in the Reformation age to present the claims of Christ to the pupil—and also to provide him with the proper theological terms to give him understanding and enlarge his insight. How far they succeeded in this Professor Torrance discusses on pp. xxii-xli.

(2) By far the largest section of the introduction is an exposition of the Reformed theology in modern terms, showing both how frequently the Catechisms gave a clear exposition, and no less how at places they appear to us to fall short of the total biblical witness. Professor Torrance contrasts the true method of theology as 'dialogical'—in which men respond to the divine revelation—with a 'dialectical method' in which the human mind takes its own abstractions as the key terms (p. xliii).

He sees medieval thinkers from Abelard's time as too much given to this latter method, so that to this day Roman Catholic theology works with a category of Being, shared by God and man, on which a basic natural theology is then constructed. But this danger also beset the Westminster Fathers. They took the biblical concept of Covenant and made it into an abstract idea, and then tended to fit all theology into it. This led to certain distinctions of very questionable worth. There was an eternal covenant of Redemption between Father and Son and a subsequent covenant of grace between Christ and men—which led on to an arbitrary doctrine of predestination (p. lxxviii). Equally the contrast between the covenant of works and the covenant of grace introduced a forensic, moralistic element into the Westminster Standards, absent from the earlier Catechisms and untrue to the teaching of the Bible. Indeed one of the most impressive parts of the Introduction is Professor Torrance's insistence that justification and adoption must not be separated, that 'justification means not simply the non-imputation of our sins through the pardon of Christ but positive sharing in His human righteousness' (p. lxxxvi). Here the older Catechisms gave a greater place to Christ and the triune nature of God as the objective basis of man's salvation, while the Shorter Catechism was 'more concerned with the appropriation of salvation and the Christian life'. Professor Torrance then discusses the *interrelatedness* of the three concepts of prophet, priest and king as the best categories for teaching about the person and work of Christ. If emphasis is laid wholly on one of the three, then you get a distorted theology, which is wholly sacrificial or incarnationalist

or moralistic. In this connexion the question is discussed—how far did Calvin himself teach a full doctrine of the humanity of Christ (p. lxxvi).

It has often been noted that the seventeenth century said less about the work of the Holy Spirit than the Reformers. Professor Torrance points out how Reformed theology failed to deal adequately with the place of the Holy Spirit as the Spirit of Father and Son in relation to nature and so left the door open for natural theology as an independent source of our knowledge of God (p. xciv). A discussion follows on the Holy Spirit as the judge of the world, and the fact that God keeps the fallen world at a distance from Him, till He draws near in Christ (p. ci). Finally Professor Torrance argues that it is better to speak of our participating in Christ's benefits because we participate in Christ Himself, rather than to begin with His benefits and come through them to Christ—which tends to obscure the personal nature of our salvation (p. cx.)

The introductory essay does two things for its readers. It presents them with a restatement of Reformed theology in a contemporary context. Here emphasis is laid on the importance of the whole history of God's saving acts. This is most adequately done in John Craig's Catechism, and Calvin himself remains not wholly satisfied with his method of choosing out some of the greater events and passing over the rest. The whole story of the people of God and the whole life of Christ must find its place in any adequate instruction as must the Spirit-filled Church of the Acts of the Apostles (p. lxxxi). Secondly, the book sends us back to learn from our Fathers in their Catechisms as the place where 'Christian doctrine is set forth at its closest to the mission, growth and life of the church' (p. xi).

J. L. M. Haire

Conflict and Agreement in the Church. Volume Two: 'The Ministry and the Sacraments of the Gospel.' By T. F. Torrance. Lutterworth Press, London, 1960. Pp. 213. 35s.

This is the second of the two volumes in which Professor Torrance is publishing his miscellaneous papers on ecclesiastical topics. The first volume on 'Order and Disorder' was reviewed in this Journal in September 1959, when it was pointed out that, though most of these papers have been published elsewhere, yet their collection into these volumes is fully justified by the author's eminence as a theologian and by his actual influence on the course of ecumenical events. Moreover several of them have hitherto appeared only in periodicals not widely known in this country.

The second volume deals not with Church relations but with the Ministry and Sacraments. First a section on the ministry deals with

the meaning of order and with the terms 'consecration' and 'ordination'. Then a section on 'The Gospel and the Kingdom' deals with New Testament communication, the biblical concept of faith, and the mystery of the kingdom (an interesting study of *musterion*, *prothesis*, and *koinonia*). We then turn to the Sacraments. There are three papers on Baptism. The Church of Scotland has recently produced some notable reports on this, and it is interesting to read the personal statements of one whose more anonymous work is no doubt also to be found in parts of the reports. Finally there are two long papers on the Lord's Supper, one of which does not appear to have been previously published.

Such a collection is obviously difficult to review, and it is impossible to comment even briefly on every article. It could have been said of the earlier volume that its central theme was Christology, indeed one might almost say Chalcedon. If there is a unifying theme here, it is perhaps eschatology, as is suggested by the title of one of the longer contributions 'Eschatology and the Eucharist'. The two themes are indeed combined in interesting sentences such as this:

> We must think of that hypostatic union, however, not in the static categories of patristic thought, but in terms of biblical eschatology, that is, in dynamic categories. (p. 171)

The notion that our participation in Christ's substitutionary oblation is essentially eschatological leads to some interesting criticisms of the doctrine of eucharistic sacrifice; if we identify the Church's *re-actio* with Christ's sacrificial *actio*, we destroy the sacrament by denying its derivative sacramental and analogical nature (p. 179). The adherents of the Liturgical Movement ought also to heed the attack on a certain way of speaking about the bringing of our offerings in the Eucharist, 'which savours rather much of the sacrifice of Cain' (p. 183).

Professor Torrance has some trenchant remarks on the intercommunion or rather the lack of it; he thinks that the arguments of many Anglicans against intercommunion, if they were sound, would equally render communion itself impossible, which is a *reductio ad absurdum*. On the other hand, advocates of 'open communion' are also sharply criticised. The author is perhaps a little impatient with those who with complete sincerity hold these opposing views; but we gladly support his view that we should have intercommunion as soon as possible and then go on to work out what this means in the whole life of the Church (p. 11).

It need hardly be said that Professor Torrance, while showing great sympathy with other traditions (we note the dedication to

Anders Nygren and Edmund Schlink) is yet completely faithful to the Reformed tradition, not only in quoting Calvin more often than any other authority, but also in the much more fundamental sense that he seeks to subordinate his thinking to the Word of God, though indeed that is not peculiar to the Reformed tradition. To read and ponder these two volumes might be the best way of celebrating the quater-centenary of the Reformation in Scotland.

The biblical foundation of the work is well illustrated in the discussion on consecration and ordination, which takes careful account of the distinction between the various Hebrew words for the imposition of hands. This distinction, which was pointed out by Professor Daube, is now often mentioned by New Testament scholars, but has perhaps not received the attention it deserves in Church relations. Professor Torrance differs, however, from Professor Daube (though he mentions the matter only in parenthesis) in that he rejects the psychological explanation of *Samakh* as a pouring of personality from one person to another; he regards the imposition of hands, when this word is used or implied, as offering and presenting the candidate to God in dedication and consecration (p. 56). He does not favour Professor Daube's view that 'the laying on of hands of the presbytery' (1 Tim. 4.14) is really a rabbinic term for 'the ordination of elders', i.e. to the eldership (p. 43).

On page 50, however, he has passed from the categories of the Bible to those of the Reformation. He maintains that ordination means ordination to the ministry of the Word and Sacraments, and is used only in a loose sense when we speak of ordaining deacons or deaconesses or even elders. But on the face of it the Bible speaks of a multiplicity of ministries; to single out the ministry of the Word and Sacraments as alone fundamental is no doubt right; but, in view of the somewhat different approach in the New Testament, it is neither self-evident nor a simple inference from the word 'ordination', and needs some further defence.

The interesting section on faith led to a reply by Professor C. F. D. Moule in *The Expository Times*, 1957, p. 157; and both he and Professor Torrance wrote about it on pp. 221-2 of that volume; these notes are not printed here.

As in the first volume, the style sometimes makes these articles difficult. The author does well to avoid cut-and-dried solutions, and he stimulates us by forcing us to think things out. But sometimes we should understand this theology better if we knew to what it would lead us in practice. A linguistic analyst might ask for the 'cash-value' of some of these statements; it would be interesting to hear a linguistic analyst on Professor Torrance or Professor Torrance on linguistic analysis. We do not like the words 'signitive' (pp. 95

etc.) and 'baptismatic' (pp. 111 etc.), though there is an explanation of the latter.

From p. 145 onwards there are frequent references to Christ's broken body. Undoubtedly Christ broke the bread, and this was thought to have a certain significance in connexion with the unity of the Church (1 Cor. 10.16-17). But it does not follow that this fraction, probably utilitarian in origin, signified any breaking of His body; in 1 Cor. 11.24 the word 'broken' is not found in the best MSS. (cf. John 19.36). Professor Torrance may have had the liturgical formula in *The Book of Common Order* in the back of his mind, but here perhaps *The Book of Common Prayer* is to be preferred.

The following words should be substituted for those wrongly printed: p. 72, *Πνεύματος*; p. 76, *empisteuthesesthe*; p. 170, paschal; p. 174 n. 1, zusammenbrechen.

A. Raymond George

The Gospel according to St. John, 1-10 By John Calvin, translated by T. H. L. Parker. Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh and London, 1959. Pp. vi + 278. 25s.

Under the editorship of Professor T. F. Torrance and the Rev. D. W. Torrance, a new translation of Calvin's Commentaries on the New Testament is being prepared, of which the first volume has lately appeared. This is the first part of the Reformer's commentary on St. John's Gospel, covering the first ten chapters; the translation has been entrusted to the Rev. T. H. L. Parker, no novice in Calvin studies.

Mr Parker has based his work on the translation which the Rev. William Pringle carried out for the Calvin Translation Society, published in 1847. But he has given us a radical revision of Pringle's effort, checking it painstakingly by reference to the Latin text. Such a radical revision was necessary, for even worse than Pringle's 'inability to grasp the close coherence of Calvin's ideas, and his missing many of the characteristic images', is his 'carelessness in omitting negatives or even whole passages and putting in the wrong word altogether'. One may add that even where Mr Parker does not need to correct the sense of Pringle's rendering, he greatly improves his English style. Pringle's English is so obviously translation-English. He says: 'The Samaritans at that time did, as we learn from the words of the woman, what is customary with those who have revolted from true godliness, to seek to shield themselves by the examples of the *Fathers*' (p. 155). And this is Mr Parker's revision: 'We may infer from what the woman said that the Samaritans acted as deserters from true godliness usually do. They sought to appeal to the fathers for precedents' (p. 95). While Pringle

reproduces the sections of biblical text in the Authorised Version, Mr Parker for the most part uses the Revised Version.

It is noteworthy that Calvin's derivation of Bethesda (John 5.2) from Hebrew *'eshed* ('outpouring') has been confirmed by the discovery of the Hebrew name of the place in the Copper Scroll from Qumran. F. F. Bruce

The first Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians. By John Calvin, translated by John W. Fraser. Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh and London, 1960. Pp. vi + 370. 27s. 6d.

Mr Fraser has translated Calvin's fluent and lucid Latin into fluent and lucid, and for the most part correct, English. The exception is that he is addicted to the annoying journalistic solecism of writing 'we will' and 'we would' instead of 'we shall' and 'we should', and of saying 'I want' when the word required is 'I wish': of the former there are two very misleading examples on page 321. There are a few misprints, chiefly in quoted Latin, and on page 146 Aulus Gellius has his name misspelt. As for the substance of this excellent work, clearly to praise or to commend Calvin would be an impertinence: yet we may say without offence that we have always in this commentary the sound and unpretentious judgment which perceives what the Apostle has meant to say, and interprets it to a later generation. Calvin seems to be working from Beza's Latin; but he also has the Vulgate in mind, as well as the Greek in the received text. He is unaware of any Greek variants at 1 Corinthians 15.51, though he knows of the Latin variants and comes to the only sensible conclusion about them. His treatment of the complicated subject-matter of chapter vii is eminently reasonable, rescuing St Paul's teaching from the misunderstandings and misrepresentations from which these subjects suffer in the hands of the Fathers and of many of the moralists. Calvin knew what he had to say, and knew how to say it. His sureness of conviction may in some of his spiritual offspring have developed into intransigence; but if this publication reintroduces his sound sense to modern readers, the editors of this series and the translator of this commentary will do good service to religion in Scotland and elsewhere. There are three useful indexes.

E. Evans

Calvin's Doctrine of the Christian Life. By Ronald S. Wallace. Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh and London, 1959. Pp. xvi + 338 + index. 27s. 6d.

The subject chosen for this study is one that should have been taken up before—and has not. One wonders whether it could have been better done—and is pretty certain that it could not. The salient

features of the Christian life in Calvin's view are presented and with great erudition and genuine insight expounded. What does Calvin really say about Christian moderation? about war, and wine, and women's clothes? What limits does he impose upon the rule of the *imitatio Christi*? How does he regard affliction? What place—and how important a place it is!—does Calvin allot to prayer? These and many other matters receive careful and just treatment at the hands of this accomplished Calvin scholar.

But the contribution which this volume makes to the understanding of Calvin is more important than the mere assembly of the relevant *obiter dicta*. Dr Wallace makes the correct start by laying down as the foundation of his (and Calvin's) thought the person and work of Jesus Christ. And this leads him on to emphasise the relation of the individual Christian to the Church. For the order is first Jesus Christ, then the Church, and only then, if a right balance is to be preserved, the individual Christian with all his manifold problems and perplexities in daily living. There are here the outlines or foundations for an ethic which will be properly Christian, and not merely a classical system with Christian embellishments.

The reader might have expected to find a little more said of two aspects of the Christian life. First, what of the obligation of Bible reading? The author is probably right when he says that Calvin chiefly thinks, not of the Word read and meditated on in private, but of the preached Word mediated through the ministry of the Church. This is clearly his primary contention when he speaks of the Christian's duty 'to attend to the Word' (*Inst.* 1.6.2). A passage in the *Genevan Catechism* may give us the clue why this should be so. Near the beginning of the section 'Concerning the Sacraments', he says: 'While everyone ought to exercise himself in daily reading, at the same time also all are to attend with special regularity the gatherings where the doctrine of salvation is expounded in the company of the faithful.' We may perhaps deduce from this that Calvin feared, not indeed the dangers of private interpretation, as did the Roman Church of his day (and later), but rather the opposite peril: the practice of private reading was so habitual (for had not Greece awakened from the grave with the New Testament in her hand?) that it tended to do duty for attendance at public worship. The important fact emerges that, when Calvin explicitly enjoins private reading, it is usually, as Dr Wallace affirms, for the nourishment and control of the life of prayer.

Secondly, what of the Christian's attitude to the State? The reason no doubt why so comparatively little is said here about the Christian's duties in this respect is that it is the *Institutes*, the *Commentaries* and the *Sermons* to which the author devotes exclusive

attention, while the *Tracts*, which chiefly deal with this matter, are not mentioned.

The book, then, is a quarry—one to which students of Calvin are likely to return again and again. It does not avoid all the disadvantages of the plan on which it is constructed. The work is in effect a concordance, 'real' rather than verbal, of what Calvin has to say upon the subject; and this kind of writing must almost unavoidably seem stodgy to all but the most resolute readers. The documentation of the assertions made reveals a scholar with an enviable command of the works of Calvin quoted. Only two other authors (I think) are cited in all the book's length, one twice and the other once. Single-minded devotion to the great Genevan Reformer can surely never before have expressed itself in just this form. In fact the *Institutes* and also the *Commentaries* have a limpid grace and even lightness of touch which make them spiritually as well as theologically invaluable. These qualities have seldom been reproduced in the vast library of books that have tried to expound Calvin. This perhaps is why the note of joy which is so exuberant in Calvin's own writings becomes muted, even when given an express place in the exposition. But then one of the functions of such a book as this is to guide its readers to and then through what Calvin himself wrote. J. K. S. Reid

A Manual of Church Doctrine according to the Church of Scotland. Second edition. By H. J. Wotherspoon and J. M. Kirkpatrick. Revised and enlarged by T. F. Torrance and Ronald Selby Wright. Oxford University Press, London, 1960. Pp. 132. 15s.

This compact handbook, first issued forty years ago, has long been out of print. Its timely reappearance will be welcomed by the many who have already proved the value of the original version by constant use, and by those—also many, we hope—who will meet it for the first time in this revised and slightly expanded form. It is a sufficient tribute to the basic soundness of the original authors' standpoint that the revision has been almost wholly confined to matters of detail, and the expansions made only at points which have since moved to the forefront in discussion, or where subsequent scholarship has amply vindicated the positions adopted in 1920.

The book does not deal with the Gospel, the substance of the Church's message, as the title 'Church Doctrine' might suggest to the unwary, but with the Church herself, the Servant of the Gospel, and with her doctrinal standards, sacraments, and ministry. It contains four chapters: 'The Church of God' (10 pp.), 'The Doctrine of Ordinance' (45 pp.), 'Doctrine, or the Word' (16 pp.), and 'Ministry' (37 pp.); followed by 16 useful pages of appendices,

mainly citations from Calvin and the Confessions, Catechisms, and other official documents of the Church of Scotland; and a full index.

While the importance of any particular theme to an author cannot be judged solely by the space and position assigned to it, these can be indicative of his general approach. Here, the much too brief first chapter can hardly be regarded as a satisfactory statement of the Reformed understanding of the Church. We would like to have seen what is basically a sound position much more boldly revised in the light of the insights into the nature of the Church which have surely accrued in the ecumenical years since the Lambeth Appeal to all Christian people. Can we really be satisfied with what is said e.g. about 'the Church visible and invisible' on pp. 6-8, excepting as a provisional approximation (useful pedagogically) to a much more complex truth, without at least a hint that there is more to it than this rather facile explanation suggests? Again, when so much of the available space has been devoted to the ministry, would not what is so well said under this heading have been even more convincing had greater emphasis been first placed on the lateral significance of the Church as, in Erik Wolf's fine phrase, 'a brotherly Christocracy', or, in the words of the Barmen Declaration of 1934, 'the community of brothers in which Jesus Christ acts presently as Lord'? It is difficult, too, to see why the Sacraments and the Word have been treated in that order, and disappointing to find the preaching of the Word relegated to what is called 'the devotional surrounding to the sacrament' (p. 46), and given such scant treatment elsewhere in the text that it has rightly to be omitted from the index. The authors plainly state that what they offer is an 'interpretation' but if this is to be, as they hope, one 'for which something more than legitimacy may be claimed' these defects of proportion call for correction. A controversial intent is disavowed, but in the present ecumenical context any public statement of Church doctrine is bound to be a contribution to the conversation not only with other traditions but also with those who share the same confessional loyalties. This book will certainly enliven the conversation of some important points, by its lucid and pointed exposition. One hopes e.g. that what is said about apostolic succession on pp. 94-98 will be carefully considered by Presbyterians (and, for their encouragement, by Anglicans too), and that what is said about Confirmation on pp. 35f will be heeded by Anglicans (and, humbly, by Presbyterians). But the wider service which this manual will render is incidental to its primary purpose of helping ordinary ministers in their pastoral and teaching ministry. Its combination of compactness, scholarship, ample references, a sometimes epigrammatic and often very moving style, and, not least, a

deep pastoral concern, should ensure its usefulness for many years to come.

There are several errata: p. 3, n. 2, the reference is to Rev. xxii, 1; p. 16, second line, the chapter reference 'v' should be inserted after 'iii, 3-9'; p. 16, n. 4, the first quotation is from Art. xxi of the *Scots Confession*; similarly, on p. 17, n. 5; p. 18, n. 2; p. 43, n. 6; p. 22, n. 4 should read: 'Ibid. xxviii, 6'; p. 34, in the penultimate line of the text, read 'of the' instead of 'after'; p. 34, n. 5, the reference should be to *inst.* IV, xix, 8; p. 38, n. 3, should read '1 Cor. x, 21'; p. 60, n. 3, the reference is to Denney's *Death of Christ* (3rd Edit.) p. 113; p. 67, the long quotation in the text is from Art. vi of the *Scots Confession.*

A. D. Lewis

Scotland, Church and Nation through Sixteen Centuries. By Gordon Donaldson. S.C.M. Press, 1960. Pp. 128. 8s. 6d.

In all the special interests aroused by this Reformation year, it is pleasant to find that the wider background has not been ignored; and the Reader in Scottish History at Edinburgh University is outstandingly well qualified to write the short, semi-popular, but most scholarly survey which this little guide contains. Despite the title, the emphasis throughout is on things ecclesiastical—how, in Scottish history, could it be otherwise? But the political complications of the theme are equally prominent, and Dr Donaldson spares no pains in showing that the establishment of 1690 was a political creation, just as those of 1610 and 1660 in their turn had been. He is interested in the life of the Church at different periods, indicating the great antiquity of Scottish Sabbatarianism, and remarking that the system of public discipline 'imported into the worship of the Church of Scotland a form of Sunday entertainment which is nowadays purveyed only by the less reputable Sunday newspapers'.

Three cursory but adequate chapters deal with the Celtic and Medieval periods. Then there follows a scrupulously fair portrait of the Church on the eve of the Reformation, leading on to a full discussion of the struggles in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Further chapters describe the various Churches, Presbyterian and other, and the conclusion is entitled 'Presbyterian-Episcopalian Relations'. This last is the least satisfactory, for it does not attempt to state the real issues involved on either side; but this, one may hope, is a chapter that yet remains to be written.

The most important part of the book might be described as a re-interpretation of Scottish history from 1560 to 1690. A radical 'demythologising' of Church history is urgently needed, and that not in Scotland alone. Here, perhaps no reader will agree entirely with Dr Donaldson's conclusions, but they are cogently argued and

amply documented. He says that 'the Scottish Reformation was less a movement for a new theology than one for the reform of life and morals', and the point is certainly worth making; but, however important 'the Congregation' may have been, one still feels that it was overshadowed by 'the Gospel'. He tentatively describes the Reformers' polity as 'congregationalism with a dash of episcopacy', and if this is correct, it is a remarkably accurate account of what they thought that they were doing: namely, to return to the organisation of the immediately post-apostolic period. But it is misleading to call Knox's system episcopalian, as he elsewhere tends to call it, for by no stretch of language can that term be used in its present-day connotation. A situation in which the same form or ordination was used for ministers and superintendents, both were alike subject to the General Assembly, and no attempt was made to preserve the episcopal succession, is more similar to the very different papal theory of the episcopate, where the bishop is no more than the Pope's delegate, priesthood is the highest order in the ministry, and in special circumstances any priest can validly ordain. The trouble is that about half a dozen quite distinct types of bishop have been known to history, and Scotland has tried most of them in turn; the argument has never been a straight debate for or against episcopacy as such, but has rather been concerned with the type of bishop that the Church ought to have.

The book is well produced; I have only noticed one obvious misprint, on p. 16, where 'Tween' appears for 'Tweed'. And the price should appeal to Scotsmen, even if, as the author suggests, diocesan bishops are too expensive for a notoriously thrifty nation. Readers of every persuasion will benefit from studying this informed and sympathetic approach. G. S. M. WALKER

An Analytical Philosophy of Religion. By WILLEM F. ZUURDEEG. Abingdon Press, Nashville, Tenn. Pp. 320. $4.75.

BY an analytical philosophy of religion, Professor Zuurdeeg (of McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago) does not mean one composed in the manner of the variously styled conceptual, philosophical, logical, or linguistic analysis now stems primarily from Oxford, and formerly from Cambridge. Indeed Zuurdeeg expressly dissociates himself from 'the Oxford school' on the ground that they make use of the analytical method to appraise the truth-value of religious beliefs, instead of simply offering a neutral analysis of such beliefs viewed as part of the output of *homo loquens*. According to Zuurdeeg, the task of the philosopher is to understand what people say, and to classify and examine the various kinds of verbal operation and the functions of language in human life; but not to presume to

judge as to the truth or falsity of the outcomes of men's linguistic efforts. 'Analytical', in Zuurdeeg's usage, is equivalent to 'descriptive' or 'phenomenological', in distinction from 'normative' or 'evaluative'. Indeed in the case of convictional language, which he regards as non-indicative, or non-cognitive, and of which religious language is the most important variety, he holds that the question of truth does not arise, except in the trivial sense that a conviction is 'true' by definition for the one who holds it, being a part of himself and of his mode of living. And so Dr Zuurdeeg can say:

> Both convictional and indicative languages refer to 'reality'. Here lies a crucial problem. The assertion that both languages refer to 'reality' does not imply any judgment on the part of the analytic philosopher about the nature of these 'realities', for example, as to whether or not they are illusionary. It is not the analytical philosopher's business to decide whether the reality meant in a certain language is 'really' there or not. The only thing he can do is to notice that if human beings speak either indicative or convictional language they refer to something which is 'real' *for them* (p. 45).

But if it is not part of the business of the philosopher of religion to ask whether 'God' refers to illusion or to objective reality, whose business is it?

At the end of the book, there is a Postscript which is not easy to conflate with the theses of the work as a whole. In this Postscript, in spite of all that he has said about a purely neutral investigation, Zuurdeeg equates an analysis with an hypothesis, and concludes by saying that 'philosophical analysis as understood in this work is compatible with some forms of Protestantism (Neo-Reformation theology, a certain kind of reconstructed liberalism), perhaps a liberal Catholicism, some form of Anglicanism and several kinds of humanism, whereas it is incompatible with fundamentalism orthodoxy, older liberalism and all forms of metaphysics, Communism, Fascism, and other totalitarianisms' (p. 308). This list of undefined goods and evils sounds more like emotive incantation than philosophical analysis as Dr Zuurdeeg has described and rigorously practised it in the main body of his book.

In the detailed working out of what I would describe as his phenomenology of convictional language Dr Zuurdeeg makes a number of interesting points, which are invariably developed with penetration and learning. Supplementary to his own reflections, the author draws upon the work of several Dutch scholars, whose thought he introduces for the first time to the English-speaking world. Some of his main conclusions are as follows:

(1) The convictional situation arises when a Convictor—an idea or person—grasps and overcomes us and makes us its servant.

(2) To understand convictional language we have to take into

account not only speech but the entire convictional situation including the speaker, the confessional group within which his language is current, and the history of its key terms.

(3) A man *is* his convictions; and it is no more appropriate to demand grounds or reasons for his convictional nature than for his nature as a whole. He is what he is; and his speech is an important aspect of this.

(4) 'All speaking is an exercise of power. It is by speaking that man arranges his life, establishes his existence' (p. 69). And convictional language, above all, has this function. It creates a thought-world which the speaker can inhabit and to which he can successfully adjust himself.

The function of convictional language in general is the function of religious language in particular, as the venting of an especially basic and determinative set of convictions. And so Dr Zuurdeeg treats Christianity, Islam, Communism, Fascism and Humanism as languages by which different people have given meaning to their lives.

His discussion provides valuable material for philosophical reflection. It raises again the perrennial question: Is religion anything more than a device by which the human animal enables himself to feel at home in the Universe? However, disappointingly, this question does not arise within philosophy as conceived by Dr Zuurdeeg. And yet, although it is not explicitly raised, it is implicitly prejudged by his crucial assumption that convictional statements are non-cognitive (or non-indicative), and therefore neither true nor false. It is here that Zuurdeeg's treatment is open to a fundamental query. For he discusses those types of religious locution which support his view, and ignores those which do not. He points out, for example, that historical statements (e.g. 'Jesus was born in 5 B.C.') are not, as such, religious; and that such distinctively religious utterances as 'I put my trust in Christ' are expressive (or, he might have added, often performatory) but not indicative. But he does not consider such ostensibly cognitive religious statements as 'God loves us' or 'God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself'—statements which appear to be, and are certainly construed in the contexts of living religion as being, indicative. An important problem, which however cannot be reached from Zuurdeeg's chosen starting point, is that of the relation between the religiously indicative on the one hand and the empirically and scientifically indicative on the other.

It is with regret that I note that Dr Zuurdeeg walks in the procession of distinguished thinkers who have absorbed what might be called, not wholly unjustly, 'the American heresy'—the view of

religion as a socio-psychological phenomenon, through which man seeks adjustment within himself and with his environment, and of God as one of the permanent symbols of religion. Zuurdeeg's contribution to the development of this trans-Atlantic deviation is to investigate the part which language plays ('the power of positive speaking') as religion fulfils its role in human life. And yet, just because it is (when viewed from a contrary standpoint) so fundamentally misdirected, this is a book to reckon with, for it is written with originality, learning and a truly impressive objectivity. One can salute its quality even whilst failing to be converted to its point of view.

JOHN HICK

Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence. By HERMANN DIEM, translated by HAROLD KNIGHT. Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1959. Pp. viii + 218. 25s.

THE existence and the value of this book had long been known to English students of Kierkegaard as Professor Diem is without doubt one of the foremost Kierkegaard scholars in the world and was awarded a prize by the Kierkegaard Society for this examination of the concept of dialectic in Kierkegaard. Professor Diem sets out to correct the false impressions of Kierkegaard created by the interest in the so-called existentialist or dialectical thinkers as well as the exclusive interest in Kierkegaard as a subjective thinker which has characterised so much talk about him. Faced with this misunderstanding on the one hand and this one-sided distortion on the other, Diem wishes to 'restore' the use Kierkegaard made of the idea of dialectic.

First, he points out that the term is used to mean (1) logic, (2) the dialectic by which the thinker probes his own existence, (3) the dialectic of communication and (4) the dialectic of the communication of the historical fact of God's self-revelation. The second meaning raises the question of the relation of logic to ontology, and here Diem's discussion breaks new ground in Kierkegaard-study. However, this is one of the many, very complicated problems in Kierkegaard, and it is not surprising that Diem fails to do justice to the whole mass of relevant material. For example in *Papirer*, volume 1 C 47, Kierkegaard notes that philosophers such as Kant with his category of existence take away with one hand what they give with the other, and in *Papirer*, volume 5 C 1-10, discusses this question of logic and being. Most of this is not referred to by Diem; and (though, of course, this is a criticism of the translation) the whole discussion is vitiated by the indiscriminate use of 'being' and 'existence' to translate the three Danish terms: Tilværelse, Væsen and Existens. However, this is not to deny the value of the discussion,

and we must add that it is one of the very few references to the extensive use Kierkegaard made of Trendelenburg's *Logische Untersuchungen*. Both as historical and as systematic work, then, this is pioneer scholarship.

Coming on to the crucial doctrine of subjectivity, one is heartened by the delicate care with which Diem unravels the meaning of the slogan, 'Subjectivity is truth' (pp. 38-41). The greatest possible misunderstanding, he says (p. 38, n. 5), is to say, as Høffding does, that Kierkegaard 'sought truth in the subjective (psychological) sphere' and 'made it the object of personal feeling'. This is quite true, but unfortunately Diem does not explicitly show how this is a grave misunderstanding. He insists on the connexion between Socrates' and Kierkegaard's dialectic, and without any doubt Socrates did represent for Kierkegaard 'the subjective thinker'. However, there is much more that needs to be said about the complex meaning of 'subjectivity in truth' for Kierkegaard even in the context of his 'dialectic of existence'.

When he gives a provisional account of the dialectical method (pp. 51ff) Diem remarks that 'Kierkegaard's splendid consistency of thought' tempts the systematic thinker 'to construct a particular philosophy to underpin [his own] theology and form an approach to it' (p. 52). This is another remark which, because it is made *en passant* and is not elucidated, is very puzzling. The consistency is defined as meaning that 'not the smallest fancy can remain outside the comprehensive conception of his dialectical method'. Does Diem then mean to say that we are to understand Kierkegaard in a piece-meal fashion? This is a vexed question of interpretation, but there is good evidence for accepting a unitary or systematic view. Diem rejects Brunner's 'eristic theology' as an interpretation of Kierkegaard's dialectic and gives a very satisfactory explanation of what Kierkegaard means by cheating men into the knowledge of truth.

The difference between the Socratic paradox and the Absolute Paradox, says Diem, is that in the former eternal truth itself was not paradoxical whereas in the latter it becomes so. This is an important distinction between what I have called the broad and the narrow use of the term paradox. In connexion with the latter it is important to understand the nature of historical knowledge. Hence Diem refers to Kierkegaard's use of the term 'faith' to indicate 'the general organ for the apprehension of the historical'. Now it is true that Kierkegaard says in one or two places that a thing can be known only by a process or organ appropriate to its nature and in this connexion says that 'the organ for the historical must have a structure analogous with the historical itself; it must comprise a

corresponding somewhat by which it may repeatedly negate in its certainty the uncertainty of becoming' (*Fragments*, p. 67—and here one realises our debt to Swenson for putting Kierkegaard's tortuous Danish into such good English). All this is extremely confusing and I cannot understand what Diem means when he says that what it implies becomes clear when we ask why Kierkegaard is so concerned about this means of grasping the historical and concludes that Kierkegaard's point is that the factuality of an event contributes nothing to the understanding of the historical. Kierkegaard makes more or less clear what he means by this last paradox (see *Postscript*, pp. 286-7), but this in no way removes the confusion of the passage in the *Fragments* where he deals with our apprehension of the past. One reason at any rate for that confusion is the opposition of the immediate and the becoming and the rather odd contrast which he makes when he introduces the word 'Faith' (Swenson's translation of 'Tro'—*Fragments*, p. 67) between the direct *knowledge* that there is a star in the heavens—because I see it—and the *belief* that this star came into being. This is a matter that needs to be discussed much more fully, but I must say that the use of the term 'faith' in this context (Swenson probably adopted it for stylistic reasons as the sentence literally reads 'belief believes what nevertheless it cannot see') is confusing.

Another topic that is only mentioned in passing by Diem is Kierkegaard's conception of man (pp. 72-73), and he remarks that Kierkegaard 'regards man as a synthesis of body and soul held together by spirit as a third factor'. I have often wondered whether Kierkegaard's anthropology shares a Cartesian dualism such as Ryle criticised in *The Concept of Mind*, but here Diem does not enlighten us. Certainly, Kierkegaard's language leaves him open to such criticism, but I do not think that his essential points are vitiated by it.

In the second provisional account of the dialectical method Diem discusses the various aspects of the communication of revelation and pays special attention to the historicity of the revelation. Though he discusses the various ways in which the historical character of the revelation is secured by Kierkegaard against metaphysical distortion Diem does not deal with the crucial problem (which he does raise on p. 89) of how the factuality of the revelation is guaranteed. What he does bring out, however, is the high doctrine Kierkegaard held of the ordination of the preacher, the sacrament and the Church; and the relation of this to the historicity of the revelation is an important and neglected part of Kierkegaard's theology. So we proceed to the thorny question of Kierkegaard's 'attack' on the state of Christianity, and Diem's general thesis is that we must interpret

this as part of the Kierkegaardian dialectic. In this he is surely right, and his insistence (p. 103f) on the validity of dogma and ordained ministry for Kierkegaard is altogether admirable. Most of the book from this point onwards is a careful examination of Kierkegaard's attack on the Church which Diem insists was neither an ecclesiastical (liturgical) not a political criticism. It was above all a demand for honesty and, as Kierkegaard himself said, neither laxity nor severity. Amongst the many services this book will render will be this: it is the first full and sober account of what Kierkegaard intended by his attack.

The final account of the dialectical method begins with Kierkegaard's criticism of Lutheranism and Luther and then asks which is the *real* Kierkegaard—the Kierkegaard of the Luther-criticism who wished to remove the 1800 years of Christianity or the Kierkegaard of the published writings who was a corrective to official Christianity. The answer Diem gives is that through the guidance of Providence the latter is the real Kierkegaard. In conclusion he stresses Kierkegaard's indirect contribution to theology and philosophy.

It is a pity that this immensely valuable book should be marred by a difficult organisation of the material and by the translator's annoying use of German titles of the individual works. If it is too much to expect the references to be given to English translations it is certainly not too much to ask that *Philosophiske Smuler* be referred to as *Philosophical Fragments* and not as *Philosophische Broken*; and to give the German references seems to me quite pointless. I have noticed two misprints—on p. 44 'Korsars' should be 'Korsar' and in the Bibliographical Note 'Efterladte Papirer' is quoted as 'Eftirladte Papirer'.

J. Heywood Thomas

Eucharist and Sacrifice. By Gustaf Aulén. Muhlenberg Press, Philadelphia, 1958. $3.50; Oliver & Boyd, Edinburgh, 1960. 18s.

This book addresses itself to the 'deadlock' which, in recent ecumenical discussion, is said to arise when churches, who agree that the Eucharist is a sacrifice of praise, thanksgiving and self-oblation, proceed to discuss the relation between the sacrament and Christ's sacrifice. Is the Eucharist a memorial of Christ's sacrifice or is it in some sense an offering of Christ or of His sacrifice?

The writer makes a fair and useful analysis of Orthodox, Lutheran, Reformed and Anglican teaching on the sacrificial aspect of the Eucharist. His account of classical and modern Lutheran teaching is particularly valuable. His own conclusions are based on Luther's insistence that Christ is truly present in the sacrament. Because He is present, His perfected, but eternally valid, ever present sacrifice must be present also. The Church cannot in any sense offer Christ

or His sacrifice, but He makes His once-and-for-all, eternally valid sacrifice present for believers and offers to them participation now in the new age which is yet to come.

Aulén admits that Reformed teaching generally has tended to limit Christ's sacrifice to His death (with a consequent melancholy and negative influence upon the eucharistic rite), whereas the NT makes it embrace His whole Incarnate Life, but he refuses to see any NT basis for asserting that Christ offers His sacrifice continually in Heaven. There is no longer the Suffering Servant, but the Victorious Lord. The Cross was definitive. 'Sacrifice' cannot be used in the same sense to describe what Christ did on the Cross and what He is doing in His ascended life. At the most, in His own Person, in the heavenly places, He *is* the Sacrifice, and His past, perfected Sacrifice is the basis of His intercession.

The writer rejects modern Anglican theories as to the unity of the eucharistic sacrifice with Christ's heavenly sacrifice, but holds that the belief that the sacrifice is present in the Lord's Supper is implied in Luther's teaching.

Aulén, however, does not tell us satisfactorily what it means before God when the Church sacramentally sets forth Christ's sacrifice in the fraction and elevation of the consecrated bread and wine. The Eucharist has a God-ward as well as a man-ward aspect. He does not explore what it means to 'plead', through the sacramental action, Christ's sacrifice, as opposed to 'offering' it. Nor does he take adequate account of the parallel between the ritual of the Day of Atonement and Christ's death on the Cross and appearing in Heaven for us. The blood which was shed without was taken by the High Priest into the Holy of Holies, so Christ, having shed His Blood upon the Cross, appears in the presence of God, showing His death and pleading His accomplished sacrifice. In the Eucharist, of which He is the true Minister, He does sacramentally on earth that which He is doing in Heaven—uniting us to Himself by the Holy Spirit, and ministering in and through us before God.

A. K. Robertson

Jacob's Ladder. By W. Nicholls. Lutterworth Press, London, 1958. 7s. 6d.

The fundamental thesis of this interesting book is that the foundation of Christian worship is our Lord Himself. He is the true Jacob's Ladder—the One who is both the Divine Word to man, and man's response to that Word. Worship is the supreme and only indispensable activity of the Church, and Church worship must follow the Christological pattern set forth in Scripture.

Starting from the insights of the Lund Conference of 1952, the writer, in a full and interesting manner, brings together modern Reformed theology, liturgical history and ecumenical insights in a critique of both 'catholic' and 'protestant' theories of worship. All Christian worship is response to the Word—whether this be in Lection, Sermon or Sacrament. Word and action are inseparable in Christ, therefore in Christian worship Word and Sacrament are necessarily conjoined. Man's response to the Word is eucharistia—thanksgiving and sacrifice. True worship is self-oblation, yet our worship can add nothing to Christ's perfect λατρεία. Indeed He is our response. All Christian worship is made through Christ and in participation in His worship. We cannot offer Christ in the Eucharist, but He can come to be offered in us. Christ's sacrifice is ours, because it was made on our behalf and in our place. It can be offered by us in Him as man's perfect worship; it is also the means of our own offering of the sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving.

The essentially eschatological outlook and the corporate nature of Christian worship are emphasised, and due note is taken of the place of the Holy Spirit in the Christological pattern, who enlivens the descending and ascending movements of worship, and of the interrelation of free and liturgical prayer.

The writer points out the only way to unity in Christian worship —the common study by the churches of the Christological pattern which will correct every tradition in some respect, but will show us what elements are essential in Christian worship and how much diversity may be tolerated. A. K. Robertson

Inspiration and Interpretation. Edited by John W. Walvoord. W. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. $4.50.

This book is not likely to be much known in this country, but it is a serviceable tool for preachers and students everywhere. Indeed it attempts to do what has hitherto not been done elsewhere. It was worth doing and it is done well.

The editor is President of Dallas Theological Seminary; and the ten contributors are, with one exception, professors in American colleges. They all represent the theological conservatism which characterises the Evangelical Theological Society under the auspices of which the book—the third in a series—is published. In nine chapters the teaching of great figures of the Church on the authority and inspiration of the Bible is examined—four giants of the distant past, Irenaeus, Augustine, Luther and Calvin—one from the not so distant past, Wesley—and four famous theologians of the modern period, Sanday, Rowley, Brunner and Niebuhr. There is a con-

cluding chapter which attempts to gather up and focus the issues. In such a field, the omission of Origen is surprising—and to a less extent Wellhausen and Robertson Smith. Specially full chapters are devoted to Irenaeus and Calvin.

The rise of Biblical Criticism was only one of several shocks which tended for a long period to shake the authority of Scripture for many people. While the issues in this controversy are still acute and cut right across all the other divisions of the Christian Church, it may well be claimed that the process of recovery from the shock is proceeding apace. This does not mean that there has to be a going back to older positions, nor that exact biblical scholarship has not and will not always have its legitimate rights. But it does mean that study of the Scriptures is growing more vertical than horizontal, and that accordingly the full authority of the Bible is unimpaired, as the unique and irreplaceable book in which God speaks to men as He does nowhere else. The contemporary revival of biblical studies, in the form of what is called 'depth-exegesis' has made it clear that the Bible requires no external supports for its authority—in Calvin's words, quoted in this book, 'The truth is indicated, in opposition to every doubt, when, unsupported by foreign aid, it has its sole sufficiency in itself'—and so the Holy Scriptures are self-authenticating.

The kind of 'modernism' which is rightly to be suspected and feared is that which passes over from the strict field of Biblical Criticism in the sense of date, structure, text, and authorship of books into the field of negative theological interpretation—involving serious questioning as to the unique substance of the Bible, its final character, its miraculous and supernatural emphases. But there is no need for this fatal transition to be made. The appearance of this book under the wing of the Evangelical Theological Society must not be allowed to suggest that scholars who do not accept the particular theory of the inspiration of the Bible which that Society presumably holds are not 'evangelical'. Fortunately, an increasing number of scholars today are fully 'evangelical' in adherence to the once-for-all Gospel of the Bible, and yet not 'fundamentalist' in the accepted sense of that term. It is a serious confusion to identify the authority of the Bible with a particular mode or theory of inspiration. Authority and inspiration go together, indeed, and it would be a great gain if those who stand on different sides as to the mode of inspiration were to unite in proclaiming the immensely large area where they stand together. For such a purpose, the book by Professor J. K. S. Reid on the subject is a sure, sound, splendid guide.

GEORGE S. GUNN

The Importance of being Human. By E. L. Mascall. Oxford University Press, London, 1959. Pp. 118. 10s. 6d.

The Meaning of Salvation. By E. K. Lee. Mowbrays, London, 1959. Pp. 102. 5s.

Bible, Congregation and Community. By Ian M. Fraser. S.C.M. Press, London, 1959. Pp. 76. 3s.

Dr Mascall's Bampton lectures, delivered at Columbia University, interpret with clarity and persuasiveness the Catholic doctrine of man and, in particular, show its acceptability to men with the modern scientific outlook. Of course, the Catholic doctrine maintains that the 'body of a man is an integral part of him', and yet St. Thomas Aquinas does suggest a dualism of soul and body more definite than that implied in the language either of the Holy Scriptures or of modern science. Should we not, particularly in the light of modern science, be discovering a Christian doctrine of man, which does more to reconcile the dualities of the body and the soul, of the natural and the supernatural, of the secular and the religious, than the Thomist doctrine does? There are points in Dr Mascall's interpretation, which suggest that the Catholic doctrine is not as firmly based on the Bible as it is often thought to be—for example the rather optimistic view of human work (very different from the realism of the Bible in this matter), the basic place given to the Eucharist, and the analogy between the Persons in the Trinity and persons in a society. One can find particular texts to support Dr Mascall's teachings on these matters, but one is not convinced of their central place in biblical doctrine as a whole. The brunt of the Protestant opposition to the Catholic doctrine is, however, its failure to do justice to 'those versions of Christian doctrine which deny that there is anything at all of value in fallen man'. We can admit that some Protestant theologians equally fail to show why man's 'worst acts reveal a glimmer of good'. Dr Mascall quotes with approval Père Bouyer's suggestion that much of the controversy between Catholics and Protestants on this matter is due to 'the nominalist outlook which both sides in the controversy inherit from medievalism in decay'. It is a matter of regret that, as far as I know, no Protestant theologian has examined critically Bouyer's argument, and Dr Mascall might have given a fuller exposition. It seems possible, however, that the controversy has its seeds in the language and thought of the Thomist doctrine itself, rather than in a later nominalism. In that case what we need today is not so much a reinterpretation of the Catholic doctrine as a new doctrine, more firmly based on the Bible, and taking into account the insights of modern science.

Mr E. K. Lee in his *Meaning of Salvation* is also expressing Chris-

tian doctrine in words that modern man should understand, but his aim is more devotional and hortatory, and his thought less profound than that of Dr Mascall. In his earlier chapters, his account of Christian salvation is clear, scriptural and free from jargon. Sometimes his language may lead to misunderstanding; one doubts the theological truth of the phrase 'the Christ in the worst of men', and the statement that 'love and hate are equally "Divine gifts" ' is certainly not true of Christian *agape*. Mr Lee's treatment of faith is inadequate and subjective, and while Christian salvation certainly involves the salvation of social life and unity, the last chapters of the book, interesting as they are, do not seem to develop naturally from the main argument of this very readable book.

The 'artisan inhabitants', who form the congregation of Rosyth, whose work is described by its minister, Dr Ian M. Fraser, in *Bible, Congregation and Community*, are the men and women whose nature Dr Mascall so learnedly interprets and whose salvation is Mr Lee's concern. Dr Fraser is concerned with the methods of congregational work in the modern world; he is so modern that he scarcely uses the word 'salvation', although for him too salvation is obviously salvation of the whole man and the whole life of society. This book is full of ideas for Christian witness in an industrial parish. What is distinctive is Dr Fraser's recognition of the part played by the congregation, so that minister has to learn from laymen discovering the interpretation of the Bible in their life in the world, as well as minister interpreting the Bible from his own specialised studies. After reading this book, one wonders how many experiments in new methods of Christian work have failed because the minister concerned has lacked Dr Fraser's patient persistence and his humility in learning from his fellow-members.

These three short books are all concerned in very different ways with the interpretation of the Christian message to the modern world. With all their varying merits, they appear to have a common, and very modern defect—a failure to realise in full measure the utter helplessness of man in his fallen condition apart from the salvation offered by Christ.

WILLIAM LILLIE

Théologie du judéo-christianisme (Histoire des doctrines chrétiennes avant Nicée, vol. i). By JEAN DANIÉLOU. Desclée, Tournai, 1958. Pp. 457.

SOME books are important because they gather up the results of years of research, and present for their day and generation a definitive account of the subject with which they deal. Others are notable, not so much for any final conclusions which they may contain, as for the stimulus which they gave, on their publication,

to the study of some problem. Some few contrive to do both, providing at once a comprehensive survey of earlier studies and the starting-point for a fresh advance, and of these this book is one. The footnotes and the bibliography bear witness to the amount of work which has been done on various aspects of the field, but it has been left to Professor Daniélou to find a thread to guide us through the maze, to see the significance of many separate studies and unite them into a coherent and comprehensive theory. It may well be that his book will herald the beginning of a new era in the study of Christian origins.

It is now more than sixty years since the publication of F. J. A. Hort's lectures on Judaistic Christianity, and comparison is interesting. Hort declared: 'The only Christianity which can properly be called Judaistic is that which falls back to the Jewish point of view, belonging naturally to the time before Christ came, and still practically maintained by those Jews of subsequent ages who are not merely unbelieving members of a caste', and found it 'a natural product of the circumstances of the Apostolic Age', but 'becoming more and more evidently a futile anachronism as the main body of the Church grew up into a stately tree in the eyes of all men; and at length dying naturally away'. Writing as he did with the Tübingen theory in view, he found the heart of his subject in the conflict of Judaistic Christianity with Paul, concentrated in the main on the New Testament, and devoted a few pages only (thirty-eight out of two hundred) to the entire period after New Testament times.

Daniélou on the other hand is primarily concerned with just this later period. He claims that between the New Testament and the beginnings of Hellenistic theology, as it appears in the Apologists, there was an intermediate period, little known because its documents have largely perished, and that this was the period of a Christianity of Semitic structure, a period in which Christian thinkers found their means of expression not in the forms of Greek philosophy but in those of later Judaism. Readers of Hort will find here some of the views which he criticised, but the evidence which has accumulated in the last sixty years fully justifies a re-appraisal. Like Hort, Daniélou begins by defining his terms. 'Judéo-christianisme' could designate those Jews who recognised Jesus as prophet or messiah, but not as Son of God; or it could refer to the Church of Jerusalem under James. In the former, particularly in syncretistic groups, he sees the origins of Gnosticism; the latter was orthodox, but this type of Jewish Christianity gradually disappeared after A.D. 70. His own understanding of the term is wider, embracing both and also such men as Paul: it denotes a form of Christian thought which expresses itself in categories derived from Judaism,

prior to the contact with Greek philosophy which eventually led to the theology of the later Fathers. Following Goppelt, he maintains that down to the middle of the second century Christianity remained Jewish in structure, as the theology of a mission-field today is primarily Western, not African or Indian; and it is the theology of this early period that he seeks to recover. The book falls into four main parts, of which the first deals with the sources, the second with the intellectual milieu, the third and longest with the doctrines, and the last with the institutions of Jewish Christianity.

The sources which may be employed include such Old Testament apocryphal works as *II Enoch*, the *Ascension of Isaiah*, and the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*, and such New Testament apocrypha as the *Gospel of Peter* and the *Gospel according to the Hebrews*. There are also, among the Apostolic Fathers, Hermas, Ignatius and Clement, and the Epistle of Barnabas (on which Hort wrote 'all is spoiled by want of sympathy with the true Jewish history and life'). A second chapter deals with heterodoxy, particularly the Ebionites and the Gnostics. In part II, one chapter is devoted to exegesis (*targumim* and *midrashim*), another to apocalyptic, while in part IV one chapter deals with Baptism and the Eucharist, a second with prayer and the ministry, and a third with personal holiness. Part III has chapters on the Trinity and angelology, the titles of the Son, the Incarnation, the theology of redemption, the Church, and millenarianism. Of special interest is the use made of such recently published documents as the *Gospel of Truth* and the *Apocryphon Johannis*—not to mention the Dead Sea Scrolls. The theology which emerges from the study has points of contact with the New Testament, and in particular with Paul and John, but Daniélou argues that in many respects the non-canonical Jewish-Christian writings attest an older stage, and that Paul and John present one expression of this older theology, and the Jewish-Christian writings another. And this theology shows some distinct affinities with the doctrines of the Essenes.

It is scarcely to be expected that this theory will at once command general assent. It would involve some reconsideration of current views regarding the hellenisation of early Christianity, although not necessarily a radical reconstruction, and there are many questions which will require scrutiny before the thesis can be said to have been established. For example, are all the sources in fact Jewish-Christian? Are we to think of this Jewish-Christian theology as existing for a period alongside the Hellenistic, and if so where? How much do we really know about Christianity in Syria or in Asia Minor in the first two centuries? On the other hand, this is not simply to be dismissed as merely another modification of the Tübingen theory, and it is not difficult to imagine the kind of development here

suggested. Nor are we asked again and again to assume that something must be so, merely to suit the author's case. The argument is clearly presented, with a wealth of detailed references, and moreover it hangs together. Those who reject the theory may be hard put to it to find a better—and if a better *should* be found it will be to the author's credit that he has stimulated the search.

On one point at least he is surely correct. It has long been urged that there is some connexion between Judaism and the Gnostic sects, although the issue has been confused by vagueness in the use of terms and by the difficulty of tracing any clear line of development. The evidence adduced in this book seems to make clear what is after all the simplest and most natural solution, that the Gnostics derived much from Jewish Christianity, but transformed it in the process. Daniélou declines to subscribe to the position that Gnosticism was a widespread movement in pre-Christian times, which influenced Christianity itself in its formative stages. There is a *gnosis* in the Dead Sea Scrolls, as there is a *gnosis* in the New Testament, but neither of these is yet the Gnosticism of the second century. In a judicious summary of the points of contact Daniélou remarks: 'On voit comment tous ces traits à la fois rappellent et déforment gnose judéo-chrétienne.' Gnosticism in fact took over the Jewish-Christian theology, speculations on Genesis for example being common to both, but re-interpreted it and combined it with alien theories.

The reader should be warned that Daniélou sometimes accepts a position which is by no means universally held. Thus he follows Bieder and Schlier in the view that Eph. 4.9 and 1 Pet. 3.18ff do not refer to the *descensus ad infernos*, but to a descent into this world. For Ephesians many would agree, but for 1 Peter it is quite another question. And occasionally, as he says himself of another scholar, he makes the text say more than it contains. The passage of Hermas quoted on p. 262 refers as he says to Baptism, but it does not speak of water as symbolic of the realm of the dead. At this point Daniélou omits a sentence (quoted p. 384) in which it is expressly said that 'the seal is the water' (So Lightfoot; Daniélou has 'the water is the seal'). These are however but small points, as is the ascription of Philo's *In Flaccum* to Josephus in the index. There is no index of subjects, and indeed to compile one would have been an enormous labour, but there is a very full index of passages cited and the table of contents is sufficiently detailed for most purposes. Altogether the book may be commended as a valuable contribution, from which much may be learned even by those who may refuse to be convinced. One reader at least would hope to see it soon in an English translation.

R. McL. Wilson

The Baptist Union. By Ernest A. Payne. Carey Kingsgate Press, London, 1959. Pp. 317. 21s.

Dr E. A. Payne, the General Secretary, has written an attractive account of the Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland from its formation in 1813 to the present day. The substance of the work was first delivered as Whitley Lectures in Manchester and London. The publication of the book anticipates the terjubilee of the Union which falls to be observed in 1963.

In the Introduction we are told that the organisation was 'a Union formed in 1813 of Calvinist ministers and churches. The founders affirmed their loyalty to the main doctrines of Calvinism as these were customarily defined by the Baptist Associations of the late eighteenth century.' Its members were, in fact, Particular Baptists whose beginnings must be sought in early Stuart times. They were not, as some have thought, inspired by 'the Renaissance idea of human individualism and autonomy'. There were, of course, other Baptists who, like the Anglican John Hales, had long since 'bid John Calvin goodnight'. These General Baptists, however, quickly found a place within the national Union beside their Calvinist brethren. Regional and county Associations had existed in both wings for close on two centuries before 1813. Even after this date the national character of the new organisation was frequently qualified by competing Baptist groups and interests. The most important of these was the Baptist Missionary Society which, founded in 1792, has continued to enlist the passionate devotion of many ministers and church members.

In the later chapters of the book Dr Payne traces with wide knowledge and obvious sympathy the steady fusion of these various interests in the present Baptist Union. The story moves on by periods of ten to fifteen years. This is a useful method but it does not always lend itself to complete historical perspective. References to the 'background' are consequently somewhat mechanical at times. It was an interesting epoch in politics, economics and religion. Some might have wished to find a fuller analysis of the position of Dissent, and especially of Baptist Dissent, in relation to the Established Church and to the Liberal democracy of the nineteenth century. This perhaps lay beyond the object of the lectures and is hardly a valid criticism.

Readers will be interested in certain special subjects. One of these is the unfortunate controversy between C. H. Spurgeon and the leaders of the Union. Dr Payne treats it accurately and fairly but with caution. The issues involved were fundamental but they were deeply coloured by the attitude of Spurgeon and the bureaucracy of his opponents. Fortunately his abiding greatness is inde-

pendent of this quarrel. Again there is the question of Superintendents. Dr Payne seems to regard these officials as firmly established in the Union and provides a useful record of their institution. One might venture to think, however, that the office has not yet received its final definition. The position of Baptists in relation to the Ecumenical Movement is also of great immediate interest. This is not discussed at any length but it is clear that the author regards the Movement as an important way forward in the twentieth century.

This book is the ablest and most readable of Dr Payne's writings. He avoids the irritating ecclesiastical habit of reading into denominational origins a 'catholicity' or a connexionalism which the records do not justify. He presents an accurate picture of a movement deeply conditioned by history. The great occasions are clearly drawn; the great personalities have their entrances and their exits. Behind them and around them we are shown from time to time a succession of holy and devoted lives which, for many beside Baptists, is the only true Succession in the Christian Church.

A. B. Miller

Barriers to Unity. Edited by Michael Bruce. The Faith Press. Pp. 112. 15s.

This book will not lower the barriers to unity, but heighten them. It is indeed described as 'a fresh attempt to break down barriers to unity between Catholics and Protestants, East and West, written by an international team on the Catholic side of the great divide'.

It appears under the aegis of the International League for Apostolic Faith and Order, the aims of which are to promote understanding between Catholic-minded Christians of various communions, to bear united witness in ecumenical gatherings and to work for unity according to Apostolic Faith and Order. By 'Apostolic Faith' is meant the living doctrine revealed by our Lord, handed down by the Apostles through the Bible and preserved in its purity by the Creeds and the tradition of the undivided Church. By 'Apostolic Order' is meant the priestly threefold ministry, duly consecrated in the Apostolic Succession and in the Communion of the Catholic Church.

There are seven contributors representing Rome, the orthodox Church, and Anglo-Catholics. The Primus of the Episcopal Church in Scotland writes the Preface, and there is a full introduction by the editor.

The introduction declares that the book 'aims at grasping the nettle of controversy' but it does so in a fashion which merely increases the controversy. Right at the beginning are wild, extreme

words about Protestants and their interest in the ecumenical movement—'consciously or unconsciously their energies are bent upon the Devil's work of division'. It is also held that 'the main stream of the ecumenical movement is not poisoned by the spirit of division' —and presumably the main stream is what this book represents. This is irresponsible use of language.

The Catholic approach is no exclusive concern or preserve of Roman Catholics, still less of Anglo-Catholics. People who think that there might be anything in such a view would need the corrective of John Calvin's Tracts and Treatises on the Reformed Church. The charge that all this is but Protestant individualism is no answer to the mighty argument of the Reformers who were employed by God to rescue the Apostolic faith out of gross error and abuse.

The Archbishop of Utrecht who is the Roman Catholic contributor says in a pleasant way just what he might be expected to say. But the representative of the Eastern Orthodox Church is more bold —'She is the true Catholic Church of Christ on earth. There is none other. All other Christian denominations are not "Churches" at all. All Protestant Churches and sects are not "Catholic" in any sense.' However, he adds, 'But God who sees the human imperfections of the militant Church on earth and is the master of her divine, heavenly nature, knows how to save those who appeal to Him from outside, bringing them sooner (on earth) or later (in heaven) back to that same, and only, restored wholeness of life.'

The Archbishop of Utrecht says, 'We do not want to be unteachable and obstinate'. But obviously there is a limit to this, when it comes to Rome's basic claim to be the one true Church with an infallible earthly head. The 'Catholic-minded Christians' who are behind this book must realise that Rome does not recognise them at all as a true Church, and that the only unity to be achieved in that direction is by 'making submission'—the phrase commonly and exactly used to describe conversions. No real dialogue can be carried on with an infallible Church, only a dreary monologue. Moreover, if history lasts, the time will come when the idea that mankind has to look to Rome for final guidance in faith and morals will, in Dean Inge's words 'evoke only a smile'.

Fortunately all the Churches hold in common the great centralities of the Christian faith, as some paragraphs in this book admit. It is when it comes to questions of order, ministry and sacraments, that acute difference arises. The line of argument in this book on these matters is unwelcome and fruitless to the non-episcopal Churches, and the majority of Anglicans would be far from enthusiastic about it. The last sentence of the book speaks of 'the necessity

of seeing episcopacy as part of the revealed truth'. It is not to be denied that the Church has to exercise authoritative oversight. But the idea that this is to be done in a divinely-appointed form or order has no sure basis in Scripture, and can only be sustained by an appeal to Tradition. Those who maintain that the Ascended Lord gave as a gift to His Church the threefold priestly order of bishop, priest and deacon would do well to ponder Ephesians 4.7-13. The approach which makes a particular Church order part of revealed truth and of the essence of the Church is unspiritual at its root, and alien to the genius of the Christian religion. 'A true valuation of the sacraments and a sound idea of the ministry' have been secured in the non-episcopal Churches as fully as in the episcopal, and there is no prospect of reunion except on the recognition of this. So far as order is concerned, all Churches are defectively constituted because of schism from each other. In his essay in this book, Dr Mascall distinguishes between 'real ministries of the Word and Sacraments *in* the Universal Church and such ministries *of* the Universal Church.' He is aware that this will be condemned as hair-splitting, but he has no success in answering the charge.

GEORGE S. GUNN

The Life and Letters of Kenneth Escott Kirk. By ERIC WALDRAM KEMP. Hodder and Stoughton. Pp. 220. 20s.

DR KIRK was Bishop of Oxford from 1937 to 1954. He stood for something very distinctive in the Church of England, and he stood for it with unwavering, almost relentless, steadfastness. Here we have a most adequate, if not very exciting, biography of an exceedingly able and competent man, of whom many people felt that 'as long as Kirk was there things could not go very badly wrong'. His was indeed 'a brilliant and massive mind, but, like others of whom that can be truly said, he was somewhat detached, lonely and sad; for he had suffered by the death of his wife in early life and by much ill-health. Once he actually said, 'I have no friends'—but that could refer only to his independence of attitude in the courts of the Church.

This biography not only gives us a just estimate of the Bishop and a good selection of his able letters, but helps us to get a good hold of the whole period. Dr Kirk, from his early days in the Student Christian Movement and his deep interest in questions of education, made a definite and lively contribution to every important point of life which he touched. Although he became the leading Anglican authority on Moral Theology, he was emphatic that it is love, not dogma, that attracts the outsider to the Church, and he was puzzled that this was so much forgotten.

He probably lacked the qualities necessary for daring leadership, as his views on atomic warfare suggest. He did not seem to be able to press far enough his strong views on legislative and administrative change in the Church of England. In his parish preaching he was simple and helpful, and his confirmation addresses were notable. His concern for his clergy was constant and deep. If upon occasion he appeared to be ruthless, men did not forget the Bishop's poor health.

His greatest book is *The Vision of God*, revealing that he had become a leading scholar on New Testament and Patristic subjects. The other book chiefly associated with his name is *The Apostolic Ministry*, an extensive symposium to which Dr Kirk contributed an important chapter which aroused much controversy. The point of view expounded in this book on the nature of the ministry, order and succession is one highly disagreeable to all non-episcopal Churches and makes discussion of reunion difficult and frustrating. In keeping with this point of view is his consistent opposition to the South India union, which is told in this book with almost unnecessary detail. Yet he had a real sense of mutual tolerance, and he was often tired of the long, bitter argument.

GEORGE S. GUNN

The Family in Contemporary Society. S.P.C.K., London, 1958.

THE fruit of a group enterprise is presented within these pages such as must characterise the thinking of the Church more and more, if its task in the world is to be undertaken seriously. Here accurate information, careful statistical inquiry and interpretation are allied to mature theological thinking. Justice is done to the twin foci of theology—revelation and the human situation. Those who have writhed whenever theology has maintained liaison with an unexamined or inadequate sociology, can take encouragement from this publication. It is not only valuable in itself. It points a way.

The group, whose work is presented thus, was convened at the behest of the Archbishop of Canterbury. The report was duly presented at Lambeth 1958. The contribution of churches from all over the world makes it a refreshingly rounded document: and at the same time confirms the impression that there is work to be done by the Church in this field for many a year to come.

The family is always examined in the context of its existence within a wider society, and the scale is a world scale. As a result there is always a menace of drums in the background. The pressure of rising populations. The obligation to save life by diverting capital loans to welfare services, fronted by the menace of life saved when work and food for growing populations fails through scarcity

of capital for industrialisation. The disruptive influence of Christianity on cohesive family groupings within a pagan society. Legalised abortion and sterilisation pointing the need for urgent reconsideration of the use of contraceptives. It is the world Church, thus chivvied by real situations, which gets down to the job of understanding the family as a unique and precious gift of God.

I would select certain features for special attention.

The section entitled 'Theological Considerations' is important. The development of theological thought regarding marriage and the family in the past thirty years is examined. Although the question of what constituted a genuine marriage (in this large context) was still under debate, the mind of the group emerged in significant affirmation. Primary to marriage is the one-flesh unity analogous to the union of Christ and His Church: children are not the 'end' of marriage, but its 'fruit'. A new value within marriage is accorded to coitus and love-making. Procreation is recognised as an act of participation in God's creativity; and is extended to include the upbringing of children. The family is seen to provide a model situation in which the meaning of human relationships is learned. The relationship of marriage to the Eucharist is richly suggested: in each there is the offering of a human fellowship for a divine empowering.

In this section it is noted that deliberately non-generative coitus raises new questions. A substantial part of the publication deals with this matter. New ground is broken compared with that maintained at Lambeth 1908 and 1920 (which denounced the use of contraceptives) and that of 1930 (which was grudgingly permissive). A large body of Christian opinion was recognised to hold the view that the conscientious decision to use contraceptives was in certain circumstances justified; or that, within the wholeness of marriage, it was more obviously and ordinarily justified. Spacing and planning of families was part of parental responsibility. 'If our conscience will not tolerate, when we know how to prevent it, a torrent of infant deaths, no more should we, with the knowledge we have, encourage an ungoverned spate of unwanted births' (p. 15). 'There are very strong moral-theological grounds for regarding the responsible use of contraceptives by married persons as morally right' (p. 147). 'The use of contraceptives, on this view, enables the marriage to be enriched with consequent benefit to the family, and the demand of this interpretation is not less responsibility but more' (p. 15). There is a wise, continual insistence on thoughtfulness here. Coitus is recognised as the seal of the marriage union, a mysterious mode of intercourse, a self-giving of the whole personality, a knowledge not available otherwise. Care is taken to examine adequately

the view of those who see in it a 'given' pattern, which the use of contraceptives may obscure or nullify (although, even were there authoritative grounds for this understanding of it, this 'given' pattern could scarcely be afforded in every detail and without variety of interpretation). None is more down-to-earth in treatment of the subject than Karl Barth, a summary of whose mind on the matter is included. He points out that not one, but every form of family planning, from abstinence to the use of contraceptives, requires human arrangement, and all stand or fall together. The need is for responsible consultation and carefree decision, in the light of our responsibility under God and His willingness to forgive. This whole examination is particularly valuable for churches in lands where family planning is encouraged by State action.

A final word of appreciation. It is recognised all the way through that changes in habits and attitudes derive not only from conscious Christian decision but from causes often considered extraneous to the Gospel. The husband who used to submit to the grandmother-dominated régime of Bethnal Green, who has now acquired a new status in the family and a new sense of responsibility towards it, owes this revolution not to some fresh persuasion of his duty as husband and father, but to the rehousing policy of a public authority which broke an old pattern and made a new one necessary. The shortage of domestic servants has provided an impetus towards making marriages more genuine partnerships of shared activity. God sometimes enlightens the mind of the player by the moves He makes in the game.

Surely nowadays, when shift work, overtime and Sunday work disrupt basic relationships, when the State, in the course of its normal duty to protect life, invades the innermost recesses of the family to urge policies which will keep population commensurate with resources; when further instability in family life in Jamaica would immediately follow the withdrawal by Britain of price supports for bananas and citrus fruits and the agreement to maintain the price of sugar: no one who sees the significance of theology will be content to remain a political and sociological babe.

IAN M. FRASER

The Early Liturgy to the Time of Gregory the Great. By JOSEF A. JUNGMANN, S. J. Darton, Longman and Todd, London, 1960. Pp. 314. 50s.

THIS book contains lectures given in 1949, and was originally published in 1959 in the University of Notre Dame Liturgical Series, and is now made available in this country. The intention is to provide an introduction to the worship of the early Church, and the

book is very successful indeed. Part of the ground covered in the author's famous *Missarum Sollemnia* is gone over here, but in a rather more popular way. Not that the book is not scholarly—the writer's name is a sufficient guarantee of great erudition. But it will fascinate the general reader, who will find it straight-forward and pleasant to read.

After a short introduction dealing with the history of liturgical study, Jungmann discusses the worship of the primitive Church, emphasising the idea of the Church as a worshipping community. The works of the Apologists are largely drawn upon. The various writings of the third century, especially the *Apostolic Tradition* of Hippolytus, are examined and described in detail. Separate chapters discuss the Eucharist, Baptism, the Apostles' Creed, and the Daily Offices, while the conflict between Gnosticism and orthodoxy receives close attention. The changes following upon the state acceptance of Christianity are detailed, and such subjects as the impact of paganism on Christian worship, the role of the liturgy in the transformation of pagan society, and the influence of the Christological disputes on the liturgy, are presented in an interesting and inspiring way. The developments of the fourth and fifth centuries, especially the growth of the various types of liturgy in East and West, are explained, and in the last section the subjects of Baptism and penance, the Easter cycle and the Christmas cycle, the Daily Office and the Eucharist, as they came to be before the days of Gregory, provide a clear picture of the liturgical life of the Church. A useful index completes the work.

There can be little doubt that this will take the place of not a few previous works on the early liturgy, and it should indeed become an important text-book for students of the early Church. Though the author says that the book is not intended as a guide to scientific research in the field of liturgical history, it will certainly prove most useful and acceptable to any who wish to understand the general development of worship and its forms.

There are a number of americanisms which will seem a little disconcerting. One does not care for 'synopsize' (p. 88). It is a pity too that Louis Bouyer's *Life and Liturgy* is referred to under its American title, *Liturgical Piety*, as this may cause some confusion. There are a few printer's errors—the Greek phrase on p. 23 has two mistakes, and on p. 269 the word 'virginitas' omits the 'r'.

But these are small points, and one must be grateful to the publishers for undertaking an edition for this country, and for its fine production.

JOHN A. LAMB

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REASON AND REVELATION IN LUTHER[1]

by Dr BERNHARD LOHSE

I

LUTHER's conception of reason and revelation has not yet found the attention which it deserves. Though some new studies have tried to interpret his view of human reason,[2] neither his conception of revelation as such nor his definition of the relation between reason and revelation has been the object of special research. This fact which at first sight seems rather surprising is not accidental. Rather it is the consequence of a very important development which had taken place already in the sixteenth century. It was primarily Melanchthon and not Luther whom Protestant theologians in the post-Reformation era followed. While Luther was the reformer of the Church, Melanchthon was the reformer of the German universities and the whole education system. With respect to their theology, Luther and Melanchthon differed considerably as is well known. The ideas by which Melanchthon reformed the German universities were, roughly speaking, a combination of Protestant theology as regards the doctrine of justification and a more or less unaltered Aristotelian system as regards the relation between theology and philosophy. The Melanchthonian reform gave the German universities their shape for centuries till the new ideas of rationalism and of modern science won the universities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and gave them a new form. But it seems that Melanchthon's conception of reason and revelation is even today of great significance and influence. It has at least determined most modern studies which have dealt with Luther's conception of reason and revelation.

This is true already of Theodosius Harnack's famous book on Luther's theology.[3] On the whole, Harnack gave a balanced account of Luther's conception of reason and revelation though

[1] An outline of this paper was read at Didsbury College, Bristol, on 29th September 1959.

[2] K. Stürmer, *Gottesgerechtigkeit und Gottesweisheit bei Martin Luther*, Theol. Dissertation, Heidelberg, 1939; B. Lohse, *Ratio und Fides—Eine Untersuchung über die Ratio in der Theologie Luthers*, Göttingen, 1958.

[3] T. Harnack, *Luthers Theologie* (1862, repr. Munich, 1927). vol. I, pp. 69ff.

he took all his points of view from orthodox theology. According to Harnack one can distinguish in Luther's theology between general and special knowledge of God. From the very creation man has a certain knowledge of God. By Adam's fall this knowledge has not been destroyed but only weakened. It is, however, still to be found in all men. In his conscience and in his reason man knows that God exists and that He is the Creator of the world and that one day He will judge mankind. This natural knowledge of God is not called in question by revelation, rather it is supplemented and perfected. Though Harnack knows that Luther could be extremely critical of human reason he tries to state things very cautiously. According to him Luther did not doubt the value of this natural knowledge, though on the other hand Luther thought it not to be the right one. The reason for this, however, is only that this natural knowledge of God does not save man. He needs more than the general knowledge of God could give, namely the knowledge of God as merciful and pardoning. This knowledge is granted to mankind only through revelation.

This rather 'domesticated' interpretation of Luther's conception of reason and revelation determined the discussion for a while. But as soon as the critical theology of Neo-Protestantism grew up and turned towards the Reformation, Harnack's account could no more suffice. For on the one hand Neo-Protestant theologians had a deep confidence in human reason. To them reason was the highest authority by which even all Christian doctrines had to be examined critically. On the other hand they were too honest to ignore Luther's sharp criticism of human reason. It was Ernst Troeltsch who in one of his early writings drew attention to Luther's criticism of reason and to the orthodox solution which was based on Melanchthon's theology.

According to Troeltsch[1] Luther never developed anything which could be called a well thought-out conception of reason. Troeltsch points out that Luther was one of the great religious personalities in history and that all these religious personalities had a deep confidence in the exclusive right of revelation against human reason. Luther therefore never pondered the question where man had his reason from or what might be the

[1] E. Troeltsch, *Vernunft und Offenbarung bei Johann Gerhard und Melanchthon—Untersuchung zur Geschichte der altprotestantischen Theologie*, Göttingen, 1891.

task of reason under revelation or what is the relation between faith and reason. Rather Luther was content, wherever he found reason in contradiction to revelation, to blame the former and to praise the latter.[1] Luther did not even try to prove his statement. What he aimed at was a complete dualism between divine revelation and human reason. Troeltsch knows that against this interpretation one could point to Luther's criticism of several books of the New Testament which at least show a certain use of reason. But Troeltsch simply says that Luther's criticism of the canon is not consistent with his view on reason and revelation.[2]

Troeltsch comes to the conclusion that Luther's conception of reason and revelation corresponds in all respects to his conception of law and Gospel. Reason has a certain affinity to the Lex and is therefore nothing else but sinful, proud and self-seeking. By his reason man tries to get to know the *Deus absconditus*. On the other hand, however, revelation is, like the Gospel, totally independent of anything which reason may discover, and also surpasses all human understanding.[3]

Though there is a certain truth in Troeltsch's comparison between reason and revelation on the one side and law and Gospel on the other, Troeltsch overstates his case. His book is excellent as regards the relation between theology and philosophy in Melanchthon and Johannes Gerhard. But with respect to Luther, it may well be asked, from the few references he gives, whether he has studied him sufficiently. At least he has not the slightest understanding of Luther's position. Rather he is prejudiced for the orthodox view and against Luther's conception. In this respect it is interesting to note Troeltsch's own presuppositions as regards the relation between reason and revelation. He deals with them right at the beginning of his book. There he states that for any Christian doctrine even of a totally supernatural character a certain point of contact is needed. This point of contact is above all to be found in man's natural knowledge of God. 'This natural knowledge of God is both the summit and the unity where all the different philosophical branches of knowledge converge.'[4] If therefore such natural knowledge of God is put in question, reason and

[1] E. Troeltsch, op. cit., p. 56.
[2] ibid., p. 57.
[3] ibid., p. 190.
[4] ibid., p. 5.

revelation are separated from each other and this gulf cannot be overcome.

In his interpretation of Luther's conception of reason and revelation, Troeltsch did not even make the attempt to find out the foundation on which Luther developed his view of reason and revelation. But probably the difference between the Reformation and Neo-Protestantism was too great. In spite of its more or less rationalistic prejudices, however, Troeltsch's book determined the discussion of this problem for quite a long time. This can be shown e.g. with respect to K. Stürmer's study on the *Righteousness and Wisdom of God in Luther*.[1] According to Stürmer Luther juxtaposed human reason and man's attempt to justify himself before God on the one hand and God's wisdom and God's forgiveness of man's sin on the other hand. The result of this interpretation is that Luther's conception of reason and revelation is supposed to be anti-intellectual and even irrational. A *sacrificium intellectus* is required if man is to accept God's revelation.[2] Sometimes Luther's view is put even more sharply, as e.g. by A. Lunn who states that Luther was the fore-runner of modern irrational *Weltanschauungen*.[3]

Now, the reason for these modern misrepresentations of Luther's conception of reason and revelation is that one usually starts from the orthodox view of this problem which goes back to Melanchthon and judges Luther according to this standard. Even T. Harnack's account which did more justice to Luther than Troeltsch and others, did not overcome the orthodox position. The orthodox view of the relation between reason and revelation, however, is more or less the same as the scholastic conception. It may therefore be good to give at first a brief sketch of the scholastic definition of reason and revelation, where only the position of Aquinas and Occam will be discussed (II). Part III will then discuss Luther's fundamental ideas on reason and revelation. In Part IV it will be shown what consequences Luther's conception has for the solution of special theological problems. And finally in Part V Luther's position will be confronted with that of Melanchthon.

[1] cf. p. 337, n. 2 above.

[2] O. Ritschl, *Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus* (Göttingen, 1926), vol. III, p. 175; P. Schempp, *Luthers Stellung zur Heiligen Schrift* (Munich, 1929), p. 8; K. Stürmer, op. cit., p. 43.

[3] *The Revolt against Reason* (London, 1950), pp. 20, 51ff.

II

According to Aquinas reason and revelation are associated with each other in the way of substructure and superstructure which can be compared with the different stories of a building. In his theological thought as a whole Aquinas manifests a deep confidence in human reason. The issue is not to overcome human reason but to perfect it. That which human reason can recognise finds its necessary supplementation in revelation. Since both reason and revelation are given by God they cannot be in contradiction to each other.[1] This means that human reason can perceive certain things about God. E.g. God's existence can be recognised by human reason without special revelation. Furthermore, reason can recognise God's omnipotence. It is only those attributes of God that have been revealed in the Old and New Testament which cannot be recognised by human reason. Accordingly human reason has the task of recognising God as far as it can and to define its knowledge as exactly as possible. Aquinas speaks here of the so-called *praeambula fidei*. On the other hand it is the task of faith to recognise those things which are given by God only in His revelation. Aquinas often says that faith means *cum assensione cogitare*. What faith can recognise is therefore indeed above reason, but never against reason.

There is one presupposition which Aquinas always makes, namely that the Scripture contains a number of certain truths. These special truths have been explicated during the history of the Church. Thus arose the *depositum fidei*. This *depositum fidei* must be further explicated. Nothing of the great treasure of knowledge which the Church has should be lost. Rather everything has to be handed down to posterity. Aquinas sometimes even says that though the truths of faith surpass those of reason, reason can go so far as to recognise that the truths of faith are not improbable. Reason, rightly used, must admit that divine revelation supplements human knowledge.[2]

We come now to Occam. As a matter of fact, Occam differs

[1] *S.Th.* I, q. 1, a. 8: 'Cum igitur gratia non tollat naturam, sed perficiat, oportet quod naturalis ratio subserviat fidei.'

[2] *S.Th.* II, II, q. 1, a. 5: 'rationes quae inducuntur a Sanctis ad probandum ea quae sunt fidei non sunt demonstrativae, sed persuasiones quaedam manifestantes non esse impossibile quod in fide proponitur.'

not very much from Aquinas. Formerly it was often stated that Duns Scotus and Occam not only made a distinction but a separation between theology and philosophy. Recent research has, however, shown that this is not so.[1] According to Occam the knowledge of faith and the knowledge of reason are not in contradiction to each other. He rather has a stricter conception of the principles of Aristotelian science. In the strict sense only the knowledge of human reason can be demonstrated, i.e. only the knowledge of human reason can be really proved. Though all human knowledge must be based on certain presuppositions, namely certain axioms, and though these axioms cannot be proved, they are nevertheless self-evident truths which can be made intelligible. This is not the case with the knowledge of faith. All theological thinking is based on revelation. Revealed truths cannot be made intelligible like axioms. But theology has simply to accept revelation without questioning. Occam never intended to put revelation aside. But strictly speaking, theological thinking is not provable. It has to be taken into account that theology and philosophy are different spheres of thinking which cannot be associated with each other in the way of substructure and superstructure.

This method of differentiating between theology and philosophy was not always carried through by Occam. P. Böhner makes it seem probable, that even to Occam the existence of God can be proved.[2] But this does not matter very much, at least as regards the influence of Occam on the succeeding period and especially on Luther. While a student at Erfurt University, Luther was himself trained in Occamist theology. Occam's influence on him with respect to reason and revelation can be summarised in two points. Firstly, the confidence in reason which Aquinas had in his theological thinking was shaken by Occam. Secondly, the harmony between faith and reason which Aquinas had established was called in question. The second point incited theology to meditate more thoroughly on its own sources, i.e. especially the Scriptures, but also on the validity of tradition. For theology could no more in the sense of Aquinas depend on philosophy as the *praeambula fidei*. To

[1] B. Hägglund, *Theologie und Philosophie bei Luther und in der occamistischen Tradition —Luthers Stellung zur Theorie von der doppelten Wahrheit*, Lund, 1955.

[2] P. Böhner, 'Zu Ockhams Beweis der Existenz Gottes', *Franziskanische Studien*, XXXII, 1950, pp. 50ff.

Occam himself Scripture and tradition were never in contradiction to each other. Though Occam sometimes criticised the doctrine of the Church or even the Pope, his criticism was not based on a new understanding of Scripture, but was always occasioned by certain conflicts between the Pope and the German Emperor whom Occam supported. Never did Occam criticise the *depositum fidei* as such. On the contrary, the doctrine taught by the Church became even more important than to Aquinas. For to Occam it was neither possible nor necessary to give an exact proof for what the Church taught. This means that Aquinas and Occam differ not too much. On the whole the relation between reason and revelation is somewhat different. But Aquinas and Occam are only two representatives of the Roman Catholic view of reason and revelation. Sometimes Roman Catholic theology is more sceptical towards the knowledge of human reason, especially when the Church is confronted with an atheistic philosophy. But this does not mean that to Roman Catholic theology God's existence cannot be proved by reason. The Vatican Council has therefore defined in its third session the dogma that reason and revelation cannot be in contradiction to each other.[1] Revelation never is against reason though it is above reason.

The brief account of scholasticism can be summarised in three points:

(1) To scholasticism reason is a known quantity which can be defined exactly. By reason scholasticism understands the ability of man to recognise certain things. Within a certain sphere the knowledge of human reason can be proved. Furthermore, reason can draw certain conclusions with respect to God. These conclusions are not questioned by theology but they are confirmed or supplemented. Problems as e.g. the sin of man are not discussed by scholasticism when it defines the ability of human reason. The fall of Adam has not seriously affected reason. Though reason has been weakened a little it can still

[1] Concilium Vaticanum, Sess. III, cap. IV: 'Verum etsi fides sit supra rationem, nulla tamen unquam inter fidem et rationem vera dissensio esse potest: cum idem Deus, qui mysteria revelat et fidem infundit, animo humano rationis lumen indiderit, Deus autem negare se ipsum non possit, nec verum vero unquam contradicere. . . . Neque solum fides et ratio inter se dissidere nunquam possunt, sed opem quoque sibi mutuam ferunt, cum recta ratio fidei fundamenta demonstret eiusque lumine illustrata rerum divinarum scientiam excolat, fides vero rationem ab erroribus liberet ac tueatur eamque multiplici cognitione instruat.'

fulfil its task not only as regards the things of this world but also as regards the beyond.

(2) To scholasticism revelation also is a known quantity. Reason can either be associated with revelation in perfect harmony, or one can more strongly distinguish between the different spheres of knowledge. In any case, revelation is the *depositum fidei*, i.e. a certain treasure of truths.

(3) The consequence of the first two points is that the relation between reason and revelation can be defined in an exact way. Of course, there are differences between the different theologians. But they are not of great significance.

III

After this brief sketch of the scholastic conception of reason and revelation we turn now to Luther. But before we try to show some of his fundamental ideas about reason and revelation, two preliminary remarks have to be made.

Firstly, as has already been pointed out by Occam's influence on Luther, the harmony between reason and revelation was shaken. But another point seems even more important than Occam's influence. Luther belongs to an epoch which is not marked by a strong speculative interest, especially with respect to metaphysics. In history there are times when speculation both in theology and philosophy flourishes. Usually such an epoch is followed by another that turns more to questions of practical life and ethics. In high scholasticism every good theologian or philosopher took part in the speculative strife of the time. Luther, however, lived in an era which was concerned mainly with practical things. This is true not only of Luther himself and the other reformers but also of contemporary philosophy. Previous humanists as e.g. Nicholas of Cusa had dealt in speculation to a great extent. But at the end of the fifteenth and during the sixteenth century, it was the purpose of most humanists to better the morals and customs of the people. These different interests of different eras have to be taken into account if one wants to put Luther into the right historical context. If Luther had an aversion against many philosophers and sometimes even against philosophy as such this is partly due to the whole tendency of his own time.

Secondly one must be careful not to develop a complete

system of Luther's conception of reason and revelation. Luther never wrote a compendium of his theology. It was always with particular problems of his own time that he dealt. Nevertheless, his answers to such questions had a deep theological foundation. Therefore if one wants to give a picture of Luther's thought one has to take into account the occasion on which he wrote and its importance for the selection of arguments which he adduces.

After these two preliminary remarks we shall now try to show Luther's position as regards reason and revelation. The first thing which has to be stated is that to Luther revelation is not a corpus of a certain number of truths in the sense of the Roman Catholic *depositum fidei*. Rather revelation is always concrete. Therefore the issue is not whether man can recognise certain supernatural truths. Rather revelation has a particular intention.

Luther's conception of revelation can already be shown by examining the way in which he speaks of it. The word revelation can be found in Luther's works only very rarely.[1] As far as I can see, Luther never understood revelation in the sense of a *depositum fidei*. Even the young Luther before his discovery of the meaning of righteousness and justification does not know either the word or the conception of a *depositum fidei*. If one speaks of revelation one has to realise that revelation has a subject and an object. It is God who reveals Himself to man. Luther can e.g. say that the child Jesus was made known by different revelations, and these revelations are given or granted to mankind.[2] Or he says that the revelation during the baptism of Jesus is higher than that given to the wise men from the east; for the latter was granted only a few men while the former could be seen or heard by a great multitude.[3] In these cases revelation is understood in the literary sense of the word, i.e. a disclosing or uncovering of something hitherto hidden. On another occasion Luther says the revelation of the malice of the heart is a comfort to us Christians; for it is God's will that the false pretence of the world which cannot stand God's Word comes to light.[4] This passage is very interesting because here one can

[1] cf. the index to the Erlangen edition of Luther's works, E.A. 67.54f, *sub* 'Offenbarung'. [2] W.A. 52.154.7ff (*Hauspostille*, 1544, on Luke 2.25-32).
[3] W.A. 52.103.29ff (*Hauspostille*, 1544, on Matt. 3.13-17).
[4] W.A. 52.72.22ff (*Hauspostille*, 1544, on Luke 2.33-40).

see Luther's concrete conception of revelation. Revelation has a certain purpose or intention which in this case is the comfort of Christians.

This concrete character of revelation which calls and challenges man is also shown by the fact that Luther repeatedly points out that the knowledge of Scripture or the mere acceptance of a treasure of truths does not suffice. Rather it is necessary that the Holy Spirit works in man. Luther often speaks of a revelation of the Holy Spirit. And he means by this that revelation is the work of the Holy Spirit. Luther is known for his principle 'Sola Scriptura'. But Luther never forgot that man needs the enlightening by the Holy Spirit, though the Holy Spirit never works apart from the means of teaching and preaching.[1] The revelation of which the Scripture is a witness and the revelation of the Holy Spirit cannot be separated from each other. Luther makes the objection to the enthusiasts of his time that they try to do this. The result of such an attempt always is that one is led not by the Holy Spirit but by one's own spirit. The revelation of the Scripture and the revelation of the Holy Spirit are in the same way one, as the works of the different persons of the Trinity are one. One must distinguish but may not separate them.

Sometimes Luther speaks, of course, of revelation in the sense that a certain truth or certain truths are made known to man. There is a very famous and often quoted passage in his Schmalcald Articles of 1537 where he says: 'Original sin is such a deep corruption of nature that reason cannot recognise it, but it has to be believed according to the witness of scriptural revelation.'[2] But even here one can find the purpose or intention of revelation that man becomes convicted of his sin.

The same purpose of revelation is mentioned in another passage taken from Luther's sermons on Exodus. There he says: 'At all times God has revealed Himself to the world by His Word and by external signs, and He has done this therefore because He cannot suffer it if we try to build a bridge from earth to heaven in order to seek God there.'[3] Here it is the purpose of revelation utterly to destroy self-wisdom and self-reason of

[1] W.A. 46.62.7ff (Exposition of John 16, 1538). As regards Luther's doctrine of the Holy Spirit, cf. R. Prenter, *Spiritus Creator*, Munich, 1954.

[2] *Die Bekenntnisschriften der ev.-luth. Kirche* (Göttingen, 1930), vol. I, p. 434, 8ff.

[3] W.A. 16.179.14ff (Sermons on Exodus, 1524-7).

man. In order to accomplish this, no *depositum fidei* will suffice. It is not enough if man by revelation gets certain insights which he had not had before. Rather he must be struck in his heart and in his conscience. Therefore to Luther the revelation of Jesus Christ is nothing else but the preaching about the Son of God.[1] And on the other side he can even say that man's attempt to get to know God is original sin itself.[2] By this he obviously thinks that man cannot be content with that which God wants him to know. He tries to surpass his finiteness and to grasp at the infinite. Luther does, however, not mean—as will be shown later—that revelation is irrational.

This purpose or intention which according to Luther revelation always has can also be seen in his distinction between *Deus absconditus* and *Deus revelatus* which he has made particularly in his book *De servo arbitrio* (1525).[3] There has been a long discussion as to the exact meaning especially of the term '*absconditus*' but also on the relation between *Deus absconditus* and *Deus revelatus*.[4] It is not necessary to raise these questions here since they do not affect what we are trying to show. For the distinction between *Deus revelatus* and *Deus absconditus* makes it in any case clear that God is not known to man except by His revelation. It is worth noting that Luther does not differentiate here between God as known by reason and God as known by revelation. The question whether according to Luther man has a certain knowledge of God by nature will be discussed below. What is important here is that Luther makes a clear distinction between the unknown God and the revealed God. *Deus absconditus* is God in His pure essence, in His holy majesty and in His secrecy or obscurity. Man should never try to apprehend the *Deus absconditus* because God does not want to be comprehended in His secrecy but only in His revelation where He has made Himself known. Luther stated the principle: what is above us does not concern us.[5] Revelation there-

[1] W.A. 39[1].424.25ff (Second disputation against the Antinomians, 1538): 'Quando enim Evangelium proprie accipimus, est revelatio Iesu Christi, est praedicatio de filio Dei, quod antea promiserat de suo filio.'

[2] W.A. 43.459.9f (Lecture on Genesis, 1535-45): 'Est enim curiositas ista (*sc.* to get a knowledge of God) ipsum peccatum originis, quo impellimur, ut ad Deum adfectemus viam naturali speculatione. Sed est ingens peccatum, et conatus inutilis et irritus.'

[3] cf. esp. W.A. 18.683ff.

[4] cf. W. v. Löwenich, *Luthers Theologia Crucis*, Munich, 1929, and his retraction in the 4th edition of the same book, 1954, p. 244f.

[5] W.A. 18.685.6f: 'Quae supra nos, nihil ad nos.'

fore means the end of any human attempt to get a knowledge of God.[1] Reason and revelation differ not only quantitatively but qualitatively.

Perhaps these things will become clearer when we now discuss Luther's conception of reason in relation to revelation. Strangely enough, all that is known about this is usually that Luther called reason blind. This was not always so. Former generations sometimes praised Luther for delivering human reason from Roman bondage. In the time of rationalism one often cited Luther's answer he gave at the Diet of Worms in 1521 to the appeal of the German Emperor to revoke his doctrine because he was a single man who could easily err. Luther then said: 'Since your Majesty and your Graces want a simple answer without horns and teeth: if I shall not be convinced by witnesses of the Scripture or by clear arguments of reason (*ratione evidente*)—for I do believe neither the Pope nor the councils since it is obvious that they have often erred and contradicted each other—I have been overcome by the scriptural references which I adduced and my conscience is bound by God's Word. Therefore I neither can nor will revoke anything since it is neither certain nor right to act against one's conscience.'[2] The importance of this statement of Luther with respect to our problem lies in the fact that Luther juxtaposed divine Scripture and human reason.[3] If, however, rationalism thought that it had Luther's support for its own understanding of human reason it has to be objected that to Luther human reason is to be understood only in the light of revelation. On the other hand it is not possible to put Luther's appeal to human reason aside and to emphasise merely his appeal to Scripture as has been done by a number of modern theologians. The question what Luther here means by reason can only be

[1] W.A. 43.458.35ff (Lecture on Genesis, 1535-45): 'In libello de servo arbitrio et alibi docui. Esse distinguendum, quando agitur de notitia, vel potius de subiecto divinitatis. Aut enim disputandum est de Deo abscondito, aut de Deo revelato. De Deo, quatenus non est revelatus, nulla est fides, nulla scientia et cognitio nulla. Atque ibi tenendum est, quod dicitur: Quae supra nos, nihil ad nos. Eiusmodi enim cogitationes, quae supra aut extra revelationem Dei sublimius aliquid rimantur, prorsus Diabolicae sunt, quibus nihil amplius proficitur, quam ut nos ipsos in exitium praecipitemus, quia obiiciunt obiectum impervestigabile, videlicet Deum non revelatum. Quin potius retineat Deus sua decreta et mysteria in abscondito: non est, cur ea manifestari nobis tantopere laboremus.'

[2] W.A. 7.838.2ff.

[3] cf. B. Lohse, 'Luthers Antwort in Worms', *Luther—Mitteilungen der Luthergesellschaft*, 1958, pp. 124ff.

solved if one takes into account Luther's understanding of reason in the light of revelation. But anyhow it is a merit of rationalism to have pointed out the relevance of reason in Luther's thought. Nowadays, however, Luther is sometimes praised and more often condemned for underestimating the gift of reason. One mentions only, as e.g. Arnold Lunn does, that Luther called reason blind or even the devil's whore. But on the other hand the fact cannot be ignored that Luther, while considering reason in its relation to God as blind, called it nevertheless the supreme authority on earth. Besides one finds in a great number of studies on Luther's theology the statement that according to Luther man knows of God firstly by his natural knowledge and secondly by revelation of God. All those things hardly fit together: on the one hand reason is blind towards the beyond, on the other hand it should still have some knowledge of God, and thirdly it is the highest authority on earth.

It would take very long to develop Luther's whole conception of reason. Here it is only possible to mention one or two points. What is decisive is that Luther never speaks of reason as of a known quantity. As he knows no revelation *per se* towards which man could be merely a spectator, so Luther knows no man *per se*. Either man is fallen and sold under the bondage of sin or he has been the object of God's mercy and therefore is being delivered from the bondage of sin, death and the devil. With respect to human reason that means this. When the relation between reason and revelation is discussed one must take into account the will of man. When man is confronted with God man's will is of even greater importance than his reason. For nowhere else is sin so imperious as in the will of man. Luther usually defines sin as self-will as opposed to God's will.

Even human reason is under the command of self-will. Scholasticism often spoke of the natural forces or the natural abilities which man had from the very creation. Under these natural forces one understood the gifts of reason and of will. Theologians like Occam or Gabriel Biel said that these natural forces were not even weakened much by the fall of man. They often speak of the *ratio recta*. Even after the fall, reason is upright. It can recognise e.g. God's will without revelation. Also

the will is still upright. It can obey the commandments of upright reason. The nominalist theologians only made a slight distinction between two things. They said that natural man can fulfil God's commandments merely according to their substance (*secundum substantiam facti*); man under grace, however, can fulfil them also according to the will of God (*ad intentionem legislatoris*).[1] But this distinction did not matter very much. Occamist theology really thought that human will cannot be sinful as such. According to Occam and Biel one can speak only of individual sinful acts. This meant almost a total return to Pelagius who had also emphasised the natural abilities of man. This view of Occam and Biel was often expressed in the time immediately before Luther.

Now, even the young Luther before his discovery of the scriptural meaning of righteousness and justification never spoke of the natural forces of man in the nominalist way, nor did he ever think that the will of man is not seriously affected by Adam's fall.[2] From the very beginning Luther thought of sin more radically than scholasticism. And as a consequence his opinion about human reason became more radical also. If sin is mainly situated in human will and consists in the self-will of man as opposed to God then the reason of man must be affected by sin. In his lectures on the epistle to the Romans which he delivered in 1515-16 Luther formed his final conception of reason. Now he has come to the opinion that perception itself, the very act of recognising truth, is qualified by man's will. Luther does not think that human reason has been corrupted in its very substance.[3] Rather it is so that, the moment reason tries to recognise certain things, it is determined by man's will.[4] Natural man refers everything he knows or has to himself and not to God. The consequence is that his reason cannot recognise freely. The knowledge of the beyond which natural man has leads to nothing else but to self-glory as is clear from pagan philosophy. This shows that man's knowledge of God and the beyond depends on or is determined by man's will.

[1] This nominalist view was criticised by Luther already in his Lectures on Romans, W.A. 56.355.3ff (Sch.R. 8, 3).

[2] This is so already in his marginal notes which he wrote in 1509; cf. B. Lohse, *Ratio und Fides*, p. 27.

[3] References in B. Lohse, op. cit., pp. 43ff, 70ff.

[4] W.A. 40^2.111.34ff (*Commentary on Galatians*, 1535): 'Opera voluntatis concupiscibilis sunt. . . . Rationis seu intellectus errores.'

That means that no so-called neutral insights or truths are possible. Of course, Luther was not so stupid as to say that the knowledge of certain facts, such as that two times two is four, is qualified by human will. These truths are not influenced by human will. There is a sphere of truths which can be recognised simply as facts. But this sphere is comparatively small. Already in the worldly sphere of things where human reason is according to Luther the highest authority the sentence is true that perception, the act of recognising truth is qualified by will. Though Luther freed human reason from all earthly authorities like the Pope or the Emperor or canon law and so on, even in this worldly sphere human reason can be under bondage and can be unfree if it is dominated by man's self-will. As a matter of fact, according to Luther every man must admit this. For we do sometimes say that somebody is not willing to see this or that, and so we already make a distinction between mere perception or the recognition of truths and the influence on it by human will. What is true in the worldly sphere, is even more true with respect to man and his relation to God and especially with respect to his attempt to come to a knowledge of God. Here no neutral truths can be won which do not affect man's inner attitude towards God. If man thinks that he knows something about God and if this knowledge of his does not affect his whole life he is dominated by his self-will. And therefore he really knows nothing about God.

This definition of human reason is of great importance for Luther's conception of the relation between reason and revelation. It was stated above that Luther never thinks of revelation as a *depositum fidei* in the Roman Catholic sense, but that revelation is always concrete and has a certain purpose or intention and that it is not possible to separate revelation as such from this special purpose. More or less the same is true also of his conception of reason. Luther never questioned the great importance of reason nor did he doubt the value of a critical definition of the faculties of human reason. However important these definitions may be, it is not all that has to be said about human reason. Reason is not a known quantity, either in the worldly sphere or with respect to the beyond. If the revelation of God does not just supplement the insights of reason, but is something qualitatively different from it, then the quality of

human reason is also of importance for the definition of the relation between reason and revelation. Accordingly it is not possible to give once for all a definition of the relation between reason and revelation. Everything depends on the way in which reason understands itself. If human reason tries to build a bridge between earth and heaven and to seek arbitrarily after God, then it will create a God according to its own image. Such a reason will always be in contradiction to revelation. If, however, human reason is moderate and humbly does what it can do, then it is upright reason. Of such a reason Luther said, what even Aquinas could not have surpassed, that what is evidently against reason, this is also and surely much more against God.[1]

From this two conclusions can be drawn which seem rather important. It was mentioned above that several theologians have put forward the theory that according to Luther man must sacrifice his intellect in order to get to know what revelation really means. As a matter of fact, this interpretation of Luther's conception of reason and revelation in the sense of a *sacrificium intellectus* is at present dominant. But this does not seem to be right. Though the relation between reason and faith according to Luther cannot be discussed here fully, it may be inferred from what has previously been said that Luther does not just demand a *sacrificium intellectus*. Firstly it may be asked what natural man could sacrifice. He does not possess anything which does not belong to God. But apart from this it has secondly to be stated that it is not sufficient to say that for Luther revelation is against reason. Of course, revelation is against such a reason as understands itself in the way of self-wisdom. But we have seen that this is not all that Luther says. If revelation is not against such a reason which is free of man's self-will, the interpretation of Luther's conception of

[1] W.A. 8.629.23ff (*De votis monasticis*, 1521): 'Quinto comparemus institutum istud (*sc.* monasticism) etiam ad rationem naturalem, hoc est, ad crassum illud lumen naturae, quae tametsi lucem et opera dei non attingat per sese, ita ut in affirmativis (quod aiunt) fallax sit eius iudicium, in negativis tamen est certum. Non enim capit ratio, quid sit deus, certissime tamen capit, quid non sit deus. Ita licet non videat, quid rectum et bonum sit coram deo (nempe fidem), scit tamen evidenter infidelitatem, homicidia, inoboedientiam esse mala. Qua et Christus utitur, dum disserit, omne regnum in seipsum divisum desolari. Et Paulus, dum dicit, nec naturam docere, ut mulier nudato capite prophetet. Quod ergo huic rationi evidenter adversatur, certum est et deo multo magis adversari. Quomodo enim coelesti veritati non pugnabit, quod terrenae veritati pugnat?'

reason in the sense of a *sacrificium intellectus* must be wrong. In fact reason must be correlated with revelation. To scholasticism human reason is subordinated to revelation in the sense that the knowledge of reason is supplemented by the knowledge of revelation. To Luther human reason is correlated to revelation in the sense that revelation must be understood by reason; but this can only be done if reason accepts the criticism which revelation implies with respect to human self-wisdom. Only if man acknowledges what revelation tells him about his sinful selfishness which also determines his acts of perceiving truth, his reason can fulfil its task. In this sense we have to understand Luther's answer at Worms. If Luther appeals to divine Scripture and to human reason he does not do the same as scholasticism while mentioning various authorities like Scripture, councils, fathers and reason and so on. For to scholasticism the value of these authorities was carefully differentiated and human reason was of comparatively little significance. To Luther human reason has on the one hand more importance and on the other it has less. It has less importance because Luther saw that human sin is at work even in human reason. But it has more importance because Luther gave to reason not only the highest authority for the solution of all earthly problems, but also the task to understand the truth of revelation in taking off its own sinfulness.

With these last statements we have already come to the second conclusion which can be drawn from our short discussion of Luther's conception of reason and revelation. This concerns the often affirmed so-called irrationality of God, especially in His revelation. It seems to be quite usual today to speak of the revelation as something irrational. In most studies on Luther's theology one finds the theory that according to Luther God acts in an irrational way. From what has been stated above it will be clear that there is some cause to interpret Luther in this way. Luther never said like Aquinas that the truths of revelation can be made intelligent to human reason. This, however, does not imply that revelation is irrational. In his book *De servo arbitrio* Luther has a very important passage on this problem. There he says: 'There are three lights, one is the light of nature, the other is the light of grace and the third is the light of glory. . . . Within the light of nature the problem

cannot be solved why it is right that a good man suffers affliction and an evil man is in a good condition. But the light of grace solves this problem. Within the light of grace, however, the problem cannot be solved why God condemns man though he cannot by his own forces do anything else but sin. In this case both the light of nature and the light of grace say that the guilt rests not with man but with God because He is unrighteous. As a matter of fact, they must judge in this way on God since He pardons the godless and crowns him with grace without merits, while He condemns another one who does not seem to be more godless. But the light of glory judges differently on this. Though God's judgment is of incomprehensible righteousness He will at some time show His most righteous and most manifest righteousness. Till then we can do nothing else but believe.'[1] From this passage we may conclude that revelation is only against reason in the sense that it is above reason. But one day man will understand why God decided to reveal Himself just in the way He did.

IV

The fundamental ideas which Luther developed in his conception of reason and revelation are of great importance for the solution of special theological problems. It is not possible here to discuss all questions which are involved in this matter. For, since Luther has a dynamic and not a static conception of reason, the various problems are not solved according to a definite scheme. Here and there different points have to be taken into account which are of varying significance. But it may be good just to mention a number of problems which would need to be discussed: e.g. the relation between reason and sin with respect to how the knowledge of sin is possible; or the relation between reason and faith with respect to if, and possibly how, conversion can be prepared somehow by human reason, and what role human reason plays during the so-called conversion; or the question what task reason has after the so-called conversion, i.e. if there is such a thing as an illuminated reason; or the problem what the task of reason within theology is. In the following only one or two of these questions will be raised in order to show what consequences Luther's defini-

[1] W.A. 18.785.26ff.

tion of the relation between reason and revelation has here.

One of the most important problems in this connexion is man's natural knowledge of God. It has been mentioned already that one finds in quite a number of studies on Luther's theology the rather contradictory statements that on the one hand reason is blind and that on the other hand man still has some knowledge of God. More or less at random we take a passage of Luther's exposition of the first two chapters of John (written 1537 and 1538). There he says: 'There are two kinds of knowledge of God, one by the law, the other one by the Gospel. For God has given these two doctrines, law and Gospel, in order that everyone should come to know Him. The knowledge of God through the law is known also to reason. Reason has almost grasped God. For it has learned from the law what is right and what is wrong, and this law has been written in men's hearts according to St. Paul. This knowledge is, however, given more clearly by Moses. But still all men have a certain knowledge of the law and the things which they should do and which they should not do.'[1] So far there seems to be no difference between Luther and Aquinas. Every scholastic theologian could agree with this. But the way in which Luther continues shows that such an interpretation would not be right. Luther says: 'But the knowledge of God which is given through Moses or which is written in our hearts is not the right one. For the people do not follow it. . . . They think there is no God who will punish sin and therefore they follow the multitude that lives in its sins.'[2] These last words show again the concrete character of revelation in Luther's theology, i.e. that revelation has always a definite intention and that at the same time all human knowledge must be judged according to its ethical quality. If a man says that he knows something about God but does not realise anything of this knowledge of his in his own life, then he really has no knowledge of God whatsoever.

Knowledge of God cannot be understood in a merely formal way. Of course, if one tried to separate the knowledge of God from its existential context, one might say that man can know something about God. But it seems that it is not possible to separate it from this context, at least not according to Luther, since then revelation would lose its concrete character and its

[1] W.A. 46.667.8ff. [2] W.A. 46.668.11ff.

intention. It has always to be asked what kind of a God it is that reason knows and in what way does such knowledge of God influence man's whole life. Because this is so, Luther can also state that man knows nothing of God or that human reason comes to the conclusion that there is no God or at least that if God exists He must be unrighteous.[1] These sentences sound very modern. As a matter of fact, they seem to have no parallel in the sixteenth century. But one has to realise the foundation on which Luther made these statements, i.e. the influence of human will on human reason. Therefore it is not a contradiction when Luther sometimes speaks of a certain knowledge which man has of God or which he thinks he has, and when he at other times says that man does not know God. Usually a sentence to the effect that man knows something of God is followed by another one that in fact this cannot be a real knowledge of God. It would be false to object to Luther that he is not consistent or that these different statements are in contradiction to each other. Rather they belong together and necessitate each other if one accepts the presupposition of Luther's definition of human reason. Therefore human reason knows only that of God which it wants to know.[2] Every attempt to separate a formal knowledge of God from its existential context and to build a philosophical doctrine of God is in danger of ignoring the fact of human sin and therefore of getting only a picture of God which merely corresponds to man's own wishes and not to the holy majesty of the almighty God.[3]

Another important problem is the question of the task of reason within theology. There can be no doubt that each dogma and also any theological doctrine requires a certain activity of human reason. Even if a very strong scriptural basis is found, reason must do some work to combine several utter-

[1] W.A. 18.784.36ff (*De servo arbitrio*, 1525): 'Ecce sic Deus administrat mundum istum corporalem in rebus externis, ut si rationis humanae iudicium spectes et sequaris, cogaris dicere, aut nullum esse Deum, aut iniquum esse Deum.'

[2] W.A. 16.143.17ff (Sermons on Exodus, 1524-7). There Luther says that man has before his eyes glasses of red or blue colour. Man cannot take these glasses away. Therefore everything he sees is red or blue. With regard to natural knowledge of God this means that man cannot by his own forces get free of his sinful attempt to create a God as he wants to have him. For man is not prepared to accept that God knows more than he knows himself.

[3] The same criticism of man's natural knowledge of God could be shown by a discussion of other passages where Luther deals with this problem; e.g. W.A. 19.206.7ff (Exposition of Jonah, 1526).

ances and to develop a doctrine. Now, what kind of reason is required here? Is it possible that reason becomes illuminated in the sense as orthodoxy presupposed the enlightenment of reason for any theological work? And how far is the doctrine thus developed itself reasonable, i.e. understandable and provable?

Luther never ignored the value of reason for theology. Since his writings betray not only an extremely sharp criticism based on arguments of reason, but also a well considered use of reason for his own theology, Luther should not be blamed as depreciating reason within theology. But according to Luther things are rather difficult in this respect. For at first one has to take into account that theology is a different sphere from philosophy. In theology certain premises have to be made which are not valid in philosophy. E.g. the incarnation of the Word in Jesus Christ is something which philosophy cannot understand and if it is faithful to its own presuppositions must refuse. But for any theological thinking the incarnation is, of course, of primary importance. Now, is it the fact that human reason is totally blind in this respect? According to Luther that is the case as regards the incarnation and other central truths of revelation. They cannot be understood, nor can they be made even probable as Aquinas thought. They have just to be accepted. They are immediately connected with revelation itself from which they cannot be separated. But Luther would hesitate to say the same of all Christian doctrines. At least he would state that only those doctrines are totally against reason which are explicitly contained in the Holy Scripture. It is, however, never Luther's interest to push back reason as such; this only occurs where revelation discloses man's sinfulness. There man can do nothing else but accept God's revealed will.

Not quite the same is true of the conclusions which reason draws from given premises. There are quite a few cases where reason can well argue in a 'reasonable' way if the presuppositions of a doctrine are accepted. This is true even of the doctrine of the Eucharist. In the controversy on the Lord's Supper Luther could, e.g., object to Oecolampadius that he did not observe the rules of syllogism.[1] Whether Luther is right or wrong here, this is in any case an appeal to reason within theology. On the other hand, the fact is that the conclusions

[1] W.A. 26.404f (*Vom Abendmahl Christi*, 1528).

which reason draws from certain premises are not always right. Luther gives himself an example of false arguing: 'Omnis essentia divina est pater. Filius est essentia divina. Ergo filius est pater.'[1] In this case the premises are right, i.e. that both the Father and the Son are divine essence. But the conclusion that then the Father and the Son must be one is wrong. Why? Not because this would be wrong arguing. Luther admits that within philosophy this conclusion is justified. If it is nonetheless wrong, this is due simply to the fact that the Holy Scripture bears witness of the different personae in the Holy Trinity. In this case therefore reason has just to accept what revelation says.

This, however, does not mean that the conclusions of reason from given premises are always called in question. It is rather that sometimes the conclusions are right and sometimes they are wrong. The rules of reasonable arguments are not valid where they are faced with special truths of revelation and where this can be shown quite clearly.

The service which reason has to do within theology is therefore of a peculiar character. On the one hand reason is required for everything. On the other hand reason cannot always understand what it has to do. This is very significant. For it shows that reason is of an instrumental character. It is always used for something or by something deeper than itself. With natural man reason is determined by self-will. With man under revelation reason is being freed from that self-will. This, however, is never accomplished during this life. Man has an illuminated reason only in so far as he acknowledges his own blindness. Reason can therefore be illuminated only in the sense that man understands himself in the light of the Word of God and that reason becomes an instrument of this new understanding. But it is not possible to take the enlightenment of reason once for all for granted.

From these examples of how Luther solved special theological problems according to his conception of reason and revelation two conclusions may be drawn. Firstly it will have become clear that Luther starts right in the centre of his theology in order to solve the problem of the relation between reason and revelation. This necessitates the concreteness of his conception of revelation and the radical conception of human sin which

[1] W.A. 39^2.4.28f (Disputation on John 1.14, 1539).

makes it impossible to speak of uncorrupted human abilities or powers. Luther does not, however, solve the problem of the relation between reason and revelation simply by taking over the categories of his doctrine of justification and employing them for the solution of our problem. If this were so he would have said that reason is nothing else but blind, he would have spoken of a *sacrificium intellectus* and of revelation as irrational. Luther knows that the consequences of sin have to be distinguished. As has been stated above, sin is according to Luther situated in human will. Reason is dominated by will. But, notwithstanding, reason is not as sinful as will. To put it very sharply, man sins with his will earlier than with his reason, though not chronologically but logically. Or in other words, sin is something deeper than reason.

Secondly Luther's conception has the consequence that the relation between reason and revelation is not defined once for all. By this he does not exclude all philosophical thinking as he is sometimes blamed for doing. Not only the fact that Luther praises human reason as God's highest gift to man, but also the fact that his definition of reason is not a static one leaves an open field to philosophy. Just because man is warned of the danger of hubris he can start to philosophise in a really human way. It is impossible for man to give a philosophical doctrine of God. Man can, of course, come to the conclusion that there must be some ultimate cause, an unmoved mover or something like that. But this conclusion is not really convincing. The fact that other men come, also by reason, to the conclusion that there cannot be a God should warn man not to give a doctrine of God merely by reason. From the theological point of view, however, the great problem of any natural attempt to speak of God is how to come from this first being to a personal God. Human reason which is aware of the danger of hubris could therefore ultimately do nothing else than be open to the beyond, ready to let itself be put in question by the beyond because it knows of man's finiteness. That would make possible a really existential philosophy.

V

Historically, however, Luther's conception of reason and revelation has not had any significant influence. It has been stated above that it was Melanchthon who gave the German

universities their shape in the sixteenth century. His view of reason and revelation was quite different from that of Luther.

Even the young Melanchthon in this respect did not quite agree with Luther. Though in the first years of his stay at Wittenberg Melanchthon was mainly under the influence of Luther and though he tried to follow the deep thoughts of his friend he did not quite succeed in so doing. No doubt one finds in Melanchthon's early writings quite a number of opinions which Luther in those years expressed on reason and revelation. In the first edition of his *Loci Communes* (1521) Melanchthon emphasised e.g. that God is all-ruling and that this sentence will push down and even condemn human reason.[1] Or Melanchthon is not prepared to admit a certain freedom of will.[2] In his eyes philosophy and human reason are the same and both have to be rejected.[3] For there is nothing else in man but blindness and error.[4] But there is already one difference between Luther and the young Melanchthon. While Luther reflected on the cause of the blindness of human reason, Melanchthon was content simply to call in question any effort of man's reason as regards man's relation to God. Therefore Melanchthon did not see, as Luther did, that human reason is in this respect under the command of man's will. Melanchthon could say that man is not able to conform his will to the *dictamen rectae rationis*.[5] But he failed to doubt the validity of upright reason itself as Luther had done already years before.[6] So one gets the impression that Melanchthon tried to take over Luther's formulas but that he was not able to follow Luther's profound understanding of human sinfulness. The basis on which Melanchthon in 1521 rejected human reason in its relation to God was too small, and looking back one is not surprised that it did not hold out.

There can be no doubt that also the old Melanchthon did try to teach still man's total corruption by Adam's fall and the absolute necessity of grace.[7] But he no longer put forward his

[1] C.R. 21.89.

[2] C.R. 21.89: (*sc.* the sophistic theologians taught) 'contingentiam et libertatem voluntatis nostrae, ut a veritate scripturae molliculae aures abhorreant.'

[3] C.R. 21.102. [4] C.R. 21.106. [5] C.R. 21.107.

[6] See B. Lohse, *Ratio und Fides*, p. 48, n. 4.

[7] C.R. 21.655 (*Loci communes*, tertia aetas): 'certum est homines non habere libertatem deponendi hanc pravitatem nobiscum nascentem aut deponendi mortem.'

previous determinist opinion that man has no freedom of will and that everything happens according to God's will. Rather he says that some freedom of man must be admitted. The problem of God's determination and the problem of man's free will must be kept apart from each other.[1] It is well known that Melanchthon now even thought human will to be one of the three causes for man's conversion. Besides the Word of God and the Holy Spirit there is needed *humana voluntas assentiens nec repugnans verbo Dei*.[2] And Melanchthon did go so far as to admit that man has *facultatem applicandi se ad gratiam*.[3] Though Melanchthon did not accept the Roman Catholic view of sin and grace there can be little doubt that his own conception was somehow synergistic, not dissimilar to that of the Semipelagians.

It is in close connexion with this revised conception of sin, grace and freedom of will that the old Melanchthon developed his doctrine of human reason and the relation between reason and revelation. As regards the first problem, reason as such, he gave up his previous rejection and started with the definition that reason is the faculty of perception and has certain principles, namely two. On the one hand there are speculative truths to which physical science and logic belong. On the other hand there are practical truths to which the knowledge of the law of nature and also of the divine law belong[4]: actually both, the law of nature and the law of God, are the same and therefore both are known to human reason even after the fall.[5] In conclusion man has still a certain knowledge of God. Though before the fall this knowledge was clearer and securer, it is still there.[6] Man has, as Melanchthon admits, sometimes quite a few doubts. But they are concerned not with God's existence but rather with the divine providence.[7] As regards the knowledge of God, human reason comes by its own forces to the unquestionable conclusion that God is 'mens aeterna, sapiens, verax, iusta, casta, benefica, conditrix mundi, servans rerum ordinem, et puniens scelera'.[8]

Melanchthon knows of no less than nine proofs for the existence of God. It is interesting to see his arguments. (1) The order of nature especially in the cosmos points to some supreme being as the first mover (*opifex*). (2) The fact that man is

[1] C.R. 21.652. [2] C.R. 21.658. [3] C.R. 21.659. [4] C.R. 13.649.
[5] C.R. 16.22f. [6] C.R. 21.653f. [7] C.R. 21.657. [8] C.R. 13.647.

endowed with reason allows the conclusion that he must have been created by some intelligent nature and not just by matter. (3) The knowledge of good and evil cannot go back to matter as such but must have been given to man by a *mens architectatrix*. (4) Melanchthon refers to the so-called *argumentum e consensu gentium*. (5) The fact that man has a conscience can only be explained if *aliqua mens* has given this to man. (6) The order of political society could not be kept merely by human means. But some *mens aeterna* has given both, the order as such and the power to observe it. (7) There must be some first cause of the world since no *processus in infinitum* is possible. (8) In the same way there must be some ultimate goal since all things are destined for a certain *utilitas*. (9) Finally Melanchthon draws the attention to the biblical prophecies of future events: they must have been given to the prophets by some eternal and foreseeing being.[1]

These proofs of the existence of God are to Melanchthon by no means only of secondary importance. On the contrary, they are the basis for any theology in the literary sense of the word, i.e. for any doctrine of God. Melanchthon sometimes says that to this natural knowledge of God there must be added the truths given through revelation. E.g. in his *Erotemata Dialectices* he defines the difference between natural and revealed truths in this way: 'One has to take into account the difference (*sc.* between the two kinds of truth). Some Christian doctrines are given by the voice of God. These are also known by nature as e.g. the commandments of the decalogue. But God wanted that His voice be added in order to show that these natural truths were by Himself put in our minds and also in order to sanctify the law by a new witness. This confirmation of the truth is of great value to our mind since it gets to know that a divine voice has been added to natural knowledge. Reason comprehends that the earth remains unmoved and that it is the sun which is moving. But when we hear that the same truth is given by God we can give our assent on firmer grounds. Besides, there are other sentences which are merely given by God. Of these no creature ever knew before. This is so with respect to the voice of the Gospel, the Son of God our Lord Jesus Christ, reconciliation, eternal reward and eternal punishment.'[2]

[1] C.R. 21.641ff. [2] C.R. 13.651.

From this text it is clear that the natural knowledge which man has is on the one hand confirmed by revelation, and on the other hand is supplemented or made perfect by it. It is worth noting that Melanchthon does not confine natural truths to man's natural knowledge of God. Rather he includes under natural knowledge a whole set of certain ideas also with regard to sciences. Since all these truths are confirmed by revelation and not criticised, it can well be imagined how great a shock it must be if human reason should even come to the conclusion that one or other truth which is supposed to be confirmed by revelation is false.[1]

This conception of reason and revelation has far-reaching consequences. At first, it means that revelation is again understood in the sense of a *depositum fidei*. Luther's view that revelation is always concrete is not shared by Melanchthon. To him revelation is rather the communication of a number of doctrines. He has a very intellectual conception of revelation. One has just to accept anything which God has spoken as a supplementation of natural knowledge. But the old Melanchthon does no more say that reason is totally blind. Though he still thinks that revelation is above our natural reason it is on the other hand reasonable in so far as it is merely a communication of truths hitherto unknown.[2]

This necessitates another important thing, i.e. that faith is reduced to an assent to certain revealed truths. To Luther sin was such a deep corruption that even reason is under the command of will and faith was to him the knowledge that man stands before God totally as sinner and is pardoned by God's free grace. Melanchthon's synergism in the doctrine of justification, however, has its parallel in his conception of reason and revelation.

A third consequence of Melanchthon's view is that the relation between reason and revelation can be defined in an exact

[1] In a similar way Melanchthon defines the relation between natural and revealed truths, e.g. C.R. 16.25: 'Est autem erudita philosophia proprie et vere explicatio legis naturae, ut igitur piis lege Dei seu lege naturae uti licet, ita licet uti morali philosophia, quod ad externos mores attinet. Porro cum pii fidem et agnitionem Christi et timorem Dei addunt ad hanc diligentiam in regendis moribus, eamque praestant propter Christum, et referunt ad ornandam gloriam Christi: ita hi mores fiunt bona opera et cultus Dei.'

[2] cf. A. Sperl, *Melanchthon zwischen Humanismus und Reformation* (Munich, 1959), pp. 130ff.

way. There seems to be hardly any difference in this respect between Melanchthon and scholasticism. Both reason and revelation are known quantities.

From all this it is clear that Melanchthon's solution of the problem of the relation between reason and revelation could not last very long. As a matter of fact, it is surprising that it determined orthodox theology for such a long time as it really did. But as soon as it became obvious that certain points of Melanchthon's system were questionable, as e.g. his opinion about sciences, criticism was aroused against his whole definition of the relation between reason and revelation. The sphere where reason is the only authority became larger and larger. And the criticism was almost inevitably directed not only against his antiquated views on sciences but also against his problematic conception that the truths which reason can perceive need confirmation and supplementation by revelation. More and more reason became independent of revelation and the sphere of a natural religion was extended.

It is not our purpose to follow the development of Protestant theology from Melanchthon to orthodoxy in details. The references adduced will suffice to show that Melanchthon differed considerably from Luther as to his definition of reason and revelation and that he made possible an almost total comeback of the scholastic conception of natural and revealed knowledge. Since Luther did not write a compendium of theology it was comparatively easy and understandable that many theologians followed not him but his humanist friend.

No doubt, besides Melanchthon there were also other theologians of great influence, especially Calvin. But even Calvin probably did not quite share Luther's view on reason and revelation, though his position is nearer to Luther than to Melanchthon. It is, however, not necessary to discuss Calvin's conception of reason and revelation here since it was not Calvin but mainly Melanchthon whom Lutheran orthodox theologians followed. The view which they had of reason and revelation made the development of rationalism almost necessary or at least unavoidable. With regard to the relation between reason and revelation, however, orthodoxy and rationalism differ not too much from each other. Both would on the whole accept the three points under which we summarised the scholastic view of

our problem. It is for this reason that even today the controversy not only between Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians, but also between theology and philosophy, is largely determined by scholasticism. If post-Reformation theology had followed with regard to the doctrine of reason and revelation Luther instead of Melanchthon, the whole wearisome controversy between orthodoxy and rationalism would have become unnecessary.

BARTH ON REVELATION[1]

by The Rev. T. H. L. PARKER

In 1938 and 1939 Karl Barth delivered the Gifford Lectures in the University of Aberdeen. According to the will of the founder, these lectures were established for the 'promoting, advancing, teaching and diffusing' of the study of natural theology. But Barth was, as he made plain on receiving the invitation, 'an avowed opponent of all natural theology'. Three years earlier he had fiercely attacked his former theological associate, Emil Brunner, on this same question. He had then said of natural theology: 'It has to be rejected *a limine*—right at the outset. Only the theology and the church of the antichrist can profit from it. The Evangelical Church and Evangelical theology would only sicken and die of it.' When therefore he was asked to give the Gifford Lectures he was in a quandary. The way in which he resolved the problem has usually been treated, half-humorously, as an ingenious piece of theological juggling. In fact, however, when we consider it in relation to his attitude to natural theology in his controversy with Brunner and to his treatment of it in *Church Dogmatics* II.1, on the knowledge of God, and indeed against the background of the whole of his life's work, we can see that in his solution of this difficulty there is simply the same attitude sharpened to a clear-cut issue. What he did was to jettison natural theology completely and give an exposition of its opposite, the theology of revelation. Despite considerable vitality, natural theology has ultimately no life of its own; it draws its strength, at any rate in the Church, from its opposition to the theology of revelation. Therefore, natural theology may derive strength from Barth's own exposition of this opposite. That is how the argument runs. We are now concerned only with the first part, his jettisoning of natural theology. The correct attitude to it, he maintains, is denial and repudiation.

Natural theology has been attacked often enough. Many of the attacks have come from sceptical sources (the name of

[1] A paper read at a meeting of the Lightfoot Society, Durham, on October 17, 1958.

David Hume comes at once to mind). Others, by way of correcting some point or other, from natural theologians themselves. Examples of this abound in the various deistic controversies in seventeenth and eighteenth-century England. But the general approach among theologians is instructive. No reputable theologian dreamt of repudiating natural theology or denying its validity. The most that was done was to limit its scope. It was a possibility, but in the last resort an insufficient possibility. The strongest attack had in fact already been made, in the sixteenth century, by Calvin; but it seems to have been an attack made half-unwittingly and without his usual clear-sightedness. The problems he was dealing with were the same as arose a century later, but they had not assumed anything like the same urgency. Faced with the question as to the source of the knowledge of God, Calvin gave a definite answer in favour of revelation. But in doing so he made use of natural theology as a starting point. It was a negative use, in that the validity of natural theology was at once denied. But nevertheless it was a use, and since it was not guarded with cautionary statements, the way was prepared in Protestant theology for a positive use of it. Compared with the definite rejection by Calvin, the judgment of the eighteenth century was mild, and a place was allowed in the Church's thinking for this valid, necessary, but insufficient science. From the early Protestant scholasticism until Barth the key-word in this connexion is undoubtedly *insufficient.*

In opposition to this long tradition, Barth has denied the validity of natural theology and repudiated its use in theology. In his booklet against Brunner he put it like this:

> For 'natural theology' does not exist as an entity capable of becoming a separate subject within what I consider to be real theology—not even for the sake of being rejected. If one occupies oneself with real theology one can pass by so-called natural theology only as one would pass by an abyss into which it is inadvisable to step if one does not want to fall. All one can do is to turn one's back upon it as upon the great temptation and source of error, by having nothing to do with it and by making it clear to oneself and to others from time to time why one acts that way. . . . Really to reject natural theology means to refuse to admit it as a separate problem. Hence the rejection of natural theology can only be a side issue, arising when serious questions of real theology are being discussed.[1]

[1] *No! Answer to Emil Brunner,* pp. 75-76.

Even his definition of natural theology refuses to view it apart from revelation: 'By "natural theology" I mean every (positive *or* negative) *formulation of a system* which claims to be theological, i.e. to interpret divine revelation, whose *subject*, however, differs fundamentally from the revelation in Jesus Christ and whose *method* therefore differs equally from the exposition of Holy Scripture.'[1] This is Barth's attitude, followed consistently over the years.

Now the scrupulous care that he has taken over his methodology here is a warning to anyone who attempts to treat the subject. To give a straightforward account of his rejection of natural theology, however accurate, would be to fall into the trap of making it an independent matter, of importance to his thinking. Hence Barth could be hopelessly and all too easily misinterpreted with the best of intentions. We shall only interpret him aright if we follow the course he has taken. It is already clear from what we have said that he repudiates natural theology because of his theology of revelation. We may be even more definite and say that natural theology is already denied and repudiated within his theology of revelation.

Our first step must therefore be to expound this theology of revelation. When we have done that, we can make plain how it is that natural theology is denied by it.

There is no magic key to unlock all the doors to Barth's theology, for he is not a systematic theologian in the sense that he works out his ideas from a single principle or even a group of principles. This is a weakness in two of the best books on Barth. G. C. Berkouwer sees all his theology in terms of victorious grace,[2] and H. U. von Balthasar tends to make the concept of analogy into the be-all and end-all in Barth's thinking.[3] In earlier days labels like 'the dialectical theology' or 'the theology of crisis' or the 'theology of the Word of God' were attached to him. I do not think we can do justice to Barth by trying to explain his whole theology by one principle. The very fact that all these elements can be singled out as primary or comprehensive hints at his breadth and suggests that we shall do better not to be too selective in expounding his theology.

[1] *No!* pp. 74-75.
[2] *The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth.*
[3] *Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie.*

It is, moreover, of the utmost importance that we should know where to begin. If theology is to give a correct account of the knowledge of God received through His revelation it must, in procedure, follow the same lines. And that means that it must begin with revelation, continue with revelation, and end with revelation. Hence, when we set out to give an account of the main lines of Barth's theology, our starting point is the fact that in Jesus Christ God has revealed and reveals Himself to man. In this we shall find the main lines themselves; and conversely, it contains the denial of natural theology in all its forms. Let us therefore try to fill out this statement.

The fact that in Jesus Christ God has revealed Himself. On what grounds is this to be called a fact? Can we bring forward proof capable of commanding reasonable assent? Or, if that is too much to expect in the nature of the case, can we establish it on the grounds of, say, probability? It must be faced at once quite squarely that this procedure would not be a beginning with revelation but a preparing for revelation. The basis for calling it a fact is that it is a fact, a fact that is incapable of authentication by us but which is self-authenticating. Or rather, for that is to present it too statically, God authenticates Himself in His self-revelation. If we were to try to verify it from some other source, we should show that we had misunderstood the statement. If we were able to verify it from another source, the phenomenon pointed to as the revelation of God would be nothing of the sort. There is no way of getting back behind this fact to give it a basis that would satisfy us, for it is real beginning, before which is nothing.

We have spoken of revelation. We could not possibly speak of it without anticipating the decisive factors in the problem of the nature and content of revelation. Why that certitude? Why that singularity? Why that unheard-of separation and relation between God and man which revelation effects? For the reason that revelation—that which came to prophets and apostles as revelation—is nothing less than God himself. For this reason it is a mystery, i.e. a reality the possibility of which resides absolutely within itself; and therefore, also, we shall never, no, not in all eternity, be able to understand, derive, and substantiate it except out of itself. God is of and through Himself. We, likewise, are able to meditate on revelation only if our thinking begins with revelation when it has spoken for itself. And, therefore, it is authority, i.e. it is a truth which cannot be measured by the rule of any other truth beside it, however profound and valid that truth

may appear to be. Rather, it is a truth which decides, and continues to decide what may be true. It is a truth then with whose acknowledgment every truth must make its beginning.[1]

In all this, nothing has been said about opinions, nothing even about faith. Theology does not make its starting point the fact that we believe God has revealed Himself. Certainly, unless theology does believe this, it has no claim to be called Christian. But its basis is the objective fact of revelation and not faith in it. Faith is man's acknowledgment of the objective fact of revelation. It has no power of deciding whether God has revealed Himself, but gratefully accepts the fact that He has done so and derives all its life and strength from that.

Again, when we speak of God alone authenticating His self-revelation, we might find a difficulty in regard to the position of the Scriptures in this respect. It would be very easy to make the Bible into a position from which we could verify or affirm the fact that God has revealed Himself in Jesus Christ. Is the Bible an independent verification of revelation, so that revelation is not in fact self-authenticating? Certainly, it has often been regarded in this light—for example, it has been treated as containing a number of revealed propositions, which can be appealed to in support of this or that doctrine, including revelation. Such proof-texts can be used as independent verifications of revelation. But although the Bible occupies a unique position as the witness and proclamation of the fact that revelation has taken place, it does not, and what is more, makes it plain that it does not, act independently and as an authority in itself. 'Why and in what respect does the biblical witness possess authority?' asks Barth, 'In that it claims no authority whatever for itself, that its witness amounts to letting the Something else be the authority, itself and by its own agency.'[2]

But *the fact that* denotes not only that something has been done, but also the thing itself that has taken place—in this case, the concrete event of revelation. For now we have to say we are not dealing with a general concept of revelation, which might be valid in certain particular instances or which might conceivably remain a concept. When Barth expresses the fact that God has revealed Himself, what he always has in mind is that

[1] *God in Action*, pp. 12-13. [2] *Church Dogmatics* I.1, p. 126.

God has revealed Himself in the existence of the man Jesus of Nazareth. As he says at the beginning of *Church Dogmatics* I.2: 'According to Holy Scripture God's revelation takes place in the fact that God's Word became a man and that this man has become God's Word. The incarnation of the eternal Word, Jesus Christ, is God's revelation. In the reality of this event God proves that He is free to be our God.'[1]

Once again, we are unable to supply a basis for the statement that Jesus Christ is the revelation of God. Just as God authenticates Himself in His revelation, so also He authenticates Jesus Christ as His revelation. There is no position from which we could verify the authenticity of Christ. We cannot, Barth says, even establish the necessity or probability of Christ as the revelation of God. He has himself revised his procedure here. In the earlier version of the *Dogmatics*, published in 1927, he began at this point with a chapter on 'the Objective Possibility of Revelation', saying that if God wished to reveal Himself to men it would have to be as a man, for only so could He be both hidden and revealed. Although he made it clear that he was not intending to anticipate the fact of revelation, this was, as he points out in *Church Dogmatics* I.2, an ambiguous procedure. Accordingly, he has reversed the sections to: (1) Jesus Christ the Objective Reality of Revelation; (2) Jesus Christ the Objective Possibility of Revelation. And the latter begins: 'God's freedom for us men is a fact in Jesus Christ, according to the witness of Holy Scripture. The first and last thing to be said about the bearer of this name is that He is very God and very Man. In this unity He is the objective reality of divine revelation. His existence is God's freedom for man. Or *vice versa* God's freedom for man is the existence of Jesus Christ. And now we continue by saying that in this objective reality of the divine revelation there is presupposed and grounded and brought within our knowledge its objective possibility.'[2]

And here, to give substance to our statement, let us look at it from three aspects. We may first express it in this way: It is in Jesus Christ that God reveals Himself. Then we may say: God reveals His genuine Self in Jesus Christ. And thirdly: In Jesus Christ God genuinely reveals Himself.

[1] p. 1. [2] p. 25.

1. *It is in Jesus Christ that God reveals Himself*

'The incarnation of the eternal Word, Jesus Christ, is God's revelation', says Barth. Incarnation here is not be taken only as His coming into the world, but as His being and activity in the world. The name Jesus Christ signifies the man Jesus of Nazareth who was the eternal Son of God; it signifies the words and deeds of this man as the words and deeds of the Son of God; the suffering, dying, and rising again of this man as the activity of the Son of God. The incarnate existence of the Word of God is God's self-revelation. When He encounters us, God Himself encounters us. When we know Him, we know God Himself. In sum, when we have to do with Him, we have to do with God.

In saying this, we are, as it were, localising the revelation of God. God does not reveal Himself here, there, and everywhere in space and time, but in one sharply defined locus—the incarnate Word, the God-Man, Jesus the Christ, in space one single man, in time one lifetime of about thirty years. There God reveals Himself, in that one life of suffering, death, and resurrection. Conversely, God does not reveal Himself outside this one locus. The revelation of God is localised in Jesus Christ.

2. *God reveals His genuine Self in Jesus Christ*

The one who reveals Himself is none other than God Himself: God the Father of His eternal Son, and in Him our Father; God the Son, who in His flesh suffers, dies, and rises again for our salvation; God the Holy Spirit, the bond of unity within the Godhead and of our union with Him in Jesus Christ. It is not as if in Jesus Christ anything different from God were revealed, or anything less than God, or merely one part or aspect of God. He whom Christ reveals is God Himself in His wholeness. If that which is revealed were different from God or less than God or even just an aspect of God, we should no longer be able to speak of Christ being the revelation of God. In that case, if we wished to know God, we should have to turn elsewhere for our knowledge.

Moreover, it would be a travesty of the New Testament witness to Christ, and indeed of the biblical witness to God, to represent God's revelation in Christ as solely a matter of re-

demption, as a spiritual affair that concerned only the destiny of our souls, and not at the same time the revelation of the Creator and Sustainer of men and all things. It is surely most striking that those two books in the New Testament generally regarded as most 'spiritual', St. John's Gospel, with its strong emphasis on eternal life, and the Epistle to the Hebrews, concerned as it is with access to God by means of the sacrificial suffering of Christ, should each refer at the very beginning to the Word of God being the Creator: 'All things were made by him; and without him was not anything made that was made'; and God 'hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son . . . by whom also he made the worlds'. The God who reveals Himself to us in Jesus Christ is our Creator and Redeemer, God in His wholeness, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

3. *In Jesus Christ God genuinely reveals Himself*

At this point we are concerned with the significance of the word 'reveals'. 'Revelation, *revelatio*, ἀποκάλυψις, means the unveiling of the veiled.'[1] Thus Barth, to fasten our minds upon the primary sense. Apart from Jesus Christ, God is hidden from us and unknown. We do not know that He is, we do not know who He is, we do not know what He is like. But in His incarnate Son He withdraws the veil and shows Himself, discloses Himself and makes Himself known. Within the framework of this primary meaning, Barth has also used several other concepts: God has become free for man; God has become open for man; God meets with man; God speaks to man.

God's self-revelation is a genuine revealing. It does not hang fire but is effectual. Revelation is only genuine if it reaches and is apprehended by the one for whom it is intended. And God's Word does not return unto Him void. It is effectual revelation from both sides—because it is the powerful work of God, overcoming all obstacles in its path, and because in its form it is apprehensible by man. Revelation would not be genuine if it occurred in a sphere which man could not enter and if it were totally alien to man. But God revealed Himself in man's own sphere, in the humanity of Jesus Christ. Not in some foreign form, an angel, maybe, or some different creature, but in this other man God reveals Himself to and is known by man.

[1] *Church Dogmatics* I.1, p. 133.

We must also take care to say that revelation is not to be understood purely noetically. The knowledge of God is certainly the enlightenment of the mind, and revelation is certainly also instruction; but this has to be seen as the reconciliation of the sinner, the liberation and illumination of the mind perversely turned against the truth. It is not simply a case of ignorant man needing to be taught the truth about God, but of rebellious man needing to be pardoned and reconciled. Revelation means reconciliation.

Now in this exposition of the fact that God has revealed Himself in Jesus Christ there has been an open and plain affirmation of the theology of revelation. But there has also been made a continual tacit repudiation of natural theology. This must now become audible and clear.

That God reveals Himself to man in Jesus Christ is and always has been the distinctive belief of the Christian Church. To deny it would be to separate decisively from the New Testament and the tradition of the Church. That is obvious. Nevertheless, this belief had not in the past led to a total and deliberate disavowal of natural theology. Even theologians who in general must be regarded as theologians of revelation had never gone as far as this, but had allowed a place, carefully circumscribed and limited, to natural theology. We need only think of Reformed theology of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, adhering so steadfastly to the supremacy of Scripture as the Word of God, to the uniqueness of Jesus Christ as the Mediator between God and man, and to the sufficiency and perfection of God's revelation in Him, and yet being able to find room for a natural theology as a preliminary to the theology of grace. How is it, then, that Barth feels compelled to dispense with all natural theology and to begin, as he continues, with revelation and grace?

The answer is, I believe, fundamentally simple. It is not that Barth has evolved a different doctrine of grace from his great Reformed predecessors which has then led him on to a different attitude to natural theology. Rather, what he has done is to apply this doctrine more consistently and over a wider field than before. A strict application of the doctrine of revelation has demanded the denial and repudiation of natural theology. (I call this fundamentally simple. But we may note, in an aside,

that in practice it demanded a brilliant and daring *coup*, the deliberate application of an old belief to a new field. Moreover, the outworking of it is anything but simple, as becomes very plain in *Church Dogmatics* II.1!)

Let us now proceed to draw out the denials contained in our former series of affirmations.

1. *It is in Jesus Christ that God reveals Himself*

This affirmation contains the corresponding denial that God reveals Himself or has revealed Himself apart from Jesus Christ. The objection may be made that the Creator reveals Himself or stands revealed in His creation, and that this will form a source of knowledge about God outside Christ. In practice, this natural theology will always be regarded as a preliminary, a 'preamble', as Aquinas called it, to the theology of revelation. Its worth will also be circumscribed with more or less narrowness, and no more will be claimed for it than a preliminary character which must lead on to and be filled out by God's revelation in Jesus Christ. What is more, it may and probably will claim to derive its knowledge *via* the creation from the teaching of the Bible.

Now it is true that we must see the creation as God's self-revelation. In *Church Dogmatics* III.1, for example, we find this stated again and again in such statements as: 'The act of creation is, as such, the revelation of God's glory, through which He gives meaning and necessity to the creature.'[1] But what is objectionable and inadmissible is to treat this self-revelation as independent of the incarnate Word, whether quite blatantly as a preliminary to faith which can be apprehended by unaided reason, or in a more refined way as an article of faith derived from the Bible yet still independent of the incarnation. An act of faith it is indeed, and we say: 'I *believe* in God . . . the maker of heaven and earth.' But it is not derived in general from the biblical statements about the Creator and the creation without reference to Christ. Apart from the revelation in Christ of the Creator and Redeemer, creation does not proclaim the Creator to us, but is an insoluble riddle. 'What the meaning of God the Creator is and what is involved in the work of creation, is in itself not less hidden from us men than everything else that is

[1] p. 260.

contained in the Confession. . . . It is not the case that the truth about God the Creator is directly accessible to us and that only the truth of the second article needs a revelation.'[1] And again:

> It is not the existence of the world in its manifoldness, from which we are to read off the fact that God is its Creator. The world with its sorrow and happiness will always be a dark mirror to us, about which we may have optimistic or pessimistic thoughts; but it gives no information about God as the Creator. But always, when man has tried to read the truth from sun, moon or stars or from himself, the result has been an idol. But when God has been known and then known again in the world, so that the result was a joyful praise of God in creation, that is because He is to be sought and found by us in Jesus Christ. By becoming man in Jesus Christ, the fact has also become plain and credible that God is the Creator of the world. We have no alternative source of revelation.[2]

And when Barth refers creation to Christ, he is not thinking simply of the pre-existent Word, by whom all things were made. Even this would, by itself, constitute the erection of an idol, since we have no direct knowledge of the pre-existent Word, but know Him in the flesh which He assumed. The Creator reveals Himself in the incarnate Word, and only in Him, Jesus Christ, is He to be known. 'The world came into being, it was created and sustained by the little child that was born in Bethlehem, by the Man who died on the Cross of Golgotha, and the third day rose again.'[3]

Natural theology is denied in the first place by the affirmation of the uniqueness of Jesus Christ as God's self-revelation.

2. *God reveals His genuine Self in Jesus Christ*

In this section we insisted that God's revelation was of His real Self and His whole Self. Now, if the one revealed were other than the true God we should certainly need to turn elsewhere for the knowledge of God. If the one revealed were less than God, we should need to supplement what has been offered us. If he were only one or more aspects of God, we should need to seek the other aspects in other sources. But in Jesus Christ the true God in His oneness and wholeness reveals Himself to us. Any attempt to know God apart from Christ is therefore not only doomed to failure on account of the uniqueness of His revelation in Christ, but is totally unnecessary—not necessary in any

[1] *Dogmatics in Outline*, p. 50. [2] ibid., p. 52. [3] ibid., p. 58.

degree. And unnecessary in this context is to be regarded, not as an optional possibility, but as an impossibility, inasmuch as it is outside and contrary to the will of God.

Natural theology is therefore denied in the second place by the affirmation of the completeness and sufficiency of the revelation of God in Christ.

3. *In Jesus Christ God genuinely reveals Himself*

Our concern here is with the final point that we made: that revelation is not to be taken simply noetically, but that it is redemptive, the revelation of man's sin and God's pardon which at the same time effects man's judgment and acquittal. The cross reveals that we are sinners. More, at the cross we are accused and condemned. The cross reveals that God pardons our sin. More, at the cross we are pardoned. We might well say that the cross is God's judgment seat, where God effectively condemns and forgives us in Jesus Christ.

The sin which demands the incarnation of the Word of God and the death of Jesus Christ must be measured by these events. The gravity of our sin is not to be assessed by its social or personal results or by our moral awareness of it. The depth of sin is the distance between God in His glory in the highest heavens and the child in the stable. The gravity of sin is revealed by the sweating of the man in the Garden of Gethsemane, by the cry, 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?' The incarnation and its culmination in the cross proclaim to us the extent and nature of our sin. 'The fact that Jesus Christ died totally for the reconciliation of every man as such . . . means decisively that this corruption is both radical and total. That is to say, it means that the sinful reversal takes place at the basis and centre of the being of man, in his heart; and that the consequent sinful perversion then extends to the whole of his being without exception.'[1] Hence we must speak of man's incapacity, his unwillingness and inability to know God apart from God's effectual self-revelation in Jesus Christ. But this is true, not only of knowing God our Saviour in Jesus Christ but of knowing God at all and in any degree. It must be directed against any preliminary knowledge that we might think we could derive of the nature or attributes of God in general.

[1] *Church Dogmatics* IV.1, p. 492.

Natural theology is denied in the third place by the affirmation of the reconciling character of revelation.

Now, if we were to treat this denial thoroughly, we should at this point have to go on to show how the theology of revelation is brought to bear on the conception of the creation as an independent revelation of God; and on the analogy of being between God and man apart from the incarnation, with its correlate of an *imago dei* in man; and on the use of analogies to describe God; and on God's knowability and man's ability to know Him; and on the educational use of natural theology, or apologetics. But we have not enough space for that; and it is better to deal with one point in greater detail than to generalise about half-a-dozen. The one point I propose we investigate is the existence of God.

It is customary for dogmatics to begin by establishing the existence of God. The reason would seem to be that it is not possible to discuss what does not exist, and unless agreement can be reached between writer and reader that God exists there is no point in going any further. Thus Aquinas: 'The first thing we must know of anything is, whether it exists.'[1] And even when the existence of God is treated as self-evident, the foundation has still, in fact, been laid. Three lines have been followed. (1) The existence of God is self-evident to man. This was Calvin's approach. 'We lay it down as a position not to be controverted that the human mind, even by natural instinct, possesses some sense of a deity. For that no man might shelter himself under the excuse of ignorance, God has given to all some apprehension of His existence, the memory of which He frequently and insensibly renews.'[2] Calvin uses the innate knowledge of God's existence negatively: it makes man inexcusable for not knowing God and loving and serving Him. But for theologians whose ear has not been so close to the ground of the Bible, the establishment of the self-evidence of God's existence has opened up the way for an immediate discussion on the nature of God. Inconsistently enough, however, some will at this point try to make assurance doubly sure by bringing in some or all of the proofs for the existence of God. (2) It is not self-evident that God exists. Therefore His existence must be demonstrated at the outset by rational proofs. Aquinas

[1] *Summa Theol.* I.2.2. [2] *Inst.* I.i.3.

affords a classic example of this, with the famous five proofs standing at the beginning of the *Summa Theologica*. After he has established that God exists, the way is open for him to proceed: 'When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may know its essence.'[1] (3) The knowledge of God's existence is regarded as a matter of 'faith'. Faith in this context means an acceptance of what cannot be either understood or proved. It should be more properly called a *sacrificium intellectus*, a renunciation of one's rational ability to proceed beyond a certain point by demonstration, and the consequent employment of some other mode of cognition. As an Anglican writer of the end of the last century put it: 'Although the Bible is full of appeals to nature and history and conscience, as evidence both of the being and of the character of God, it teaches also that this evidence needs something besides intellect in us, if its force is to be felt. . . . Thus, according to Holy Scripture, we must not look to be led by a process of dry reasoning, with an unmistakable, inevitable conclusion that God is. There is, intellectually speaking, a leap, an assumption to be made, in which the logical faculty is helped out by other faculties in our nature.'[2]

Different as they are, these lines of approach share certain basic presuppositions. They presuppose a capability on man's part to learn that God exists and teach this to others. Again, they presuppose a certain relationship between the deity and the man who learns of His existence. The active partner in this relationship is man. He it is who moves towards his deity, searching him out, inquiring after him, coming upon him and knowing him. In all this the deity is passive and static, waiting to be found. Even where the relationship is based upon a previous revelation—in the creation, for instance—this revelation is not conceived of as an active reaching out by God to man, but rather as a state which stands before man ready to be interpreted: 'There is a book, who runs may read'! And thirdly, who is this deity to whom the name 'God' is given? To be quite consistent, we should have to say that we cannot answer this question yet, for the knowledge of His nature—

[1] *Summa Theol.* I.3.
[2] See A. J. Mason: *The Faith of the Gospel* (1933), pp. 1-3.

what He is, what He does, what He is like—follows the knowledge that He is and will be dealt with, so to say, in chapter 2. But on the other hand, some content must be given to the word at the beginning, or the whole discussion is completely meaningless.[1] Therefore a certain provisional content is supplied which will suffice for a preliminary understanding. At the termination of each of his five proofs Aquinas says: 'and this everyone understands to be God.' The equation of the conclusion of the proofs which is called by common consent 'God' with the God who reveals Himself in Jesus Christ is an amazing assumption.

We have spoken of three lines of approach. The way followed by Barth, however, constitutes a fourth, and one which is diametrically opposed to the others in spirit and procedure. Barth has written several dogmatics; not only the full-scale *Church Dogmatics*, but also shorter works in the form of an exposition of some document of earlier days like the Apostles' Creed or the Heidelberg Confession. In none of them does he begin by establishing the existence of God. Nor, however, does he treat it as self-evident. With him it forms an integral part of the knowledge of God through His revelation in Jesus Christ. In Him God reveals His existence as well as His nature. Apart from the revelation of God man does not and cannot know God. That is to say, he not only does not know the nature of God, but neither does he know His existence. He may believe in the existence of some supreme entity to which he applies the name 'God' and which he equates with the Father of Jesus Christ as the traditional deity of his group. But why should this subjective equation be regarded as bestowing objective validity? Why should we imagine that we have only to call a concept 'God' for it to be God indeed? Any such concept has, in fact, only the subjective existence common to all concepts; it does not exist in its own right; it has no objective and independent existence. 'The word "God" in the symbol, therefore, must not mislead us into first giving consideration to the nature and the attributes of a being which, on the basis of our most comprehensive experiences and deepest reflection, we think we have discovered as that which this

[1] cf. H. H. Farmer, *Towards Belief in God* (1942): 'Clearly, if we ask, why believe in God? we must first say what we intend by the word "God". This is necessary not only in order to avoid confusion, but also in order to chart the course of our thought' (p. 15).

name may and must fit, in order thereupon, under the guidance of the historical statements of the symbol, to ascribe to the subject so conceived this and that definite predicate, behaviour and act. On the contrary, we have to begin with the admission that of ourselves we do *not* know what we say when we say "God", i.e. that all that we think we know when we say "God" does not reach and comprehend Him who is called "God" in the symbol, but always one of our self-conceived and self-made idols, whether it is "spirit" or "nature", "fate" or "idea" that we really have in view.'[1] But God exists. He exists objectively and independently. He exists as the one He is. And when He reveals Himself in Jesus Christ, He reveals not this or that fact about Himself, but He reveals Himself, that He is and who He is. We know that God is in and with our knowledge of God in His revelation.

In all this, there has been, as an underlying theme, Barth's intention to do justice to the unity of God. The God who reveals Himself in Jesus Christ reveals *Himself*. Natural theology is guilty of an unreal fragmentation of God. Man, it says, can know that God exists without at the same time knowing Him or His attributes, as if the being of God were an entity separate from His nature. Or it will say that man can know God as the Creator or the Judge, as if God were at one time Creator, at another Judge, at another Redeemer. In all this the unity of God is disregarded—even by such a superb theologian as Aquinas. But in Jesus Christ God reveals—Himself, God. 'We have taken the unity of God seriously,' says Barth, in another context but the words are applicable here, 'not only in theory but in practice. We have answered the question of the knowability of God in the light of His unity. . . . Every single thing that we have said has been conditioned by this total view.'[2]

Any attempt to establish the existence of God apart from His self-revelation in Jesus Christ is putting things in the wrong order. When God in Christ encounters man His existence is *ipso facto* shown and authenticated. Let us allow Barth to sum this up for us in a fine passage in *Dogmatics in Outline*: 'I said that God is He who, according to Holy Scripture, exists, lives and acts, by making Himself known. By this definition some-

[1] *Credo*, p. 12. [2] *Church Dogmatics* II.1, p. 79.

thing fundamentally different is taking place from what would happen, if I should try and set before you conceptually arranged ideas of an infinite, supreme Being. In such a case I would be speculating. But I am not inviting you to speculate. I maintain that this is a radically wrong road which can never lead to God, but to a reality called so only in a false sense. God is He who is to be found in the book of the Old and the New Testaments, which speaks of Him. And the Christian definition of God consists simply in the statement, "He is spoken of there, so let us listen to what is said of Him there." . . . Note well: in the whole Bible . . . not the slightest attempt is ever made to *prove* God. This attempt has always been made only outside the biblical view of God, and only where it has been forgotten with whom we have to do when we speak of God. What sort of attempts were they, after all, where the attempt was made to *prove* a perfect Being alongside imperfect ones? Or from the existence of the world to prove its ultimate and supreme cause, God? Or from the alleged order of the world to prove the ordering Power? Or the moral proof of God from the fact of man's conscience? I will not enter into these proofs of God. I don't know whether you can at once see the humour and the fragility of these proofs. These proofs may avail for the alleged gods; if it were my task to make you acquainted with these allegedly supreme beings, I would occupy myself with the five famous proofs of God. In the Bible there is no such argumentation; the Bible speaks of God simply as of One who needs no proof. It speaks of a God who *proves Himself* on every hand.'[1]

[1] pp. 37-38.

CHRIST'S SACRIFICE FOR SIN

(*Confessio Scoticana* 1560)

by The Rev. A. IAN DUNLOP

It is necessary at the outset to notice the passages in the *Scots Confession* which refer to the Atonement of Christ.

Firstly in Article 8.

He became Very God and Very Man because He was *to underlie the punishment due* for our transgressions and to present Himself in the presence of His Father's judgment, *as in our person*, to suffer for our transgression and inobedience, by death to *overcome him that was the author of death.*

The Article goes on to show that His manhead (humanity) and Godhead (divinity) were joined in one person, the manhead being subject to death which we deserved, and the Godhead to triumph and purchase life, liberty and victory.

Secondly in Article 9.

That our Lord Jesus offered Himself *a voluntary sacrifice* unto His Father for us, that He suffered contradiction of sinners, that He was wounded and plagued for our transgression, that He being the clean, innocent *Lamb of God* was damned in the presence of an earthly judge that we should be absolved before the tribunal-seat of our God. That He suffered not only the cruel death of the Cross, which was accursed by the sentence of God, but also He suffered for a season the wrath of His Father which sinners had deserved.

But this we avow that he remained the only well beloved and blessed Son of His Father even in the midst of His anguish and torment which He suffered in body and soul, to make the full satisfaction for the sins of the people.

The Article finishes with a strong assertion that there is no other sacrifice for sin, which would appear to be an attack on the mass and on Pelagian tendencies.

Thirdly in Article 25. The reprobate

have no Fruit in Christ's Death, Resurrection or Ascension. But such as with heart unfeignedly believe and with mouth boldly confess the Lord Jesus shall most assuredly receive their gifts: first, in this life, remission of sins and that by faith alone in Christ's blood: sin though remaining and continually abiding in our earthly bodies not imputed but remitted and covered by Christ's justice. Secondly, in the general judgment, . . . resurrection.

As they asserted in Article 1, the Scots Reformers attempted to base their theology on the Bible and, without being speculative in their approach, they grouped together the things they believed to be essential to a right Christian doctrine of the work of Christ.

This is *the* crucial doctrine where the biblical account of the great acts by God in Christ meet Christian experience, and it might be argued that every so-called Christian theological structure is built on an implicit or explicit foundation of the understanding of the Atonement. We should note here that the first extract emphasises especially the *Christus Victor* idea so important to Luther and basic for the pre-Anselmic understanding; the second, the penal substitution which is vital to Calvin—'in our own person', 'underlie the punishment due', 'non-imputation', etc.; and the third, the 'ontological' effect, through faith and confession, in forgiveness and justification and eschatological resurrection.

But, as we should expect, the Confession here as in so much else, follows Calvin faithfully. Indeed, these sections give a fine summary of the contents of the *Institutes*, Book 2, Chapter 16. To find, then, what they mean, it is probably best to find where Calvin stood as the primary thinker, and that would require extended study of the *Institutes* and *Commentaries*. This has been done in Van Buren's *Christ in our Place*. Calvin claimed to use the Scriptures as his source but he was inevitably influenced by the thought-forms and theology of his predecessors, perhaps Augustine especially, and there was no immediate occasion to break with the past in this doctrine. Characteristically, however, he had his own approach and emphasis. The Work of Christ is considered under the threefold Office of Christ as prophet, priest and king, though in *Calvin's Doctrine of the Work of Christ*, Jansen shows that the office of prophet was included belatedly and rather regretfully, and even in the fourth edition of the *Institutes* it had small treatment compared with the offices of priest and king. When the *Institutes* and *Commentaries* are taken together it is not always easy to see one clear doctrine, for the exegete has immensely varied material and metaphor to explain.

The so-called 'classic theory' had been dislodged by Anselm's epoch-making work. The active and passive obedience of

Christ had infinite and objective value, and this Anselm expresses in forensic terms using the thought of private law (satisfaction or punishment). Aquinas differed from Anselm in seeing the satisfaction not only as compensatory but penal—Christ's endurance vicariously of punishment due by another. Luther's vital difference was that he saw the matter in the light of public law, God being the Judge, and His law of absolute justice demanding man's punishment for sin (satisfaction through punishment). Christ was given of God as substitute for humanity's punishment and to expiate the divine wrath. Luther could speak of Christ as 'the greatest of sinners' because He assumed our sins, but there was also in Luther the note of Resurrection triumph, the real conquest of sin and death and the giving of the power of victory to the justified by faith. Within the conception of the sovereign will of God and His predestination and election, Calvin saw the Work of Christ as essentially to do for us what we cannot do for ourselves, as 'substitute' on our behalf and with all that the word 'penal' conveys.

But Calvin from his knowledge of the Scriptures corrected many wrong emphases, that had entered with the forensic and commercial metaphors used by the scholastics, and saw the gift of the Mediator as the realisation of the Father's love and the love of the Father in the Godhead as the measure of His love for us. There could therefore be no opposition between Father and Son in the Atonement as there had tended to be for Anselm. Notice how the Scots Reformers underlined this truth. Calvin saw sin as *disobedience* primarily and the Incarnate Christ's sinlessness as obedience—in the Incarnation itself, in the life on earth and in the death on the Cross. Our 'substitute' made satisfaction by suffering in obedience the punishment we deserved by our disobedience, and the whole act of obedience from incarnation to Calvary was His 'Baptism', His identification with us so that He might act for us. It was in a sense all His Cross. Calvin, also, realising that the enmity between God and man, which brought a curse on man for his disobedience, could only be broken down by the vicarious suffering for the punishment due, stresses the *form* of the death of Jesus, a voluntary offering on the cursed Cross after condemnation as an evil-doer by an earthly judge (cf. *Institutes*, 2.16.6).

Calvin spoke of 'satisfaction', which is itself a non-biblical term, and worked with the scholastic forensic language, but he continually returned to the Word of God for his balance, and the whole idea of the 'substitute' took its form from the New Testament itself and through the New Testament from Isa. 53, which he quoted frequently.

The two phrases in the *Scots Confession* from the concept of Sacrifice are: '*The Lord offered Himself a voluntary sacrifice unto the Father for us*' and the '*clean, innocent Lamb of God*'. So much has the phrase 'Lamb of God' come to mean Jesus in theological thinking that the authors of the Confession could write of the Lamb of God as being damned in the presence of an earthly judge, and this simple confusion between Temple and law court is indicative of one reason for our difficulty in thinking of the Work of Christ.

What is implied in these two phrases? Is the language without any particular reference to the Temple at all, 'sacrifice' and 'Lamb of God' being words which once had Temple reference but now no more? Surely not. Is then Christ the Priest making the offering, or the Victim? Surely both. He is the Priest, as taught in Hebrews, of the order of Melchizedek entering in once and for all into the Holy of Holies, but especially here the Lamb, the Victim, offered in His voluntary death to God for us.

What is involved—the principal emphasis of the Old Testament with Isa. 53 behind or the whole Old Testament sacrificial system? Calvin himself did not lay great stress on the details of this system apart from Isa. 53, but surely we cannot understand Isa. 53, or the death of Jesus without considering the meaning and values of the temple rites—and these would be familiar at least to the Jewish-speaking part of the early Church. It is necessary, too, to understand the Covenant demands, and Calvin assumed much of the Old Testament system in his doctrine with regard to propitiation, expiation and so forth.

If this is so, would it not be well in seeking for a doctrine of Atonement and approaching what must always remain ultimately a mystery, to take this idea that runs right through the Bible from Genesis to Revelation and the implications of which have concerned every doctrine in the past, and only

depart from it if some other metaphor, for example in St. Paul's teaching, conveys what the sacrifice idea cannot convey? In the Old Testament sacrifice has to do directly with God, and generally with Judgment, Sin and Forgiveness. But what do justification, the metaphor of the law court, redemption of the slave-market, reconciliation of human relationships, etc., convey that is essential to the Work of Christ and is not implied in expiation or propitiation? Being made right with God, being given freedom from the dominion of sin and evil, being given peace with God, may in subsequent theological thinking express different emphases and stress different results from being made holy and *sanctified* (used not in its special sense); but do they really say more with regard to what is *done* in the Atonement? It would surely avoid the confusion and many battlefields of theological scholarship where there should only be wonder and worship. It would, too, be appropriate to keep the language of sacrifice primarily because the language of sacrifice *is* the language of worship, and is not 'sacrifice' as a word just as meaningful for the non-Christian as, say, 'reconciliation' and in much less danger of being reduced to purely human terms? It is truly impossible for us to find the full meaning of what Christ has done. The light we have can only come when we leave Ur with Abraham and Egypt with Moses; when we travel among the mighty acts of God and worship in the temple; when we go into exile with Jeremiah and Deutero-Isaiah and come back to Jerusalem—and then when we live with Jesus from His Birth to His Resurrection, and with the Apostles of the Pentecostal Church, who sought to interpret the meaning of the central event of history and experience. Is not the way of sacrifice the God-given way of understanding the Work of Christ given in the context of the revelation of God's Word?

Several things should be said about sacrifice in the Old Testament. It may have been conceived of as a way of communion with God or a thank-offering to God, not so much perhaps to attain God's grace as to retain it. But it does not seem to have been seen, even early, as the propitiation of an angry God (cf. Welch, *Religion of Israel under the Kingdom*, p. 18). Yet it has soon to do with God's Covenant, when the Covenant is broken by Israel, and has more and more to do with sin until, by the time of Christ, it has almost entirely to do with the way

of forgiveness. The way is provided in the Law by God, and God provides the animals that are offered, and the priesthood to prescribe the right offering. Much could be said about the Passover, the Scape-goat, the Day of Atonement, and the significance of sin offerings, burnt offerings, and peace offerings. Whether the idea of 'substitution' is involved in the Levitical sacrifices or not, the expiation of guilt for those who have sinned in ignorance is provided in this means of grace given by God. There is no magical idea in sacrifice of changing God's will; He is the Holy God. Bishop Hicks (*The Fulness of Sacrifice*) and Vincent Taylor (*Jesus and His Sacrifice*, *The Atonement in New Testament Teaching*) have given full treatment to the Old Testament sacrifice ideas and have drawn the parallel between the sin offering, the burnt offering, and the peace offering, and the Cross, the Resurrection and the Ascension. Bishop Hicks (cf. a good summary of Hicks' material in J. S. Whale, *Christian Doctrine*, pp. 82) has emphasised that it is not the death of the victim so much as the life that should have the emphasis. The life is surrendered, the life is transformed, the life is shared. The life for the Hebrew is the blood, and the writer to the Hebrews wrote a Hebrew truth when he declared that without the shedding of blood 'there is no remission', but it is the blood of the living. Cost is essential to sacrifice and there is deliverance in the sacrificial surrender of life, and reconciliation.

And yet in the Old Testament with the development of the priestly sacrificial system went the prophetic teaching of a righteous God who demands no ritual sacrifice, and these two came together in the Servant passages and especially in Isa. 53. There the idea of substitution is undoubtedly present and in its penal form, and the *prophetic obedience* and suffering and the *priestly sacrifice* became one to be offered and borne by the innocent, obedient, suffering servant.

In the teaching of Jesus about His death two passages stand out as meaningful—the '*ransom*' *passage* (Mark 10.45), and *the word at the Last Supper*, 'This is my blood of the new covenant which is shed for the remission of sins' (Mark 14.22f and parallels, and 1 Cor. 11.23). *Λύτρον*—ransom takes us straight back to the Old Testament to פדה, כפר and גאל, the first two of which are undoubtedly sacrificial terms. A close study of these terms would be necessary to find the meaning of

λύτρον which the Septuagint uses to translate them. Each has a different essential meaning. The New Covenant passage surely refers to Exod. 24.8 and Jer. 31 (the promise of forgiveness, and a law written in the heart) but also to the Servant passages as the way by which the Servant would fulfil His Work.

Suffice it to say with regard to St. Paul's teaching that there is less direct reference to the Old Testament sacrificial system than one might expect, but it is good to remember that he was writing to Gentiles to whom the ideas were strange. He used instead rich, varied language and metaphor to interpret the glorious Gospel; yet note 1 Cor. 5.7, 'Christ our passover is sacrificed for us'; Eph. 5.2, 'Christ also hath loved us and given himself for us an offering and a sacrifice to God for a sweet smelling savour'; and Rom. 3.25, 'for all have sinned and come short of the glory of God, being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus: whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation (ἱλαστήριον) through faith in his blood'.

The conception of 'substitution' is deeply embedded in St. Paul's doctrine and we need not be afraid of the word, although some theologians have preferred the word 'representative' and often have meant the same thing. Consider the three passages: 2 Cor. 5.21, 'he made him to be sin for us'; Gal. 3.13, 'he became a curse for us'; and 2 Cor. 5.14, 'one died for all'. As A. B. Macaulay says (*The Death of Jesus*, p. 174) 'they simply express in legal terminology what propitiation expresses in the sacrificial'.

There is a penal element in the Cross for St. Paul. But does this mean that Christ was vicariously punished, or that Christ suffered what we should have suffered and God 'reckons Christ's suffering to mankind as punishment endured by it'? D. M. Baillie (*God was in Christ*, pp. 187-8), following C. H. Dodd, thinks that the real meaning of ἱλαστήριον is that 'God has set forth Christ as a means by which guilt is annulled' or even 'a means by which sin is forgiven'. 'The propitiation is the revelation of the Divine Mystery of Love in the midst of the reality of Wrath' (Brunner, *The Mediator*, pp. 519f, quoted by D. M. Baillie, *God was in Christ*, p. 189). To quote Mozley, *The Doctrine of the Atonement* (p. 79), 'Christ, out of His love,

which is as the love of God His Father, offers to God a sacrifice which proceeds from and does not give birth to God's gracious purpose of salvation. This sacrifice may, however, be spoken of as propitiatory, since through the expiation of sin which results from the sinless taking upon Himself sin's penalty, God's attitude to sin is made perfectly plain, and that wrath which stands for His holy reaction against all that is unholy can be laid aside without injury thereby being done to God's moral character and government. Hence the direct result of Christ's death is reconciliation.'

The Epistle to the Hebrews is directly concerned with the Work of Christ understood in terms of the Old Testament sacrificial system, although the whole subject is spiritualised and the priesthood and sacrifice seen as fulfilled once and for all in Jesus Christ. St. Peter too attaches great importance to the expiatory value of Christ's death and refers to the Old Testament directly in 'the Lamb without blemish' (1 Pet. 1.19) and obviously to Isa. 53. There are direct references in 1 John, and the Book of Revelation is dominated by the thought of the Lamb, the reference being Isa. 53, and possibly the Lamb of the Passover.

The idea of sacrifice underlines the *objective* nature of the Atonement. God gives the means in Christ Jesus, the Mediator, the Servant, His Son, and God bears the cost. The *whole life* and death of the incarnate Jesus is the sacrifice and in the Resurrection it is revealed that the offering is accepted. The propitiation of an angry first Person of the Trinity by the differently disposed will of the second Person is in no sense implied, although a modern tendency in theology is to lay less stress on the impassivity of God. At least, a new relationship results from the sacrifice and God's wrath is turned away, and man's sin is covered and a righteousness is given to those for whom the sacrifice is made.

The doctrine of the Atonement must be objective. The other side, however, call it subjective if you will, has its place. On the great Day of Atonement the worshipping Hebrews stood watching as the sacrifice was made in their name. In the once and for all sacrifice of Christ provided by God and made voluntarily by Jesus, the benefits of Atonement are given to worshippers who gather round Christ—repentance and faith

and the fruits of faith. Where sin made communion impossible between man and God there is now union with God in Christ. The New Covenant is made possible and replaces the old. Baptism sets forth Christ's identification with humanity and His giving of Himself, and the Lord's Supper in which the blood of the New Covenant is shed for many shows forth Christ's death till He will come; both are pledges of His communion and forgiveness and of love; both really provide for man the benefits of His sacrifice.

A word on two matters here. First, *union with Christ*: this was important in Calvin's teaching—a spiritual union based on the humanity of Christ and the means of sanctification. Article 21 of the Confession, speaking of the Sacraments, reflects this in the reference to 'that most blessed conjunction, union and society which the elect have with their Head, Christ Jesus'. The Sacraments have a vital place in the appropriation of the benefits of the Work of Christ. But Calvin insisted that Christ's body is in heaven and not here. Article 21 again makes this clear: 'and yet notwithstanding the far distance of place which is between His body now glorified in heaven and us now mortal in this earth'; and this may have been the factor that led Knox and the leaders of theological thought of the next generation in Scotland, Craig and Bruce, to lay such stress on union with the risen and living Christ, and on the joyful life of discipleship. There is a Christian mysticism in St. Paul which is relevant here, expressed, for example, in Gal. 2.20, 'I am crucified with Christ: nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me.'

Secondly, for Calvin the *Love of God* lies *behind* all the work of Christ—as indeed it does for St. Paul—'God commendeth his love', 'God so loved the world', etc. But so great is his emphasis on God's saving justice in His act, and on the effect of justification that one wonders whether the note of the love of God has not been depreciated in the orthodox doctrine. This would be more true when one is thinking of the *Institutes* and the later 'federal theology', but by no means so true when one is thinking of the *Commentaries* or *Sermons* of Calvin. Jansen quotes a passage from a sermon of Calvin on Isa. 53 where he has been develop-

ing the relation between the wrath and the love of God: 'When we see that God did not spare His Only Son, when we see that He had to cry out "Why hast Thou forsaken me?"—when we see these things it is impossible not to tremble and be filled with fear, and wonder at such measureless love unless, indeed, we are more hard than stones' (Jansen, *Calvin's Doctrine of the Work of Christ*, p. 95).

I would not plead for a subjective theory of Atonement, which is no Atonement at all, nor for the moral influence element in Abelard's teaching, as in any way sufficient. But the love of Christ *is* involved in the act of sacrifice and in the mediation of the effects of the act. A. B. Macaulay gives the direction of this in a way in *The Death of Jesus* when he develops the idea of the mounting temptation which Jesus is called on to meet; He conquers each previous temptation until the last and supreme temptation is conquered on the Cross. The temptation is twofold: on the one hand, to lose faith and love for the God who can allow the sinless to suffer and die the death of the Cross, and, on the other hand, to lose faith and love for man who in sin can bring it to pass. His obedience in this twofold love is of the essence of the sacrifice of Himself for sin.

I would plead for the value of the sacrificial as providing a point of contact with the world today. Men and women know within themselves that complete self-sacrifice is admirable and they know at least this of Jesus Christ, that He was crucified completely unjustly and without complaint, believing that He went to His death in some way for the sake of the world. Men of the world do not mock at the Cross; they admire it from afar. We have to show them that all self-sacrifice takes its value from the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, the Son of the Living God, and lead them to self-sacrificial living and service in obedience to Him and His example, and His oft repeated words: 'Whosoever shall save his life shall lose it, and whosoever will lose his life for my sake shall save it'; 'Let a man deny himself and take up his cross and follow me.' Christ is the Priest for ever, offering to the Holy God the sacrifice of His obedient servants. The full meaning of faith, and obedience, and self-sacrifice, awaits the Last Day, when the Priest takes the worshippers into the Holy of Holies.

This is the way for each and all who would be His disciples,

for the saints and martyrs of every age, for the early Church and for the Apostles. Let the last word be with Christ's great interpreter: 'I beseech you, brethren, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable unto God, which is your reasonable service' (Rom. 12.1f).

MORE QUESTS OF THE HISTORICAL JESUS

by The Rev. Professor ALLAN BARR

On the long journey towards a clear understanding of the historical Jesus it is desirable from time to time to halt and survey the scene, take our bearings and choose the direction for further advance. In this article I do not profess to cover the recent relevant literature, which is vast in extent. The aim rather has been to select a few works representative of different approaches and methods, and to present in this way both the lines of progress and the questions which still await an answer.

A feature of the contemporary situation is its increased complexity. In the earlier periods of the quest one can distinguish stages at which a single issue came to the front and became for a time the topic of discussion. In the latter part of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth the rationalists, convinced of the inviolability of natural law, sought ingeniously to explain away the miracles of the Gospels while maintaining a naïve acceptance of the letter of these records. The issue simply was: Can miracles happen? Somewhat later, controversy ranged around the relative historical value of the Fourth Gospel and the Synoptics, an old question indeed, but one which was bound to become insistent with the advance of literary and historical criticism. At another stage the dominant question was the priority of Mark among the Gospels and its value as providing the framework of Jesus' activities. By the end of last century the place of eschatology in the history, and later the question of the inherent value of the biblical eschatology successively came into the centre of debate. Was the eschatology in its Jewish apocalyptic form a temporary and limiting encasement of Jesus' spirit, as Schweitzer thought, or has it a value not only as explaining Jesus' position among His contemporaries but as the permanent basis of Jesus' historical importance?

Such questions in some measure still remain with us. But new considerations complicate the quest. One of these is the question of the nature of historical study itself. There are those who classify historical investigation with the sciences. The

historian's attitude to his work must be impartial, unprejudiced, objective. His first task is to ascertain fact, and interpretation goes no further than the presentation of the facts in logical relation and causal sequence. On the other hand there are historians like Spengler and Toynbee who paint their picture on the widest canvas, judging whole civilisations and the full story of mankind, and are denounced as prophets by the stricter historians. These are extreme cases, but there are many now who feel more than hitherto that historical work requires personal involvement from the student.

This question of the aim of historical study meets us with special intensity when we turn to the Gospels, our chief documents for the knowledge of the historical Jesus. It becomes necessary to ask whether it is appropriate, permissible or even possible to treat the Gospels with detached objectivity. Of course, everyone acknowledges or should acknowledge the necessary function of unprejudiced study of certain matters; philology, literary structure and relationships, geography, chronology. But these can only be regarded as preparatory to a full historical treatment. And there—so it is now maintained —the nature of the documents is such that an attempted impartiality is itself prejudice. The Gospels call not only for judgment and valuation but for personal commitment, and it becomes a historical question whether the theological values of the records are true.

Yet if the claims of theology are pushed to extremes an unsatisfactory tension appears between theology and history as commonly understood. This may be illustrated by the disparagement of Luke's Gospel on the part of some recent German writers. Luke, they say, is too much of a historian. He treats the Acts of the Apostles as a continuation of his Gospel and writes with too much of a secular interest. But do Luke's wider interests really handicap him as an evangelist? It may be further remarked that if the claims of theological interpretation are pushed to extremes, a good case might be made out for treating the Fourth Gospel as the most historical of the Gospels. In regard to ultimate truth it may be thought to give the best picture of Jesus. It shows us Jesus as He would appear to speak and act to a Christian disciple who was permitted to live again alongside Him in His earthly life and had

been prepared by Christian reflection to see Jesus' words and acts in their ultimate significance. The objection to this, in respect of the historical quest, is that it makes history an esoteric pursuit. Only mature Christian faith can participate in it. It is necessary, I think, to make some kind of accommodation to generally held and common-sense views of history. We must treat it as a public branch of knowledge.

From what has already been said we are prepared to consider another complication in the present situation. Not only the students of history but the evangelists and their sources have their interests and their tendencies. Apart from literary interdependence, the sources of the Gospels can be discerned in the individual sections (narratives, parables, groups of sayings, and so on) of which they are composed. According to form-criticism these had circulated in the Christian communities each with its definite function in the life of the Church, for instruction, exhortation or guidance in practical matters. For these purposes the Church had exercised not only a preservative but a creative influence upon the tradition. The authentic history of Jesus can only be reached by disentangling the primitive Palestinian elements from the nexus of the Gospel accounts.

And the evangelists themselves are not mere compilers of traditional elements. Their interests have served to shape the Gospels both in their general content and in detail. This is specially important in the case of Mark, who may have been the first person to make a continuous narrative of the events, and whose framework is used by the other Synoptists. Some critics see Mark's presentation as fully dominated by dogmatic ideas. Many of them are still attracted to Wrede's theory of the Messianic secret. Many are working at Mark's eschatology. James M. Robinson, South California School of Theology, in his study *The Problem of History in Mark* conceives Mark's purpose as that of writing a history of a cosmic eschatological struggle between Spirit and Satan with his demons, continuing from the baptism of Jesus to the Resurrection. We shall return later to Robinson's views on the quest. Here a quotation from his study of Mark will serve to show his approach to the question of historicity: 'Marcan eschatology is such as to imply a continuation within the Church of the same kind of history

as characterised Jesus' history, i.e. a struggle between Spirit and Satan, until the final outcome of that struggle is reached and the goal of history attained' (p. 59).

The insistence of some writers on the influence of dogma on Mark's Gospel has to be weighed against the contention of others that Mark shows respect for eye-witness testimony and gives other signs of historical interest in the ordinary sense of the word. In a salutary article on 'The Intention of the Evangelists', C. F. D. Moule[1] has maintained that the early Church was aware of the distinction between the 'Jesus of history' and the 'Christ of faith', that the Gospels have a definite apologetic aspect and that even when used in worship they catered for an interest in 'how it all started'. He points to their relatively late date, after Paul and other leaders had helped the Church to reflect on such matters as the Person of Christ, and the beginnings of credal formulation can be traced; and he contrasts the restraint and even defectiveness of Mark in expression of the beliefs of the early Church. 'The Synoptic Gospels represent primarily the recognition that a vital element in evangelism is the plain story of what happened in the ministry of Jesus.'

From what has been said it might appear that at present the quest has reverted to prolegomena. There are, however, attempts to advance the quest in a positive way, and Lives of Jesus of one kind or another are being published from time to time.

We must keep in mind that while the critics discuss their prolegomena there are very many people, learned and unlearned, who approach the Gospels without the critic's equipment but find themselves close to Jesus in their reading and enter with discernment into the historical situation. As an example I take a work by a Roman Catholic scholar. Monsignor Romano Guardini, born in Italy, for many years a Professor of Philosophy in German universities, has written a devotional study of the life of Jesus entitled in the English translation *The Lord.*[2] The main interest of the writer lies in inner experience and his usual line of interpretation is psychological, in the sense that he reads between the lines the motives,

[1] *NT Essays in honour of T. W. Manson*, pp. 165ff.
[2] Longmans Green, 1956.

feelings and spiritual crises of the various people who appear in the Gospel narratives. This method is sternly discountenanced by modern critics, who maintain that the evangelists tell us next to nothing about these things and that in particular the inner life of Jesus is not disclosed.

The spiritual insight and good taste of Guardini are impressive. Yet one is tempted to envy him in his lack of concern about the problems which the Gospels press upon the critical mind. There is uncritical transposition and mixture of passages from the Gospels, a preference for the 'apostolic' Gospels, Matthew and John, and a relatively slight attention to Mark. In his account of the Last Supper he says that Jesus' words are to be taken literally, but there is no discussion of what the words of Jesus were. There is an anachronistic application of later orthodoxy. The full trinitarian doctrine is assumed. Where difficulties are encountered in the narratives Jesus' divinity is stressed and even played against His humanity. Does the belief in demons belong to a lower level of religion? For an answer we must not rely on our own judgment; we must 'accept him once and for all as our ultimate authority in everything'. Dealing with Jesus' prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem and of the world he says, 'If we recognise Jesus as the actual Son of God the Creator and Lord, we do not presume to judge his words, because there is no standard by which to do so—neither scientific, historical nor religious. They are their own standard. He is the First and the Last, and what he says is revelation. Here faith begins. This is our answer to the world.' The Kingdom of God which Jesus inaugurated is understood by Guardini for the most part in terms of the inner life, and a non-eschatological interpretation of the Son of Man is adopted; 'That humble and yet so exalted name that the Messiah goes by: Son of Man. No one is so warmly, so intimately, so excellently human as he is.' Romanist views naturally appear, as in the discussion of the Eucharist, but seldom obtrude. And it is worth drawing attention to a striking passage about the danger of orthodoxy, arising from a study of Jesus' attitude to the Law: 'The moment rules of salvation, cult and communal pattern are fixed, one is tempted to believe that their strict observance is already holiness in the sight of God. The moment there is a hierarchy of offices, and powers, of tradition and law,

there is also the danger of confusing authority and obedience with the kingdom of God. . . . Wherever a decisive either-or is demanded in the realm of sacred truth; where the objective forms of cult, order and authority are all that count, there you may be sure is also danger of the "Pharisee" and his "Law".'[1]

The uncritical though devout approach of Guardini, in which he is representative not only of Roman Catholics but also of very much popular and clerical Protestant exposition, stands in extreme contrast to criticism run wild. This pseudo-criticism is represented by *The Nazarene Gospel Restored* of Robert Graves and Joshua Pedro. This book, extending to over 1000 pages, but including much heavily edited transcription from the New Testament, the Apocrypha, etc., came out some six years ago with a great flourish of trumpets and much presumptuous self-advertisement. It was to replace everything that had ever been written before. The motives of commentators, especially the Protestants, are shown little respect. We are told in the Introduction that 'they do not fear the truth but owe a duty of caution alike to their employers and to their dependants, and are particularly anxious not to offend any of the "little ones".' On the other hand neither of the authors 'has a chair, post or pulpit to lose'. One an Irish bishop's grandson, the other brought up a devout Eastern European Jew, 'both developed a historical conscience and ceased to hold orthodox beliefs long before we came to know each other in England during the recent war'. Robert Graves is a man of some eminence in the literary world. His writings include critical and historical works, novels and poems. He has held a chair of English literature.

Graves and Pedro take as pillars of their edifice a few passages in the Gospels where Jesus seems to speak favourably of the Law and the Pharisees. He had come not to destroy, but to fulfil. 'The scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' seat: all therefore whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do' (Matt. 23.2f). (The following words, 'but do not ye after their works' are an interpolation!) Jesus was a devout Pharisee of the liberal sort, owing much to Hillel but belonging also to a small apocalyptic sect known as 'Watchers for the kingdom'. The original Nazarene Gospel was Pharisaic throughout. The

[1] op. cit., pp. 116, 335, 160, 171.

present Gospels are the result of mishandling by numerous Gentile heretics, whose operations are described by such words as manipulation, distortion, misrepresentation, deception, piracy, forgery. Some of the distortion can be easily corrected. In some passages read 'Sadducees' or 'feigned Pharisees' for 'Pharisees'. Paul, by the by, is one of these pretended Pharisees, in the pay of the Sadducees. Despite his claims he cannot have been of Jewish birth; 'had he been so he could not have argued as he did . . .'. The parable of the Good Samaritan has been subjected to editorial guile, 'tampered with by Simon Magus or one of his compatriots'. Originally it was the wounded man who was the Samaritan. The first two, who passed by, were Sadducees, obeying the letter of the Law, the third, who helped the wounded, was a true Israelite, an enlightened Pharisee, obeying its spirit.

Only a few specimens of this fantastic reconstruction can be given. John the Baptist initiates the history. In preparation for the revival of the Jewish monarchy he (the Gabriel of Luke's Gospel) announces to Mary Madgalene that she is to be the mother of the king. A ceremonial rebirth of Jesus follows. (Here take in the sayings, 'Woman, behold thy son', 'Son, behold thy mother'.) The Baptism of Jesus is the Coronation. Possibly this was accompanied by a ceremonial marriage, the queen being Mary, the sister of Martha. 'Thereafter as the King Messiah Jesus had to follow a rule of conduct laid down by the prophets and hagiographers; and since the precise details of this rule are known, the truth of the Gospel narratives can be tested by it.' His death was a royal sacrifice. Officially he died on the Cross; but afterwards when he had recovered from his death-like coma and found that the Kingdom of Heaven had not come, he recognised that his sacrifice had been premature. Self-exiled from Palestine he ended his days as a 'wanderer somewhere in the far East among the Jews of the Dispersion, a penitent and branded fugitive'.

I must give just two examples of absurd exegesis. Peter in the courtyard after Jesus' arrest is not only questioned about his Galilean speech, but asked his name. He answers, 'Barabbas' —'Father's son'. This non-committal if not impudent reply did not help Peter. They led him (not Jesus) away and accused him before Annas. (So are settled some old questions about the

appearances of Jesus before the Sanhedrin, and the identity of Barabbas.) An account of this trial of Peter may be partly found in Acts, chs. 22, 23, where Paul's name has been substituted for his. Again at the Tomb, when the soldiers had rolled back the stone, Jesus emerged clad in pall and headcloth and sat on the stone in the moonlight, easily mistaken for a ghost. It seems that it was on this occasion that he uttered the words, 'I thirst'. The transposition of these words from the Cross, where they are weighty and appropriate, to this scene, where they are trivial, is characteristic. There is no motive for the change except the desire to be different from the Gospels and from other people.

All this is built with plenty of bricks, but on sand, not on pillars set on rock. It is probably the expression of some deep personal dissatisfaction, and I would not have given it space if I did not see some significance reaching beyond the work itself. It points to the disunity of our modern culture, and the inability through prejudice of some of our literary people to appreciate the Gospels, even on the literary level.

It is a relief to turn from indifference to criticism and criticism run riot to sober, responsible scholarship. To represent this I would refer to the work of Dr Vincent Taylor. He is one who has all along believed that it is still possible to write a Life of Jesus. For him the old 'liberal' Lives were not entirely futile, nor has form-criticism destroyed the conviction that the outlines of Jesus' ministry and the substance of His teaching have been preserved in the Gospels. He comes from his great commentary on Mark and largely on the basis of the Marcan account presents in a small book of some 200 pages *The Life and Ministry of Jesus*. Here there is not much that is new, but much that is fairly and wisely judged. Two examples of his reflections may be quoted. 'We cannot see the Jesus of history if we close our eyes to the Christ of faith; we do not see the Christ of faith except in the light of the Jesus of history.' 'We must cease to cherish the delusion that Jesus faced his cross without the shadow of an idea why he must die and what ends his death would serve. His calm and confident bearing at the betrayal, the arrest, and at the trials before Caiaphas and Pilate is that of one who moves on steadily to his appointed goal. Although in the garden of Gethsemane he prays that the

cup may pass from him, and experiences a sense of desolation on the cross, he is sure that all is of the Father's appointing and that his mission reaches its climax in death and resurrection.'[1]

Many people will find great satisfaction in the work of Dr Taylor and other scholars, mainly British and American, who follow the same road in the quest. Such writers gather what is most assured from earlier research, are moderate in their judgment of the evidence, and succeed in presenting a credible portrait of Jesus. But the brevity of such works—Dr Taylor's book is a sketch rather than a finished picture—and the numerous points at which discussion is indecisive leave us with the question whether some new approach might be fruitful. Can fresh light be shed on the purpose and methods of the evangelists? Are there in our day new philosophical and theological insights that can help us towards a true historical understanding in this field?

Here I wish to mention two new attempts to understand the structure of Mark's Gospel and the mind of the evangelist. Dr Austin Farrer (*A Study in St. Mark*, 1952; *St. Matthew and St. Mark*, 1954) is intent upon tracing symbolic cyclic patterns in the sequence of events recorded by Mark. The symbolism is prefigurative and frequently can be traced in Mark's use of numbers. The cure of the paralytic, borne like a corpse to Jesus by four bearers, let down through the roof when a hole had been dug out, and standing up in Jesus' presence, suggests death, burial, resurrection. Mark shaped the cycles of the ministry with a view to the Passion narrative. The first group of cycles (different kinds of healings and so on) culminates in the raising of Jairus' daughter, a prefiguration of the Resurrection. There is one healing narrative for each of the twelve disciples, or rather for the tribes of Israel which they represent. The five thousand and four thousand of the fed multitudes, with the number of the loaves used and of the baskets of fragments remaining are worked out to symbolise the mission to the Jews and the Gentiles respectively. Old Testament types are in view. Bartimaeus' appeal to Jesus as 'Son of David' has a reference to Solomon, who rode upon a mule to his anointing as king (1 Kings 1).

Dr Farrer's ingenuity is hard pressed at times. The healing

[1] op. cit., pp. 36, 181.

narratives (excluding for the purpose exorcisms and general statements of healing activity) turn out to number thirteen, not twelve; but then there were thirteen tribes by one way of counting. Seven healings precede the raising of Jairus' daughter. Why should the prefiguration of the Resurrection be the eighth? The Resurrection took place on the first day of the week, the eighth if the previous week is included. Dr Farrer's general conclusion is that 'prefiguration is Mark's form of historical thinking'.

The second of these studies of Mark is by Archbishop Philip Carrington of Quebec, *The Primitive Christian Calendar*. His theory is that the Gospels and particularly Mark were composed from a liturgical motive, composed, he says, 'to give a Sunday by Sunday arrangement of words and acts of Jesus, to be announced or proclaimed at the proper part in the service'. The calendar is the Jewish one, and the sequence of events in Mark's Gospel corresponds with the Jewish festivals. In our early MSS—here Carrington relies for Mark on Vaticanus—the Gospel is divided into sections by marginal numbers. In Vaticanus there are sixty-two of these; forty-eight are assigned by Carrington to that number of Sundays, the remaining fourteen to more frequent reading at Passiontide. *Prima facie*, these divisions appear to me to be far more probably made for reference purposes than for lections. Some of them contain as few as two of our verses, others over twenty; many of them correspond to the paragraphs separated in Huck's Synopsis.

Relating the events to the calendar brings great difficulties, and the theory breaks down where it should have its strongest support, at the Transfiguration. There we would expect a relation to the Feast of Tabernacles. 'Master,' says Peter, 'it is good for us to be here: and let us make three tabernacles, one for thee, and one for Moses, and one for Elias.' The Archbishop, however, has to admit disappointment here. The Transfiguration is too early in his scheme for Tabernacles, and has to be assigned to a midsummer festival. That the Gospels were soon read in Church is certain. That in course of time passages came to be read regularly at certain seasons or for certain observances is also evident. But that Mark was composed in order to provide a sequence of lections is hardly credible.

These two writers put forward their theories tentatively and modestly, and therefore their views are worthy of respect. Dr Farrer indeed has readily withdrawn some of the suggestions of his earlier book. But for our present purpose the question that arises is the import of such views for the historicity of Mark. Each of these writers would, I think, maintain the substantial historicity of Mark, but they do not seem to be fully aware how a scheme of numerical symbolism or of liturgical arrangement would detract from it. This is different from the question of Mark's theological handling of the traditions. If it is granted that Mark applies certain doctrines of the Church or even of his own it might still be argued that these ideas have affinity and continuity with Jesus' purposes and acts and in a measure at least are true to the history. But Jesus' actions cannot have been taken to accord with numerical patterns, nor, though His life was conditioned by the calendar, can He have acted with the purpose of providing a lectionary for the Church. On both these theories Mark must have selected from the tradition and adapted it in the interests of an artificial scheme. Structures based on numbers and festival dates would have been an imposition on the history.

To turn now to Continental scholars, Ethelbert Stauffer's *Jesus, Gestalt und Geschichte*[1] opens with the promise of breaking new ground, of 'pioneering a new way', as he says. He would use Rabbinical and Baptist-movement writings where they refer to Jesus as evidence for the history. Even where they are most slanderous a residue of fact can be obtained in which they correspond with the Gospels. Like most recent writers Stauffer abhors the older psychological, evolutionist, romantic treatment of the Life. It is not the self-consciousness of Jesus but His self-interpretation to which our sources bear witness. Stauffer's method, however, does not seem to produce as much as promised, and he has been criticised for writing just another Life of Jesus in the old style, 'a return to the nineteenth century' (Robinson). Certainly he seems to surmount difficulties too easily, by harmonising the Gospels for example, and he sometimes gives the impression of accepting events as historical facts as soon as he has shown that it is not improbable that they may have happened.

[1] Francke Verlag, Bern, 1957; English translation, London, 1960.

The strongest claim to a new initiative in the quest comes from a group of Germans who have been influenced by Bultmann, old Marburgers fully versed in the methods of modern criticism, and generally approaching the New Testament with existentialist presuppositions. The outstanding product of this school so far is Gunther Bornkamm's *Jesus von Nazareth*,[1] which has attracted much attention in Germany and is likely to do so here now that the expected translation has appeared. An account of this movement has been written with confidence and full sympathy by James M. Robinson, *A New Quest of the Historical Jesus*.[2]

Bultmann's critical analysis of the Gospels had eliminated for him all the biographical elements and left only a restricted selection of Jesus' teaching as the authentic deposit of the original history. On the other hand the Gospels, like the rest of the New Testament, witness to the kerygma, the proclaimed message of the early Church, and it is this kerygma that has been conveyed through the centuries, meeting us now with a requirement of existential decision.

The first sentence of Bultmann's *Theology of the New Testament* classifies Jesus with Judaism. His message is a presupposition of New Testament theology, not a part of it. There is an eschatological frontier at the Resurrection; what was future for Jesus is present for Paul. Such at any rate was Bultmann's former position; it appears that he has modified it under the influence of his followers. These have set themselves (E. Käsemann, E. Fuchs and G. Bornkamm are the names most frequently mentioned) to investigate and if possible resolve the discontinuity between Jesus as criticism has presented His figure and the kerygma which proclaims Him as the exalted Lord. The line of progress is an interpretation of the authentic teaching of Jesus whereby it constitutes a repeated claim to have a unique part in the events by which God brings in His kingdom. In Jesus' proclamation of the kingdom He Himself is proclaimed. In all He says a Christology is implied. This line of interpretation is carried beyond Jesus' teaching to His conduct. He is 'a man who dares to act in God's stead by calling

[1] Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart.

[2] Studies in Biblical Theology, No. 25, S.C.M., 1959. I am indebted to this work for much of the following survey.

near to him sinners who apart from him would have to flee from God' (Käsemann, in Robinson, p. 15). Even the parables, which seem so wide in their interests, are brought into service in this reconstruction. In the situations in which they were uttered Jesus uses them to confront men with Himself. Bornkamm goes farther; for one thing he 'risks' (I quote Robinson here) 'an introductory chapter in which he collects whatever general biographical material is available about Jesus into what amounts to a personality sketch. The significance of this chapter lies in its attempt to describe the human impression Jesus made upon people in a way clearly suggestive of the meaning Jesus has for faith, as if a human contact with Jesus were—at least potentially—an encounter with the kerygma.'[1]

Bornkamm, who sets back the 'eschatological frontier' from the Resurrection to John the Baptist, uses the phrase 'unmediated presence' (*unmittelbare Gegenwart*) to describe the characteristic of Jesus' words, appearance (i.e. His entry into human situations) and actions. For Bornkamm as for others the Messiah and Son of Man concepts have ceased to be of primary importance for an understanding of Jesus' self-interpretation. 'We have to speak,' he says, 'not of an "unmessianic" history of Jesus before His Passion, but of a movement marked by shattered messianic expectations and of One, hoped for as Messiah, who not for the first time at the moment of shipwreck but with all His preaching and all His work disappointed the hopes which were placed in Him. For—and this is specially astonishing—there is in fact no single sure piece of evidence that Jesus claimed for Himself one of the Messianic titles which tradition assigned to Him.' 'The Messianic aspect of Jesus' being is enclosed in His word and act and in the immediateness of His historical appearance.'[2]

This elimination of interest in the 'Son of Man', 'Messiah' and other titles may well appear to us, in view of their prominence in the Gospels, a renunciation of the historian's quest. If so, let us note the magnitude of the task that awaits those who seek to reach an agreed solution of the problems which the Gospels here present. For though each of us may have reached definite opinions on the origin and content of these titles, and on their place in the mind of Jesus, of His contemporaries and of

[1] Robinson, op. cit., p. 16. [2] Bornkamm, op. cit., pp. 52, 158, 163.

the early Christians, it must be admitted that great diversity and confusion still exist in scholarly opinion on these matters. A blessing awaits the man who can bring light that is not only new but convincing into this shadowy realm.

Robinson in his account of the new quest maintains that the old quest was both impossible and illegitimate. This judgment he bases partly on our new knowledge of the structure and aims of the Gospels and on new conceptions of historiography, but also on a definition of the old quest which hardly does justice to it. The expression 'historical Jesus', he says, 'comes to mean "what can be known of Jesus of Nazareth by means of the scientific methods of the historians" '. He may be right in saying that this quest was initiated by the Enlightenment in its effort to escape the limitations of dogma and thereby to gain access to the whole reality of the past. But the following words seem to impugn unfairly the motives of many who have engaged in the quest till our time: 'Now it became increasingly clear that "the historical Jesus", the scholarly reconstruction of Jesus' biography by means of objective historical method, was just such an attempt to build one's existence upon that which is under man's control and invariably at his disposal. The historical Jesus as a proven divine fact is a worldly security with which the *homo religiosus* arms himself in his effort to become self-sufficient before God. . . . To require an objective legitimisation of the saving event prior to faith is to take offence at the offence of Christianity and to perpetuate the unbelieving flight to security, i.e. the reverse of faith.'[1]

Surely this description cannot be applied in a wholesale fashion to the efforts of the former quest. We should recognise as a fact of experience that at least some works portraying the 'Jesus of history' in a realistic way have proved a Godsend to many a young man at the beginning of his Christian life. And the production of these Lives and studies of Jesus was surely not always motivated by a search for an 'objectively verified' foundation or substitute for faith; rather by faith itself which overflows from Jesus Christ Himself to confer a sacred interest on everything associated with Him. The Gospels themselves do this very thing.

Robinson argues that the old quest has proved impossible

[1] op. cit., pp. 26ff, 44.

and illegitimate, not only because the Gospels have been shown to be thoroughly kerygmatic and therefore intractable by scientific methods, but because the historian's aims and methods have changed. The distinctively human, creative, unique, purposeful, which distinguishes man and the actuality of history from nature are inaccessible to impartial investigation. They demand of the historian existential commitment. Both theological and historical reflection have served to bring the old quest to an end.[1]

A new quest, on the other hand, so Robinson argues, is both possible and legitimate. It is not to be pursued by attention to the Church's kerygma alone, nor through new sources, nor in new views of the Gospels, but 'in the radically different understanding of history and of human existence which distinguishes the present from the quest which ended in failure'. This has led to 'a positive appraisal of the kerygmatic nature of the Gospels, so that one came to recognise the legitimacy in their procedure of transforming the *ipsissima verba* and brute facts into kerygmatic meaning'. There are sufficient authentic sayings of Jesus in the Gospels to ensure 'that Jesus' history and selfhood are accessible to modern historiography and biography'. 'Jesus' understanding of His existence, His selfhood, and thus in a higher sense His life, is a possible subject of historical research'.[2]

An important objection is dealt with by Robinson. Does the new method not result in two kerygmata, distinguishable, as the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith were distinguished? This is met with the possibility of demythologising. When the kerygma is demythologised it dissolves into the meaning of Jesus of Nazareth. And 'if in encountering Jesus one is confronted with the same existential decision as that posed by the kerygma, one has proved all that can be proved by a new quest of the historical Jesus: not that the kerygma is true, but rather that the existential decision with regard to the kerygma is an existential decision with regard to Jesus'.[3]

What estimate is to be given to this existentialist approach? There is an obvious danger of mistaking a new terminology for new knowledge. But apart from that, I wonder if this new approach does full justice to the Gospels. If I understand

[1] op. cit., pp. 28ff. [2] op. cit., pp. 70ff. [3] op. cit., p. 92.

existentialism at all, its strength lies in the insistence on the uniqueness of individual things, events, and especially persons over against generalising philosophies, natural sciences and scientific historiography which treat them as particulars of general laws. One would therefore expect that this existentialist approach to the Gospels would recognise the rich variety of the narratives and the value in their own right of many details even if they do not of themselves call for an existential decision. Instead, there seems to be an abstraction into a single principle of existential encounter with Jesus. The effect resembles that of a preacher who preaches conversion and nothing but conversion till he empties the word of meaning. Could this confrontation with Jesus not have been achieved in the Gospels by recounting one or two incidents rather than a multitude? Is there not a legitimate Christian interest in the people, even the places, to which the Gospels introduce us, as well as in Jesus, and just because of the vital interest which Jesus Himself arouses? When we read, for example, of the raising of Jairus' daughter, it is forced exegesis which takes it as a prefiguration of the Resurrection, and even less is to be said for the allegorists who interpret the words, 'He commanded that something should be given her to eat', as a reference to the Eucharist. The interest is indeed in the scene itself and it is right to see Jesus at its centre, in power and compassion that speak to us of God. Yet that very compassion leads us not only to Him but from Him, to Jairus and the girl and the others gathered there, with an interest that is truly historical. The understanding of the parables which brings them into line with the existentialist interpretation of the sayings of Jesus has to be considered, but I would be surprised if it altered the opinion that Jesus' interest in farmers, labourers, fish-nets and oil-lamps was an interest in ends as well as means, that He Himself has, just in these stories, given us an example of that truly historical interest which is not fully satisfied by the new approach as I understand it. There is a difference between kerygma with its primary demand for decision and *evangelion* which accompanies the demand with overtones of joy and outgoing interest. The true apostolic kerygma is the whole of the New Testament in all its variety, and it is not for nothing that the sources of the history bear the name of Gospels.

CHANGING EMPHASES IN THE WORK OF THE MINISTRY[1]

by The Rev. Professor WILLIAM S. TINDAL

In a few brief months some of you will be going out into the active ministry, exchanging the life of classroom, library and common room for the very different life of parishes or service in the Church in other lands.

Eighty years ago a professor of Divinity in Cambridge, Lightfoot, was invited by the Prime Minister of that day, Disraeli, to make a similar exchange:

> Reverend and Dear Sir (he wrote),
>
> I am anxious that you should permit me to submit your name to the Queen to fill the See of Durham, which will be vacant in a few days.
>
> I can understand, for I have felt it, the sacrifice that is made in surrendering a life of lettered ease, and forgoing the tranquil joys of learning; but there is such a thing as Duty, and this is an age which calls pre-eminently for its fulfilment. I will therefore hope that you will grant me the permission I desire.

I would not like to assert that essays and examination papers always reflect the tranquil joys of learning though occasionally they do give unmistakable evidence of a life of lettered ease; nevertheless there is such a thing as duty and we are all concerned with the fulfilment of it especially within the whole work of the ministry. We want to know how in our day people are to be converted to the Christian faith, and when they are converted how they are to live Christian lives. We want to know how the Church can become more evidently the body of Christ. How then is the mission of the Church to be furthered?

It is illuminating to read through the book of the Acts of the Apostles with this question in mind. The answer seems to be that the Christian faith spread by preaching and teaching. There is a strong emphasis on proclamation, telling what the Gospel is and how the gift of utterance was granted to the first apostles. In response to the preaching there is the record of conversions—men like Saul of Tarsus, the Philippian jailer,

[1] A lecture delivered in New College, Edinburgh, at the opening of Session 1959-60.

the Ethiopian eunuch, women like Damaris. Here is a mystery. We sometimes think we know who is likely to be converted in response to the preaching of the Gospel, but we do not know.

The Gospel, according to the book of the Acts, spreads also by overcoming opposition—opposition of a very definite character from purveyors of magic, from vested interests, from pagan religions, from the Jewish religion. It spreads by the power of the Holy Spirit. This is the most important fact of all. It is not a work originating in man. Think of the record of miracles, prayers, visions, strange summonses, deliverances. But it also spreads through Church organisation. There is the recognition of the necessity of diverse ministries. 'It is not right that we should give up preaching of the word of God to serve tables. We will devote ourselves to prayer and the ministry of the word' (Acts 5.42). Again, Paul and Barnabas appointed elders in every church (Acts 14.23).

Further, there is evidence that the faith takes hold through a more intimate work, face-to-face dealings not to be publicised. 'And therefore be alert,' says St. Paul, 'remembering that for three years I did not cease night or day to admonish everyone with tears' (Acts 20.32). There is the work of nurture and admonition.

Here then in the Book of the Acts are indications of the ways in which the Church increased through the preaching of the Gospel. St. Paul preached once in Athens and we are told 'some men joined him and believed, among them Dionysius the Areopagite and a woman named Damaris and others with them'. How important these 'others' are—the faithful members, but important also those with the particular ministry of preaching, teaching, admonishing, and organising within the Church!

I want to consider the forms of the more specific ministry of Word and Sacrament which have developed from the ministry of which we read in the Book of the Acts, and to ask where the emphasis should lie in our day. That the emphasis has varied within a wide range of activities is clear. It is for example a far cry from the Book of the Acts to the picture given by Jane Austen when Mr Collins, clergyman, first comes upon the scene in *Pride and Prejudice*. Elizabeth Bennet, you may recall, was chiefly struck with 'his extraordinary deference for Lady

Catherine, and his kind intention of christening, marrying, and burying his parishioners whenever it were required'.

That may be a picture of the ministry as it is in the minds of many today, and there are countries where it would almost seem to be state policy to keep parishes so large and ministers so few that all their time is occupied with christening, marrying and burying, lest they should have time also to meddle with politics or industry or engage upon any of the more turbulent roles sometimes played by the clergy of neighbouring countries.

Let me remind you of the role played by ministers well known in our own land in past days, to see where they placed the emphasis in their ministry, and then consider the modern scene and where the stress should be laid in our generation.

We shall be preoccupied next year with celebrations of the Reformation. It was the reformation of a Church in Scotland where the voice of the preacher was seldom heard, the sacrament of the Lord's Supper seldom dispensed to the people, and the flock but poorly shepherded. A letter written from Geneva in 1556 commending the Order of the English Kirk at Geneva of which John Knox was minister, speaks of the scarcity of God's word being so great in England that although men 'seek it from one sea-coast to another, yet they cannot find it, but as men affamished, devour the pestiferous dung of papistry to the poisoning of their own souls'. In the heat of that desperate fever which melted and remoulded the medieval structure of the Church, men decided that the preaching of the Gospel, the right celebration of the sacraments, and discipline, must be given first place, and, in Scotland at any rate, that discipline must not include private confession to a priest in the old way.

John Knox did his work by preaching, by ministering the sacraments, by discipline and pastoral care, by pamphleteering, but chiefly by preaching.

'This father of the Scottish Reformation,' says Eustace Percy, 'had . . . one hidden talent and one obvious qualification for popular leadership. He was a born preacher in days when the pulpit was the main instrument of political as well as religious propaganda. . . . It was by preaching, and almost only by preaching, that he did his work and won his fame.'[1]

[1] Eustace Percy, *John Knox*, pp. 43, 133.

Perhaps then it was he more than anyone else who founded the preaching tradition of the Scottish Church. It is certainly for our preaching that we are known and valued by other branches of the Church—and it may be also for our theology. But within a hundred years from Knox's time it became clear that the new emphasis on preaching and the public celebration of the sacraments and public censures were not sufficient to meet the deeper needs. Henry Scougal (1650-78), Professor of Divinity in King's College, Aberdeen, has a notable sermon preached before the Synod entitled 'Of the Importance and the Difficulty of the Ministerial Function'.[1] In this he reflects upon the work of the minister in his day.

'The end and design of the ministerial function is to frame and mould the souls of men into a conformity to God, and superinduce the beautiful lineaments of his blessed image upon them. . . .

'The world lieth in sin, and it is our work to awaken men out of that deadly sleep. And if any think this an easy work, let them pitch on some person whom they know to be addicted to some one particular vice and try whether it be easy to reclaim him.

'The greatest enemies we have are those within the souls of men, their depraved affections, their lusts and corrupt inclinations . . . our greatest difficulty is in dealing with the wills of men and making them consent to be cured: they hug the disease, and shun the medicine as poison, and have no desire to be well. Hence it is they do all they can to keep us strangers to their souls, and take as much pains to conceal their inward distempers, as they might to do in revealing them. We have justly shaken off the tyranny of the *Romish* confession, but alas! our people go too far in the other extreme; and because they are not obliged to tell everything to their pastors, in effect they acquaint them with nothing at all.'

And so having shown us the temper of the people, Scougal proceeds to consider the several duties of the minister.

Catechising, he says, is a necessary but painful one. 'It is no small toil to tell the same thing a thousand times to some dull and ignorant people who perhaps shall know but little when we have done. . . .'

[1] Printed in Henry Scougal, *The Life of God in the Soul of Man*, London, 1735.

Preaching is 'an exercise that many are ambitious of, and none more than those that are least qualified for it; and it is probable the desire of this liberty is no small temptation to some of our giddy people to go over to that sect and party, where all ranks and both sexes, are allowed the satisfaction to hear themselves talk in public: but 'tis not so easy a matter to perform this task aright, to stand in the presence of God, and to speak to his people in his name, with that plainness and simplicity, that seriousness and gravity, that zeal and concern, which the business requires; to accommodate ourselves to the capacity of the common people, without disgusting our more knowing hearers by the insipid flatness of our discourse; to excite and awaken drowsy souls, without terrifying and disturbing more tender consciences; to bear home the convictions of sin, without the appearance of some personal reflection; in a word, to approve our selves unto God "as workmen that need not be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of truth".'

'*Discipline* is an edged tool, and they had need be no fools that meddle with it. It is a hard thing to manage the processes of the censures of the church with such care and prudence, that may neither encourage the flagitious persons by our remissness, nor tempt to irritate others by needless severity; nor give advantage to captious and troublesome men for want of some legal formality.'

'But certainly the greatest and most difficult work of a minister, is in applying himself particularly to the several persons under his charge, to acquaint himself with their behaviour, and the temper of their souls, to redress what is amiss, and prevent their future mis-carriages. Without this private work his other endeavours will do little good, and considering the great variety that is among the humours and dispositions of men (equal almost to that of their faces) this must needs be an infinite labour.'

This pastoral work he calls the greatest and most difficult work of a minister. It is the art of arts. Here surely Scougal makes us stop and think. He knows well how the ministers of his day recoiled from this side of their work, but he is insistent that they face it. He returns to his charge at the end of his sermon when he addresses himself to the divinity students who were in his audience—'those sons of the prophets, those candi-

dates of holy orders, whose diligence and study aim at the ministry'.

'Ordinary callings are not learned without a long apprenticeship, and will the act of governing souls be learned on a sudden? It is not the knowledge of controversy, or the gift of eloquence, much less a strong voice and bold confidence that will qualify you for it . . . your greatest work lies within, in purifying your minds and learning that wisdom which is necessary for souls.'

From Henry Scougal with his emphasis on the intimate pastoral work and the wisdom necessary for souls, I go on 150 years to Edward Irving (1792-1834) once a student of this University, assistant to Thomas Chalmers before he was called to London, and ask you to listen to part of his torrential ordination charge to the minister of the Scots Church, London Wall, in 1827.[1] He tells the new minister that he has now by the solemn ordinance of the laying on of the hands of the presbytery been set apart to the most burdensome and responsible office and that in the most difficult portion of the vineyard of the Lord.

'Therefore,' he says, 'gird up your loins like a man; and hear me while I set forth at length what the Church of Scotland expecteth at your hands in this city, wherein she has invested you with the sacred character of a minister. And that I may keep order in my charge, I shall present it to you under these five heads: first, the Student or Scholar—secondly, the Preacher or Minister—thirdly, the Pastor—fourthly, the Churchman—and fifthly, the Man'. He insists on the necessity of increasing a man's store of wisdom, especially in the knowledge of the holy Scriptures, all the more he says, a little unkindly, because 'the order of Doctor which our Church constituted for the searching of deep learning and the handling of difficult questions has become a mere nominal title'.

In a very interesting passage he warns the minister against criticism, i.e. the higher criticism, which is the region of pride and malice—and invites him rather to study physiology, which is the science of life in all its forms and conditions, and philology, which is the science of words, the forms of human thought. And then he warms to his theme:

[1] Printed in Edward Irving, *Preliminary Discourse to the Work of Ben Ezra*, London, 1859.

'Make not thyself a mere sermon-maker, or a talker, or a declaimer, or a clerk of religious accounts, or a committee-man, or a polite payer of visits, or a drudge of any kind.' No, this man whom he addresses is to be a preacher or minister of the Gospel. 'The several parts of public worship thou hast to conduct without the help of any service-book or curate; no form to guide thee, which I hope thou wilt never need nor desire to have.'

He speaks of leading in prayer. 'Remember thou pray not for thy people alone, nor for the presbytery alone, nor for the Kirk of Scotland alone, but for the holy catholic church and communion of saints.

'It is an onerous charge, my brother, this of public prayer. I cannot tell thee how it weighs my spirit down: and I give it in charge to thee to make this part of the ministry thine especial care. Our church loveth that it should be extempore, and it is best that it should be so; but fill the fountains of thy spirit every week by secret devotion, and painful meditation, and solemn careful thought of all things.'

'Preaching cometh next in order, which is as it were the food and nourishment of all the rest, the foolishness of God which is wiser than the wisdom of men, the royal ordinance of the kingdom.

'Take thy liberty; occupy thy commission: beat down the enemies of the Lord; wound and heal; break down and build up again. . . . And take a long and a strong pull at the work; if they will measure thee, let it be by the hours and not by the minutes.'

'Lastly come the Sacraments, which I pray thee to study from the scriptures, or any author older than a century; but at thy peril from any later; and give no heed to what is talked upon Baptism and the Lord's Supper in these clear-headed times.

'I charge thee to enter into the mysteries of these two sacraments; if I should hear of thee setting them forth as bare and naked signs, I will be the first to charge thee with a most dangerous error.'

So he comes to the third head of his charge—the Pastoral, 'which I begin by telling thee that thou wilt find the very idea of it departed and lost in this city, for a certain idea of society and companionship which is totally fruitless of any spiritual

good. But thou must recover it as thou wouldst answer to the Great Shepherd of the sheep.'

'Be thou the pastor always, less than the pastor never. Go thus, or go not at all. Thou art an ordained minister from henceforth: thou art a shepherd of the people. Be thou, then, a bishop.'

He advises him to visit with an elder. But this is not enough; 'thy people must come to thee and seek thy counsel and thy prayers. Have no idlers about thee; have no spare time. If they come, they come for holy ends; if not, they had better not come at all. And thou wilt have to lament how few do come near thee for spiritual counsel or instruction, [here is an echo from Scougal in his day] and how many complain that thou comest not near them in an easy way, to pass an hour, and so forth.'

Then he charges the minister with his duty as a churchman—to maintain the doctrine, discipline, government and laws of the Kirk of Scotland. He is to look through the cloud of the papal apostasy into the presbyterian discipline and primitive worship of the Culdees.

'As a churchman thou owest brotherly love to the Church of England; . . . but thou owest also rebuke and reproof for her backslidings in doctrine and discipline—which also she oweth to us; and both debts of love must be discharged. To the non-conformists also, who hold sound doctrine, thou owest brotherly love; and rebuke and reproof also thou owest them for their uncharitable spirit towards us and all establishments. To the papacy and to the Socinian thou owest no mercy.'

I would like to know how it fared with the minister of the Scots Church, London Wall, after such an ordination charge.

Clearly Irvine was no 'either-or' man. He presents the full measure of a Scottish presbyter's office—scholar, preacher, pastor, churchman. Certainly he speaks with conviction about preaching, and of the sacraments, but he is also profoundly aware of the need for exercising the office of the pastor and of the great hindrances that stand in the way.

It is this same concern for pastoral care that comes to a new focus in the life and work of Henry Drummond (1851-97). The conviction that ministers must acquire the wisdom for dealing with souls one by one came to him early in his short

life. He set this forth when he was a student of this college in an essay read before the Theological Society in November 1873.[1] This was a sustained argument for placing the study of the soul on a scientific basis. 'The study of the soul in health and disease ought to be as much an object of scientific study and training as the health and diseases of the body.' 'The power of the individual, the value of the unit, the respect due to one human soul—this is the great truth for churches, for armies, and for empires.'

How to hold a crowd we know—'but to draw souls one by one, to buttonhole them and steal from them the secret of their lives, to talk them clean out of themselves, to read them off like a page of print, to pervade them with your spiritual essence and make them transparent, this is the spiritual science which is so difficult to acquire and so hard to practise.'

There are intentions in the spiritual science so described which scarcely seem consistent with the reverence due to each human soul, but it is clear that Henry Drummond felt that 'the art of arts' had been neglected to the undoing of many.

'The men to whom you or I would go if spiritual darkness spread across our souls, who are they? How few have penetration enough to diagnose our case, to observe our least apparent symptoms, to get out of us what we had resolved not to tell them. . . . Plenty there are to preach to us, but who will interview us, and anatomise us, and lay us bare to God's eye and our own? . . .' To take a man by himself; 'to feel his pulse alone, and give him one particular earnest word—the only one word that would do—all to himself—this is the simple feat which we look in vain for men to perform'.

This power of soul analysis, these are Drummond's words, is a hard thing to possess oneself of. It requires intense discrimination and knowledge of human nature. 'It is a matter of profound regret that so sacred and important a subject should exist in such a dishevelled state when the scientific method, which is being applied to so many trivial matters, could be so easily applied to it.' Easily applied? He will hardly hold to that. 'Those who have thought of it have confessed that everything yet remains to be done.'

[1] Printed in Henry Drummond, *The New Evangelism and Other Papers*, London, 1899.

He refers to the work of Henry Ward Beecher, to Spurgeon—'not so much a practical analyst as a self-introspectionist'. 'So also were Thomas à Kempis, and Blaise Pascal, and pious John Hervey and quaint Robert Bruce. . . .' He finds that most of them were wanting 'in that delicacy of handling which makes analysis effective instead of insulting; and many of the Puritans were quite destitute of the foremost quality which distinguishes the successful diagnosist—respect, veneration even, for the soul of another.'

'One thing I can assure you of. If any man develops this faculty of reading others, of reading in order to profit by them, he will never be without practice. Men do not say much about these things, but the amount of spiritual longing in the world at the present moment is absolutely incredible.'

Such were the convictions of Henry Drummond when he was a student of New College in 1873. The rest of his comparatively short life makes a story of apostolic quality. He became one of the lieutenants of D. L. Moody in his evangelistic campaigns. W. M. Macgregor tells how in 1879 the Glasgow College welcomed 'a half-exotic decoration in the coming of Henry Drummond, like a kind of fairy prince, to discourse on Natural Science', but while he occupied that position, he succeeded in building up a new congregation in one of the poorest quarters in Glasgow, in conducting one of the most remarkable series of evangelistic meetings year after year for the students of Edinburgh, and addressing on several occasions the leading politicians of the day in Lord Aberdeen's drawing-room in Grosvenor Square in London. Macgregor says of him that he had few intimate friends and 'lived a curiously detached life in a big house close to the College, and his main evangelistic interest was always in Edinburgh. . . . Thus very few of his students came really to know him, but they all confessed his charm and power. He was nobly kind; he possessed in perfection the gift of capturing speech, and he had the art of dominating men and eliciting their secrets, without ever betraying anything of his own.'[1]

Drummond had his critics, but there is much evidence that many men felt that they owed their standing in the faith to him,

[1] W. M. Macgregor, *A Souvenir of the Union in 1929. With an Historical Sketch of the United Free Church College, Glasgow.*

and men also in the U.S.A. and Australia who came under the magnetic influence of his preaching and pastoral care.

We have now listened to some voices from the past. I want next to look at the work of the ministry today. Since the time of Scougal there has been the great switch of interest and attention from the theological questions concerning the relation of God to man and the wisdom necessary for souls to what Irving described as 'physiology'—the systematic study of all forms of life. Since Irving's own time the 'criticism' which he deplored has continued and raised questions about the nature of revelation and the authority of Scripture which must be wrestled with by preachers in a day when it is insufficient to quote proof-texts. Since Henry Drummond pled for the placing of the study of the soul on a scientific basis, we have witnessed the spectacular rise of psychology and the practice of psychiatry. And as a factor greatly affecting the ministry since the time of these men there has come the great increase in state education, the welfare state, and the taking over of many of the works of compassion and the general management of people's lives by public authority. All this bears upon the functions of the ministry, yet the Lausanne Conference on Faith and Order in 1927 was able to record agreement between the Churches that 'the purpose of the ministry is to impart to men the saving and sanctifying benefits of Christ through pastoral service, the preaching of the Gospel, and the administration of the sacraments to be made effective by faith, and that the ministry is entrusted with the government and discipline of the Church in whole or in part'. The order is significant. Pastoral service, the preaching of the Gospel, the administration of the sacraments, government and discipline—this is the work of the ministry.

Throughout the world-wide Church, Christians are looking afresh at these functions and asking how they are to be exercised and whether theological training fits men to exercise them in the world of today. In the U.S.A., for example, under the direction of Dr Richard Niebuhr, more than a hundred theological schools agreed to examine themselves and to raise immediate and ultimate questions about their purposes, their methods and their effectiveness in discharging their duties. A first volume giving the results of this inquiry entitled *The*

Purpose of the Church and its Ministry, appeared in 1956.[1] Under the central chapter on the Emerging New Conception of the Ministry there is a description of the ministry as 'The Perplexed Profession'. Is the minister primarily pastor, preacher or priest? For this study the view that is gaining ground in the U.S.A. is the conception of the minister as a *pastoral director*—someone apparently like the pre-Nicene bishop who was elected to oversee a single local church. 'He is concerned in everything that he does to bring into being a people of God who as a Church will serve the purpose of the Church in the local community and the world.'[2] 'It is significant that when ministers reflect on their theological education they are likely to regret more than any other deficiency in it the failure of the school to prepare them for the administration of such a church.'[3]

Here what is stressed is the work of the ministry in furthering the life of the Church in and for the whole community, and in perfecting Christians for their work of ministry in the world within their trades and professions and all their human relationships.

What of the Church of Scotland? In our Declaratory Articles we stress that within the Church the Word must be purely preached, the sacraments administered according to Christ's ordinance, and discipline rightly exercised. Preaching and the preparation for it still claims a high place in a minister's priorities. It is for us, in Irving's splendid phrase, 'the royal ordinance of the Kingdom'. But we are, I think, more ready to grant that too much of our worship has been drawn into the pulpit and too much has taken on the pulpit tone. Certainly we need to be humbled and challenged, instructed and exhorted, but we need to be nourished together with a nourishment that is not by words alone. There have been days when ministers have felt that there was a certain declension from preaching to sacrament, but that day is past.

The Lausanne formulation of the purpose of the ministry put first pastoral service and last the government and discipline of the Church. In Scotland we put both of these under the single word 'discipline', but there are functions covered by this one word which must be distinguished. What is required

[1] H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Purpose of the Church and its Ministry*.
[2] ibid., p. 82. [3] ibid, p. 83.

today is not more stress on government and censures, but rather a more creative and sympathetic pastoral ministry.

(*a*) *The Problems of the Personal Life*

I have heard an elder speak regretfully of the lost art of visitation, and a student, after his first efforts to visit, speak of parish visitation as being largely in 'an ice-age of conventionality and embarrassment'. Who among us, climbing a stair and knocking on a door has not found half of him saying, 'I hope they are in', and the other half saying 'I hope they are out'? But this only reveals how exacting is our calling in the pastoral ministry of watching and serving—watching how all sorts and conditions of men stand in relation to God's purpose for them in Christ; serving them because we care for them.

It is comparatively easy for a minister to speak to people in the climate of today of medical and psychiatric help, and the help of the welfare state, but hard to speak of the life in Christ and the initiative and comfort of the Holy Spirit. Yet the problems of the personal life—the problems of guilt and fear, the estrangement between persons, are not to be solved primarily by science or organisation but by that which is committed to the Church—a ministry of reconciliation.

Scougal, Irving and Drummond speak with one accord of the need for ministers to apply themselves particularly to the several persons under their charge to redress what is amiss and to set them free, but it is at this point the memory of the pre-Reformation Church discipline and perhaps also that of the Reformation Church still weighs heavily upon us. We have not yet found an acceptable interpretation in practice of the sayings in Matthew 16.19, 18.18, and John 20.23: 'I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven: whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven'.

Life in the Church is life in the Holy Spirit. If ever and again men are found resisting the Holy Spirit and need to repent, is there sufficient recognition of this conflict and the need for its resolution in the life of the Church? It is significant to find Dr George McLeod, like his kinsman before him in 1870, John McLeod of Duns, who was in trouble with his presbytery over it, with his concern about confession and absolution because, as

he says, together they make men free and because 'we live in a world where literally thousands of our Church members are in need of that release and are being denied it either by our ignorance or by our craven disobedience. . . . At so many levels, Absolution (the setting at nought of our sins) is a personal need of our time.'[1]

This aspect of pastoral care is being emphasised by a group within the French Reformed Church, the community of Taizé, and their views have been expounded in a recent book by Max Thurian.[2] Confession he holds is a proper part of the Church's ministry and should be exercised habitually by every pastor. His whole book deserves careful study and criticism.

Our Book of Common Order gives us orders of worship to set the norm for the orderly and reverent conduct of services. Might not this work be extended further to help ministers to bring the faith to bear with clarity and directness in areas of personal life, again not to fetter but to set a norm—services for those burdened in conscience, for those who are sick, for those drawing near to death?

(b) The Mission of the Church

The Church is a mission and not a club, and therefore the Church cannot allow itself to be imprisoned within its own structures or be found fighting civil wars on its own parade ground. Our age has been notable for a movement outwards from the sanctuary of the Church and here there has been a re-discovery of the power of the small group and of the occasional large group. The House Church is both old and new, but if this is to grow, more of the time of the ministers will be required for instructing elders and members in the leadership of Bible Study Groups so that members and inquirers can be effectively confronted with the word of the Gospel.

If the Church is mission it must have its reconnaissance groups, and ministers are to be found today sitting down with doctors, industrial workers, politicians, atomic scientists and many others, and waiting with them upon God to hear His Word in particular environments where it is hard to name Him and to discover Christian duty. This is the work of Evangelical

[1] *The Coracle. The Journal of the Iona Community*, No. 34, March 1959, p. 9.
[2] Max Thurian, *Confession*, S.C.M. Press.

Academies, 'Church and World' centres on the European continent, and *Kirchentag* and Kirk Week.

Through all this there has come to the Church a fresh disclosure of its own nature. It is easy to think of the Church as the ministry, but the Church is its faithful people and witnesses to the world through their lives as well as through the ministry. The different scientific disciplines and the various callings in life require their own measure of autonomy, but it is only too possible for them to deny that the universe is sacramental and to work loose from the foundations of faith and the discernment which faith gives of the purpose of life. The resulting instability and insecurity are plain to us all. To minister in this unstable situation requires of ministers a very clear grasp of the essential Gospel, great flexibility in putting themselves alongside their people, and the wisdom necessary for souls to help men to live in freedom within the household of faith.

The Word purely preached, the sacraments administered according to Christ's ordinance, discipline rightly exercised—these must always be marks of the Church. I am suggesting that in our day fresh emphasis should be placed on pastoral service.

BOOK REVIEWS

A Church History of Scotland. By J. H. S. Burleigh. Oxford University Press, 1960. Pp. 456. 42s.

I have sometimes said to my Scottish friends, that I find it difficult to know how to start students upon the study of church history in Scotland. They usually reply that they are amply supplied with excellent writers upon church history, and they ask me what is wrong with Hume Brown, or MacEwan, or Cunningham, or Lang? And I reply that these are all notable scholars without whose work we should all be far more ignorant than we are at present—and yet, that I still find it difficult to know how best to guide my students. In the light of these conversations there is going to be a large number of people who will be profoundly grateful to Professor Burleigh, for they will find in his book just that treatment of the broad sweep of Scottish history by a fair and liberal mind, devoid of every shadow of crankiness, of the too common inclination to ride hobby-horses. And the author has achieved one great virtue for which it must have been difficult indeed to find room in writing a book of this design. I do not recall any other history where Scotland is so well framed in a wider European context, where we are never allowed to lose sight of the communications and relations, the attraction and the repulsion, exerted by England or Ireland or France, by Rome or Geneva or Wittenberg.

Knox was inclined to dislike the papacy so bitterly that he could hardly see the medieval church as anything but a mass of corruption and idolatry, and some of the documents drafted with his countenance in 1560 seem to eschew the idea of Christian continuity. Yet from the first histories of the Reformation in Scotland, the historians —a Leslie or a Buchanan—set their account of the revolution and of Queen Mary at the end of the long sequence of Scottish history. Perhaps it was the easier for some of the historians because they imagined legends about the Celtic Church and its liberty from Rome, legends parallel to those legends so beloved of Archbishop Matthew Parker and many later Anglicans of the Anglo-Saxon freedom from Rome.

Professor Burleigh is fully aware of the continuity of Scottish church history, and the only thing we might cavil at is his refusal on page 420 to allow this continuity to be in any sense 'institutional', but a continuity of witness to the Gospel. It is true that the breaking of papal control and canon law in 1560-7 singularly transformed the polity of the institution, and so did the double restoration of epis-

copacy and its double overthrow. But many of the buildings and part of the glebe have survived from immemorial times in the possession of the Church, the greatest of Scottish theologians of the Reformation were (like Luther or Calvin) recognisably the successors of a strong strand of medieval thought, and, above all, the idea of the pastor in the parishes of Victorian Scotland was an idea which an instructed pastor of the later middle age could have recognised and probably approved—however inefficiently the practice of his own times represented his own better ideas upon the subject. The medieval Church was rich in bishops, abbots, monks, friars, deans, prebends; poor in pastors. The Reformation Church cut away its bishoprics, abbeys and prebends and devoted its institutional power to the pastors, in large part because most better men of the old tradition believed that the shepherding of the flock was the highest, though not the sole, function of the Christian ministry and institution and were fortified in their belief by the renaissance of biblical studies which humanism and the collapse of the scholasticism had made possible.

A book such as this, where the history of the Church is integrated into the long history of a nation, inevitably suggests to the historian one subject of perennial fascination, but so irretrievably elusive that for the most part we must be content to feel it and refuse thereafter to define it—namely, the relation between the religion of a people and the national character. Were the Irish faithful to the Roman Catholic Church in part because they disliked their English misgovernors who wished to Protestantise them, or did they dislike the English because the English were Protestants and the Irish were faithful to Rome and particularly resented these foreign innovations? Was religion moulding the young nation-hood, or was ancient racial loyalty conditioning the religion? No doubt manners are making men at the same time that men are making manners, and a religious tradition is at once governing the history of a race and being formed and developed by the history of a race. Whether we may now call the Church of Scotland 'the national church', when there are 700,000 Roman Catholics living in Scotland, apart from the members of other denominations, is a question raised by this book. Dr Burleigh affirms it, and I do not shrink from the term. National character may exist even when a great many citizens are untypical of it—we need look only at modern India and the relation of its national characteristics to the Hindu tradition. It is of course easy to make an artificial and personal picture of Scottish character by selecting according to fancy, or experience, by disregarding King James VI or Claverhouse or Cardinal Beaton or James Boswell as 'untypical', and by claiming Knox and Melville and Montrose and

Chalmers and Carlyle and Livingstone as in some way 'typical', as though it was possible to lay out Scotsmen, or men of any other race, in rows like specimens. But even genius and individualism has deep roots in its origins and environment; and suspicious as we all will rightly be of attempts to analyse national attributes, we cannot doubt that they really exist, and that if a trawler swept a random group of swimming Scotsmen out of the water, they would almost certainly betray certain quasi-instinctive moral judgments, reaction attributes and attitudes, subtly different from those betrayed by a similarly captured and similarly random group of Italians. In composing such subtle characteristics of a people, many elements not specially religious have entered—the geography of a country, its hills and lochs and inlets; its agriculture and its struggle for existence; its racial and political history and the response of a people to its national needs; the decisions and examples of individuals, as Nelson's acts at Trafalgar have helped to condition the feeling which Englishmen have about their duty, or Knox's stand before the Queen of Scots have passed into the deeper consciousness, as well as the outer history, of the Scottish people. But above all these, and often indissoluble for all these, is the religious tradition and institutions of the nation. The nature of the Scottish Reformation; the legend of Jenny Geddes, and all that the name stands for; the myths and the history of the covenanters; the organisation of the reformed Church, its pastorate and its elders; the doctrinal inheritance of Calvinistic theology and the ethical inheritance of Puritan discipline—these are all powerful in the framing of national attributes and alive, not as the legends of Bruce and Bannockburn which live only as memories and folklore, but alive through a still vital institution, an institution which has grown and developed with the growing and developing life of the people. In this sense, a still irretrievably undefined but nevertheless real sense, we may surely accept Dr Burleigh's epithet of *national*, in this fair, sympathetic and beautifully presented history.

W. O. Chadwick

The Church and Scottish Social Development 1780-1870. By Stewart Mechie. Based on the Cunningham Lectures 1957. Oxford University Press, 1960. Pp. 181. 25s.

Dr Stewart Mechie has given us a very important study of the development of the social order in Scotland in the ninety years from 1780 to 1870, especially in so far as the interest and work of Church men was related to that development. The study deals with poor relief, the provision of houses for the working class, the Chartist movement, temperance reform and education in that period which was dominated in social affairs by the industrial revolution and in

ecclesiastical affairs by Disruption. The subjects of study are all intimately related to one another, and the social reformers, with Chalmers perhaps in the van, being particularly interested in one, were often concerned with them all. And much there was to be concerned with. We need the facts and figures which Dr Mechie has mustered to help us to realise the material and moral degradation which came in the train of too hasty industrial expansion. The Church was either too weak spiritually, too concerned with its own immediate affairs, or simply too unaware of its responsibilities to treat the social diseases before they became chronic; and when the evils were perceived it was left to leading personalities within the Church to act as prophets in condemning the evil and in calling for reform. Chalmers' experiment in St. John's, Glasgow, limited as it was in its effects, is one example but the book of John Dunlop, the temperance reformer, Patrick Brewster and James Begg, writing their pamphlets and organising their societies, illustrates the same fact and makes us wonder whether the Church as a corporate organism can ever really act as prophet. Again and again in the period under review the person who sees clearly the evil and the need calls upon the Church to act and the most that the Church can do through its General Assembly is to make a painstaking investigation into facts and petition the civil power. On the other hand, of course, it is noticeable that the imperative for action does come from the Church, and it is the Church that provides the power for continued vigilance when the immediate evil has been faced and overcome. This latter fact is perhaps most clear with regard to the appalling drunkenness which was a feature of the social life of Scotland in the early years of the nineteenth century. The passion for temperance among so many of our Church people today is not a little due to the Church's corporate memory of a very great evil.

The chapter on The Scottish Church and Education shows how very much Scottish education owes to the Church, but also how we have often overemphasised the success of the Church in fulfilling the ideals inspired by Knox and his colleagues. Dr Mechie considers the series of events that led to the Act of 1872. Partly because of the number of denominations, there were so many kinds of school that uniformity and supervision were impossible and the State was forced to act. There was, however, from the Church's point of view a great loss in that the goal of education changed; no longer was the fundamental and underlying purpose the ability to read and understand the Word of God.

The industrial revolution had to take place and it would be wrong to imagine that the social evils which it brought replaced an idyllic situation. The sad thing is that the evangelical power of

the Church in the early nineteenth century was deflected from the wellbeing of the people to deal almost exclusively with the old problem of the relation between Church and State. The result was the Disruption, and the Disruption itself in dividing the Church made it more difficult for the Church to cope with the social situation. It has been said that at no other period in the history of Scotland would it have been possible for the Free Church to build churches, manses and colleges in such numbers. The spiritual and economic power that made this possible might have been used, if the State and the Courts had not clung to the privileges of patronage, to put Scotland before all the world in social wellbeing.

The publication of this book comes at a time when many in the Church are wondering just how far it is the Church's business to enter spheres of public life that have become marked off with labels 'social' and 'political'. The whole wellbeing of man is the Church's business, but especially all that concerns his spiritual and moral life. No one bred on the Gospels or within the Calvinist tradition can allow the Church to be content with manifest social evil abounding, or fail to resist a civil power bent on the destruction of the Christian values. But how far is the Church to give its support to a particular form of social or political theory? Was or was not the Presbytery of Paisley right in bringing Patrick Brewster to the General Assembly for his avowed support of Chartism? How far is it the duty of the General Assembly by a majority to provide the government with plans which it believes might better the lot of humanity? Is it theoretically or practically wise to go further than the interpretation and declaration of the Word of God on the matter—the task of the preacher? The Word of God is mightier than decisions of State or Church, but how are the absolute imperatives of the Word of God related to the expediencies of economic or government policy in the complexities of today? In the coming years the Church will have to think hard on these things. The danger on one hand is that the Church say so little that the body politic has really no soul; on the other, so much that soul becomes just like the body and again the body has no soul. As with man, things are only really right when it is seen and known that the *soul has a body*, and the Spirit of God rules all in all.

Dr Mechie's book should be widely read for its subject concerns us all. At times the reader would prefer to have the material presented in historical order rather than around the personality of the chapter on The Scottish Church and The Poor before that on The Social Policy of Thomas Chalmers. But the book is easily read and pages of reference indicate the deep scholarship behind it. Dr Mechie has met a real need in this volume. A. Ian Dunlop

The Holy Communion in the Reformed Church of Scotland, 1560-1960. By G. B. Burnet. Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1960. Pp. 329. 25s.

This is a most valuable and timely book. It traces the prevailing use and wont in celebrating the Lord's Supper within the Church of Scotland and its derivative sects from the beginnings of the Scottish Reformation to the present day. The author says (p. 293), 'There is no uniform way of serving the Holy Communion today: it varies in different congregations.' The day may be near when, in the interests of clarifying doctrine and preparing the way for reunion, the Church of Scotland may wish to see more uniformity of practice among her people in celebrating Holy Communion. This book provides an excellent starting-point for disentangling what is Reformed Scottish usage from accretion and corruption.

At once we see how different the development of worship in the Church of Scotland would have been, had Calvin succeeded in establishing the norm of a weekly Eucharist at Geneva. As it is, the Scottish story is one of infrequent celebration, sometimes even of neglect of the sacrament which bordered on contempt. Scarcity of ministers was the primary cause of infrequency. Persecution provided some excuse for neglect of the ordinance in the Covenanting period. Yet there was neglect in more settled days, the supreme instance of which is probably the parish of Shapinsay, where the minister stated in 1795 that the sacrament had 'not been ministered for fifty years and only once or twice in 100 years'.

While the narrative is lively and interesting, the book is well documented, and the treatment of problems such as the kneeling controversy, the compilation of the Westminster Directory, and the attitude of the Moderates to 'tent preaching' is extremely unbiased. All the practical aspects of the Communion are examined—fasting, the preparation of catechumens, the distribution of tokens, and the serving of the Bread and Wine. The fact that the 'top table' seems to have originated with 'Laud's Liturgy' and the fact that at first the minister did not accompany the elders when they left the church to bring in the elements will come as a surprise to many.

One is impressed by the account of the persistently high standard of preparation demanded of communicants—through catechising and public examination and later through the complexity of ancillary services which grew up around the Communion. There is no attempt to veil the irreverence which could mark the earlier celebrations or the misconduct associated with the mass communions of the eighteenth century. The bitterness of ecclesiastical division was taken right to the Lord's Table, when Protestor excommunicated Resolutionist, Seceder refused a token to a communicant who

had crossed the threshold of the parish church, and when within the Established Church Evangelical parishioners declined to receive Holy Communion at the hands of a Moderate presentee. But through the dark shadows there shines continuously the mystery and the spiritual reality of the traditional Calvinist rite. Dr Burnet has put us in his debt by giving us what is sure to remain an authoritative book. This study, however, raises in the reader's mind questions as to what interpretation of the Eucharist was taught at the different phases in the history of this period. We would welcome a companion volume dealing with the development of eucharistic doctrine in the same period. A. K. Robertson

Fathers of the Kirk. Edited by Ronald Selby Wright. Oxford University Press, 1960. Pp. xiv + 288. 21s.

From Adamnan's *Columba* onwards, Scotland has shown a passionate interest in ecclesiastical biography. But in more recent years there has been a decline of that public taste which demanded 'Men of the Covenant', 'Disruption Worthies' and all the rest; much of the material is no longer readily accessible, which at least allows scope for reassessment; and Dr Selby Wright has tried to meet a very real need in editing this popular 'pageant of history'. Twenty-three characters have been selected, from the Reformation to the early twentieth century. Whether the number is significant I do not know—perhaps one place still remains vacant among the four and twenty of the Apocalypse; but if the round two dozen had been completed, I should have wished for the inclusion of Alexander Duff, as a tribute to the missionary interest of the Church. Still more, and even at the cost of losing some from the rather tedious twelve figures of the nineteenth century, I should have liked at least one Celtic saint and a brace of medieval bishops. The decision to start with Knox, though perhaps inevitable, is much to be regretted, for the religious history and the religious character of Scotland can only be understood against the background of its more ancient past. Knox's own habit of cursing at large is a distinctive trait from the godly men of Celtic times; Melville's claim for spiritual independence, like Cargill's excommunication of Charles II, is in the best Hildebrandine tradition; the Sabbatarianism, the witch-hunts, the heresy trials are all part of that medieval ethos which lingered longer north of the Border than in the south. To start with the Reformation not only makes the Scottish scene parochial but also leaves it largely unexplained.

The editor has assembled a team of twenty-three contributors, as varied as the Fathers whose biographies they write. Not all of them reach the masterly standard of Croft Dickinson on Knox,

G. D. Henderson on his namesake, or Hugh Watt on Ebenezer Erskine. But all are competent, informative and readable, even if originality is seldom evident. Indeed, the chief demerit of the book is its lack of a bibliography for further study; for its chapters, brief as they are compelled to be, will whet the reader's appetite for more. The contemporary relevance of many of these lives is striking. In his chapter on 'Jupiter' Carlyle, William Neil brings out the continuing importance of much that the sorely maligned Moderates stood for; and this forms a delightful companion piece to Ian Henderson's account of Thomas Chalmers. Guthrie's attack on juvenile delinquency, like the congregational missions of Norman MacLeod, belongs to the present century as much as to the last. And with Foster Franklin's tribute to the ecumenical interests of James Cooper, we are brought to the crux of contemporary Church life. A few traces of old bitterness peep through the pages, but the main impression from the book is that of a richly catholic inheritance; Robert Leighton, portrayed with touching tenderness by William Niven, stands out as its central figure and epitome.

Though the scholar may find nothing here that is new to him, the general reader, for whom it is intended, will enjoy this book. All the proceeds from its sale are generously to be given to the work of Church Extension. G. S. M. Walker

A Short History of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland by Professor John M. Barklay, m.a., ph.d., d.d., f.r.hist.s. Publications Board, Presbyterian Church in Ireland, Belfast. Pp. 138. 3s.

On the occasion of the Fourth Centenary of the Reformation in Scotland, Dr John M. Barklay has prepared this most useful history of the 'eldest daughter of the Kirk'. It is very moderately priced and should point the way for someone in Scotland to prepare a similar short history of the Church in Scotland for adults to read. The understanding of Church history, even among many of our elders, is confined to knowledge of several brief and supposedly epoch-making events, without any proper realisation of the movements and reactions, the imperatives and relationships, that are the fabric of a church's life. And it is only now, thirty years after the Union of the Churches in 1929, that a sufficiently balanced account for these days could be prepared. We urgently require such a short volume to put into the hands of our elders and office-bearers.

The Presbyterian Church in Ireland has had an intimate relationship with the Mother Church in Scotland, as Dr Barklay has shown in his *Westminster Formularies in Irish Presbyterianism*. For many years the Acts of the General Assembly in Scotland served as law for her

Courts, and parallel secessions took place because of similar circumstances. But she has had her own independent history, and that a most turbulent one. One would have expected that the trouble would have come principally from the Roman Church, but Dr Barklay makes it clear that the persecutors were the Irish Episcopalians who, in the most petty way, again and again, caused trouble and disaster. One result was the emigration of vast numbers of Ulstermen to America to provide the revolutionary armies that won independence for the States, and to set up Presbyterian congregations in the New World.

It was during the Ten Years' Conflict in Scotland—in 1840—that there took place the Union in Ireland between the General Synod of Ulster and the 'Presbyterian Synod of Ireland distinguished by the name of Seceders'. The union was made easier than in Scotland because the General Synod was not established like the Church of Scotland, and the 'Seceders', who had been divided as in Scotland on the question of the Burgher oath, had been in receipt of the Regium Donum and so avoided the 'Voluntaryism' of their Scottish counterpart. They were impelled to unite for strength in the face of the Anglicans and Romans. The 1841 Code makes one thing quite clear: 'The highest ecclesiastical power upon earth, acknowledged by the Presbyterian Church, is the Presbytery. The General Assembly is therefore not higher than a Presbytery in power, claimed or exercised; but merely as being a larger Presbytery is entitled to exercise an equivalently larger jurisdiction. . . .' It is perhaps good for us to see the essentials of Presbyterianism through the eyes of a daughter Church living in different surroundings.

Dr Barklay gives attention in several chapters to the Presbytery, Session and Congregation; Doctrine, Worship and Government, illustrating from their history and practice the vitality of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland. He also provides a plan of Divisions and Unions, a summary of statistics, several pages of references, and a fine bibliography. We have all much to learn from this little book and it is warmly recommended. A. Ian Dunlop

The Christology of the New Testament. By Oscar Cullmann. S.C.M. Press, London, 1959. Pp. xv + 342. 42s.

The appearance of the English edition of this work, translated from the German by Shirley C. Guthrie and Charles A. M. Hall, is an event of note in theological literature.

Professor Cullmann's approach to New Testament Christology is analytic; he takes up one by one the various Christological titles that are used by the New Testament writers, investigates their significance in Judaism and (where relevant) in the Hellenistic

world, and then asks how the title was applied by Jesus to himself, and how it was applied to him by the different New Testament writers. (The question of Jesus' application of the designation to Himself must, he points out, be examined in the light of form-critical study and in detachment from every presupposition—'including that present in the thought of R. Bultmann'.) The general method is thus fairly similar to that followed by Dr Vincent Taylor in *The Names of Jesus*, but Professor Cullmann carries it farther and presents a more exhaustive study.

The titles are divided into four groups—(i) those which refer to Jesus' earthly work (Prophet, Suffering Servant, High Priest); (ii) those which refer to His work which is still future in the sense of not yet being completed (Messiah, Son of Man); (iii) those which refer to His present work (Lord, Saviour); (iv) those which refer to His pre-existence (Word, Son of God, God). Professor Cullmann agrees that these four groups are not mutually exclusive and that the frontiers between them are not rigid; thus Jesus' designation as high priest has reference to His present and even to His future as well as to His earthly work, although it 'refers above all to the earthly work of Christ' (p. 109). Here we may recall the statement of Heb. 8.4, that 'if he were on earth, he would not be a priest at all'; but the writer to the Hebrews is there speaking of Levitical priests who ministered in the material sanctuary, and Professor Cullmann is thinking not only of the expression 'high priest' but of the reality which it expresses. He links the high-priestly work of Jesus closely with the function of the Suffering Servant—and the Servant Himself, of course, as portrayed in the Old Testament, has a priestly as well as a prophetic ministry to perform.

Professor Cullmann has no doubt that Jesus considered His God-appointed mission to be the fulfilment of the work of the Isaianic Servant of the Lord. His consciousness of this calling probably came to Him at His baptism (it is considered certain that the heavenly voice which addressed Him then was really a citation of Isa. 42.1). As for Mark 10.45, Professor Cullmann not only defends its authenticity against Professor Bultmann and others, but finds in it a clear allusion to Isa. 53.5: 'It is as if Jesus said, "The Son of Man came to fulfil the task of the *ebed Yahweh*".' This last interpretation has been disputed of late by some scholars (such as C. K. Barrett and Morna D. Hooker) who dissent from the widespread belief in the influence of the fourth Servant Song on Jesus' thinking about His ministry and death; but Professor Cullmann's argument is highly persuasive.

It is a pity in a way that Professor Cullmann's grouping of Christological designations separates two such closely related titles

as Suffering Servant and Son of Man. But he accepts as genuine not only the sayings about the Son of Man's vocation to suffer but those about the Son of Man as the coming judge, and answers in the affirmative the much debated question whether Jesus could have ascribed the Son of Man's judicial function to Himself within the context of His life and work on earth. He expresses a large measure of agreement with T. W. Manson's societary interpretation of the title 'Son of Man': 'in the light of the collective use of the title in Dan. 7.13f, it is almost certain that the idea is not completely foreign to Jesus that as the "Son of Man" he represents the "remnant of Israel" and through it all mankind' (p. 156).

This is a thoroughly exegetical study; the questions and answers of post-New Testament theologians are excluded from consideration, especially with regard to the titles denoting Jesus' pre-existence and deity. It is interesting, by the way, to see that Professor Cullmann thinks that Jesus is probably directly designated 'God' in Rom. 9.5.

The work closes with a few pages which set out not so much a synthesis of what has gone before but what the author calls the 'perspectives of New Testament Christology'. Christology must begin with the facts of the life and ministry of Jesus, he holds, not first with the Church's faith in Him as the exalted Lord. 'The question "Who is Jesus?" did not emerge for the first time with the early community's experience of Easter' (p. 317). In his own way, Professor Cullmann reasserts the insight expressed many years ago by R. C. Moberly in *Lux Mundi*: 'Councils, we admit, and Creeds, cannot go behind, but must wholly rest upon the history of our Lord Jesus Christ.'

F. F. Bruce

Jesus Christ and Mythology. By Rudolf Bultmann. S.C.M. Press, London, 1960. Pp. 85 + 9 (notes).

Jesus and His Story. By Ethelbert Stauffer. S.C.M. Press, London, 1960. Pp. 192. 12s. 6d.

Of the little Bultmann book, which consists of lectures delivered in America, little need be said, since it contains no new developments or modifications of Bultmann's thought. But it is good to have clear and concise statement in English of what might be called 'the quintessence of demythologising', and so have some current misconceptions dispelled.

Ethelbert Stauffer seeks to disprove the current belief that Gospel criticism has made the writing of a 'Life of Jesus' in the late nineteenth-century style impossible. His method is to draw upon what he calls 'indirect sources'—'the contemporary evidence concerning the conditions, events and personalities playing any part in Jesus' story' (p. 8). These do not directly mention Jesus. But what a

variety of evidence the erudition of Stauffer calls in! Arabic customs, Roman law, the papyri, the astrology which was contemporary with the Gospels—these are only a few of the many 'indirect' sources which he summons. And on their basis, supplemented by the direct Jewish evidence, Stauffer makes out a very good case indeed not just for the substantial accuracy of the Gospel record of the life of Jesus, but even for a very great deal of its detail—the census, the virgin birth, the star, the massacre of the innocents—to take only these incidents: for these Stauffer adduces historical or literary evidence which, as he holds, establish the statements of the Gospel.

Taking the Johannine chronology as alone possible, Stauffer examines in particular the contemporary Jewish laws concerning heresy and the procedure for trials. 'As soon as this task is undertaken, one detects the brazen logic which dominates Jesus' prosecution from the first secret proceedings up to the great trial for heresy' (p.9). These 'first secret proceedings' on the part of the Jewish religious leaders began with the death of John the Baptist. When John was arrested due to political events in Rome which, as Stauffer shows, had repercussions in Palestine—as a fanatical supporter of the Torah, 'his former favourite disciple, Jesus, broke officially with the Torah'. Immediately afterwards Jesus' healing of a lame man on *the Sabbath* 'meant that he had on his track two implacable sets of enemies; the upper ranks of the priesthood (whom he had already alienated by cleansing the Temple) and the rabbinate with its Pharisaic following'. What follows from then on, Stauffer says, is a logical conclusion.

As well as this presentation of the events, there is an important section dealing with 'I am HE' (ANI HU), of which Stauffer says, 'Jesus uses these words with the meaning of the theophanic formula in the Old Testament and in the liturgy. He intends to state that in his life the manifestation of God in history is taking place.' But the great event in the history of the manifestation has taken place already. Then follow words which may occasion a fresh reflection upon contemporary trends of thought: 'he who thus speaks has no interest in apocalyptic oracles or questions about the date', and 'the apostasy of the apostolic preaching, the *kerygma*, from Jesus' original message'.

The reviewer is not being flippant when he says that this book has all the fascination of a first-rate detective story. A wealth of erudition of the most diverse kind is applied to prove a case. The results seem almost too true and watertight to be credible! Surely *Formgeschichte* cannot thus easily be pushed aside? And yet. . . . Stauffer has called in question a great number of current presuppositions. The book demands, and will certainly get, careful

consideration. It may—though the reviewer doubts it—turn out to be another 'Quest of the Historical Jesus'.

D. G. M. Stalker

Heaven in the Christian Tradition. By Ulrich Simon. Rockliff, London, 1958. Pp. xviii + 310, 2 pl. 42s.

The title of this interesting study is somewhat misleading as it suggests that it is concerned with beliefs about heaven throughout the development of the Christian tradition up to the present day, whereas in fact it concentrates upon the biblical teaching alone. This in itself, however, is a broad enough subject and the author has to range widely in order to survey it in all its complexity. So, in successive chapters, he considers heaven in the Hebrew tradition, the God of heaven, the society of heaven, i.e. angels, and the enemy of heaven, i.e. demonic powers. Although the material is thus divided neatly into sections, it is so amorphous that the author's attempts to master it are not always successful. Heaven, as he himself admits, is a very elusive concept: 'the Bible never presents us with a precise definition but with a large variety of endless shades of meaning. One could evidently believe anything about Heaven without being suspected of betraying the right faith' (p. 38). It is not surprising therefore that this account of the biblical evidence should be diffuse and indeed so diffuse that at times one longs for some sense of perspective, some criterion to decide what is and what is not important. So, for example, when beliefs as to demons are garnered from the sober Old Testament, from the visionary apocalypses, from the moderate Rabbinic writings, from the reticent New Testament and from the fascinating Qumran scrolls and detail piles upon detail, one is bound to ask: where is this leading?

In what may be termed the second half of the book, a greater coherence is to be observed, for there the New Testament is mainly in view and a certain unity of ideas allows a greater measure of unity of treatment. So, under the title of the victory of heaven, the author expounds in detail the Classic theory of the atonement, following this with an account of life in heaven and discussing *inter alia* the resurrection and the vision of God; then in a valuable final chapter he examines heaven in Christian worship, arguing powerfully that liturgical action is not a succession of services but the divine order itself, that there is a relation between heavenly and earthly worship of correspondence, anticipation and participation and that the centre of the Church's worship is in heaven itself.

As an exegete the author shows himself capable of balanced and careful judgment, although not all his interpretations will carry conviction. So it may be questioned whether John 14.2 is evidence

that Jesus accepted a sevenfold cosmogony or whether it is necessary to adopt an either-or approach to the problem of the origins of belief in angels—Mr Simon rejects the totemistic theory as well as the view that angels were replacements of God at the various shrines when He was no longer conceived to be localised, and accepts instead the stellar hypothesis: but are these necessarily mutually exclusive?

It is not, however, with the sober and at times penetrating exposition that the reviewer is inclined to find fault; rather he would raise a query concerning certain assumptions which are stated in the preface and in the opening chapter—the latter being a survey of extrabiblical concepts of heaven from the dawn of history to the twentieth century, a survey which is necessarily superficial and therefore of doubtful value. Mr Simon believes that there is at the present day an almost total eclipse of belief in heaven, that this impairs the cosmic nature of the Christian religion and that contemporary theology has failed to grapple adequately with this 'fundamental problem'. Whether or not there is such a defalcation of belief is a matter not of opinion but of statistics which neither the author nor the reviewer has at his disposal. Many, however, would say that the majority of Christian believers do hold to heaven, although their conceptions of it are as diffuse as those of the Bible and may differ from the blissful 'place' of the very simple to the unimaginable 'new mode of being' of the more sophisticated. Nor, it may be argued, is the 'cosmic' nature of Christianity a matter for primary concern. It is true that certain of the New Testament writings, notably Colossians, Ephesians, Hebrews and the Fourth Gospel, do give expression to a certain 'cosmological' Christology, but this is developed on the basis of a firmly held soteriology in order to define more precisely the relations of the Saviour and the Supreme God, and it is not concerned primarily with the cosmic scope of Christ's redemptive act. The Classic theory does indeed centre in a victorious clash with the powers of the air, but again soteriology and not cosmology is primary. We may, if we like, speculate as to the effects of Christ's atoning act on the furthest corners of the expanding universe, but such speculation can scarcely be regarded as fundamental, as Mr Simon seems to recognise on occasion when he says: 'in the Gospel itself, however, it is not the heavenly life so much as the earthly challenge which matters' (p. 232).

It is further an oversimplification to protest against contemporary theology that it presents false alternatives that 'either Christianity is a belief which must be adjusted to empirical discoveries and therefore lacks an absolute degree of reality, or that an outworn symbolism may be used for certain religious ends which are themselves at variance with what is known of the nature of the universe' (p. 37).

The impact of symbolism is not determined simply by rational and conscious knowledge—the sun still 'rises' and 'sets'—and where concrete imagery is employed, it is natural to man, and so far as one can see will remain so, to express himself in terms of 'ascent' and 'descent' or of 'lifting' his heart to heaven, although he is well aware that these are symbols and do not involve movement in space. A correct understanding of biblical cosmology too indicates that the Christian religion is not linked with empirical discoveries, for the biblical cosmology is not scientific but theological. The Hebrew knew of no natural sciences; he never objectified the world; when he spoke of God's act of creation he was not concerned to formulate a scientific theory of origins but to praise God for His mighty acts of which creation was but one among many. To treat the three-storeyed concept as if it were the result of empirical science is to confuse the Greek with the Hebrew; the Christian Gospel is no more to be linked with early Greek scientific ideas than it should be with the philosophical concepts of any particular age.

These are questions which Mr Simon intends to treat more fully in a second volume but by deliberately separating the biblical material from its interpretation in modern terms, he has made it difficult for the reader to distinguish on occasion the wood from the trees. J. G. Davies

The International Lesson Annual—1960. Edited by Charles M. Laymon, Lesson Analysis by Roy L. Smith. Abingdon Press. $2.95.

To anyone accustomed, whether at the production or the receiving end, to the exigencies of Sunday School publication in this country, this book on American Sunday School Lessons must appear fabulous. It is a volume of some 440 pages, attractively bound in blue stiff boards with imposing gilt letters on the spine and up-to-the minute dust-cover in high-gloss paper, complete with maps and illustrations, and costing rather more than £1.

The size and production are impressive and from the start creates a disposition to take it seriously. Not for the churches in America the monthly magazine on thin paper, meagrely produced at the lowest printing rates, which, no matter what or how good the material content, give the initial impression of the second-rate, the ephemeral, the 'also ran' to the weekly comic. Not that those who produce our Sunday School lessons in Scotland are to blame for this state of affairs; the penury is not of their making, but is the result of a state of mind in the Church which quite rightly attaches vast importance to the putting up of new churches, and quite wrongly virtually none at all to the production of suitable text-books for the instruction of those within the Church's care. Could we find in

Scotland a Kirk Session that would think books such as this so essential to their Sunday School teachers as not to cavil at the price? Given our present attitude within the Church to Christian Education the situation is virtually unthinkable.

One up then on the first count to the Americans for producing a book that vies for consideration with the most carefully produced school text-books.

The next matter for surprise to the Scot is that this sumptuous book is prepared not for the age group that we here characterise as 'Sunday School level', not for the Bible Class or catechumen, but for the adult members of the Church wanting further instruction in their religion. Such classes were common enough in Scotland as the Minister's Bible Class in the days when that tended to be the concern of the younger members of the Church and not of the younger adolescents, and even more common in the Free Churches in England where, until no more than a generation ago, a man might attend the Sunday School all his life from childhood to old age.

Whatever the reason for the decline (although one suspects that it is largely due to the confusion of mind that thinks religion concerns the heart and never the head and that therefore instruction is a superfluity), certain it is that the age in this country at which all formal instruction in the Christian Faith ceases is being pushed steadily back, until nowadays the child tends to think that he has had enough of Sunday School by the age of twelve, may be cajoled into a few more years attendance at Bible Class, possibly attends a communicants' class, maybe joins the Church, or maybe not, and lapses into the ranks of the half-instructed Church member or the uninstructed outsider, as may be; but in either case is fully convinced of the lack of necessity for further instruction. How refreshing then to find adult Sunday Schools in America so essential a part of Church life that provision for them must be made on this scale!

Second round to the Americans.

But what of the contents of this book? Again the Americans appear at first sight to score heavily. The mere contents page gives an impression of organisation, of well thought-out presentation, like a cogent advertisement or an attractive shop window. It has an air of purpose. The year is divided into quarters, each with its special subject for study. (1) The Acts of the Apostles; (2) Sermon on the Mount and the Parables; (3) The Century of Great Prophets; (4) Passages of Spiritual Power, i.e. largely passages from the Psalms with a codicil of prophetic writings on the Advent of Jesus Christ, leading up to the Christmas passage from Luke 2. (It is significant that while Christmas is given a section to itself, Easter is thrust obtrusively into the section on the Sermon on the Mount.) Each of

these sections is given a general introduction by the general editor of the series, and is then subdivided into separate subjects for each Sunday, starting with the biblical passages printed in full with the Authorised Version and the Revised Standard Version presented in parallel columns. The biblical passage is then given a general textual analysis called 'Exploring the Bible Text' by a religious scholar of repute (a different professor to each quarter); this in turn is followed by lesson analysis called 'Looking at the Lesson Today', which attempts to relate the Bible passage to life today (this is written throughout by the same man). Lastly, the passage is further broken down into a section called 'Teaching the Lesson in Class' which sets out the material in two alternative methods for teaching and follows it up with suggested Bible Readings for the six days until the Sunday School meets again. In addition there is information about supplementary reading, and each section has a list of what we would call Visual Aids but are known here as Audio-Visual Resources. Now all this sounds mightily impressive, as indeed it is. The organisation and the idea are excellent and ensure that the teacher, in preparation for the lesson, not merely has sufficient background but ought to know where he is going and is shown how to use his material—not in a form that could be read out to the class he has to teach, but in the lesson-scheme form that is used in Colleges of Education here. It makes no enormous demands upon the teacher because the material is progressively boiled down so that he can come in at the point where he is capable of taking it up; and all this would be admirable if only the boiling down process could be stopped when we had reached the bare bones; but the process has gone on further than mere rudimentary boiling. It is pressure-cooked and the eventual substance bears little or no resemblance to the original meat and even the bones have been mushed down. One must admit that the pressure in all adult teaching is very high; intelligence does not advance with the years as prejudice and opinion do, and to present mature material to immature minds of indiscriminate age without insulting them is to bring very high pressure to bear in favour of the temptation to substitute the understandable for the true. Add to this that a whole generation has now been trained in America under the Dewey system of experience-centred education and it becomes obvious that it is almost impossibly difficult to introduce into Christian Education ideas that might as yet lie outwith experience. And so in the process of reduction from 'Exploring the Bible Text' to 'Teaching the Lesson in Class' the kingdom of God tends to be reduced to citizenship and the Church to 'simply a fellowship of families' or 'the fellowship of the concerned'; 'to do justly, to love mercy and to walk humbly with thy God' is

the 'Scripture that puts the heart and core of real religion within the reach of the simplest and the most untrained. We may not know what the Atonement, the Incarnation, may mean, but any of us can understand justice, kindness and humility.' A statement from which the Jew, the Buddhist, the Mohammedan, the Humanist and the heathen Parsee could hardly dissent. But surely it is exactly the difference between Christianity and this common postulate of religious practice, that Sunday School instruction at all its stages should be demonstrating; and it is exactly in the Incarnation and the Atonement, in Grace and Redemption and Salvation, that Christianity does differ from other beliefs, however worthy. These mysteries of the Faith may not be explicable but they should at least be familiar, and to cut them out of the vocabulary of instruction in the interests of experience-centred education is not merely to stunt the teaching but equally to stunt the taught. What idea can there be of the profundity of Christian Faith for anyone who is taught that 'his right to call himself Christian depends upon his active out-going interest'; or that 'concern furnishes motivation: leadership helps us channel our interest: and Faith provides the power to realise our goal'?

Throughout the lessons in this book the constant equation of the Holy Spirit with power and never with the Pentecostal fire leaves one wondering where the meek with no will to power, take their religious faith in America. It can't be to Church.

ELISABETH HEWITT

The Day of Light. By H. B. PORTER. S.C.M. Press, London, 1960. Pp. 86. 7s. 6d.

SHOULD the Duke of Edinburgh play polo on Sunday afternoon? Should a mother who is out at work during the week hang out her washing on Sunday morning? In the present state of muddled thinking about Sunday, nobody (nobody, that is, except the Lord's Day Observance Society) seems to be able to answer these practical questions. This book will not answer them either, but it will unfold for us the biblical and liturgical meaning of Sunday in such a way that we shall have something other than prejudice to work on in our approach to the right use of the Lord's Day.

'Sunday' is a pagan name, but, unlike 'Easter', it brought an appropriate symbolism to its baptism into Christian usage; for Sunday, as the title of this excellent addition to the 'Studies in Ministry and Worship' series indicates, is the Day of Light. It was the day on which God commanded light to shine over the first creation; it was the day which came to be closely associated with

'the light of the glorious Gospel of Christ' which illuminated the second creation of the Christian Church.

The Christian associations of Sunday, established (divinely, it would seem) by its connexion with the Resurrection and the outpouring of the Spirit, and reinforced by the use of Sunday for the Liturgy, Baptism and Ordination, undoubtedly caused the hebdomadal week to become common in the Gentile world, ousting the Roman system.

The joy of the Christian Gospel coloured the observance of the Lord's Day for the early Church. It largely lost its colour under the combined influence of biblical literalism and Puritan sabbatarianism. It may be disconcerting to some to be informed by Professor Porter that this last is a direct survival of late medieval Latin piety which had already turned Sunday into Friday, but, then, the late Gregory Dix had already said something of the sort. It may be that the Church of England in general has stood for a cheerful Sunday, but what happens when the cheerfulness becomes completely divorced from religious sanctions? One of the things that happens is that the Sunday queues outside the cinemas do not even look cheerful!

Professor Porter affirms (and here he will be accused of overstating his case) that the theological basis of Sunday observance would best be secured by a better understanding of the theology of the Eucharist, which is, traditionally, the central feature of Sunday observance. Creation and Redemption, having been brought together by being commemorated on the same day, are brought even closer together in the Eucharist which sums up the faith, at the same time as it sums up the Church, turning a mass of separate Christians into a *synaxis*. The different Sunday actions which Justin enumerated are united in one service which could bring back a wholeness into Christian worship instead of the present fragmentation.

In his examination of early Eucharistic texts, the author demonstrates, once again, how much we have to learn from the Eastern Church, with its joy in Creation, in the Resurrection and in the gift of the Spirit.

It may be objected that Professor Porter does not do as much as he might have done to indicate the right approach to such questions as the ones at the head of this review, though it is likely that a renewed emphasis on Creation might suggest a more positive approach to re-creation. Whatever developments Sunday may undergo, however, one thing must remain central—for us, as for St. John, the first day of the week is the *kyriake* day, which is, of course, the kirk day.

H. J. Hammerton

The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense. By S. A. Grave. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1960. Pp. iv + 262. 35s.

This was the philosophy that was taught in the Scottish universities for something like a century. Sir William Hamilton continued to expound and defend it, though later with some reservations. Ferrier at St. Andrews rose up against it, but the death-blow came with the invasion of German idealism. The same long rule, and the same ending of it, happened in those American academies where Scotsmen taught, notably Princeton under the doughty James McCosh. The same philosophy was caught up in France in the early years of the nineteenth century, and left a lasting residue there in a line of thinkers who have conceived philosophy as a study of mind, and have refused to reduce mind to a mere shuffling of its sensations, emotions and desires. So influential a school deserves to be written about, yet little has been written in this island. Reid and his immediate followers have long been lying under a cloud. The empiricists, clinging to a somewhat Humean tradition, have tended to ignore them as lacking psychological subtlety, and the idealists have looked down on them as lacking both breadth and depth. Within the last few years, however, some of the 'linguistic analysts' have found that their anti-metaphysical campaign leads them less towards positivism than towards a study of the beliefs and language of common sense. In consequence, Reid is being occasionally referred to again, and quoted, and even read.

This new climate of opinion explains the appearance of Mr Grave's fairly full study, primarily of Reid, secondarily of Beattie, Oswald, Stewart and Brown, so secondarily and fitfully that the exposition would have been cleaner without them.

The book concerns itself chiefly with the theory of perceptual knowledge. It avoids the error of seeing Reid only over against Hume. Mr Grave recognises Reid's plain witness that his attack on 'the way of ideas' was against the whole line from Descartes through Locke to Hume. These started with the view, supposed to be empirically unquestionable, that the immediate objects of perception are ideas, i.e. entities within the mind of the perceiver. The first two concluded to a representative theory of perception: the ideas within the mind indicate, and in part copy, physical things outside the mind. Reid, in this connexion following Berkeley, stigmatised the theory as untenable: the passage from objects in the mind to the existence and nature of non-mental things outside has no logic in it, and, which is worse, would by the very terms of the theory be necessarily incapable of empirical verification. Hume, as Reid understood him, had escaped from the difficulty by discarding the external things, keeping only the subjective ideas. Reid's way

out was equally bold; he denied the existence of the alleged ideas. In perception the mind does not have as its *object* (i.e. what the mind is aware of) something within itself. When I see a table, the object is something that has shape, size, solidity, etc., properties that are obviously not mental. On the one side, there is the act of perceiving, on the other the external thing perceived. True, there are sensations, and these are in the mind, but not as objects (except for introspection); they are not that of which we are aware, but are 'feelings', qualifications of the awareness. This distinction between sensation and object needed to be drawn. For example, when I perceive by touch a surface as smooth, what I instantly become aware of is a solid thing the outer parts of which are compact and in a virtually two-dimensional place. Such an object is physical; it could only be before the mind, not in it. The touch-sensations are quite different: first, they are a temporal series, and secondly they are qualitative feelings, which could exist only in a mind. Mr Grave's account of Reid's doctrine of the distinction, and relation (as 'signs'), of sensation and object is careful and illuminating, one of the best parts of the book.

There is, then, Reid holds, no leap at all from an internal object to an external one, because there is no internal object, and because what is internal, namely sensation, has plainly no physical nature. Such is his *analysis* of perceptual experience—a question of fact. If it now be asked what *justification* can be given for this doctrine that we perceive physical things directly, Reid's reply is that none can be given—except the fact that the objects of perceptual awareness *are* things with physical properties and relations, and the logical point that to call them mental ideas is to confuse the physical and the mental intolerably.

His contention that perceptual belief in an external world is an affair of common sense seems to me to add nothing to the above analysis. It has given his critics the excuse of making fun of him, for accusing him of running away from philosophy, and for overlooking his analysis, in which his philosophical calibre is evident. The weight he puts on common sense lies elsewhere. For example, he rests on it the inductive principle that past uniformities will remain constant, belief in a permanent, continuously identical self, and reliance on memory as taking us to past fact. He has an alternative way of designating these, namely, as 'original principles of human nature', which means not simply that we are in a sense born with them, or cannot help thinking in accordance with them, but, more theoretically, that they cannot be analysed into anything simpler or deduced from anything more general, and that without them we could build no science and frame no firm expectations. The business

of critics is not to scoff at 'common sense', but to show, if they can, that these assertions are wrong. It must be admitted that Reid presents no single precise meaning of 'common sense'. At times it means the apprehension of something self-evident, though not in the formal logical sense; at other times, the apprehension of a principle which thought and practice cannot reject without loss of sanity. Mr Grave brings out the shifts of meaning admirably. What Reid certainly had in mind was that somewhere or other we must have first principles, or that philosophy cannot consist in trying to answer unanswerable questions and then, on realising its failure, collapsing into scepticism.

Most readers of the *Journal* would probably be more interested in Reid's defence of moral principles. Except for a good chapter on his analysis of free will, Mr Grave has little to say about those, and is not there at his best. Throughout the book he has a way of dropping a subject before he has really finished with it. Besides, sometimes one has to read closely to notice where he is expounding Reid, and where he is either personally developing it or restating it in a present-day idiom. Immersed in his topics, he forgets the little things that would help the reader, e.g. the change of voice, and the open statement of explicit links. Yet every sentence is carefully pondered, and remarkably well expressed; and the philosophical competence is high. Within its limits the book is a distinguished one, so good that the incompleteness of its expositions and criticisms is tantalising. I hope it will send many back to an unduly neglected thinker.

T. E. Jessop

BOOKS RECEIVED

Roland Allen: *The Ministry of the Spirit.* Selected Writings of Roland Allen, with a memoir by A. McLeish, edited by D. Paton. World Dominion Press. Pp. 208. 12s. 6d.

A. H. Armstrong and R. A. Markus: *Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy.* Darton, Longman and Tod. Pp. 162. 15s.

John Baillie: *A Diary of Private Prayer.* O.U.P. Pp. 135, paper covered edition. 3s. 6d.

R. H. Bainton: *Early Christianity.* Anvil Book. Van Nostrand Coy. 250 Fifth Avenue, N.Y. $1.25 (paper-back).

W. Barclay: *Fishers of Men. The Life and Work of the Evangelist.* The Joseph Smith Memorial Lecture for the year 1960. The Berean Press, Birmingham. Pp. 19. 2s. 6d.

W. R. Barrie: *Jesus and the Trinity. A Key to Deeper Religious Experience.* Abingdon Press. Pp. 160. $2.75

J. C. Bennett: *Christianity and Communism Today.* S.C.M. Press. Pp. 186. 6s.

Werner Bieder: *Die Apostelgeschichte in der Historie. Ein Beitrag zur Auslegungsgeschichte des Missionsbuches der Kirche.* EVZ-Verlag, Zürich. Theologische Studien. Heft 61. Pp. 63. Sw. Fr. 5.80.

G. Bornkamm: *Jesus of Nazareth.* Translated by Irene and Fraser McLuskey with James M. Robinson. Hodder and Stoughton. Pp. 239. 21s.

A. C. Bridge: *Images of God. An Essay on the Life and Death of Symbols.* Hodder and Stoughton. Pp. 158. 16s.

Adolf Brunner: *Wesen, Funktion u. Ort der Musik im Gottesdienst.* Zwingli Verlag, Zürich. Pp. 128. Sw. Fr. 12.

W. W. Bryden: *The Christian's Knowledge of God.* James Clarke. Pp. 266. 15s.

James Bulloch: *The Kirk in Scotland.* The Saint Andrew Press. Pp. 230. 25s.

J. H. S. Burleigh: *A Church History of Scotland.* Oxford U.P. Pp. 421 + index. 42s.

C. Butler: *The Church and the Bible.* Darton, Longman and Tod. Pp. 111. 8s. 6d.

David Cairns: *A Gospel without Myth?* S.C.M. Press. Pp. 227. 25s.

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